Rating: 
Summary: objectivism is the lighthouse in the sea of nihilism
Review: at first, it may seem the concepts rand explains are simple and really need no elaboration, but it is only by doing this that she rips apart arguments for philosophies that claim "there is no reality and what we percieve is all man's invention." it's really a great book.
Rating: 
Summary: Interesting but isolated and not at all rigorous
Review: Ayn Rand and her followers have some interesting things to say sometimes, but they are horribly handicapped by their refusal to engage any other philosophical literature. In fact, they seem largely unaware of it. For example, Peikoff's piece on the analytic-synthetic distinction shows that he is completely unaware of contemporary philosophy: he begins by saying that the analytic-synthetic distinction "is accepted, in some form, by virtually every influential contemporary philosopher". But this is clearly false. The most cited paper in 20th century philosophy is Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1953, available in From A Logical Point of View) which famously (and, I think, quite effectively-much more effectively than Peikoff) attacks the distinction. Though there have been many criticisms of the paper and defenses of the distinction, many agree with Quine and he is one of the most famous philosophers of the 20th century, especially within Anglo-American philosophy. Peikoff must have been completely removed from the philosophical community and not reading any contemporary philosophy in order to not be aware of this. And this kind of ignorance and refusal to make citations to important philosophical works being drawn on or criticized shows up throughout the book. This is an interesting read for those with little philosophical background, but frustratingly vague, ignorant, and thus arrogant--not accurately prideful--to anyone with such a background.
Rating: 
Summary: Muddled and Confused
Review: I read this book in the course of renewing an interest in philosophy. The title intriqued me. I was aware that Rand has been criticized for her politics and her polemic style. I was determined to ignore those aspects, to the extent they appear, and learn more about epistemology. I found the book garbled and incomprehensible; I have read the reviews that attempt to address the obvious problems, and find they fail to rehabilitate the work. Rand begins by impressing us with the importance of the question of universals. This is an odd starting place, as universals are an issue of ontology, not epistemology. The problem of universals is important, for the reasons Rand suggests: realists, in holding that there are universal qualities that transcend the particular, tend towards deism; nominalists, in denying the reality of the universal concepts that we use to understand particulars, tend towards subjectivism. Rand clearly wishes to avoid either of these results (although she lumps deism with mysticism, which is extremely overbroad). Certainly I understand the desire to find an answer to the problem that avoids these approaches, and I am fully on board with her in her quest. In attempting to avoid the results of choosing between realism and nominalism, however, Rand simply avoids discussing ontology at all. Hence, the problem of universals remains. She begins by assuming nominalism and ends by assuming realism. I note the fovorable reviewers suggest that she wasn't taking on the HISTORICAL question of universals; or that she was discussing only epistemological universals, not ontological universals. There are lots of problems with these defenses. First, the HISTORICAL problem of universals, as Rand says, is a vital REAL problem of philosophy. It can't be dodged. Either universals exist outside the mind or they do not. If they exist outside the mind, there remains the question of where and how they exist, despite the changing nature of all particulars we experience, and how they get into the mind, since we expericence only transitory particulars. If they exist only inside the mind, we have to confront the problem that knowledge is disconnected from reality. If Rand is answering another question, fine - but she isn't clear on this (in fact she is emphatic that she is confronting universals), and (unless she confronts the "historical" question of universals elsewhere), her philosophy lacks an ontology. There isn't any such thing as a "epistemological universal" unless you are suggesting a theory that universals in the mind exist a priori - and you should call it by its name. It is possible that I'm just too dense or stuck in my ways to follow what Rand is arguing. At some point, however, I will have to take an author at his or her word. She says she's discussing universals, but she clearly isn't (and she's arguing/criticising philosophers who clearly were discussing universals - why bother with them, if they started out on the wrong track?). She isn't clear as to what question exactly she is answering, and if it isn't the question of universals, how it sidesteps the question of universals. Perhaps if I had unlimited time, I could rehabilitate her argument - but that was her job, not mine.
