Rating: 
Summary: supreme
Review: Civil-military relations have been at the center of recent controversies. During the Iraq War, many talking heads told us that Donald Rumsfeld, the civilian Defense chief, had erred in "watering down" the invasion force, contrary to the advice of the generals. The result, we were told, would be disaster; the mid-war pause was cited as evidence of Rumsfeld's mistakes. From the beginning, criticism has plagued Rumsfeld, who was painted as an icy and arrogant Secretary whom the Pentagon brass despised. The war on terrorism has only slightly diminished that portrait. Eliot Cohen analyzes Rumsfeld's leadership in the new afterword to the paperback edition of Supreme Command, which is an excellent (despite at least three glaring errors, probably typos, with dates) addition to an excellent book. Of course, the final verdict on Iraqi Freedom remains to be written--and will not be until the passage of time lends greater objectivity and documents are released. Nevertheless, despite lingering difficulties in securing the peace, the war was stunningly successful, the result of a war plan devised largely by Gen. Tommy Franks but also overseen by Rumsfeld, who guided the process and asked difficult questions (which might seem brazen to some). According to Cohen, while the crisis is not as great as those of the past, Rumsfeld's leadership bears comparison to that of Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion, the four subjects of his book. Using those four wartime leaders as case studies, Cohen explores the nature of civil-military relationships, including what has been called the "normal" variety (in which the civil and military exist in mostly separate spheres), and explains how the great statesmen violated the "normal" theory. Indeed, it was such violations that contributed to their successes. They understood, in Clemenceau's now cliched statement, "War is too important to be left to the generals," and actively participated in the conduct of military operations and the formation of strategy. They weren't always right and didn't try to do the jobs of their generals. But they asked difficult, pointed questions, creating a give-and-take between civilian and military leaders, and they demanded results. Lincoln read telegraphs voraciously and effectively used letters to his generals; he was not afraid to relieve generals of command if they did not pursue his goal of destroying the Southern armies. Clemenceau visited the front every week and sought balance between the conflicting opinions of Petain and Foch. Churchill asked numerous and detailed questions and demanded written, point-by-point explanations of how his orders were carried out. Ben-Gurion mastered the most minute details of war and sought to create an army that was above the politics of the elements that came together to form it. Yet, despite the determination of all of them and a willingness to resort to seemingly extreme measures, the four are linked by a sort of moderation--a moderation, as Cohen explains it, that is not so much a third way pursued on its own as it is the result of leaning in a direction entirely opposite what was currently on the table. Supreme Command is fascinating reading and fine analytic history. It will surely frame, or at least contribute to, any debate on the proper nature of civil-military relations and, indeed, on current events for some years to come.
Rating:
Summary: Very Informative
Review: Cohen gives 4 compelling examples of nation leaders who have managed their generals during times of war. He clearly demonstrates that these leaders, who he refers to as civilians, have the right stuff to make tough strategic decisions while their generals should be obligated to carry out their orders. While it is important for heads of state to take their generals advise under consideration, these generals are in no real position to make political decisions, according to Cohen. Of course, there are exceptions and the author could have pointed those out instead of avoiding them completely.
Rating:
Summary: Interesting account of wartime leadership
Review: Cohen is Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University. In this fascinating book, he studies the art of wartime leadership by examining Lincoln in the American Civil War, Clemenceau in World War One, Churchill in World War Two, and Ben-Gurion in Israel�s war of independence.
Cohen relates how Lincoln rightly dismissed Major John Key from the Union army for private remarks about the Union�s strategy that conflicted with agreed Union policy.
