Rating:  Summary: A must read Review: A terrific book, which helped me understand my political feelings. I am a registered Independent and have always tried to vote for the best candidate, but more and more I find myself voting conservative because I have so much trouble swallowing the liberal-elite party line. Basically, conservatives view their birthright and security as coming from a just God, while liberals believe it is provided by a secular, centralized state. In the beginning, this book mentions four things, which combined, make America great:
1. A constitution intended to divide and dilute power, while encouraging vigorous pursuit of freedom and the American dream.
2. Geographical abundance, which encourages individualism and accumulation of wealth.
3. Reinvention on a continual basis, which is reflected in American industrial productivity and flexibility.
4. Morality. The more the secular nations of the world hate us for this, the more convinced we are that we are indeed right.
The book makes the point that America is definitely a conservative country, in a very unique way, and makes no apologies for it. After living in Europe for 9 years, I returned to my beloved America with a new appreciation for what I had here. I was also fed up with cradle-to-grave socialism and the unbelievable taxes that go with it. I well remember Barry Goldwater saying some 30 years ago that America is and always has been a conservative nation. The liberal power-grab by the 60's flower children only served to awaken and motivate a sleeping giant. The backlash is likely to be enormous, and could well seriously threaten the Democratic party.
A few quotes from the book that caught my eye, are:
"Conservative America leans toward unilateralism. It has always been skeptical about the fancy-pants sophisticates who run the foreign policy establishment in Washington, and the the organs of international diplomacy - particularly the United Nations."
"Today the triumph of secularization in Europe seems to be going hand in hand with the decline of the work ethic, just as the survival of religion in the United States is going hand in hand with the survival of the work ethic."
"Europe and America can establish a mature relationship on when the Europeans begin to take more responsibility for their own defense."
The book leaves one with the idea that American conservatism is here to say. The liberals in New York and San Francisco, the Canadians and the secular Europeans may as well get used to the idea.
A great read and heady stuff!
Rating:  Summary: good overview but lacks substance Review: An avid reader and student of American politics, particularly the conservative movement, I was excited to see this book and hesitate to give it a negative review, since it is so very fair to its subject. But I found it limited and superficial.First, some good points. The book treats conservatism and conservatives very objectively--without any kind of arrogance or condescension or venom. They approach conservatism seriously and treat it as a legitimate political philosophy held by intelligent people. Neither are they uncritical. Flaws and errors are outlined, and the authors are particularly harsh on John Ashcroft. The book's main arguments are especially interesting: that conservatism is what makes American unique; that the process works the other way and American exceptionalism gives American conservatism its distinctive character (and sharply distinguishes it from European conservatism); that conservatism triumphed mainly through demography (specifically the shift west and south), intellectuals/think tanks, and foot soldiers/grassroots; and that the US is and will remain an essentially conservative nation, no matter who is elected in 2004. Ultimately, though, the book is superficial. The best part of the book is its first section that chronicles the roots of the conservative movement in the 1950s. Not only highly readable, it gives a very nice summary of that period, touching on the key names (like Kirk, Hayek, Rand, and Buckley) and providing some colorful anecdotes (like Albert Jay Nock's penchant for capes). Still, those versed in the movement's history--particularly those who have read Nash's superb Conservative Intellectual Movement in America--will find nothing new here and will most likely be frustrated by how much the authors gloss over, such as the fusion of traditionalism and libertarianism (which they attribute to William F. Buckley without mentioning Frank Meyer) or how conservatives shunned the Birchers. After the history lesson, the book discusses the conservative present and future, loses much of its focus, and starts to digress and repeat points that were previously reviewed (including an almost verbatim repetition of a six-point summary of Burke's philosophy). It is at this point that the authors move from ideas to politics, which is logical since the book is about "conservative power" and conservatives gain power through politics. But too frequently, the authors seem implicitly to conflate conservatism with the Republican Party. Certainly, the GOP is home to most conservatives, and we surely have some form of *Republican* power today, holding all three branches of government and evidenced by the red-blue map, but it is debatable whether Republican governance, and the Bush administration specifically, represents *conservative* power. This should have been discussed. The book was clearly written for those unfamiliar with the conservative movement and American politics, if the basic descriptions of American government are any indication (did you know each state has two senators and that this gives small, rural states as much or more power than larger states?). As an introduction, then, to American conservatism and political beliefs, this book is excellent. And because it is so fair, it is a much-need corrective for those inclined toward simplistic and stereotypical views of conservatism. But those well-versed in the history and ways of the American Right might want to look elsewhere.