Rating:
Summary: Needs a lot more work
Review: If the assertions in this book were validated from an empirical/scientific standpoint, it would be a major advance in psychology and neuroscience. The author of this book though did not intend to produce a scientific work, but instead a philosophical one, and as in all such works, one is free to speculate, with the only side constraint being that its logic must be cohesive (although some modern works relax even this restriction). The claims that the author makes in this book are very extreme, considering the paucity of scientific evidence and complete lack of references. The author's intent was to summarize the "Objectivist theory of concepts" as a prelude to a future book on Objectivism, the latter name the author has given to her philosophy. Since it is a summary, and since it is philosophy (which usually eschews any need for empirical validation), one perhaps should not expect the details of all the assertions made in the book. The problem with this work though is that the author implicitly draws on fields such as child psychology and neuroscience, but no citations are given and therefore its credibility is suspect. Some examples of the parts in the book that need reworking include: 1. The author's assertion that the human mathematical and conceptual abilities develop simultaneously. Not only is the author assuming that these abilities are indeed different, she offers no studies to support her assertion concerning the time development of these abilities in a child. What studies influenced her thinking on these matters? It is doubtful that the author has conducted the careful experimental work needed to reach her conclusions. Considering the amount of research that has been done in child and cognitive development in the past fifty years, this research involving many individuals, the author's claims on the cognitive development of a child are most astounding. 2. In her discussion on concept formation, the author explains the process, as she sees it, of the forming of the simplest concept, the concept of a single attribute. She does not define or have a criterion for "simplicity" of a concept, but as an example gives the concept of "length" as being one of the simplest. For the author, the child forms the concept "length" by observing objects of different length, noting that the length is the attribute they have in common, but the actual measurements are omitted. The author does not give any empirical evidence supporting this claim of concept formation, and she asserts that this process does not involve words. The lack of words to form concepts is not by itself troubling, but the lack of evidence to support both of these claims is. Again, there are many researchers who are very curious about the processes of learning and cognition, and much work in these areas has been done. The author's claims are extraordinary in this regard, and require much more substantiation if they are to be accepted from a scientific standpoint. 3. It is very apparent throughout the book that the author's knowledge of mathematics is very limited, and her limitations here cause problems in many of the discussions in the book. For example, when she describes the process of a child forming the concept of "table", she claims that it is the "shape" of the tables that forms the distinguishing characteristic. However, "shape" is a more complicated concept than the author realizes from a mathematical standpoint. A classification of objects by "shape" would not necessarily be the rigid geometric one which she clearly wants to use in the book. As another example, she discusses integral calculus as being a method for calculating the area of circles. It does this of course, but this is perhaps its most elementary application, and it goes far beyond this in its ramifications. The author's case for the importance of mathematics in her theory of concept formation would be much more credible if she would have obtained a more in-depth understanding of modern mathematics. 4. In the book the terms "complexity" and "random" are used very loosely. Since these notions are important in her epistemology, and of course very important from the standpoint of modern computer science and complexity theory, they need more careful consideration in this book. Indeed, her assertion that as a child's knowledge grows the complexity of the definitions of his concepts increases may if taken at face value completely invalidate her theory of concept formation. This is because some theories of concept formation that are based on knowledge trees can run into the problem of a "combinatorial explosion" or if based on first order logic may be "undecidable". The author's definition of complexity is completely absent though, and so one cannot analyze her works in the context of modern notions of complexity. Her notion of randomness too is left undefined, but she makes use of the notion frequently in the book, as for example in her assertion that concepts cannot be formed "at random". But randomness is a notion that requires careful elucidation in many different fields of endeavor, and especially in the field of neuroscience, the latter of which is also very concerned with developing a successful theory of concept formation. It is readily apparent while reading the book that the author was completely isolated from the mathematical and scientific community while the book was being written. The lack of references, the extraordinary claims made, and the overall tone of the book make it almost useless to those readers who are actively involved in developing theories of cognitive development or those who are curious about such developments. If the book had included what was needed, its size would be many times over what it is now. Its status as a book on epistemology is typical of philosophical treatises: lots of speculation and arm-chair reasoning, but little or no empirical content.