Cohen shows how all military matters are linked to wider political issues, how for instance a dispute in 1918 over whether to integrate American divisions or even regiments into larger French units had vast ramifications: as he sums up, �a seemingly tactical or even technical issue was fraught with the largest implications for French national morale, manpower policy, strategy, and alliance relations.�
Cohen over-praises Churchill�s strategic abilities. Churchill�s imperialism led him into the disastrous foray into Greece in 1941, into underestimating Japanese military and naval abilities, also in 1941, and into diversionary adventures in North Africa in 1942, Italy in 1943, and Greece in 1944. His anti-communism led him to refuse to open the Second Front, as he had promised, in 1942 and 1943, and to his stingy attitude to supplying the Soviet Union. Yet Cohen calls him �the greatest war statesman of the century�. Perhaps if Cohen had also studied the leadership of the country whose forces alone shattered more than 200 Nazi divisions - more than three quarters of Hitler�s army - he might have found a greater!
A chapter on �leadership without genius� covers US wars since Korea - Vietnam, the Gulf War, Somalia and Serbia - �a period in which the United States finds itself chronically resorting to the use of force�, as Cohen quaintly puts it.
He sums up that leaders need to listen, to be fertile and resourceful in act and speech, and must see things as they are, without illusions. And they must never accept the dogmatic division between civilian and military spheres of responsibility. As Harry Truman said, �the buck stops here�, for military and political decisions alike.
Rating: 
Summary: Case Studies of Civilian Leadership at War
Review: Cohen's book on the nature of civil military relations provides timely analysis and debunks traditional perceptions of how civilian leaders should relate to the generals that work beneath them. One can look to the headlines and see some of the author's opinions underlying many of the current Defense Secretary's decisions. Rumsfeld's choices of successors to the leadership in the Army reflect Cohen's argument that the strong wartime civilian leaders have chosen the right generals, as with Lincoln, and they have also micromanaged much of the wartime effort that senior military leaders attempt to carry out. Cohen uses four case studies of wartime leaders to support his arguments: Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben Gurion. Lincoln - Cohen challenges traditional views that Lincoln allowed Grant complete freedom of maneuver without undue meddling. The president also fired numerous generals before finding in Grant someone that could win the war. The author argues that Lincoln became very involved in military issues, and he provides examples to support his conclusion. Clemenceau - the leader of France during World War I, this strong civilian head visited the front lines on average, once per week. Cohen argues that Clemenceau developed a close understanding of the nature of war and used that to manage two general officers with monumental personalities. Clemenceau achieved fame for his quote, "War is too important to be left to the generals." His quote underscores many of the opinions outlined in Cohen's book. Churchill - subjected his military leaders to continuous probing about methodology, assumptions and planning. Cohen argues that he skillfully managed his own field marshals, as well as some of the U.S. generals. Ben Gurion - this chapter provides a tremendous example of one leader building a military against all odds that could preserve a fledgling nation in the midst of many enemies, to include the British, who initially leaned toward the Palestinian cause. Ben Gurion combined several organizations within Israel to create a military force that has withstood numerous threats to the nation's security. Chapter six adds an analysis of the Vietnam conflict and attempts to debunk the popular perception that undue civilian meddling kept the military from achieving victory. Cohen presents information that the military leadership provided no viable alternatives to the strategies proposed by McNamara and LBJ's other civilian advisors. Thus, the president had no true choices to choose from, and he hadn't chosen the right generals that could develop alternate strategies that encompassed an understanding of the enemy and the international situation. This provides an interesting twist to many popular conceptions of the war within our society. The prologue outlines the "normal" theory of civil military relations, providing much background on Huntington's model developed in his landmark book, the Soldier and the State. Given the author's position on the Defense Policy Board as an advisor to Secretary Rumsfeld, this book helps to understand much of the philosophy behind the Defense Secretary's interaction with military leaders. Military leaders of all uniforms, as well as civilian policy makers, will benefit from reading Supreme Command. The book lends an alternate perspective to the traditional view of civil-military relations. Highly recommended!
