Rating: 
Summary: Diplomatic history at its best
Review: The writer of this book, Shlaim is one of the Revisionist School of Israeli historians. His book is an interesting companion piece to Benny Morris's Righteous Victims. Whilst Morris writes in detail about the military and political history of Israel, Shlaim writes a sort of diplomatic history.The person who has most shaped popular views of Israels history and predicament is Benjamin Netanyahu. His work may not have sold many copies but it provides the ideological framework through which large numbers of people understand the history of the period. Netanyahu paints a picture of Israel as being a sole democracy in a sea of autocratic, fanatical Muslim states. The predominant response of the Arab world to the creation of Israel is one of hate loathing and in the end a commitment to its destruction. Shlaim deals however not in the simple right wing ideology of Netanyahu but in the complex series of events which have brought about the present. His central thesis is that Israel?s foreign policy has always been founded upon a principle that any relations with the Arab world must be based on strength. The problem with this policy is that it has not only protected Israel but it has shaped the response of the Arab world around it. It is this policy of the use of force which has led to problems with the achievement of peace in the region. Shlaim shows how the creation of Israel in itself was an event of immense importance for the Arab world leading to the collapse of most of the Monarchies which had been set up prior to the withdrawal of the colonial forces. The response of Israel in regard to a number of boarder incidents is discussed in some detail in the book. This led to a decision by Egypt to arm itself and in turn this led to the idea in Israel that there would be another war. The Suez incident was an attempt by Israel to weaken any potential Egyptian threat but this again lead to tensions in the region which again led to all nations arming. The invasion of Lebanon led to the response of terrorism being directed against Israeli troops. This response was succesful and it lead to the success and growth of the extreme movements such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah. The book is one that is written from the persepective of the Israeli left. It is a well written book which can be read in conjunction with other histories of the period. Its depth of study in the field that it covers means that it is always interesting.
Rating: 
Summary: A Revisionist Perspective of Israel's Struggle
Review: Too many books about Israel and the Middle East either paint Israel as a flawless sole democracy surrounded by hordes of anti Semites seeking only her destruction; or as an oppressor and violator of the inherent rights of the Palestinians. This book clearly falls somewhere in between; freely finding major fault in Israel's policies, particularly of the Likuds, while only seeming to touch on the Arab nations intolerance of the state in their midst. Credit is deserved for the Arab nations who eventually did secure a peace treaty with Israel, and for the Israeli diplomats who sought peace even at the protest of some of Israel's elements who insisted that none of the West Bank or Gaza should be bargained away and that there was no Palestinian people (Golda Meir). Schlaim offers some illuminating insights to the most complex political situation in the world. The aftermath of the Holocaust left the Jewish nation with an overwhelming drive for security, dictating the development of its awesome military. Zev Jabotinsky, one of Israel's earliest figures, envisioned the Iron Wall as a needed step to get the surrounding Arab nations to accept Israel, who would only then negotiate a peace. Yet it was this military, so important to that security, that alarmed Israel's neighbors and made peace so hard to attain. Schlaim argues that Jabotinsky saw beyond the Iron Wall to peaceful relations, but that some of the current disciples saw only the continuing struggle, particularly Netanyahu. Schlaim was particularly harsh on Netanyahu, holding him singularly responsible for destroying the breakthrough Oslo accords. The time frame of the book ends just before the current intifada and the dramatic changes taking place today. It's coverage from the War of Independence through 2000 presents a revisionist perspective, that in spite of many flaws will help an open minded reader gain some valuable perspective of this complicated crossroads.
Rating:
Summary: sometimes dead on, often wishful thinking
Review: While Shlaim rightly exposes the Likud's role in sabotaging the peace process - from Begin to Sharon to Shamir to Netanyahu (to Sharon again, which happened after the publication of the book), he also re-writes the central myth of Israeli history - that Mapai and Labor have always sought peace but could not find willing Arab partners. He details Ben-Gurion's missed opportunities for peace and Golda's intransigence, and even Shimon Peres' ill-fated war on Hamas that precipitated Netanyahu's election. While not absolving the Arabs of their own responsibility, Shlaim lists the many disproportionate Israeli military actions that took a quiet situation inevitably towards war. However, on many occasions, Shlaim displays what can only be called wishful thinking: Ben-Gurion's unwillingness to consider peace with Syria in 1949 is not a failing - the Syrian regime ended in a bloody coup less than six months after it took power and the next regime could hardly have been expected to honor its peace agreement (much as Netanyahu did not honor Oslo.) Shlaim champions Moshe Sharett and Levi Eshkol, but they were simply weak politicians. It is wishful thinking to believe that if only Ben-Gurion hadn't been so domineering that Eshkol and Sharett would have achieved peace. Shlaim can be very confident in exposing Ben-Gurion because he has Ben-Gurion's verbose diary - but he has no such information about Assad or Nasser or Sadat and chooses to take dubious statements about them at face value. In the end, Benny Morris probably has it right: there will never be a full accounting of the Arab-Israeli peace process until the same kind of revisionist historians appear on the Arab side to challenge the myths of Israeli intransigence as firmly held by their countries as those of Arab intransigence are held by Israel.
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