Rating:
Summary: Interesting but isolated and not at all rigorous
Review: In this book Rand presents, for the first time, a fully objective theory of concept formation. This second edition contains much material not available in the first. As an appendix, we have the pleasure of seeing her mind at work as she answers questions from philosophers, mathematicians and physicists. This book is essential to understand Objectivism, and should be read along with Peikoff's book on Objectivism.
Rating: 
Summary: Good amateur philosophy
Review: It's hard for me to give an objective review of this book. Honestly, it's a thought provoking philosophical work in the sense that it *does* force you to think if you are unacquainted with these problems. In addition, it's not as inaccessible as many contemporary and historical (traditional) philosophical works, and it presents some topics that *should* be of interest to the general public. But if you are not a philosophical amateur, and you are acquainted with the *best* of traditional and contemporary philosophy, you will probably not find much in this book that piques your interest. There is no proper attempt made in this book to engage historical views properly, or to criticize contemporary views after developing them competently. It is not a scholarly or academic work - it is better than pop philosophy, but well below the (proper, not just pretentious) scholarly bar. And a huge part of the problem is that Rand has a cult following which claims that she was absolutely right on the major issues. The real problem is that the amount and quality of reading required to show she was wrong is probably beyond the practical limits of most people's interest in philosophy. However, I do not think that this is a sufficient reason to say that people should not read the book - it can genuinely aid your practical thought like it aided mine and that of many others. Ayn Rand discusses the problem of universals, which has historically been characterized as an ontological (metaphysical) problem, in a book on epistemology. This might annoy some philosophical purists, but she does defend this act (while she might not have agreed with my claim that she was defending a form of conceptualism, it is that fact alone that might have justified her making the problem a matter of epistemology). I do not think that her attempt was ultimately successful (for the simple reason that I think that conceptualism cannot provide a *full* account of universals, which are properly ontological). However, given the fact that this book was written at a time when philosophies like pragmatism, logical positivism, and linguistic analysis were running things, Rand was a great alternative. Rand doesn't seem to consider the possibility of real inter-contextual identities existing in reality (precisely the same shade of red on two different objects). She does give a decent account of similarity/resemblance, but I think that her account is contrived. I think that she depends on a real universal (length) in her account of similarity - however, it is the existence of that real universal that she is meant to explain without postulating its metaphysical existence if her account is purely epistemological. Rand does ground a lot of her epistemology in sense perception and this is a good thing for the clarity of thought and communication. However, she doesn't distinguish between sensation and sense perception, and she fails to realize that reason is a faculty that provides a lot of the information given in sense perception. It seems that she is not at all acquainted with the arguments in British philosophy about the status of logic, mathematics and ethics as not being based in sense perception which hasn't been moulded by reason. This argument historically proceeded through the works of
: Locke, who claimed that all knowledge originates in sensation.
: Hume, who denied the validity of any knowledge not given in sensation.
