The Persian Puzzle : The Conflict Between Iran and America

Rating:
Summary: Read with caution
Review: I have mixed feelings about this book. On the one hand it represents an enormous amount of research. Parts of it are well written and constitute an important resource for anyone who wants to better understand the US-Iran relationship. But the reader should be aware that it's also a flawed book. The author can't seem to make up his mind if he's a progressive or a conservative. He supported the US invasion of Iraq -- and continually attempts to justify that failed policy in this, his latest opus. The reader therefore needs to be alert.

There are numerous problems with the book. Here are some:
*The author contradicts himself on the second page of his introduction when he arrogantly states "I will say very bluntly that I don't think the US needs Iran..." The author then spends the better part of the next 500 pages presenting powerful evidence that the US in fact does need Iran, very much. For how in heaven's name will we ever succeed in resolving the matter of Iran's nuclear ambitions, what the author refers to as the "problem from hell" without the cooperation -- if not the good will -- of Iran? Answer: we won't.

*The author seriously underestimates the figure of Mossadegh, the vastly popular Prime Minister of Iran overthrown by the US CIA in 1953. Pollack refers to him as reckless and thinks he was an extremist -- not true. The reader would do better to check out Stephen Kinzer's excellent book All the Shah's Men for a clearer look at Mossadegh. In fact he was the Iranian Gandhi, and while he made mistakes he was never the tyrant or dictator described by Pollack. Nor was he inept as a lawyer, which Pollack also implies. Mossadegh was capable enough to plead his case against the Anglo-Persian oil company in the world court -- and to win it in grand fashion. Not bad. Pollack just can't seem to grasp the essential fact that Iran had every right to control its own oil. Mossadegh's biggest mistake was in trusting the treacherous Americans.

*The author continually understates or ignores altogether Israel's role in perpetuating the horrible US-Iran relations. Pollack never mentions the war of words in the Israeli Hebrew press, which started immediately after the 1991 Gulf War (see Israel Shahak, Open Secrets), when Israel began preparing its people for a future war against Iran, the new nemesis, and also began pressing the Americans for regime change. Sharon called for it in the fall of 2002, then Daniel Ayalon the Israeli ambassador to the US repeated the call in April 2003 as the Iraq invasion was winding down. The point is that so far the Israelis have had it their way. They wanted the war against Iraq and now they want a war against Iran. These are facts that Pollack seems never to have heard. His naivete regarding Israel undermines his credibility as a serious scholar.

*The case of the Karine A is another similar example. This was the boat load of Iranian arms headed to Gaza intercepted early in 2002 by Israel. The incident became the smoking gun and supposed proof of Iran's support for terrorism -- and it killed the Iran-US talks that blossomed after 911 and held such promise for improved relations. But Pollack never mentions that at this time the Palestinians were facing a holocaust -- daily bloody incursions by the IDF, targeted assassinations, curfews, checkpoints, Apache rocket attacks, and the destruction of the infrastructure built up during the Oslo peace process. Israel reduced much of the W Bank to smoking rubble during this time, and Pollack completely misses the obvious point: that the Palestinians had every right to arm and defend themselves. The incident should never have been allowed to destroy the US-Iran talks. The case only shows that US talk about freedom is a cruel lie. The truth is that the US does not support the right of the oppressed to fight for their freedom. And in this regard Pollack just doesn't get it.

*The author rambles on about Iran's nuke program, which he correctly identifies as the most serious issue. Yet it never occurs to him that the real solution would require the US to press Israel also to give up its nukes. The only way the US will lead the region is via example, and the matter of Israel -- not just iran -- is the stumbling block. The author also fails to mention one of the principal dangers should the situation go south, for example, if Israel decides to pre empt and surgically hit Iran's nuclear sites. And this vacuole is weird, because Pollack does mention, in his closing remarks, about Iran's great interest in anti-ship missiles. But again, he doesn't get it. If we or Israel hit Iran they will respond by attacking our Navy sitting like ducks in the Gulf. In that case, the entire Gulf will become a killing field, and will run red with the blood of US sailors. This is why we must work for a peaceful resolution!

There are other flaws. But this should be enough to make the reader appropriately chary.

