Swarming and the Future of Conflict (Mr (Rand Corporation), Db-311-Osd.)

Rating:
Summary: A cool study on information war...applied
Review: An interesting start into a functional aspect of evolving information-based warfare. Going beyond just having "information dominance," this work explores the application of such knowledge with an explication of "BattleSwarm" doctrine. Returning to the controlled chaos of Mongol hoards, this study sees our capacities for information for integrated attack from all sides and from all dimensions. With a broad, historical outline that helps one's imagination, this study is a good start at the pros and cons this doctrine for the future.

Rating:
Summary: A cool study on information war...applied
Review: An interesting start into a functional aspect of evolving information-based warfare. Going beyond just having "information dominance," this work explores the application of such knowledge with an explication of "BattleSwarm" doctrine. Returning to the controlled chaos of Mongol hoards, this study sees our capacities for information for integrated attack from all sides and from all dimensions. With a broad, historical outline that helps one's imagination, this study is a good start at the pros and cons this doctrine for the future.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent introduction to a new theory of combat
Review: First off, it should be stated that this is by no means a full book. Rather, it is more of a fleshed out briefing paper. That said, the authors have done a superb job of positing a new theory of combat and have gone to some lengths to establish it in the context of military history, and to consider some of the potential strengths and weaknesses of this nascent doctrine.

Swarming, or "BattleSwarm", as the authors refer to it, might be considered the logical endgame of maneuver warfare theory: small, highly mobile, highly lethal, and most importantly, largely autonomous units that converge on a point (either with force or fire) from all directions, and then disperse until called upon again. This mode of attack has the advantage of maximizing the application of fire when needed, while minimizing the exposure of friendly units to PGM's and massed enemy formations when not. To a degree, this is what we have seen American forces do in Afghanistan, but that was a result of ad hoc planning born of necessity. What the authors propose here, however, is a complete rethinking of the military (primarily the Army) to effectively engage in this new kind of fighting.

As one might expect, of paramount importance to the success of BattleSwarm is the development of networking technologies that can allow widely dispersed units to communicate with each other and command elements in an effective fashion. Moreover, the authors point out the need for a new command doctrine that will limit micromanaging of the battlespace, on the one hand, and insufficient coordination of assets on the other.

Ultimately, this study is just a first step, albeit a critical one. I fully expect that the authors will flesh this work out into a full-fledged book that will seek to overcome some of the difficulties they have outlined. In the meantime, this briefing provides a valuable framework within which to evaluate our successes and failures in Afghanistan (it should be noted, this was published prior to 9/11). It seems that military, out of necessity, is moving in the direction that has been outlined here, and as a result, understanding swarming and its application will be critical for anyone interested in the shape of our armed forces in the years to come.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent introduction to a new theory of combat
Review: First off, it should be stated that this is by no means a full book. Rather, it is more of a fleshed out briefing paper. That said, the authors have done a superb job of positing a new theory of combat and have gone to some lengths to establish it in the context of military history, and to consider some of the potential strengths and weaknesses of this nascent doctrine.

Swarming, or "BattleSwarm", as the authors refer to it, might be considered the logical endgame of maneuver warfare theory: small, highly mobile, highly lethal, and most importantly, largely autonomous units that converge on a point (either with force or fire) from all directions, and then disperse until called upon again. This mode of attack has the advantage of maximizing the application of fire when needed, while minimizing the exposure of friendly units to PGM's and massed enemy formations when not. To a degree, this is what we have seen American forces do in Afghanistan, but that was a result of ad hoc planning born of necessity. What the authors propose here, however, is a complete rethinking of the military (primarily the Army) to effectively engage in this new kind of fighting.

As one might expect, of paramount importance to the success of BattleSwarm is the development of networking technologies that can allow widely dispersed units to communicate with each other and command elements in an effective fashion. Moreover, the authors point out the need for a new command doctrine that will limit micromanaging of the battlespace, on the one hand, and insufficient coordination of assets on the other.

Ultimately, this study is just a first step, albeit a critical one. I fully expect that the authors will flesh this work out into a full-fledged book that will seek to overcome some of the difficulties they have outlined. In the meantime, this briefing provides a valuable framework within which to evaluate our successes and failures in Afghanistan (it should be noted, this was published prior to 9/11). It seems that military, out of necessity, is moving in the direction that has been outlined here, and as a result, understanding swarming and its application will be critical for anyone interested in the shape of our armed forces in the years to come.