Rating:  Summary: A fairly nonpartisan analysis of American conservativism Review: I can't imagine this being a book that pleases anyone in its entirety, but I also can't imagine anyone except the most fervid extremists not finding a great deal food for thought. It is also a book that will broaden and stretch one's point of view. Book on the political situation in the United States today tend to be rabidly partisan. John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge are British conservatives writing about American conservatism. Their interests as conservatives are starkly at odds with the interests in many American conservatives (British conservatives tend to be perplexed by American obsessions over the culture wars and their enthusiasm for gun ownership and the death penalty, which they like virtually all people in the civilized world consider a barbarous practice), and they definitely are not partisan in the sense of owing allegiance to any American political party. They seem to sympathize with the American drift to the Right while at the same time lamenting many of the accoutrements of the Right. All in all, this is probably one of the more helpful surveys of the contemporary American political scene, even if one would, as I do, take issue with a host of their specific points.
A great deal of the book is devoted to surveying the historical development and current landscape of American conservativism. They helpfully get to the peculiarity of American conservativism near the beginning of the book by contrasting the American Right with the classic conservativism that we associate with Edmund Burke (conservatism as an identifiable political movement having been born in Burke's reaction to the French Revolution in his REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE). Burkean conservatism, they point out, is devoted to six principles: "a deep suspicion of the power of the state; a preference for liberty over equality; patriotism; a belief in established institutions and hierarchies; skepticism about the idea of progress; and elitism." They point out that American conservatives dramatically exaggerate the first three of these principles, and utterly eschew the final three, putting them curiously out of step with European conservatives. Indeed, as they point out later in the book, one can actually view many contemporary American conservatives as classic liberals, and indeed (something they do not point out), many political writers today, especially in France, write of Reagan and Bush 43 as being proponents of Neoliberals. Indeed, they both esteem that classic liberal Adam Smith (oddly enough an icon for the Right today, who bizarrely assume he was a conservative). Throughout the book they as conservatives look at the American Right with some perplexity, baffled at the emphasis on individualism that is a feature of American conservativism along, or the dedication to fundamentalist religion, or the strange backing of Israel.
Where I had problems with the book was with the author's tendency to both write the more liberal segment of American political life off. For instance, they could easily have pointed out that George W. Bush is pretty much without debate the most hated president in American history (in modern history Truman had lower approval ratings, but except for Nixon at the height of Watergate, it is hard to remember an American president who was the target of so much wrath). Under no scenario is it possible to describe Bush as a popular president. Nor has a strong majority shown a preference for Right Wing ideas or principles. Indeed, a poll conducted shortly after Bush's 2004 election showed that a strong majority of Americans opposed most of the agenda Bush was touting for his second term, including tax reform, the nomination of extremely conservative judges, drilling for oil in the Alaskan wilderness preserve, and pushing individual retirement accounts over social security (though a majority does support making it an option in addition to social security). Moreover, if one looks at American society as a whole since 1968, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that on a social level America has become more and more socially liberal. In 1968, for a woman to kiss another woman, as Willow did with her girlfriend Tara on BUFFY THE VAMPIRE SLAYER in 2001, would have been scandalous, but thirty years later we barely noticed it. Yes, there has been a revival of fundamentalist religion, but the advance on sexual and racial tolerance has been extraordinary. There is absolutely no reason to imagine that the clock is going to turn back.
On the other hand, the section near the end of the book on the Democratic party was a vivid reminder of precisely how conservative Americans really are politically. As they write, "These days, American politics is a sport played between the center Right against the Right. From an international perspective, Democrats are LINOs-Liberals in Name Only." By way of illustrating this, they point out that European mainstream conservatives (though there is also a radical conservatism in Europe and England that plays a larger role in politics than the radical fringe in the US, where it plays none, and has been successfully marginalized-we may have militia and white power groups in America, but they have close to no political influence of any kind, unlike La Pen's supporters in France) are far more liberal than British conservatives, who are in turn probably a bit more liberal than the American Democratic party, which in turn is the "liberal" alternative to the Republican party. Today's Democratic party is in fact not a liberal alternative, but the not-quite-so-conservative alternative.
