Rating: 
Summary: The Generals War
Review: A great resource book on Daddy Bush' war and how it relates to the new war in Iraq. Wheter you are for or against the war now in progress this book is must reading to help you understand what's going on in Iraq. General Tommy Franks was considered as next to incompetent as you can get and now he's leading our troops. The mistakes we made in the first war were major---for instance our Army didn't disarm the Iraqi Guard when they could have. The Iraqis left Kuwait with all of their weapons wwhil our troops stood by and watched. The Marines were pretty much on their own and ran ahead of the plans (plans, sound familiar?) only to be nearly wiped out but for some very lucky finds of Iraqs plans. This book is required reading in the Army war college. I was given a copy by an Air Force Colonel/pilot. He's a very conservative politics guy and he insisted I read the book. It's an excellent book written by a retired General.
Rating: 
Summary: Very good book, horribly edited
Review: Gordon and Trainor have written what is mostly a very readable and very well put together book about the first Gulf War. Students of history should be so lucky to get a book like this on the most recent conflict in the Gulf in a few years time.
The book weaves political and military decisions together seemlessly, and discusses how political considerations did hamper the war effort, in contrast to the line from Washington that the civilians let the generals do all the planning.
Colin Powell does not come out well in this book at all, nor does Gen. Schwartzkopf. The two authors prove that Powell in contrast to his media image at the time, was an extremely reluctant warrior and then wanted to make sure that the US forces did whatever it took to not sustain casualties. Reading this after the second Gulf conflict, one gets a sense of why Powell is Secretary of State and not Secretary of Defense, he seems to have a much better grasp of politics than he does of war. In the book, Schwartzkopf remarks bluntly that Powell does not have the stomach for war, and from what Trainor and Gordon detail, it looks like he is right.
The current value for students of history and not just students of military history and tactics, however, lies in the fact that the Air Force wanted all along in the first Gulf war to topple the Hussein regime and made that a priority, only to have the other services and the civilians in the Bush administration such as Powell and Baker, push that consideration aside. The end of the book details war plans that were even drawn up and immediately classified by an outraged Washington that the field commanders even thought of this, to go to Baghdahd and topple Hussein.
The book is also remarkably instructive on how the US managed to get hoodwinked by Hussein into letting him fly helos anywhere he wanted in Iraq and also not using the occupied oil fields as a bargaining chip because Powell and Schwartzkopf wanted to get out so quickly. Schwartzkopf's failures as a commander in decentralizing his command so much also led to the military not ever understanding the significance of the Battle of Kafji and the Iraqi army's horrible state. If Schwartzkopf had understood the battle's significance, the US and its allies could have possibly destroyed much of the Iraqi Republican Guard much more thoroughly and faster.
Things were so disorganized at the end of the war, the Bush administration failed to even give Schwartzkopf guidance on the terms of the cease fire. All of these mistakes leaving Hussein in power with a military able to suppress internal dissent, and the US to get into a long running needless battle over sanctions and inspections that culminated in the most recent Gulf conflict. If the Bush administration and CENTCOM had done their jobs in the first Gulf war, Hussein would have been gone over a decade ago and Iraq rebuilt.
This is a great book, however, it's horribly edited. There are several misspelled words with many of the chapters having the same passages repeated a few pages apart, especially in the conclusion of each chapter. A better editor should have caught those mistakes and told the authors that the reader didn't need to have something defined to them twice in three pages, and didn't need passages repeated verbatim in the conclusion.
Rating:
Summary: A Good Companion Piece to "Crusade"
Review: I am half way through "The Generals' War" and I am enjoying it immensely. However, as an avid reader and student of military history, I feel the conclusions or the judgements by the authors of the commanders are a bit off and unfair. At times it comes off as a hatchet job.In one example, the overall plan or objective to destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard did not succeed as well as hoped. But, it was not at the fault of the planners or those fighting the battles. Bottom line - we prepared for the worst case scenario and got the best. With the left hook in motion, the Marines and the Army Tiger Brigade were to attack basically head on. The two events that occurred greatly in our favor to minimize casualties also caused the objective of destroying the Republican Guard to not be fully achieved. First, the Iraqi soldiers gave up in numbers greater than ever expected. In many cases, it wasn't a fight. Second, partly because of the first, the Marines and the Tiger Brigade blew through their objectives so fast, the left hook barely had time to materialize. There is something for everyone to remember when reading any book about the Gulf War. The intent of the major commanders was to minimize casualties. I'm thankful that they were a part of the Viet Nam fighting (if one can actually be thankful for such), because it instilled a common goal among each one of them, including Schwarzkopf, Powell, Horner and Franks to name a few. To achieve the objective as planned would mean the casualties resulting from the expected heavier fighting would have had to occur. Our light casualties verses the full achievement of the objectives? That's a no brainer.