: Green, the British Idealist who showed that Hume and Locke had to be wrong or knowledge would be impossible. His account of metaphysics and epistemology was defended by Bradley and Bosanquet in Britain and Royce and Blanshard in America, with Blanshard being the most empircally advanced in terms of 20th century science. There are many other important names in these debates apart from the British ones I mentioned, but the difficult "Introduction to Locke and Hume" shows the inadequacies of empiricism, and there is no need to read Kant or Hegel's dark ruminations, which are even worse (more difficult). In fact, it can be argued that so many philosophical errors were repeated in the 20th century because the work of the Idealists was not properly understood before being rejected. British Idealism was uncritically associated with mysticism, and rejected by some secular philosophers the same way that classical economics was rejected by some pro-capitalist economists because it was uncritically associated with socialism. If people had sat down and understood the arguments of the Idealists before writing them off, maybe we would not have had the foolishly dark pronouncements of skepticism emanating from the vortices of logical positivism, linguistic analysis and existentialism today. Rand talks about many interesting issues: essences, axioms, definitions etc. Whether they all properly belong in a work on epistemology is another story. There are some ad hominem remarks directed at opposing positions (sometimes right, but still not good writing practice). The essay by Peikoff on the Analytic-Synthetic dichotomy correctly rejects the dichotomy, whose acceptance was based on a rejection of necessity in causality, but the arguments get the distinction wrong and mix it up with a lot of other dichotomies. However, one cannot know this unless one acquaints oneself with philosophical history of the highest quality (and not just the popular, but often incorrect/biased people like Bertrand Russell either). I think this is a good book for anyone who wants to gain some insight into knowledge. Ayn Rand was probably the biggest bridge on my path to becoming an amateur philosopher so I can recommend this book to anyone. However, the level of sophistication with which the arguments are presented makes the book more of a sermon than a philosophical argument. It should be read quite critically, and I would recommend the books of Robert Audi or Laurence Bonjour for those who want good, contemporary traditionalist and rationalist accounts of epistemology in the purist tradition of philosophy. For a good historical account of philosophy that is accessible to the intelligent reader, I, without hesitation, recommend anything by Brand Blanshard, who is easily my favorite philosopher.
Rating:
Summary: Incredible
Review: Rand states early in this book that she has solved the problem of universals with a third category, objectivism, in addition to the traditional nominalism and realism. Bear with me here, as I'm going to excerpt a paper I wrote on Rand's writings, and I have to assume for brevity that you understand the problem (basically: realism - the properties objects hold in common actually exist on their own; nominalism - the properties objects seem to hold in common do not exist except in our minds)... First, I established that Rand, who statedly does not believe in realist universals, would qualify as a nominalist trying to create a working analysis of similarity. This is accomplished by Rand's theory of concept formation by way of measurement-omission: "Let us now examine the process of forming the simplest concept, the concept of a single attribute (chronologically, this is not the first concept that a child would grasp; but it is the simplest one epistemologically)-for instance, the concept 'length.' If a child considers a match, a pencil, and a stick, he observes that length is the attribute they have in common, but their specific lengths differ. The difference is one of measurement. In order to form the concept "length," the child's mind retains the attribute and omits its particular measurements." (In the volume at issue.) Rand's analysis of the problem seems to hold some weight - its account of similarity, if it functions, would give a corresponding form of nominalism equal explanatory power to realism. Unfortunately, this is not quite the case. Rand's theory that measurement omission will reveal basic assumptions itself is not unsound; it is a fully functional description of abstraction. Its problem is that it does not function as a nominalist account of abstraction at all. The nominalist must admit that there are no actual universals, only some form of perceived similarities in objects that are assigned to categories by the human mind. That is, literally, there is no thing that any two objects literally have in common. The nominalist then makes the claim that concept formation occurs by observing differences among the characteristics of objects, noticing that the differences seem to occur in terms of measurement, and subsequently omitting the measurements from the mental abstract concepts. Let us use Rand's example: length. Once the match, the pencil, and the stick are observed, they seem to have differing quantities of length. Length is the similarity, the measurements are the difference. The problem is: now the match, the pencil, and the stick have some thing in common. This contradicts the earlier nominalist statement that there is no thing held in common by any two particulars. The very property being considered, length, still must be explained in terms of universals. It seems to me that the nominalist may claim that there is, indeed, no thing held in common by these two particulars. For length to not be a universal, it must be observed that it is not a thing that exists. Here we see Rand again, now stating the childlike assumption more clearly:
"Or, more precisely, if the process were identified in words, it would consist of the following: Length must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity. I shall identify as 'length' that attribute of any existent possessing it which can be quantitatively related to a unit of length, without specifying the quantity." (Rand) The key word that is used here is exist. The abstract attribute of length is, even in Rand's account, some thing that exists. It is impossible, on face value, for the nominalist to continue to hold this view while remaining consistent. Rand's account has shown itself to be indisputably realist. This does not reveal what sort of realist she was, but simply that her own account could not support a different position. From here I diverged; my interest was in an overall discussion of analyses of similarity, but we see that Rand's odd form of nominalism is, in fact, a very incomplete realism: for as soon as you accept that the objectivist stand is a realist one, you face the fact that Rand did nothing whatsoever to expand on the problems associated with realism (such as the difficulties of the various perceptions of where universals lie). Hence, any claim made that this book is a significant contribution to the problem of universals, much less a solution to it, is sadly flawed. If you're a devotee of Rand, or interested in her as a philosopher, you might get something out of ItOE. But some claims made in favor of the book are...exaggerated. Also, there is useless renaming of terminology in the book; my paper, being submitted for a 300-level metaphysics course, used the terms that are in standard use. So caveat emptor.
