<< 1 >>
Rating: 
Summary: Best work on post WWII foreign policy
Review: Anyone interested in learning how US foreign policy is created should start with this important and well-written book. Gaddis examines the post war search for ways in which the various administrations attempted to come up with a strategy to deal with the Soviet Union. Of course this was the primary center piece of foreign policy and it was the prism by which all other actions, all around the world, were viewed.
What is interesting to me is that each administration sought to embrace some new measure once it took office. What Gaddis makes plain is that despite the rhetoric, what they ended up doing, without exception is to rely on the basic rules of containment established under Truman. For all the talk about "New Looks" and "Flexible Responses," "Rolling Back Communism" and "Detente" new presidential adminstrations were left to fall back on the methods and processes that were developed under Truman and refined somewhat under Eisenhower.
Rating:
Summary: Best work on post WWII foreign policy
Review: Anyone interested in learning how US foreign policy is created should start with this important and well-written book. Gaddis examines the post war search for ways in which the various administrations attempted to come up with a strategy to deal with the Soviet Union. Of course this was the primary center piece of foreign policy and it was the prism by which all other actions, all around the world, were viewed.
What is interesting to me is that each administration sought to embrace some new measure once it took office. What Gaddis makes plain is that despite the rhetoric, what they ended up doing, without exception is to rely on the basic rules of containment established under Truman. For all the talk about "New Looks" and "Flexible Responses," "Rolling Back Communism" and "Detente" new presidential adminstrations were left to fall back on the methods and processes that were developed under Truman and refined somewhat under Eisenhower.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent Review
Review: I bought this book based on a recommendation from a professor. I wanted to get a good review of US containment strategy and I certainly got that. It is a very detailed accout of how the strategy developed in the US after WWII and how that strategy manifested itself though the following Presidential administrations. I am reading it quite carefully because it is so very educational. I have already recommended it to others who have a similar interest in US containmnet strategy.
Rating:
Summary: An authoritative overview of U.S. foreign policy
Review: I do not believe there is a finer overview of post-World War II American foreign policy than this important book. As a work of history as opposed to political science, it is well-suited for any reader who cares about America's relationship with the world. Gaddis explains containment as it was originally envisioned by George Kennan and then goes on to show the fluctuations between symmetrical and asymmetrical policies up through the Carter administration. He first describes each policy stance--its antecedents, influences, and applications--then describes the applicability of that policy in reality. He shows how Kennan's conception of containment was quickly lost in the enactment of NSC 68 by the Truman administration and the U.S. involvement in Korea. He describes Eisenhower's "New Look" as a shift back to a policy wherein America drew distinctions between conflicts it would and would not react to, relying heavily on the nuclear option in an all-or-nothing containment strategy. Then he dissects the "flexible response" policy of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, ascribing much importance to their Keynesian economic outlooks in convincing them that America could response to any and all threats while still growing the domestic economy. After the debacle of Vietnam, Gaddis does a wonderful job of describing the détente policies of Nixon and Kissinger. The most important conclusion he draws is that economic realities and domestic politics seemingly play an integral part in America's oscillating policies over time. To be more exact, the perception of means largely steers policy. Eisenhower adopted an asymmetrical policy, relying on the nuclear threat while decreasing the nation's conventional forces, because he feared the effects of overspending. Kennedy wanted to distance himself from the previous adminstration, and his liberal economic outlook convinced him that the American economy could be grown and controlled in such a way as to provide the funds for increasing both military and domestic spending, which would allow him to meet any threat any where at any time. This symmetrical policy, continued by Johnson, led America into a war in the wrong place at the wrong time against the wrong enemy. Nixon, naturally, wanted to distance himself from Johnson, and he also faced great constraints in public perception and Congressional distaste for increased military spending--under such constraints, he and Kissinger decided on a policy of détente with the Soviet Union, a policy that was effective to some degree but was ineffective in many ways (especially lesser regional conflicts). Carter's foreign policy was a blundering tightwalk between symmetry and asymmetry and was basically no policy at all. Gaddis is fairly objective in his assessment of the oscillating course of foreign policy, pointing out the successes as well as the failures of each strategy. He does not discuss every single incident because it would be impossible to cover everything in detail, so some issues I was interested in, such as Greek policy in 1948, the Bay of Pigs invasion, Khrushchev's shoe-thumping speeach at the U.N., the Iranian hostage crisis, to name a few, were barely mentioned, but his overall synthesis and communication of ideas is illuminating. I learned a great deal from reading this book. I only wish the book had been written more recently than 1982, so it could have concluded with a study of how Ronald Reagan actually won the Cold War.