Rating:
Summary: Case Studies of Civilian Leadership at War
Review: Cohen's book on the nature of civil military relations provides timely analysis and debunks traditional perceptions of how civilian leaders should relate to the generals that work beneath them. One can look to the headlines and see some of the author's opinions underlying many of the current Defense Secretary's decisions. Rumsfeld's choices of successors to the leadership in the Army reflect Cohen's argument that the strong wartime civilian leaders have chosen the right generals, as with Lincoln, and they have also micromanaged much of the wartime effort that senior military leaders attempt to carry out. Cohen uses four case studies of wartime leaders to support his arguments: Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben Gurion. Lincoln - Cohen challenges traditional views that Lincoln allowed Grant complete freedom of maneuver without undue meddling. The president also fired numerous generals before finding in Grant someone that could win the war. The author argues that Lincoln became very involved in military issues, and he provides examples to support his conclusion. Clemenceau - the leader of France during World War I, this strong civilian head visited the front lines on average, once per week. Cohen argues that Clemenceau developed a close understanding of the nature of war and used that to manage two general officers with monumental personalities. Clemenceau achieved fame for his quote, "War is too important to be left to the generals." His quote underscores many of the opinions outlined in Cohen's book. Churchill - subjected his military leaders to continuous probing about methodology, assumptions and planning. Cohen argues that he skillfully managed his own field marshals, as well as some of the U.S. generals. Ben Gurion - this chapter provides a tremendous example of one leader building a military against all odds that could preserve a fledgling nation in the midst of many enemies, to include the British, who initially leaned toward the Palestinian cause. Ben Gurion combined several organizations within Israel to create a military force that has withstood numerous threats to the nation's security. Chapter six adds an analysis of the Vietnam conflict and attempts to debunk the popular perception that undue civilian meddling kept the military from achieving victory. Cohen presents information that the military leadership provided no viable alternatives to the strategies proposed by McNamara and LBJ's other civilian advisors. Thus, the president had no true choices to choose from, and he hadn't chosen the right generals that could develop alternate strategies that encompassed an understanding of the enemy and the international situation. This provides an interesting twist to many popular conceptions of the war within our society. The prologue outlines the "normal" theory of civil military relations, providing much background on Huntington's model developed in his landmark book, the Soldier and the State. Given the author's position on the Defense Policy Board as an advisor to Secretary Rumsfeld, this book helps to understand much of the philosophy behind the Defense Secretary's interaction with military leaders. Military leaders of all uniforms, as well as civilian policy makers, will benefit from reading Supreme Command. The book lends an alternate perspective to the traditional view of civil-military relations. Highly recommended!
Rating:
Summary: Why Colin Powell Is Wrong
Review: Eliot Cohen shows that the Pentagon's preferred model of civil-military relations--namely that the civilian leadership should leave war to the generals--does not make for a successful policy. By profiling four supremely successful war leaders--Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben Gurion--he demonstrates that they all took a very active hand in the conduct of war, and that they were often right, and the generals were often wrong. Whereas when political leaders have deferred to the generals--for instance in the original Bush administration's determination, made at the urging of Gen. Powell, to end the ground war in the Gulf after 100 hours--the results have often been far from satisfying. Not only is this an important argument, highly relevant to today's policy debates, but Cohen also offers interesting profiles of four very different leaders. I was particularly interested in the discussion of Clemenceau and Ben Gurion, since I know less about them than about Churchill and Lincoln. This is a book that all our leaders should read.