Rating:
Summary: What exactly is thinking?
Review: Some people tell you to think. Many more will you what to think. In this book, Ayn Rand discusses how to think (epistemology is the study of knowledge/thinking). This is an absolutely imperative question, because unlike the lungs or the heart, the mind does not function automatically. Fortunately, this book does a great job of explaining every aspect of thought from concept formation to the role of language to the need for abstractions. The book also describes three basic axioms (existence, identity, and consciousness) and shows how any attempt to disprove an axiom must in fact rely on that axiom, and thus is self-defeating. My biggest question after reading this, was how was this not included in my (and everyone's) schooling? It's one thing for schools not to present Ayn Rand's epistemology, but no school (before college) I am aware of presents ANY epistemology. That more than any other statement shows the poor state of modern academia.
Rating:
Summary: What exactly is thinking?
Review: Some people tell you to think. Many more will you what to think. In this book, Ayn Rand discusses how to think (epistemology is the study of knowledge/thinking). This is an absolutely imperative question, because unlike the lungs or the heart, the mind does not function automatically. Fortunately, this book does a great job of explaining every aspect of thought from concept formation to the role of language to the need for abstractions. The book also describes three basic axioms (existence, identity, and consciousness) and shows how any attempt to disprove an axiom must in fact rely on that axiom, and thus is self-defeating. My biggest question after reading this, was how was this not included in my (and everyone's) schooling? It's one thing for schools not to present Ayn Rand's epistemology, but no school (before college) I am aware of presents ANY epistemology. That more than any other statement shows the poor state of modern academia.
Rating:
Summary: Ayn Rand at Her Best
Review: This book has three sections. The first is Ayn Rand's new theory of concepts, which is 87 pages long. A concept is something like "red" or "justice". You'll never find an object lying on the ground that is red or justice all by itself, so where do these ideas come from? Do we just make them up? These are the questions Ayn Rand explores and offers a unique solution to. Far from being useless philosophical babbling, Rand goes on to show how important it is to form concepts properly, as they are our way of understanding the world. The next section, by Leonard Peikoff, is a discussion of what is called the "analytic-synthetic dichotomy". As its name suggests, the dichotomy is what you expect from modern philosophy: very complicated and totally irrelevant to the way real people think. Peikoff shows how it is equally useless philosophically, and he does this without delving into obscure techno-babble while still making the argument clear and illustrative. This is accomplished in a neat 34 pages. My favorite section of the book is the last 171 pages, which presents the highlights of a workshop held by Ayn Rand to discuss the first section of the work. Here you can find Ayn Rand engaged in philosophic discussion with other intellectuals of her time, clarifying points and coming up with new examples. It is inspiring to see how much thought must have gone into this work, for her to be able to discuss even the finest points at length in conversation. While the first section may be only 87 pages, there is a tremendous effort and understanding behind every sentence in those pages. A word of warning, though. This book is unlike anything else published by Rand, as it deals with formal philosophy, not current events or the lives of fictional heroes. If you are familiar with the 60-page speech in Atlas Shrugged, it's like that, but without the excitement and emotion evoked by the plot.
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