The book is thought provoking and stimulating from beginning to end, but I found myself not trusting it in the details. Though sceptical of American conservativism, the authors nevertheless buy into a good deal of the propaganda that the American Right has so skillfully articulated. For instance, at one point they write of the "liberal" TODAY show, an odd adjective for one of the blandest, generic shows on TV. Whatever politics it has could only with effort be described as "liberal." Indeed, despite all evidence to the contrary, they persist in the myth of the liberal media, a myth easily dispelled by many of the other observations they make in the book. They also falter in a large number of details. For instance, they remark with disdain about Clinton's pardon of Marc Rich, but fail to note that the drive for his pardon was driven not by Democrats but by a former Israeli prime minister and Rich's GOP lawyer Scooter Libby, currently Cheney's chief of staff and the primary suspect in the probe into the leak to Robert Novak that Joseph Wilson's wife Virginia Plaume was a CIA field operative. Instead of a Bill Clinton-drive scheme, it was a GOP-driven operation, but the authors do not note this. Nonetheless, they in general are not deceived by many of the cruder efforts of the Right to mislead the public. They recognize the Clear Skies Initiative as a turning back of environmental protections, do not buy into the stark good and evil justifications by the White House and others for various foreign policy moves, and acknowledge the legitimacy of claims that much of hoopla surrounding Clinton wrongdoing was the result of Right Wing propaganda efforts. So, while they are sometimes weak in some of the details, they rarely succumb to simplicity.
There was one rather blatant feature of the American Right that they miss and miss rather completely: the anti-intellectual nature of American Right-Wing movements. Others have pointed this out, especially Richard Hofstadter in his book ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE. This was unfortunate not merely because it leaves out an important consideration concerning many contemporary American conservatives (in addition to leaving out Conservativism's place within the Counter-Enlightenment as a whole) that would have helped the authors to understand more fully the historical connections between right wing movements and those religious movements that flourished in the South, denominations that did not require their ministers to possess a formal education (largely because of the absence of colleges in the region in the 18th century). This led to an ongoing promulgation of anti-intellectual values, an exceptionally crucial element in the history of the American Right. Though the authors quote Hofstadter at a couple of points, they neglect this aspect both of his work and American history.
Despite these caveats, this book truly does do a great job of helping Americans understand how extraordinarily unique their political life is. We live in a nation where the "liberal" party is more conservative than the conservative party of the most conservative nation in the European Union. We Americans are scarcely aware of this. In the end, the book had a depressive effect on me, as I realized how profoundly out of step the United States is with the rest of the world. My fear is that we may get even further out of step before we move more back to the global mainstream. I heartily recommend that anyone concerned with American political life-whether one is a non-American, a member either of the Republican Right or the Democratic Right, or a true leftist-read this for a deeper understanding of contemporary America.
Rating:  Summary: Makes you proud to be an American Review: I take this as great news - that the United States is emerging from a transition that has taken it from a generally conservative culture as originally conceived 250 years ago through a dalliance with more Socialistic trends from the 30s thru the 80s but is now becoming more deliberately and more sustainably conservative from coast to coast.
This is an observation thoroughly documented and entertainingly described by two young Brits, John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, employed by the British Economist magazine and stationed in the United States. They recorded their extensive observations in their 2004 book Right Nation (The Penguin Press) and drew their conclusions even before George Bush's and the Republican victories last November.
The two young authors are not rebellious escapees from uber-liberal Europe seeking to glad-mouth things American. Indeed their European leftism is evident in several places throughout the book. While they offer hundreds of interesting historical facts and developments that document the unique and powerful conservatism of American politics, they say, in several places, the US Supreme Court "put Bush in the White House" in 2000, ignoring the simple fact, as most leftists do, that President Bush was elected by properly counted votes and the Electoral College. Also like many liberals they don't seen to understand the very basic objection Americans have to calling homosexual unions marriage. On the other hand, as a sign of their objectivity and without one negative word about Michael Moore they successfully portray him as being out of touch with reality.
They also tend to side with their fellow Europeans in condemning Israel as "the biggest threat to world peace." Yet they suggest that Europeans should "take more responsibility for their own defense."
Overall Micklethwait and Wooldridge have done their homework diligently; they write brilliantly; and they present a remarkably objective and open-minded study of the unique cultural and political development of the United States, the world's most powerful and most exceptional country and people.