Rating: 
Summary: Supreme Hubris
Review: Eliot Cohen's book is remarkable and worth reading, destined to be read in command colleges for decades and also destined to hold a special place in US military history; because it is so wrong and its consequences have been so destructive. This book has already led to a lot of death and suffering, and it will likely lead to even more. When historians and strategists try to make sense of what went wrong in Operation Iraqi Freedom they will find it necessary to refer to the confused thinking that finds an unfortunately elegant and persuasive voice in this book. Ostensibly this book is a profile of several civilian leaders (Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion) who ignored the warnings of the generals under their command and managed to push forward to victory. Consider it a book of case studies. To his credit, the author does demonstrate that bold civilian leaders possessed with good instincts and strong leadership capabilities can press forward to victory. But one gets the sense that the real purpose of this book is giving politicians and appointed civilians the justification to dismiss the warnings of the generals beneath them. The author's main point is that the popular idea that war should be left to the generals is wrong. The book's unmistakable message stated in vulgar terms would read, "War as far too important to be left to generals, who tend to be a bunch of wimps. If general balks at some civilian leader's demands, the civilian leader should feel perfectly justified in overriding them to overcome the general's cowardice. In fact, he should feel bold and heroic, destined for historical greatness. Just like Lincoln, Churchill, . . ." Unfortunately, in providing such a limited number of case studies the book necessarily leaves out the situations in which bold civilian leaders have ignored their generals and pressed their armies into meat-grinders and defeat. For example, Adolf Hitler famously overrode his generals and ordered them into defeat. Admiral Yamamoto was opposed to attacking Pearl Harbor, and those above him ordered him right into it. Cohen makes his case, but he does so with an extreme paucity of evidence combined with an amazing avoidance of the record of military history that does not fit his thesis. Select a few key incidents and ignore all the rest and you can come to all sorts of wild and dubious conclusions. As I write this review, the US is experiencing extreme complications in Iraq. It's possible that the situation may be salvaged, but virtually every problem currently experienced was clearly seen by the US military leadership yet dismissed by the civilian leaders in the Office of Secretary of Defense. In the build-up to war and after the fall of the Hussein regime, the generals in the Pentagon consistently stated that more troops would be needed and raised a number of concerns about establishing stability in post-war Iraq. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a man closely associated with the author of this book, has consistently rejected the very real concerns raised by his generals. [See James Fallows' article in the January '04 issue of the Atlantic Magazine or my website.] He boldly pushed forward, disregarding all of their concerns which are now appearing to be absolutely prescient. Was part of Rumsfeld's problem that he was inebriated by the message of this book? William Kristol, a prominent republican advisor and advocate of the war in Iraq, has claimed that this was the one book he most wanted President Bush to read. Perhaps in reading this book Bush was left unconcerned about all of the very real concerns that members of his administration so blithely dismissed. The fundamental theme that this book deals with is extremely important. There have been, and will continue to be, situations where civilian leaders need to take command and override their generals and order them to accomplish objectives, develop new doctrines, or procure new technology that those generals may be opposed to. But Supreme Command does not adequately address this essential and very complicated issue, instead it seems to bludgeon the reader with a certain message derived from the selective interpretation of the actions and results of just four leaders. While the author's historical research is great and his writing entertaining it's been the experience of this reviewer that far too many of the book's readers come away with a frighteningly simplified understanding of a complex and serious issue. The book is good, it's worth reading, it's well-researched and well-written. Read it, just don't get carried away by the author's message. If you want to know learn more about military history and strategy, there are far better books to read. Victor Davis Hanson, Martin Van Creveld, and Ralph Peters are all much better places to start. A strong understanding of the work of John Boyd will give you a clearer understanding of strategy than this book. (In fact, understanding Boyd is all it takes to collapse much of the neo-conservative message.) If you want to have a clear understanding of how Operation Iraqi Freedom went wrong, if you want to know how a bunch of civilians in the Pentagon could so cavalierly dismiss the warnings of the generals of the US military, you need to read this book. The mess in Iraq may very well be the legacy of this book and its author.