Rating:
Summary: MUST READ for GULF WAR HISTORIANS
Review: The General's War is an excellent account of the planning and implementation of the Gulf War. In short, it shows why the United States is a great nation. One of the main reasons we were so successful was because we DID argue on how to fight this war. Both the Military and Washington worked together to come up w/ the best possible plan. No war is ever conducted perfectly, but the Gulf War comes pretty close. Don't forget...it is the men and women who fought the war that won it, but the planning phases were crucial to putting our soldiers in the position to win. A little luck in some area never hurts as well. The best part of tis book is that it questions specific decisions from the war. This critcal analysis not only brings awareness, but helps our military and polititians plan future military operations. Don't forget to read "Bravo Two Zero" about the British SAS in the Gulf. Great book!
Rating:
Summary: MUST READ for GULF WAR HISTORIANS
Review: The General's War is an excellent account of the planning and implementation of the Gulf War. In short, it shows why the United States is a great nation. One of the main reasons we were so successful was because we DID argue on how to fight this war. Both the Military and Washington worked together to come up w/ the best possible plan. No war is ever conducted perfectly, but the Gulf War comes pretty close. Don't forget...it is the men and women who fought the war that won it, but the planning phases were crucial to putting our soldiers in the position to win. A little luck in some area never hurts as well. The best part of tis book is that it questions specific decisions from the war. This critcal analysis not only brings awareness, but helps our military and polititians plan future military operations. Don't forget to read "Bravo Two Zero" about the British SAS in the Gulf. Great book!
Rating:
Summary: Not the same Gen Franks
Review: This book provides an excellent view into much of the political and military decision-making that occurred during the first Gulf War. Gordon and Trainor's prose flows smoothly in this historical account of the war and this, along with many interesting vignettes mixed in, make the book easy to read. I would recommend it to anyone interested in learning not only more about the first conflict in the Gulf, but also those wanting insight into how the planning and execution of such an operation is complex and riddled with political battles. Beginning their narrative shortly before Iraq invades Kuwait, the authors show that while some within the CIA were concerned with Iraqi troop developments near the Kuwaiti border, most in the Bush Administration were unconcerned about the possibility that Hussein would challenge the U.S. in the region. The ambiguous communiqués exchanged between Iraq and the U.S. are briefly mentioned, including the infamous Glaspie memo. What the Bush administration failed to realize, was how desperate Iraq's situation would become due to their failing economy and continued large military expenditures. This combination created "an explosive relationship" according to Gordon and Trainor. After the Iraqis seize Kuwait, the book turns to its most interesting section-the decisions of where and how many forces to deploy and what to do with the forces once in place. After scrambling to receive approval from the Saudis to station troops in their territory, debate began to center around whether U.S. forces should protect Saudi Arabia or attempt to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Powell favored only protecting the Saudis, while Eagleburger believed the U.S. should seek to remove the Iraqis. This first quibble over the role of the U.S. forces was only one of many to occur throughout the conflict between decision-makers at all levels. Once it was decided Kuwait was to be liberated, the next hot topic was how to use the forces in the Gulf most effectively. In the U.S. command debate swirled over how to use the air and ground forces. Unsurprisingly, the Air Force asserted the war could be won solely through the use of air power while the Army and Marines thought a ground offensive would be necessary. Pentagon official, John Warden, pitched his revolutionary war plan to CINC commander Norman Schwartzkopf. Warden's plan involved striking at the heart of Iraq's command and control center-Baghdad. Rather than bombard Iraqi ground troops with an endless stream of firepower, Warden proposed going straight to what he called the "inner ring" of Iraq's military power and targeting electrical, radar, communication, and other installations critical to Saddam's ability to disseminate orders to subordinates. Unlike Vietnam where air power provided support for ground forces, Warden's plan involved knocking out key pillars of the Iraqi military machine with the hope that it would collapse on itself. Warden's plan was tweaked several times over to accommodate other branches and military officials but the basic framework stayed in place-Iraq would be weakened through a systematic air campaign aimed at Baghdad before a ground war would begin. With the air strategy firmly in place, work began on identifying potential targets. As the U.S. gathered intelligence on exactly what types of equipment the Iraqis possessed, they began to realize two things: 1) they were unsure about the quality of the hardware the Iraqis had and 2) the massive military buildup undertaken during the Reagan administration had neglected a few areas that might become crucial during the Gulf War. Hussein had managed to cobble together a formidable regional force through arms sales mainly from the Soviets, French, and Chinese. The U.S. was uncertain how good the Iraqi air defenses were, how effectively the Iraqis could use it, and how U.S. stealth technology and radar jamming techniques would perform against it. The U.S. was not only uneasy because the stealth technology was untested but because other areas of the military had been neglected during the Reagan era build-up. Obsessed with technology, the Reagan buildup did an excellent job of developing high-tech weapons (stealth, Tomahawk cruise missles, etc.) but passed over smaller, more minor upgrades but upgrades that were still important. Two cases illustrate this point. First, only Air Force planes had two systems of independently identifying aircraft as friend-from-foe. Since it was a rule of engagement that U.S. planes had to have two independent identifications, the Navy could not engage what it believed (rightly) were two Iraqi war jets trailing U.S. planes