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Rating:  Summary: Bold, and Brilliant Review: Despite its subtitle, the author's focus is on explaining 19th & 20th century world history. Tutoring without condescension, he explains fundamentals of historical interpretation, and how democracy, free markets, and peace emerged as unchallenged principles for governance and international relations following the end of the cold war. The legacy of the Cold War is the historical demonstration of the failure of communism, in any incarnation, to deliver what people generally expect governments to deliver - peace, order, and material well-being. A whirlwind world tour examines the status of the implementation and acceptance of these ideas in various regions, and the risks remaining. Despite the verdict of history, there are holdouts - notably China and the mid-East - and resistance to full implementation. The biggest risk to world peace is found in China, where the potential for war over the status of Taiwan is unmitigated by China's participation in the global economy. But the author also worries over the possibility of failure in the "core region" of the world, for example rejection of free trade for protective tariffs & quotas for domestic political reasons could send the world back to the conflicted & warlike condition driven by defeated ideas.Disappointment - the author dismisses the Islamic challenge to the Western world because they offer no viable alternative. Rule by religious elites not chosen democratically - including a cluster of values such as dispute resolution thru trial by combat on a national scale, economic policy reduced to trading for short-term profit without long-term investment - these ideas appeal not because they reject the West and its ideology. The indigenous peoples of the Islamic world believe that ideals of personal submission to God's will, governmental enforcement of His laws, and restoration of the cultural dominance of these values transcend and triumph over ideas put forth in this book. China may fight a war for rational, if poorly thought-out reasons. But the dragons' lair of Middle East politics has sucked us into wars for causes that can only be understood outside the author's framework. Thus the author's historical treatise falls far short. Peace, democracy, and free markets are rooted in Judeo-Christian values. Why did they fail in the 7th and 8th centuries, and what will prevent a recurrence in the 21st? Without this analysis the story is incomplete. The author's conclusion that these ideas have achieved hegemonic status rings empty.
Rating:  Summary: Bold, and Brilliant Review: It is rare these days to find a book on world affairs that has an original and provocative thesis and that is also a pleasure to read. Mandelbaum has written just such a volume. His purpose is nothing less than to identify the main forces--markets and democracy--shaping the contemporary world, and he does so by moving effortlessly from the overall claim to real-world examples and back again. The lines of the forest are always in view but there are plenty of trees, and the main argument is made with compelling clarity, conviction, and the occasional bit of humor. Despite Mandelbaum's crystal clear prose, it's apparent that some reviewers (see below) fail to grasp his main points. Fundamentalist Islam as an alternative to liberal democratic capitalism? Just where exactly have people, when given the opportunity to freely elect their leaders, chosen a Taliban-like model? And what have such regimes, when they have grabbed power, brought people except poverty and brutality? As for the absence of capitalism in the Judeo-Christian world in the 7th and 8th centuries (!), one need not have read Karl Polanyi's "Great Transformation" to understand that many complex changes had to unfold before national markets arose; any regular history book should suffice. Modern democracy, too, could not have taken root over a thousand years ago for precisely the same reason. Mandelbaum is not saying that all you need for markets and democracy is the Judeo-Christian ethic; he identifies it as being AMONG the critical factors that promoted their growth. Alas, even the most lucid writer is fated to have his ideas misunderstood. Buy the book; it's terrific.