Rating:
Summary: Robust analysis
Review: Most of the historical background, except maybe for the Mossadegh period is accurate. Dr. Mossadegh legacy in the modern Iranian politics is enormous. This popular and freely elected leader was overthrown in 1953 with the help of the C.I.A. and was replaced by the late Shah. This event traumatized Iranians for the last 50 years and increased their suspicion on foreign influence in Iranian affairs.

Pollack's analysis of the Iranian psyche is also very accurate. Iranians might have an exaggerated perception of the geopolitical importance of their country, but this is a common character in countries where people have a strong national pride.

Finally, I fully agree with Pollack's multi-facet approach to resolve the current issues. The last thing the region needs is an additional conflict that would further complicate the already entangled situation.

Rating:
Summary: More History the Perscription
Review: Mr. Pollack's latest work is an impressive critique of past U.S. engagement with Iran. Coming a mere two years after an arguably mistaken advocacy for the Iraq invasion, his redemptive efforts are obvious: the overwhelming thrust of the work is retrospective, not prospective, in nature.

That being said, Mr. Pollack has written an extremely cogent and complete narrative of U.S.-Iranian relations. Topics are covered in an orderly fashion that blends together seemingly isolated events, showing how they all combine to create Iran's stormy past and our turbulent bi-lateral relationship. If it is perspective you seek, then "Persian Puzzle" is the order of the day; however, if the reader desires a more prospective debate, Mr. Pollack's work is lacking--only a single, albeit long, chapter is devoted to proffering solutions for the "future". As an introductory tome, Mr. Pollack has succeeded, but it is doubtful that this book will move the debate over how to engage Iran in any meaningful way.

Rating:
Summary: Informative, Thought Provoking, Easy Read
Review: The author is a research director at the Brookings Institution in Washington and a former director of Gulf affairs on the National Security Council. He has a least two other popular books on the Middle East.

I approached this book not knowing really what to expect, i.e.: does the book try to justify past US policies or is it a rational discussion. It is the latter. The author tries to clear the political air in the introduction and set the record straight on why we have problems with Iran. He uses a direct quote from the Iranians regarding a speech from Secretary Albright who acknowledges the over 25 years of US interference in the politics and leadership of Iran starting with the shah in 1953 and ending with the aid to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq conflict in the 1980's. This of course is contrary to public posture at home that our actions are about promoting democracy abroad. It is clear that past actions against Iran were to promote US commercial, trade, and strategic defense interests at the expense of the Iranians. So that admission up front is refreshing. Many Iranians had expected help from the US, not a new imperial power to replace Britain and Russia. They had dominated Iran for most of the 19th century and half of the 20th century. So the question now is simply this: can we build a new relationship, especially with that 200 year history of distrust by Iran of Russia, Britain, and America?

The book is somewhat long and can be described as comprehensive, but it is well written and is suitable for the average reader. It is a fairly quick and light read. The pages seem to whiz by like a Jack London novel. It has about 428 pages of main text with five maps, and is followed by 60 pages of notes and a bibliography approximately 25 pages in length. It covers 13 subjects including a history of Iran, the shah, the rise of US influence in Iran, the hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq war, and the post 1980 political developments in Iran.

The first chapter - about 30 pages long - presents a short history of Iran including the dealings between Iran and Britain and Russia. That takes the reader to approximately the year 1914. After that there are two chapters that lead us through the events surrounding an early democracy in Iran and then the ousting of the nationalist Iranian leader Mosaddeq by royalist troops in 1953, and his replacement by the shah. The author thinks that a certain myth has developed about the coup that overstate the American-British role and, in Iranian mind's at least, to exaggerate the role of the CIA. In the next 70 to 80 pages the author takes us through the 25 year reign of the shah, his spending, his use of terror, and the inequities in Iranian society which finally trigger the fall of the shah. The Iranians tend to equate America with the reign of the shah, and the failure of the US to apply human rights standards to that country while espousing them at home, especially by Carter.

The next 200 pages describe the developments related to Iran from about 1980 going forward including many details on the primary Iranian political figures, the long and exhausting war with Iraq, the current and past Iranian views of the US in the 1990's, Islamic fundamentalism, supporting terrorism against mainly Israel, Iranian designs on controlling the Gulf region, suport of some Al Qaeda members by Iran, the Karine A incident, Hamas, the Geneva working group on Afghanistan, the Axis of Evil speech, Iranian nuclear weapons, etc.

