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Rating: 
Summary: An Apologia for Non-Intervention
Review: Alan Kuperman purports to stick to "the facts." But the fact is that he ignores them:
He assumes that the only effective intervention in Rwanda would have been an airlift of U.S. troops from the continental United States, and then calculates that intervention would have taken too much time to be effective. In fact, 2500 UNAMIR peacekeeping troops were already on the ground in Rwanda, with over 5,000 French, Belgian, and U.S. troops in neighboring countries, and the French and Belgians had their troops in Rwanda within a week of the beginning of the genocide, but only to extract their own citizens. As Linda Melvern proves in her much better book, A People Betrayed, what was needed was the revised U.N. Security Council mandate for UNAMIR and the reinforcements the courageous UNAMIR commander, Gen. Romeo Dallaire requested.
Mr. Kuperman also assumes as fact that President Clinton did not know about the genocide until weeks after it began. In fact, despite efforts by lawyers in the State Department to avoid calling it genocide, U.S. diplomats in Rwanda called it genocide the day after the killing began, and Pres. Clinton knew it within the first week.
The failure of the U.N., U.S., France, and others who could have intervened to prevent and then stop this preventable genocide was a failure of political will and moral empathy. Mr. Kuperman's attempt to excuse it as militarily and logistically impossible to stop may let the policy makers responsible for this colossal failure sleep more peacefully. But for the murdered people of Rwanda, his excuses provide little solace.
Dr. Gregory Stanton
President, Genocide Watch
Rating:
Summary: An Apologia for Non-Intervention
Review: Alan Kuperman purports to stick to "the facts." But the fact is that he ignores them:
He assumes that the only effective intervention in Rwanda would have been an airlift of U.S. troops from the continental United States, and then calculates that intervention would have taken too much time to be effective. In fact, 2500 UNAMIR peacekeeping troops were already on the ground in Rwanda, with over 5,000 French, Belgian, and U.S. troops in neighboring countries, and the French and Belgians had their troops in Rwanda within a week of the beginning of the genocide, but only to extract their own citizens. As Linda Melvern proves in her much better book, A People Betrayed, what was needed was the revised U.N. Security Council mandate for UNAMIR and the reinforcements the courageous UNAMIR commander, Gen. Romeo Dallaire requested.
Mr. Kuperman also assumes as fact that President Clinton did not know about the genocide until weeks after it began. In fact, despite efforts by lawyers in the State Department to avoid calling it genocide, U.S. diplomats in Rwanda called it genocide the day after the killing began, and Pres. Clinton knew it within the first week.
The failure of the U.N., U.S., France, and others who could have intervened to prevent and then stop this preventable genocide was a failure of political will and moral empathy. Mr. Kuperman's attempt to excuse it as militarily and logistically impossible to stop may let the policy makers responsible for this colossal failure sleep more peacefully. But for the murdered people of Rwanda, his excuses provide little solace.
Dr. Gregory Stanton
President, Genocide Watch
Rating: 
Summary: Brilliant and Insightful!
Review: Ever wondered how to decide whether to intervene in a genocide? This book lays out the obstacles that would have had to have been overcome to avert the wholesale slaughter in Rwanda, a genocide that was largely completed in a matter of weeks. As a lay person and concerned citizen about U.S. intervention policies in other countries, I am relieved to find a book that analyzed the issues in an clear, unbiased fashion. Kuperman briefly but cogently outlines various considerations including geography, culture, and history in a practical, behind-the-scenes manner that makes a complicated situation better understood, even for those outside government and policy think tanks. Highly recommended for any reader interested in humanitarian aid.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent read for the lay person
Review: Ever wondered how to decide whether to intervene in a genocide? This book lays out the obstacles that would have had to have been overcome to avert the wholesale slaughter in Rwanda, a genocide that was largely completed in a matter of weeks. As a lay person and concerned citizen about U.S. intervention policies in other countries, I am relieved to find a book that analyzed the issues in an clear, unbiased fashion. Kuperman briefly but cogently outlines various considerations including geography, culture, and history in a practical, behind-the-scenes manner that makes a complicated situation better understood, even for those outside government and policy think tanks. Highly recommended for any reader interested in humanitarian aid.
Rating:
Summary: Brilliant and Insightful!
Review: Having read favorable reviews of this book in both the Harvard Magazine and the Harvard International Law Journal and being an attorney who is deeply concerned with human rights, I felt compelled to read Kuperman's book and I was not disappointed. While the conventional wisdom that a small force of 5000 troops could have prevented genocide in Rwanda and possibly in other places, Kuperman smashes such beliefs in his intricate analysis of the 1994 genocide of 500,000 Tutsis in Rwanda. And unlike Samantha Powers who in her book "A Problem from Hell" sugarcoats how easy it would be for the United States to have prevented genocides throughout history, Kuperman in his book deals with the facts -- and as he states so eloquently in the first page of his preface "facts are stubborn things". Therefore, Kuperman proceeds to lay out all the facts of the Rwanda genocide in excruciating detail. And in laying out all the facts, Superman dispels myths, discusses the complex motivations of all the actors in this civil war, hypothesizes about the success of various forms of military intervention, and ultimately, draws important and reasoned conclusions which can help future leaders prevent civil conflicts from escalating into genocides. While this book is not light reading and you do need at least a couple of years of college to understand it, Kuperman's book is a must read for any serious student of genocide and international relations. I give it my highest five star rating!
Rating:
Summary: Rave Reviews
Review: Here's a sampling of published reviews:
"Essential if dispiriting reading for the tender-hearted and tough-minded alike."
- Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2001
"A detailed, thorough, and compelling analysis."
- Harvard International Law Journal, Summer 2002
"Hard-hitting and authoritative account . . . highly recommended"
- American Society of International Law, Jan 2002
"Thorough, succinct, analytically innovative, and refreshingly unbiased."
- Marine Corps Gazette, March 2003
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