Rating:
Summary: Supreme Command: Very Unusual Cocktail of Traits
Review: Elliot A. Cohen masterfully discusses the normal theory of civilian control and how Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill and David Ben-Gurion breached the theory. All four men were four great democratic leaders at war for the survival of their respective nations. Cohen also looks at the civil-military relations in the current war against terrorism and WMD proliferation that our country is waging. The normal theory of civilian control posits that the civilian leadership take the back seat after defining the overall strategy. It is then up to the military leadership once given a mission to get near total discretion in its execution. Cohen persuasively demonstrates that Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion rightly believed that war was too important to be left to the generals. Unsurprisingly, they were all embroiled in conflict with their respective military establishment. They were accused of being "micro-managers", making some blunders here and there to be truthful to their records. Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion were all somewhat open to influence, and practiced what Cohen calls an unequal dialogue with their generals - a dialogue in which both sides expressed their views bluntly, eventually offensively, and not once but repeatedly. Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion made very clear to their generals that the final authority of civilian leadership was unquestionable. Interestingly, in their book "Execution The Discipline of Getting Things Done", Larry Bossidy and Ram Charan come to a similar conclusion. The most effective business leaders are not out of touch with day-to-day activities but are deeply involved with all aspects of execution. Although Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion lived in different times and dealt with very different sets of problems, Cohen brilliantly demonstrated that they were remarkably very similar on several key points: 1) Mastery of Detail: Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion demonstrated a measure of intuition and genius that stands well above the norm in human affairs. They all shared a capacity for integrating a vast amalgam of constantly changing information coming from many sources and an ability to synthesize and comprehend how a multiplicity of factors were interacting with one another. The eye for - indeed, the fascination with - detail displayed by these four men was not a mere irritating trait on their part but an essential element of their art and science of war. Furthermore, these four great statesmen were all not only well read in history, politics and literature but also the most gifted orators and authors.
2) Ruthlessness: Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion were very good "butchers", the first requirement for success as a prime minister to quote British Prime Minister, William Gladstone. These four statesmen, who had an exceptional ability to judge other men, strikingly had an unusual hardness in dealing with their enemies, wavering allies or internal opposition. 3) Fascination with Technology: Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion had a great interest in new technology and were great learners who studied war as if they felt compelled to know in many ways as much as their generals did. 4) Obstinate, Unyielding Determination: The resolution Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion personified was the hard will of men who dealt with the greatest task of their lives, who had seen much and who did not make themselves illusions about the potential lethal outcome of their enterprise. 5) Moderation: Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion displayed moderation totally compatible with their steely determination. The emotional state of these four statesmen was in deep contrast with that of those around them because of their unusual courage. 6) Courage: Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion were blessed and cursed with the ability to see things as they are, without illusions. They persevered despite disappointments and perils behind and ahead of them. Survivors of terrorism, whose only "crime" was perhaps to be at the wrong place at the wrong time, know better than most people that the WMD and terrorist threat should be, under no circumstances, underestimated. Usually far from public sight, some victims of terrorism and WMD attacks are expected to continue to pay a heavy price until the end of their life on earth. Democracy will once again prevail over barbarity, regardless of the price that will be paid in the meantime. Hopefully, terrorists, WMD peddlers and their sponsors will realize it sooner rather than later in their best interest. As a side note, Cohen could write a book about exceptional stateswoman such as Joan of Arc, Margaret Thatcher and Golda Meir and compare their leadership style with the four above-mentioned statesmen.
