Rating: 
Summary: A Breath of Sanity--Hard Look at Cost of Cold War
Review:
This is an extraordinary book, in part because it forces us to confront the "hangover" effects of the Cold War as we begin an uncertain path into the post 9-11 future. It begins by emphasizing that the Cold War glorified certain types of institutions, personalities, and attitudes, and ends by pointing out that we paid a very heavy cost--much as General and President Eisenhower tried to warn us--in permitting our society to be bound by weaponry, ideology, and secrecy.
Two quotes, one from the beginning, one from the end, capture all that lies in between, well-documented and I would add--contrary to some opinions--coherent and understandable. "For the United States, the price of victory goes far beyond the dollars spend on warheads, foreign aid, soldiers, propaganda, and intelligence. It includes, for instance, time wasted, talent misdirected, secrecy imposed, and confidence impaired. Particular costs were imposed on industry, science, and the universities. Trade was distorted and growth impeded." (page xi) "CIA world-order men whose intrigues more often than not started at the incompetent and went down from there, White House claims of 'national security' to conceal deceit, and the creation of huge special interests in archaic spending all too easily occurred because most Americans were not preoccupied with the struggle." (page 643) Although the author did not consult the most recent intelligence reform books (e.g. Berkowitz, Johnson, Treverton, inter alia), he is consistently detailed and scathing in his review of intelligence blunders and the costs of secrecy--in this he appears to very ably collaborate the findings of Daniel Ellsberg's more narrowly focused book on "SECRETS: A Memoire of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers." He points out, among many many examples, that despite Andropov's having been head of the KGB for fifteen years, at the end of it CIA still did not know if Andropov has a wife or spoke English. He also has a lovely contrast between how little was learned using very expensive national technical means (secret satellites) and open sources: "So much failure could have been avoided if CIA has done more careful homework during the 1950s in the run-up to Sputnik; during the 1960s, when Sovieet marshals were openly publishing their thoughts on nuclear strategy; or during the 1970s and 1980s, when stagnation could be chronicled in the unclassified gray pages of Soviet print. Most expensively, the CIA hardly ever learned anything from its mistakes, largely because it would not admit them." (pages 567-568). The author's biographic information does not include any reference to military service, but footnote 110 suggests that he was at least in Officer Candidate School with the U.S. Marine Corps during the Vietnam era. The biography, limited to the inside back jacket flap, also avoids discussing the author's considerable experience with information technology. Given the importance of this critique of all that most Republicans and most 50-70 year olds hold very sacred, we need to more about the man goring the ox. Future editions should have a much expanded biography. Bottom line: America muddled through the Cold War, made many costly mistakes, and developed a policy-making process that is, to this day, largely uninformed due to a lack of a comprehensive global intelligence capability, or a sufficient means of consulting diverse experts (as opposed to the in-town intellectual harlots). If ever we needed a clean-sheet look at how we make policy and how we provide decision-support to that policy process, this is the time. The "fifty-year wound" is still open, and the author warns us it will not heal without a reappraisal of how we do the business of national security.
Rating:
Summary: This is the book we've been waiting for
Review: America has been waiting for this book since 1991. Leebaert has given us a rich and detailed account of what the Cold War cost the United States in resources, people, and money. No one is sacred; no one is exempt from Leebaert's cold scrutiny. The myths of Kennedy and Kissinger are shattered, and Reagan is finally put in perspective. Leebaert's writing is often complex; one can easily get lost in his grammar. But don't let that deter you from picking up this book; his research and analysis are top-notch. You should know that this book, although proceeding in a chronological way, is not a history of the Cold War. It is an analysis of what it cost the U.S. If you don't have a good understanding of the outline of the Cold War, watch CNN's documentary before you tackle this book.