Rating:  Summary: Virtuous Circle of Free Markets, Democracy and Peace Review: Michael Mandelbaum clearly explains that the liberal theory of history is made up of two tenets: 1. Free markets, through their workings such as constitutionalism, civil society, the rule of law, property-protecting and contract-enforcing state, entrepreneurship, competition and mass consumption, tend to promote democracy and enrich most of their economic agents over time (pg. 11, 234-237, 257, 268-274, 289-295, 313-318, 394). A responsible social safety net, however, is key to stability of free markets (pg. 299-304, 340-341, 402). 2. Democracies are inclined to conduct peaceful foreign policies (pg. 11, 237). Popular sovereignty, constitutionalism, civil society and political habit of compromise are key drivers of peace and minority protection (pg. 249-250, 259, 269). Furthermore, defense dominance and weapon system transparency are built on the recognition that the problem of collective security can only be solved through systemic cooperation nurtured over time (pg. 113-114, 129-131, 231). The common denominator of free markets, democracy and peace is their focus on the individual (pg. 31). Illiberalism such as Communism and Fascism stresses the strength of the state through group cohesion and solidarity rather than the welfare of individuals (pg. 254, 336). Before WWI, this set of liberal ideas was not firmly established in the British Empire and the U.S. from which it came. Britain was the most fervent advocate of free trade but was clearly ambivalent about self-government beyond its White Dominions and dismissal of any limit to power projection. The U.S. was protectionist rather than a convert to free trade, was an impire rather than an empire until the 1890s and had not yet granted the benefits of democracy to all its inhabitants in spite of its unequivocal constitution (pg. 33, 87). At the Conference of Paris in 1919 just after WWI, President Woodrow Wilson could not convince the victorious empires how closely related were the rise of free markets and the devaluation of war. The high price of war to the victors and perhaps more importantly poor salesmanship from President Wilson himself in the U.S. and abroad ultimately led to the rise and dismissal of an emasculated League of Nations and disastrous economic protectionism in the 1930s (pg. 20-24, 359, 363, 393). The emergence of Fascism and Communism, two new murderous, inefficient rivals to Liberalism, was the bitterest legacy of WWI, the Conference of Paris and subsequent peace conferences (pg. 33, 41, 54-55). Liberalism succeeded in defeating and discrediting Fascism at the end of WWII in 1945 and Communism at the end of the Cold War in 1989 (pg. 253). The liberal theory of history has found its historical validation for example in the successful conversion of fascist Germany and Japan to Liberalism in the decades after their crushing defeat in 1945. These successful conversions to Liberalism demonstrate which way the lagging peripheral countries should go to ultimately emerge in the limelight (pg. 6, 79-86, 174-181, 279-280). Mandelbaum also reminds his audience that in the post-cold war era, the core countries have lost much interest in what is going on in the periphery (pg. 96, 198-199). China, Russia and the Middle East are three major exceptions to this loss of interest in the periphery (pg. 7). Core countries legitimately fear that undesirable developments in some peripheral countries, especially failed states, if left unchecked, could have a negative impact in their backyard (pg. 182-187). The Middle East is of interest to core countries due to its reserves of oil, the existence of weapons of mass destruction and the presence of fearsome terrorist networks on its soil (pg. 97-99, 199-230). Operation Iraqi Freedom is an expression of this interest in the region on behalf of a well-understood Liberalism (pg. 403-412). China and Russia remain a source of concern to the core countries because they have not yet fully embraced the tenets of Liberalism (pg. 306-307, 390-391). Like Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, Russia and China are not satisfied with their military place in the world today and can become a source of instability tomorrow (pg. 160-174). Furthermore, both countries harbor powerful economic ambitions (pg. 160). The inability of economic socialism to be productive enough and meet the wants and needs of its economic agents behind the military sphere has made a gradual transition to economic liberalism vital to the survival of the Chinese and Russian nomenklatura (pg. 48, 52, 66-67, 99-104, 261-265, 291, 309). No Communist regime in the 20th century came to power through a coup d'etat staged by an impoverished, mobilized and ideologically committed working class (pg. 233). The current liberal hegemony, which is not per se irreversible, does not make everybody happy. Some of its most determined opponents include Middle Eastern terrorists and the western-inspired anti-globalization movement who do not offer any constructive, workable alternative to Liberalism (pg. 38-39). The United States, spiritual successor of the British Empire, has a key role to play in the successful spread and survival of this Wilsonian triad (pg. 7, 88, 327, 358, 381-382, 404). The technological, economic, military and cultural leadership of the U.S. requires that Americans bear a higher burden than their fair share in the maintenance and development of Liberalism (pg. 88, 153, 364-365, 389). The harshest critics of the U.S. for example in Europe and Asia should keep this in mind instead of taking it for granted (pg. 153, 363-365, 388-390). Passing interest in the (most dangerous) failed states is a recipe for disaster (pg. 193-199). In too many places around the world, democracy and capitalism are foreign transplants that must be cultivated long enough to take deep roots (pg. 259-260, 297-298, 311-313, 386-387). Ultimately, with might come not only rights but also responsibilities (pg. 388-389).
Rating:  Summary: This is a magnificent book Review: This is a magnificent book - I can happily recommend it to anyone, regardless of their politics (an all too rare thing these days, as the culture wars spread ever wider). The West ought to remember its roots, and why it is where it is today. A book like this is therefore very timely and well worth reading. Christopher Catherwood, historian, teacher and author of CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS AND ISLAMIC RAGE (Zondervan, 2003)
Rating:  Summary: A Less Myopic, More Optimistic View of Recent History Review: This is an account of evolution as it occurs in the affairs of nations. An evolution of markets, democracy, arms control, and finally peace. It takes everything you know about history and rearranges it in its logical order. This book will set you free.
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