Rating:
Summary: Supreme Command: Very Unusual Cocktail of Traits
Review: Elliot A. Cohen masterfully discusses the normal theory of civilian control and how Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill and David Ben-Gurion breached the theory. All four men were four great democratic leaders at war for the survival of their respective nations. Cohen also looks at the civil-military relations in the current war against terrorism and WMD proliferation that our country is waging. The normal theory of civilian control posits that the civilian leadership take the back seat after defining the overall strategy. It is then up to the military leadership once given a mission to get near total discretion in its execution. Cohen persuasively demonstrates that Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion rightly believed that war was too important to be left to the generals. Unsurprisingly, they were all embroiled in conflict with their respective military establishment. They were accused of being "micro-managers", making some blunders here and there to be truthful to their records. Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion were all somewhat open to influence, and practiced what Cohen calls an unequal dialogue with their generals - a dialogue in which both sides expressed their views bluntly, eventually offensively, and not once but repeatedly. Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion made very clear to their generals that the final authority of civilian leadership was unquestionable. Interestingly, in their book "Execution The Discipline of Getting Things Done", Larry Bossidy and Ram Charan come to a similar conclusion. The most effective business leaders are not out of touch with day-to-day activities but are deeply involved with all aspects of execution. Although Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion lived in different times and dealt with very different sets of problems, Cohen brilliantly demonstrated that they were remarkably very similar on several key points: 1) Mastery of Detail: Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion demonstrated a measure of intuition and genius that stands well above the norm in human affairs. They all shared a capacity for integrating a vast amalgam of constantly changing information coming from many sources and an ability to synthesize and comprehend how a multiplicity of factors were interacting with one another. The eye for - indeed, the fascination with - detail displayed by these four men was not a mere irritating trait on their part but an essential element of their art and science of war. Furthermore, these four great statesmen were all not only well read in history, politics and literature but also the most gifted orators and authors.
2) Ruthlessness: Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion were very good "butchers", the first requirement for success as a prime minister to quote British Prime Minister, William Gladstone. These four statesmen, who had an exceptional ability to judge other men, strikingly had an unusual hardness in dealing with their enemies, wavering allies or internal opposition. 3) Fascination with Technology: Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion had a great interest in new technology and were great learners who studied war as if they felt compelled to know in many ways as much as their generals did. 4) Obstinate, Unyielding Determination: The resolution Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion personified was the hard will of men who dealt with the greatest task of their lives, who had seen much and who did not make themselves illusions about the potential lethal outcome of their enterprise. 5) Moderation: Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion displayed moderation totally compatible with their steely determination. The emotional state of these four statesmen was in deep contrast with that of those around them because of their unusual courage. 6) Courage: Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion were blessed and cursed with the ability to see things as they are, without illusions. They persevered despite disappointments and perils behind and ahead of them. Survivors of terrorism, whose only "crime" was perhaps to be at the wrong place at the wrong time, know better than most people that the WMD and terrorist threat should be, under no circumstances, underestimated. Usually far from public sight, some victims of terrorism and WMD attacks are expected to continue to pay a heavy price until the end of their life on earth. Democracy will once again prevail over barbarity, regardless of the price that will be paid in the meantime. Hopefully, terrorists, WMD peddlers and their sponsors will realize it sooner rather than later in their best interest. As a side note, Cohen could write a book about exceptional stateswoman such as Joan of Arc, Margaret Thatcher and Golda Meir and compare their leadership style with the four above-mentioned statesmen.
Rating:
Summary: The hardest job an elected leader has to perform.
Review: I read this book because it was touted as one of the books President Bush was reading in the summer of 2002. The book by Eliot Cohen is about the tension that often exists between civil and military leaders in wartime. By looking at four democratic leaders Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill and Ben-Gurion, Cohen, uncovers their "strategy-making in war". Cohen evokes the memory of Clausewitz to show the importance of civil military relations. "War is not merely an act of policy, but a true political instrument." Politicians need to be prepared to make monumental decisions about strategy, select generals, work with coalition partners sometimes even having to re-organize military organizations. Another problem to work through is the mutual distrust that often arises between politicians and generals. By studying his four subjects Cohen finds that they exhibit some similar traits that make them successful wartime leaders. They were all curios men who rated technology highly. They were men who paid close attention to detail and asked probing questions of their generals. They prodded but did not dictate orders to their generals. They were very adroit politicians and great judges of character. Finally, they were well read men who also had a great command of the spoken word. "War is too important to be left to the generals." This quote uttered by France's President Clemenceau, will forever be remembered by students of history to illustrate the importance of civil control over the military. Cohen's book is an important study of the difficult job politicians face in their roles as commanders in chief. As a retired Army officer and student of political philosophy, I recommend this book to the layman as well as the professional.
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