Rating: 
Summary: An Engaging Mess
Review: Considering the author's weighted interest toward technology and business, it is surprising how well much of this book reads. It is nothing if not quotable, brimming with insight-packed sentences and entertaining character sketches. Leebaert definitely knows his stuff: this doorstop-worthy tome is loaded with information. Perhaps too much information. The main flaw of the book is its rather bogus thesis: The Cold War was filled with "costs." Yes, I suppose any forty year endeavor would be filled with its share of expenditures, many mistaken, but this is hardly the most enlightening point to make about the superpower conflict. Unfortunately, it is Leebaert's point, and he desperately tries to tie every nugget of info he tosses at the reader into his great theme. Every chapter, no matter how diffuse the subjects covered, is rounded off with a monotonously pedestrian "these mistakes could have been avoided" conclusion a harried undergraduate would have been ashamed to employ. Many of Leebaert's mini-analyses of various arenas of the conflict are fascinating: his emphasis on the economic and technological subplots of the Cold War are particularly insightful. But the attempt to weave these analyses into an overarching narrative ultimately undo much of the coherence of the book. His appraisal of many of the power players in the struggle often come across as bitchy or unfair (as he spends little time examining the reasons for their actions, but nonetheless tallying their "mistakes" to play up his theme). Another problem is that many of his assessments come to contradict each other: while showing how the Soviets ground their economy into the ground preparing for a "winnable" nuclear pre-emptive strike, Leebaert condemns the US "mandarinate" for advocating the essentially common sense theory of mutual assured destruction, rather than dangerously aping the Soviets in constructing ABM defenses (which, Leebaert refrains from explaining, are built to fire nuclear weapons at incoming ICBMs in the atmosphere. In which case, a city will suffer double the number of thermonuclear airbursts it would without the defense. The ABM Treaty of 1972, which the author does not hide his disdain for, was set up with the understanding that MORE offensive nuclear weapons around cities does not constitute a "defense," but rather, a furthering of an offensive arms race. Later in the book, it appears that Leebaert's ambiguous attraction to the SDI program has influenced his judgement). At various times, weapons build-ups are deemed wasteful, or necessary, depending on Leebaert's opinion of the administration calling for the build-up. JFK's triumphalism is derided as reckless, Ronald Reagan's is applauded as decicive---though the author considers the Soviet war scare of 1983, which Reagan's rhetoric precipitated, the most dangerous time of the Cold War. The ambiguities and inconsistencies in Leebaert's assessments need more development to explain them, but, given the scope of the work, the reader is usually left with a stream of brief anecdotes. These contradictions, along with a thesis so broad as to be practically meaningless, often make the reader pause and wonder if the author has not taken on more than he can handle. A reader looking for a clear, introductory narrative of the period is advised to look elsewhere (Martin Walker's book is quite good). But for Cold War nuts looking for an engaging new spin on familiar material, as well as a deeper appreciation of the less-reported aspects of this apocalyptic time, this is a good addition to the literature.
Rating:
Summary: An Engaging Mess
Review: Considering the author's weighted interest toward technology and business, it is surprising how well much of this book reads. It is nothing if not quotable, brimming with insight-packed sentences and entertaining character sketches. Leebaert definitely knows his stuff: this doorstop-worthy tome is loaded with information. Perhaps too much information. The main flaw of the book is its rather bogus thesis: The Cold War was filled with "costs." Yes, I suppose any forty year endeavor would be filled with its share of expenditures, many mistaken, but this is hardly the most enlightening point to make about the superpower conflict. Unfortunately, it is Leebaert's point, and he desperately tries to tie every nugget of info he tosses at the reader into his great theme. Every chapter, no matter how diffuse the subjects covered, is rounded off with a monotonously pedestrian "these mistakes could have been avoided" conclusion a harried undergraduate would have been ashamed to employ. Many of Leebaert's mini-analyses of various arenas of the conflict are fascinating: his emphasis on the economic and technological subplots of the Cold War are particularly insightful. But the attempt to weave these analyses into an overarching narrative ultimately undo much of the coherence of the book. His appraisal of many of the power players in the struggle often come across as bitchy or unfair (as he spends little time examining the reasons for their actions, but nonetheless tallying their "mistakes" to play up his theme). Another problem is that many of his assessments come to contradict each other: while showing how the Soviets ground their economy into the ground preparing for a "winnable" nuclear pre-emptive strike, Leebaert condemns the US "mandarinate" for advocating the essentially common sense theory of mutual assured destruction, rather than dangerously aping the Soviets in constructing ABM defenses (which, Leebaert refrains from explaining, are built to fire nuclear weapons at incoming ICBMs in the atmosphere. In which case, a city will suffer double the number of thermonuclear airbursts it would without the defense. The ABM Treaty of 1972, which the author does not hide his disdain for, was set up with the understanding that MORE offensive nuclear weapons around cities does not constitute a "defense," but rather, a furthering of an offensive arms race. Later in the book, it appears that Leebaert's ambiguous attraction to the SDI program has influenced his judgement). At various times, weapons build-ups are deemed wasteful, or necessary, depending on Leebaert's opinion of the administration calling for the build-up. JFK's triumphalism is derided as reckless, Ronald Reagan's is applauded as decicive---though the author considers the Soviet war scare of 1983, which Reagan's rhetoric precipitated, the most dangerous time of the Cold War. The ambiguities and inconsistencies in Leebaert's assessments need more development to explain them, but, given the scope of the work, the reader is usually left with a stream of brief anecdotes. These contradictions, along with a thesis so broad as to be practically meaningless, often make the reader pause and wonder if the author has not taken on more than he can handle. A reader looking for a clear, introductory narrative of the period is advised to look elsewhere (Martin Walker's book is quite good). But for Cold War nuts looking for an engaging new spin on familiar material, as well as a deeper appreciation of the less-reported aspects of this apocalyptic time, this is a good addition to the literature.