Finally we have perhaps the most interesting chapter, a chapter on developing future US strategies. That is in fact the reason for the title of the book, The Persian Puzzle. Can we do anything to solve the problems short of a war? It is a puzzle that can be solved by either attacking Iran or more rationally attempting to develop a long term relationship with Iran, possibly following many paths in parallel. In the final analysis short of war it will be a decision to be made by Iran.

Whether you agree with everything the author presents in the book, or do not, one will find the book to be informative and stimulating. Easily 5 stars.


Rating:
Summary: Credible Author???
Review: This author's previous book was about the grave threat to the USA by Iraq. This information has been proven wrong, so can we trust him again? This book may be interesting but the author has not had the best rack record with reporting the truth.

Rating:
Summary: Now what?
Review: This is a very interesting and timely book. Ken Pollack is a former US government expert on Iran and Iraq. Two years ago, just prior to the invasion of Iraq, I read Ken Pollack's earlier book The Threatening Storm where he argued forcefully in favor of a military invasion to remove Saddam Hussein and his odious regime from power. Of course, since then we have run into many difficulties and Mr. Pollack has been distancing himself from it all, saying things like, "Oh yes, I favored AN invasion, but they did it all wrong, Blah, Blah, Blah." As if such a problem could ever be solved painlessly or without a big mess to clean up. Who is kidding who? In this book he recounts the history of Iran, another big headache. Why do they hate us so much? Why do they oppose the Middle East peace process? Why is Iran now arguably the world's worst state sponsor of terrorist groups? Where do they figure into the problem of nuclear proliferation? These are the type of questions that Mr. Pollack attempts to address in this book starting about 100 years ago when Iran figured in the Great Game between the British and Russian empires. Then the British decided to switch their navy from coal to oil and depended upon Iran as their gas station. Iran was then occupied by Allied forces during WW2 because of its oil and strategic location. After the war the US helped place the Shah of Iran back upon his father's throne so that he could guarantee relative stability and pro-Western policies during the Cold War. Of course, the Shah was toppled by the popular revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeni in 1979 and has been more or less an Islamic Republic ruled largely by the mullahs ever since. However, the forces of moderation and pro-Western liberalism have never been entirely eliminated and have shown themselves recently to have great popular support. The way Mr. Pollack tells it, the Iranians feel that they have been used as a pawn by the major powers for a long time and resent it. They aspire to be a major player themselves, especially in that region. They view Israel as a modern day Crusader state, an outpost of Western influence in the Islamic world, and are determined to drive both Israel and its patron the US out of the region. As if that isn't enough, they are VERY close to getting the BOMB. As usual the Europeans talk up a smoke screen while they conduct business as usual figuring that its the US problem to protect them when things go bust. What a nightmare! Mr. Pollack caused me to raise my eyebrows when he presented a rationalized defense of Jimmy Carter's handling of the 444 day hostage crisis. This was one of the most disgraceful episodes of US history that I can recall. In my view, many of the subsequent actions by people like Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden were prompted by the perception of America as a cowardly giant that resulted directly from the Iran hostage crisis. Of course, Reagan didn't do much better. He got involved in the Beirut quagmire and then cut and ran after 241 Marines were killed by a truck bomb. He tilted to Saddam Hussein during the Iran/Iraq war. Bush, the father, did better when he led the coalition that evicted Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in the first Gulf War. The book gets most interesting when it gets to the Clinton years, presumably because this is where the author was most personally involved in the policy making. Of course, the centerpiece of Clinton's foreign policy was the Middle East peace process. He quickly discovered that Iran was ready, willing, and able to wreck it all for him. To hear Mr. Pollack tell it, the Clinton Administration engaged in heroic efforts, including at least 10 or 12 overtures and gestures, to try to get better relations with Iran, only to eventually fail. For me, its hard to escape the conclusion that the Iranians simply strung Clinton along for eight years before finally rebuffing him, just like Yassir Arafat did with the peace process itself. Along comes 9/11 and George W. Bush declares war against all terrorists and their state sponsors. Mr. Pollack expresses almost amazement that the Iranians have been very cooperative, even helpful during the US led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. And this is largely true even after Bush included Iran in his Axis of Evil speech. My take on this is that while the Iranians were quite confidant that Clinton would never go after them they were worried that Bush might do just that and so they decided to play along for time while they are working night and day to get a usable nuclear bomb. Then they'll be sitting pretty. They obviously figure, correctly in my view, that no US president, not even George W. Bush, will go after a country which possesses nuclear weapons. Iran can then go back to sponsoring suicide bombers, etc, confidant that US policy will then be limited to containment and sanctions, etc, with the military options completely off the table. At the same time, the Bush Administration realizes that Iran can cause major problems for us in Iraq and even in Afghanistan and so is studiously attempting to avoid any clash with Iran for the time being. This current state of affairs boils down to a horserace with Bush & company betting that they can get a handle on the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan in time to deal with the Iranian nuclear threat, while the Iranian government is betting that they can get the BOMB before Bush can extricate himself from Iraq and Afghanistan and then do anything to stop them. Of course, sad to say, anything initiated by the Europeans through the IAEA or anything else should be regarded as a smokescreen intended to permit them to conduct business as usual. The game is afoot!