Their interesting book certainly validated my decision of 40 years ago to emigrate to the US and to become a citizen. Like the authors I was raised in a trade-union leftist household, mine in Australia which, like their native UK has no political entity to compare with the right wing of American politics. They document the remarkable exceptionalism of the US and reveal that nowhere else is there an understanding of the fundamental 'rightness' and exceptionalism of the American culture.
All people who 'get' what America is about will be buoyed by this book - optimism - confidence - validation - enthusiasm for living. The book is full of good news.
I must add that this book is first about sociology and culture rather than politics. It has been written for all audiences whether right or left. It explains eloquently why so many millions of people emigrate here, fall in love with this most exceptional country and eventually embrace more conservative politics than their distant relatives and friends can possibly understand.
Right Nation should be a standard text for all American high schools.
Rating:  Summary: Fair and balanced (if you'll pardon the expression) and fun Review: I walked through the current-events section of a brick-and-mortar bookstore recently and was amazed by the mass of anti-Bush books on the shelves. They're everywhere. A cottage industry. If the Clinton-haters dialed into talk radio, the Bush-haters are all hunched over their keyboards, pouring their spleen onto the page. It's a little discouraging, then, that this great book -- "The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America" -- should come out in the midst of all this noise. My fear is that people will see it as just one more "exposé" of the evil right-wingers and their malevolent influence on the country. If that's what you're looking for, you're bound to be disappointed. This is, in fact, a thoroughly researched and marvelously fair look at the rise of conservatism as a political force in America. More than that, it's a fascinating look at why America is a fundamentally conservative place, and why even liberal Democrats -- on the far Left by U.S. standards -- would be centrists, or even conservatives themselves, in Europe. While this last may be an unpleasant idea for the American Left to have to entertain, even readers on that side of the political spectrum will find a lot in here to recommend it. Especially useful, I thought, was the authors' discussion of the true role and influence of the much-maligned neo-conservatives. Far from their alleged role as the dark masterminds behind unilateralism, preemption, and other Bad Things in American foreign policy, Micklethwait and Wooldridge argue that (a) the neo-cons are less influential than popularly imagined, and (b) that Bush's decisions and policies are consistent with the broad range of conservative opinion, not the product of an obscure Straussian corner of it. With all the hysterical attention given to the neo-cons these days, this part of M&W's discussion struck me as refreshingly calm and reasonable. With the analytical distance that comes from not being Americans themselves, Micklethwait and Wooldridge have keen insights into the successes and failures, the good and the bad, of American conservatism. And while their work is insightful and thorough, it's also well written, engrossing, and even, from time to time, flat-out funny. Its polished prose makes it easy to read, and the balance of personalities and issues keeps it from getting mired down in obscure policy debates or analysis of election returns. I was fortunate to be able to dive into its pages for hours at a time, and seldom found myself bored or skimming. From the vast sea of ink spilled on the Iraq War, the American Empire, Halliburton, Karl Rove, the neo-cons, Texas, and other evils -- plus George W. Bush's apparent ability to be simultaneously bottomlessly stupid and an evil genius -- every so often, a real gem floats to the surface. "The Right Nation" is one of those gems. Scoop it up and enjoy it.
Rating:  Summary: Explains why the USA is different Review: I wonder if previous reviewer WA Franklin read the same book as I did. The authors neither demonize nor sanitize the conservative movement in America. From their lucid, interesting, and fairminded treatment comes a portrait of America as culturally and psychologically different from other countries. Especially interesting is the authors' backward glances at Edmund Burke and their explanations of what Americans took from Burkean conservatism (suspicion of the state, liberty over equality, patriotism) and what they have abandoned (established hierarchies, elitism, and skepticism toward the idea of progress). Nowhere do the authors suggest that the "I've got mine, Jack" attitude is the defining feature of American conservatism.
Rating:  Summary: Superb: The Best Nonfiction Book of 2004 Review: Liberal Democrats still wondering just what hit them in the last election should be encouraged to read this book. The two authors, both of whom are British ex-pats on the U.S. staff of the Economist, have written a superb narrative on the rise of modern American conservativism. They trace its development from a fringe movement in the fifties that began as little more than a fascination with eccentric figures like Ayn Rand, Russell Kirk, and Friedrich Hayek, to its blossoming into the mainstream power of the religious right and tax-cut enthusiasts of today. They show the movement was not just some spontaneous manifestation of American political popular will, but primarily a manufactured political coalition galvanized by a nexus of right-wing think tanks, media, and political organizations, with the latter ranging from anti-tax advocates and the NRA to the religious right. While the book is not a how-to guide on building a winning political movement out of nothing, it provides enough details to show that not only is such an undertaking possible, it can succeed brilliantly. If liberals are curious as to why they lost to a weak conservative incumbent in 2004, one they felt sure they could unseat, they need look no further than this book.