Rating:
Summary: A Book Well Worth Reading, Thinking About and Arguing About!
Review: Derek Leebaert has written a remarkable work on the 50 Year Cold War that was the hinge of the history of the 20th Century. The term "magisterial," all too often a cliche appended to long rather than worthwhile books, is apt. Intrepidly crossing various academic disciplines, Mr. Leebaert explores many aspects of the all-encompassing US-USSR conflict. The book is at once balanced and provocative--sure to stir controversy in the best sense, spurring thought, argument, reflection and perspective. At the same time, it is accessible and beautifully written, manifestly informed by a lifetime of curiosity, learning and action. Among the themes is a declaration of the importance of leadership and the significance of individual action even in a time marked by unprecedented institutional and bureaucratic power and authority. The book concludes with interesting perspectives on our current situation and the world scene. In a sense, Leebaert is helping fill the void created by the startling absence of a transcendent presidential message by Presidents George H.W. Bush or Bill Clinton, marking the end of the Cold War, offering perpective on its meaning, updating our national vision, and preparing Americans for the changes that the victory of our values is unleashing not only on the world abroad but also on ourselves.
Rating:
Summary: Views of a Fighter Pilot
Review: Derek Leebaert's book, The Fifty-Year Wound is the finest work of historical analysis that I have ever read and studied. His work is complete and definitive. With his insight into the dynamics of world events he has transformed the mosaic of the complex events and personalities of the 50 years of Cold War into a seamless story. Many know the history of events, but few can reveal why they were what they were. His perspectives are priceless; his words dense with meaning. He has a unique ability to capture and interpret significant events in a single sentence. He reveals the good and the bad, and separates facts from fiction. Telling the truth took great courage. His style is fascinating. With the moment of the subject and his outstanding ability to write, this will be one of the outstanding books on national events and international relations of this decade. I give it an unqualified recommendation for all who wish to learn from history.
Rating: 
Summary: A Critical Review
Review: I bought the paperback version of this book because it had blurbs on it from both the Washington Times (conservative) and Washington Monthly (liberal). I thought a book on the Cold War appealing to both sides of the political spectrum might have something to offer. It does. This is a book well worth reading. It is also a bit of a mess. For the liberals, there's a sound thrashing of the CIA; a dim view of our involvement in Vietnam and other lesser countries hardly worthy of our notice; and a harsh assessment of talents, resources, and money wasted in frantic stop-and-start waves of over-reaction to dimly understood but sensationalized events like the Cuban missile crisis, for example. For the conservatives, there's the claim that massive amounts of defensive spending notwithstanding, we were never a militarist society; the trashing of wimpy and wistful detente policy; and, most of all, there's Ronald Reagan, striding manfully onto the scene like, yes, John Wayne, with a resolve and vision lacking in all his predecessors combined, it seems, driving the Soviet Union to ruin at long last. So how did Reagan do it? Well, he spent the Soviets into ruin. On Star Wars. Leebaert makes a good case for this. But massive spending on Star Wars - a still unproven defense strategy some 20 years later - is just the kind of military-university/academic-science/research-thinktank-policy wonk boondoggle he has such fun ridiculing for most of the book. In short, a work both exhilirating and exasperating.