Rating:
Summary: The options for American policy vis- a-vis Iran
Review: This work is first of all an illuminating survey of Iranian political history. It begins with the first movement of Indo- European peoples into Iran and traces the story to today's regime of the Mullahs. It in tracing this history which is largely the history of a vast empires it reveals a great deal about Iranian national character. According to Pollack the Iranians have the arrogance of those who have been a great imperial power. They too as a power which has been conquered more than once have a real suspiciousness toward the world outside. This extends also to their Sunni Muslim brothers as Iran is at present the only Shiite regime in the world. Pollack is an especially good narrator of Iran's historical development. But his real focus and aim is to provide the reader with the background to the present American - Iranian relationship. In this regard he focuses in later chapters on the overthrow of the Mossedaqh regime in 1953 and the American embassy takeover in Tehran which helped cause the downfall of the Carter Administration. Pollack in his last chapter tries to outline the options for United States action towards Iran. And the Persian puzzle of the title is the puzzle of how to work out properly these relations. The United States and Iran are totally estranged from each other. Iran is according to the US State Department the largest state- supporter of terror in the world. Iran is according to many observers a supporter of anti- American action in Iraq. And Iran has been working for years clandestinely to develop its own nuclear option. Here one should understand what the Israeli scholar Ephraim Kam has pointed out in his study of Iranian military development in the past thirty years. The tremendous trauma of the Iraq war in which Iranians were subject to non- conventional gas warfare by the Iraqis is one of the major elements impelling them to the nuclear option. But the Iranians also wish to balance and counter US power. The Iranians conceive of the nuclear option as a means of driving the US from the region , and Israel out of the world entirely. The Iranians are steadily working to increase the range of their missiles and parts of Europe may already be in their reach. Their long- range goal is to be able to reach not only US troops in the Mideast but heartland America. One of Pollack's central points is the tremendous importance of containing Iran. He is not however certain that this can be done now. He believes that the Iranians have so scattered and placed underground their nuclear facilities that the US may simply not have a viable option of preemption. He is even more emphatically against the possibility of a US land- invasion of Iran which he believes would be a great mistake. Iran is four- times the size of Iraq and is a much more formidable force to contend with in every way. The US is as it is now over- extended, and so Pollack does not believe the military invasion option is a real one. Pollack argues for the US making a combined effort with European allies, and others offering Iran incentives , economic and otherwise in order to forestall or at least contain a nuclear Iran. This method of dialogue is the approach of the Germany France Great Britain and thIAEA now, and there is no sign that it is working. Iran has a strong Russian connection( The Russians are building their nuclear facility at Bushehr) and more especially an increasingly closer relationship with China.China has already indicated it would veto any sanction effort against Iran in the U.N. US sanctions have been in place against Iran for some time now and have only worked to encourage Iran to deepen its Russian and Chinese connections. Thus the path of dialogue despite its being urged by many US foreign policy experts does not seem likely to stop Iran . Pollack indicates that there is strong opposition to the Iranian regime from the people .And that over a long - period it is possible to hope that the regime may be overturned. But the nuclear clock is ticking faster than that. And the nuclear issue is the one issue on which the regime has the total backing of its citizens. This may not only because they feel threatened by having the US nearby but even more importantly, psychologically, because they feel as a great empire nuclear weapons are their right. In any case Pollack is honest and realistic in assessing the difficult situation the US finds itself in - in trying to understand how to relate properly to Iran. However his suggestion that the US might be wise to rely on deterrence, and accept the coming into being of a nuclear Iran seems a particularly unwise one. There is a general consensus of non- proliferation experts that a nuclear Iran will lead to a nuclear Saudi Arabia and a nuclear Egypt, and a world far more dangerous. There is even the suggestion that it will break down completely all non-proliferation agreements, and trigger a world- wide nuclear arms race. A nuclear Iran would have greater power over its Gulf neighbors who already are threatened by it. Therefore it would seem that Pollack is right in not completely foreclosing a preemptive action( not to take over the territory of Iran) but to stop it or delay it for years from becoming nuclear. The exercise of such an option might too be incentive for regime change in Tehran though such an outcome is by no means guaranteed.
Another dimension of the Iranian- US relation is of course in the context of the US struggle against Terror worldwide.Iran is an ideologically driven state whose declared aim is the export of the Islamic revolution throughout the world.
Pollack's book is an outstanding guide to the overall history and development of Iran. It provides some of the options for possible US action vis- a- vis Iran in the future. But here it is by no means comprehensive or definitive. And it is to be hoped that the Intelligence Services of the United States ( and perhaps too Israel) have a good enough picture of what is happening in Iran to ensure that a nuclear Iran does not come into being which will threaten the world as a whole. Iran at present is driven both by memories of its own past historical grandeur and by fundamentalist religous callings. Its hostility as Bernard Lewis has pointed out in other contexts to the US is not simply military and religious but cultural and moral. It does not seem then that the word ' compromise'is most suited for dealing with the Iranian Revolutionary Islamic Regime now. What does seem more hopeful is the idea that Iran has many strands in its rich past. And that at some point these strands will once again come to the fore .