Americans live in an era of conservative domination. Conservatives might still complain about the pervasiveness of liberals in the media and academic establishments, but their complaints mask that it is they now who are the real political establishment. The liberals are playing catch-up. How did this happen? As recently as the mid-sixties, liberalism reigned supreme. Conservatism in that era was, in the words of literary critic Lionel Trilling, little more than an impulse that expressed itself in "irritable mental gestures." By the late sixties, however, conservatism was already winning political battles and, a decade later, it began winning the war over policy.
Conservatism's rise was helped by several factors. The first was demographic. As Americans moved both west and south, the Sunbelt became increasingly important to the nation's politics. It is easy to forget now that only a century ago Maine had more people than Texas and Rhode Island had more than Florida. With the shift in population, the south and west grew in national prominence. This can be seen in where the nation has picked its recent presidents. Not since the assassination of JFK forty-one years ago has a president called a state home which is outside of the Sun Belt. And as the epicenter of the nation's population drifted south and west, those two regions' local politics figured more prominently on the national level. In the west, those politics were anti-tax and anti-regulation. In the south, religious revivalism was at the center.
Another factor was liberalism -- both its successes and excesses. With the implementation of much of the civil rights agenda in the 1950s and 60s and the large-scale expansion of the federal government under LBJ, liberalism ran out of steam. The success of the civil rights movement led to a political revolt by the south, which the conservative movement took advantage of. Meanwhile, the expansion of the federal government was thought by some to be the main reason the U.S. economy sputtered under the impact of budget deficits, inflation, and high taxes in the 1970s. Many religious voters saw some of the Supreme Court decisions in the 60s and 70s as hostile to their beliefs. A group that would later be called the neoconservatives turned away from their leftist roots after experiencing the radicalism of the sixties. Out of these various responses to the successes and failures of liberalism, disparate conservative groups began to make political headway.
Yet another reason for the success of conservatism was its ability to articulate a national agenda. In the 1950s, National Review was the lonely voice of mainstream American conservatism. But over the next two decades, wealthy donors financed think tanks to battle the liberal-dominated universities. New conservative magazines and newspapers began to appear. Talk radio became the voice of the movement. The switch of numerous scholars from leftist causes to neoconservatism in the sixties amounted to an intellectual coup of sorts. These different media and scholars added cohesiveness to what was a motley crew of anti-liberal causes.
Micklethwait and Wooldridge don't merely detail the history of the movement. They also include their observations as to where they think it will go and what are the biggest dangers to its continued success. They believe that Republicans - as the party of conservatism -- have a narrow advantage over Democrats in the future. As one example, they present evidence that Hispanics -- America's fastest growing minority -- are far more attracted to the rhetoric of the right than are African-Americans . But they also point out that conservatism is inherently unstable because of its numerous, sometimes clashing, interest groups. The libertarian types sit uncomfortably with the religious types. The ethics of big business don't always mix well with the ethics of Middle America. Some conservatives in the west grow increasingly uncomfortable with the southern domination of the party. Micklethwait and Wooldridge demonstrate that while American politics is currently dominated by conservatives and might be dominated by them for some time, there is still much that can go wrong for the movement.
Americans wary of another European perspective on a peculiarly American phenomenon need not worry with this book. The authors obviously know their subject well. They spent a great deal of time on America's roads going to everything from evangelical church functions to right-wing scholarly seminars. The writing is incisive and smooth, moving easily and fluently across wide swaths of modern U.S. political history. But it never feels forced. While the two Brits are clearly fascinated by a mainstream political philosophy they admit has no counterpart in Europe, they write sympathetically of its aims, even as they maintain a proper critical distance. This book can remind Americans that, whatever tensions might currently exist across the Atlantic, when intelligent, fair-minded Europeans focus their attention on the United States, there are no finer observers of its politics and society. This is the best book I've read this year.