Rating:
Summary: Exhilirating and Exasperating
Review: I bought the paperback version of this book because it had blurbs on it from both the Washington Times (conservative) and Washington Monthly (liberal). I thought a book on the Cold War appealing to both sides of the political spectrum might have something to offer. It does. This is a book well worth reading. It is also a bit of a mess. For the liberals, there's a sound thrashing of the CIA; a dim view of our involvement in Vietnam and other lesser countries hardly worthy of our notice; and a harsh assessment of talents, resources, and money wasted in frantic stop-and-start waves of over-reaction to dimly understood but sensationalized events like the Cuban missile crisis, for example. For the conservatives, there's the claim that massive amounts of defensive spending notwithstanding, we were never a militarist society; the trashing of wimpy and wistful detente policy; and, most of all, there's Ronald Reagan, striding manfully onto the scene like, yes, John Wayne, with a resolve and vision lacking in all his predecessors combined, it seems, driving the Soviet Union to ruin at long last. So how did Reagan do it? Well, he spent the Soviets into ruin. On Star Wars. Leebaert makes a good case for this. But massive spending on Star Wars - a still unproven defense strategy some 20 years later - is just the kind of military-university/academic-science/research-thinktank-policy wonk boondoggle he has such fun ridiculing for most of the book. In short, a work both exhilirating and exasperating.
Rating:
Summary: Sweeps out 60 years of cobwebs...
Review: I can't say enough about how much I enjoyed this book. The writing is crisp and thought-provoking and the research is exhaustive. After reading Leebaert, it is a little easier to see how the "sins of the fathers" have laid the foundation for the world we are currently living in. The Osama bin Ladens of the world were spawned from the cold warriors and Quixotic missions that Leebaert so excellently profiles. The reading is sometimes difficult, and I found myself re-reading sections to make sure I understood where Leebaert was trying to go. Even so, it remains one of my top 20 favorite books.
Rating:
Summary: The Burden of Cold War Economics
Review: Leebaert, who seems neither Left nor Right, but perhaps neoconservative sympathetic, has written a non-authoritative and revisionist account of the United States and its Cold War "glory". Though not an accomplished historian, what Leebaert does accomplish is to provide the reader with first-rate anecdotal storytelling combined with a fact-reinforced chronology spelling out just how far state worship went in bringing forth a disordered and warmongering society. In chronicling the Kennedy era, the most noteworthy of the Cold War years, there is an abundance of out-and-out blunders from which to choose. Most remarkable is John Kennedy's candid mission to fund a gigantic global crusade against imagined enemies in a more or less universal civil war. After all, Kennedy came into office extolling the virtues of Cold War expenditures while railing against his predecessor Eisenhower's lack of commitment to military might and Cold War spending. He championed his cause of "closing the missile gap" with the US's Soviet counterparts before he was even elected to office. Within months of inauguration, as Leebaert points out, Kennedy's assorted intimates authorized $808 million for military construction and $1 billion in special Lockeed monies to confer graciousness upon hometown elected representatives. Defense spending escalated as a percentage of GDP under Kennedy that had gone unequaled in Eisenhower's days. Leebaert is priceless in noting events such as Kennedy's first State of the Union address, which he refers to as "a wartime speech without a war." He correctly acknowledges that perhaps there was no one better than John Kennedy "for exalting the glamour and authority of the State." War or no war, hot or cold, John Kennedy was the epitome of a political generation that was entrenched within a global superpower mentality in which any and all crises could be contrived as a basis for the furtherance of the State and its assorted powers. The Kennedy years, in particular, created a great new global economic burden, and set the stage for the LBJ venture into the Vietnam graveyard. By the time of Kennedy's death, around one million US servicemen were stationed at more than two hundred foreign bases. The Cold War was by then so huge in its global range and its apparently even higher stakes that it operated more on dangerous generalizations and less in pursuit of specific objectives. As Leebaert puts it, "the country got a veneer of Theodore Roosevelt: vibrant, long-term possibility running down into a set of exhausting divisive crises. It was becoming a strenuous life indeed for Americans." And Derek Leebaert does a penetrating job of telling the story of the Cold War and its sham crises.
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