Rating:
Summary: An authoritative overview of U.S. foreign policy
Review: I do not believe there is a finer overview of post-World War II American foreign policy than this important book. As a work of history as opposed to political science, it is well-suited for any reader who cares about America's relationship with the world. Gaddis explains containment as it was originally envisioned by George Kennan and then goes on to show the fluctuations between symmetrical and asymmetrical policies up through the Carter administration. He first describes each policy stance--its antecedents, influences, and applications--then describes the applicability of that policy in reality. He shows how Kennan's conception of containment was quickly lost in the enactment of NSC 68 by the Truman administration and the U.S. involvement in Korea. He describes Eisenhower's "New Look" as a shift back to a policy wherein America drew distinctions between conflicts it would and would not react to, relying heavily on the nuclear option in an all-or-nothing containment strategy. Then he dissects the "flexible response" policy of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, ascribing much importance to their Keynesian economic outlooks in convincing them that America could response to any and all threats while still growing the domestic economy. After the debacle of Vietnam, Gaddis does a wonderful job of describing the détente policies of Nixon and Kissinger. The most important conclusion he draws is that economic realities and domestic politics seemingly play an integral part in America's oscillating policies over time. To be more exact, the perception of means largely steers policy. Eisenhower adopted an asymmetrical policy, relying on the nuclear threat while decreasing the nation's conventional forces, because he feared the effects of overspending. Kennedy wanted to distance himself from the previous adminstration, and his liberal economic outlook convinced him that the American economy could be grown and controlled in such a way as to provide the funds for increasing both military and domestic spending, which would allow him to meet any threat any where at any time. This symmetrical policy, continued by Johnson, led America into a war in the wrong place at the wrong time against the wrong enemy. Nixon, naturally, wanted to distance himself from Johnson, and he also faced great constraints in public perception and Congressional distaste for increased military spending--under such constraints, he and Kissinger decided on a policy of détente with the Soviet Union, a policy that was effective to some degree but was ineffective in many ways (especially lesser regional conflicts). Carter's foreign policy was a blundering tightwalk between symmetry and asymmetry and was basically no policy at all. Gaddis is fairly objective in his assessment of the oscillating course of foreign policy, pointing out the successes as well as the failures of each strategy. He does not discuss every single incident because it would be impossible to cover everything in detail, so some issues I was interested in, such as Greek policy in 1948, the Bay of Pigs invasion, Khrushchev's shoe-thumping speeach at the U.N., the Iranian hostage crisis, to name a few, were barely mentioned, but his overall synthesis and communication of ideas is illuminating. I learned a great deal from reading this book. I only wish the book had been written more recently than 1982, so it could have concluded with a study of how Ronald Reagan actually won the Cold War.
Rating: 
Summary: A classic
Review: This book is still useful even 20 years after publication. Gaddis view US policy toward the USSR as a pendulum that swings between"symmetrical" and "asymmetrical" approaches. The periods are split into: Kennan's original containment, NSC-68, Eisenhower's "New Look", JFK and Nixon's détente. There is a coda covering Carter, but it is less helpful. The symmetrical approach confronts the USSR wherever the USSR chooses to probe. In this approach, wherever the Soviets seek to advance is, by their very actions, a US interest. In contrast, the asymmetrical view seeks to identify those areas that are inherently vital US interests and protect those. The first seeks to build a fence (containment) around the Soviets. The second approach builds its fences around US interests and lets the USSR do what it wants - within reason - elsewhere. Heck, why let them do that? The answer is "means." Gaddis stresses the point that US means are not unlimited. The US must balance means and ends and this leads to the pendulum swings. The reasons I do not give the book the last star are: It does not cover the Carter-Reagan-Bush era and Smith over draws the magnitude of the swings. The book makes it sound like there were tremendous differences between the various administrations and does not pay enough attention to the essential consistency of US Cold War strategy. Smith acknowledges this in a retrospective on his own book available at the Hoover Institute web site.
Rating:
Summary: A classic
Review: This book is still useful even 20 years after publication. Gaddis view US policy toward the USSR as a pendulum that swings between"symmetrical" and "asymmetrical" approaches. The periods are split into: Kennan's original containment, NSC-68, Eisenhower's "New Look", JFK and Nixon's détente. There is a coda covering Carter, but it is less helpful. The symmetrical approach confronts the USSR wherever the USSR chooses to probe. In this approach, wherever the Soviets seek to advance is, by their very actions, a US interest. In contrast, the asymmetrical view seeks to identify those areas that are inherently vital US interests and protect those. The first seeks to build a fence (containment) around the Soviets. The second approach builds its fences around US interests and lets the USSR do what it wants - within reason - elsewhere. Heck, why let them do that? The answer is "means." Gaddis stresses the point that US means are not unlimited. The US must balance means and ends and this leads to the pendulum swings. The reasons I do not give the book the last star are: It does not cover the Carter-Reagan-Bush era and Smith over draws the magnitude of the swings. The book makes it sound like there were tremendous differences between the various administrations and does not pay enough attention to the essential consistency of US Cold War strategy. Smith acknowledges this in a retrospective on his own book available at the Hoover Institute web site.
Rating:
Summary: A Stunning Foreign Policy Book
Review: This great book by John Lewis Gaddis is a rare achievement in the field. It is a necessarily dense assessment of American post-war foreign policy but, at the same time, immensely readable and enjoyable. The focus of the book, as implied by its title, is a deep exploration of the containment strategy as originally authored by George Kennan during his stint in Russia for the State Department. Gaddis explains the origins of containment quite well, but the real genius of the book is the way he takes us on a logical examination of the strategy's evolution into the heart of the Cold War. A nice surprise is learning how American leaders misunderstood the real intentions of George Kennan himself, resulting in military investments of which Kennan did not approve. A particularly fascinating section of the book is Gaddis's descriptions of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of opening the doors to China as a means of gaining leverage against the Soviets. In these areas Gaddis walks a high-wire balance of strict academia and joyous intrigue. Gaddis doesn't approach this material from any particular political viewpoint, but rather with his own brand of sharp and steely reason. This book truly is a masterpiece and a must-read for anybody serious about American foreign policy. It is the stuff of genius, the core of which is Gaddis's crafty work of combining political science with poetry.
<< 1 >>
|