Rating:  Summary: A good overview of Conservative movement Review: The problem with non-conservatives who seek to analyze the conservative movement is that they frequently get lost in the details and bogged down with generalizations. Frequently the shortest pieces by men like Podhoretz could do more in the way of explaining conservativism and its attributes then ten book such as this. Partly this is because although this book claims to be 'unbiased' their sis certainly a bias in the sense that the authors confront American conservatism as if it is some sort of strange item, as if they are examining an ancient culture like an anthropologist. The reader almost finds wanting a short "I have conservative friends" to buoy the authors acceptance that conservative are a legitimate force. The main claim and direction in this book is trying to figure out how Conservative thought came to 'dominate' American politics and how America became a 'far more conservative' nation then it had been. The problem here is that neither statement is true. The Conservative movement may have been a reaction to out of control government and rampant social engineering liberalism but it was only a reaction by the vastly silent majority. In the old days this book claims the nation wasn't proclaiming itself conservative, but this is simply because conservative thought was de facto the way of life. Conservative nuclear families were the norm and church going was typical. By the 1970s their was a vast movement to turn the accepted way of life on its head. Conservatism, as embodied by Goldwater, was the reaction of the majority saying "wait a sec, aren't we the norm?". So the claim here that these 'radical' reactions like Christian radio, Rush Limbaugh, Prayer at cabinet meetings or a university for homeschoolers is some sort of radical reversal, ala the Iranian revolution, taking America into the Puritan dark ages is just not literary honesty. The reality is that in the 50s no one would have noticed a prayer at a cabinet meeting, schools taught what conservatives considered 'normal values' and radio shows like Limbaugh weren't needed because his views were the accepted viewpoint in the media. When the media and education systems changed the conservatives found themselves out in the cold and created their own education systems to rebel against the liberalism they saw being shoved down their throats. This book, although detailing all these facts, doesn't seem to understand that Conservativism is simply a reversion to traditional values. Yet this book, for its shortcomings, is a good analysis of the conservative way of life and the rise of conservative power. Certainly this book opens up the alliance between southern democrats and hawk democrats like 'Scoop' Jackson, along with the Paleo-conservatives who struck down the eastern liberal wing of the Republican party led by Nixon and Rockefeller. This book does not delve into the main break between neo-conservative thought and Goldwater/Taft conservativism, but this is simply another small oversight. This book would be a wonderful companion to "before the Storm' or 'Conservative Revolution'.
Rating:  Summary: Disappointing Review: This book examines the past, present, and prospects of America's conservative movement. The book starts by tracing the Right's rise from obscurity in the 1950s, when it was confined to a few intellectuals and fringe groups. As expected for a book by reporters, the book concentrates on the present: the Bush administration, its foreign policy and its relations with the conservative movement, as well as discussions of conservative think tanks, media, and political organizations. Regarding the American Right's future, the authors wonder how such a heterogeneous movement can remain united.
The book has some flaws:
(1) Although intended for European audiences, the book presumes a familiarity with myriad politicians, activists, and scholars, whom few Europeans will recognize and who are characterized briefly, if at all. The book also uses too much American slang; e.g., "third rail" (p. 245) and "soccer moms" (p. 246).
(2) The authors also clearly despise conservatives, whom they call "diehard cavemen" who preach a "stomach-turning" "hypocritical Puritanism" (pages 122-123). Elsewhere, American conservatives are routinely characterized as fat, stupid, and crude. If you seek a dispassionate account of the American Right, look elsewhere.
(3) The book doesn't explain why the Left has been losing elections. (According to the authors, the Left is rarely wrong; the Right rarely right.) The Right's success is attributed largely to greater enthusiasm and better organization.
(4) The book covers too much too fast. It's also poorly organized; e.g., chapter 13 (why Americans are innately conservative) should have been chapter 1.
(5) The book fails to answer the very question (p. 24) that the authors set themselves: Why does the world both dislike and admire the U.S.? There is little analysis of foreign opinion.
The book offers a few useful facts and insights; however, if you really want to understand American conservatism, read volume two of Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America.
Rating:  Summary: An Excellent Analysis Review: This book is an excellent overview of the recent political history and the national psyche of the United States. Written by a couple of very informed Brits, it also seems to be about as unbiased as a political analysis can be. Analyzing the roots and the structure of the conservative movement, the authors also look at why we differ so much from our European counterparts.
This book should be read by "reds" and "blues" alike. It offers real perspective on where we are now, how we got here and where we could be going. As a bonus, it is very easy to read.
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