returning from bombing raids. Another example involves the radio technology possessed by the Army. Instead of modern radios, the Army pilots had antiquated radios that had been held over from the Vietnam era. The radios were still operable but also gave away the position of the user. When two Army pilots were forced to eject over Iraq, the Iraqis eventually captured them in part because their radio transmissions were traceable. With the air phase humming along, planning for a ground invasion continued. Again, there were battles over which ground forces would carry out which missions. The Army had planned to enter the western part of Iraq, storm toward Baghdad, and cut off the supply lines of the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The Marines' role would be to push the Iraqi army out of Kuwait and into the Army, which would have gathered a full head of steam and deliver the knock-out punch. The Marines became upset because they felt undermanned to charge into Kuwait only to have the Army swoop in and steal the glory by finishing off the Iraqis. Why do they have to do the dirty work and get none of the credit? Partners within the coalition also had to be accommodated. The Saudis insisted on helping push back Iraqi forces that had crossed the Saudi border as a matter of pride. Britain wanted a prominent role in the ground war and France also wanted to conduct a significant number of sorties. All were woven into the battle plan, even if the plan had to be altered in ways that were thought detrimental to success. With the concerns of the services and allies adequately assuaged, the ground war was finally set to begin. The Marines moved into Kuwait and after some intense initial resistance, had the Iraqis on the run. The only problem was the Marines' effort had been too successful. They Iraqis retreated quickly enough that the Army did not reach a position to deliver its "left hook" to the fleeting Iraqi forces. Since the U.S. had been so effective in the ground phase, Powell and Schwartzkopf began to lobby the president with the idea that the fighting should end soon and the U.S. should scale back in the region to prevent anti-American sentiment. Both Powell and Schwartzkopf believed that plowing through Baghdad and deposing Saddam Hussein would be costly in terms of casualties. They argued the mission had been accomplished-Kuwait had been liberated.
Rating:
Summary: Great detail on the politics of warplanning
Review: This book should be a must read for anyone who is working at the operational or strategic level of command in the US Military. The book details the rough and tumble political battles that are waged behind the scenes, out of sight from the average American.
From the national political level, who wanted to draw a line in the sand, and was more than willing to provide input to General Schwartzkopf, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, who utilized the strengthened office of the JCS, brought about by Goldwaters-Nichols in 1986 to put Washington's stamp on the Centcom plan...the book does a great job in interviewing all the players at this level who had a hand in formulating policy.
Even more interesting is the narrative surrounding the actual war planning. From the Air Force's bold plan to affect change through the use of airpower, to the Marine Corps, who wanted a greater role in the invasion of Kuwait, to the US ARmy, who competed against themselves to ensure their respective units had a part in the attack.
A great book, which could perhaps provide insight into what recently happened in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. THis will give the non-military reader insight into what General Franks probably encountered when formulating his plan, and all the inputs he had to weigh when making decisions.
This book provides a great counterbalance to the respective service histories of the first Gulf War and a must read for anyone interested in that conflict.
Rating:
Summary: Great detail on the politics of warplanning
Review: This book should be a must read for anyone who is working at the operational or strategic level of command in the US Military. The book details the rough and tumble political battles that are waged behind the scenes, out of sight from the average American.
From the national political level, who wanted to draw a line in the sand, and was more than willing to provide input to General Schwartzkopf, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, who utilized the strengthened office of the JCS, brought about by Goldwaters-Nichols in 1986 to put Washington's stamp on the Centcom plan...the book does a great job in interviewing all the players at this level who had a hand in formulating policy.
Even more interesting is the narrative surrounding the actual war planning. From the Air Force's bold plan to affect change through the use of airpower, to the Marine Corps, who wanted a greater role in the invasion of Kuwait, to the US ARmy, who competed against themselves to ensure their respective units had a part in the attack.
A great book, which could perhaps provide insight into what recently happened in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. THis will give the non-military reader insight into what General Franks probably encountered when formulating his plan, and all the inputs he had to weigh when making decisions.
This book provides a great counterbalance to the respective service histories of the first Gulf War and a must read for anyone interested in that conflict.
Rating:
Summary: objective account
Review: This is an objective account of the planning and execution of military force during the gulf war. It brushes aside many of the claims made by the USA, and our military brass(details ineffectiveness of patriots, lack of SCUD hunts, overestimation of enemy, etc). It is well written and entertaining, however I wish it had more maps with greater detail of the region and military advances and attacks. I would give this book my highest recommedation.
Rating:
Summary: Comprehensive account of the planning for Desert Storm...
Review: This is the only book that I've read on Desert Storm, but I'll bet that you won't find one that better describes all the considerations in the planning for the mission. Gordon covers all bases in the planning and excecution of the mission (from the Middle East to Washington)and that's what I bought the book for, so if you're looking for a comprehensive account of the Gulf War (with some unvarnished opinions thrown in) than you should get this book. Recommended.
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