Rating:
Summary: Vital Reading on Why Ignoring Iran Is a Frightening Mistake
Review: Twenty-five years after the Iranian hostage crisis, author Kenneth Pollack, a former CIA analyst and National Security Council official, has written a thorough, sometimes frightening, sometimes rose-colored account of the U.S. relationship with Iran. Overshadowed lately by its war-torn neighbor, Iran is a contradictory country that supports terrorism, is building an arsenal of nuclear weapons, and with Saddam Hussein's ouster, evolving into the new key threat in derailing the interminable Middle East peace process. In fact, the author argues that the Bush administration's continued ignorance of Iran's burgeoning prominence will likely result in yet another war based on fictitious weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps still smarting from his previously hawkish stance against Iraq in his last book, "The Threatening Storm", Pollack believes containment should be our new strategy in dealing with Iran. He calls for a flexible approach that would take into account the constant state of flux in Iranian foreign policy, as extremists and pragmatists fight for internal control of the country.

Pollack provides a valuable primer on Iranian history, which is redolent of the suffocating xenophobia of Iranian leaders like Mohammed Mossadegh and the Ayatollah Khomeini. Nineteenth century European imperialism shaped a lot of the current Iranian suspicion of foreign interference in their affairs. The author also discusses the Iranian tendency to resent and resist their rulers, obviously peaking with the Shah's 25-year regime until his overthrow in 1979. And most pertinent, Pollack reviews the many traumatic encounters between the United States and Iran over the last fifty years, which of course, culminated with the fourteen-month long ordeal in the taking of the U.S. hostages. This was a defining moment in our own history, scarring the American psyche and making the U.S. look weak in the eyes of the world. Jimmy Carter's presidential legacy took a tumble as a result (the hostages were released just hours after Reagan's inauguration), and the perceived weakness invited challenges that persist today. When one sees the beheadings of Westerners like Daniel Pearl by terrorists, one cannot help that the hostage crisis was the spark that led to such atrocious activity. Ironically, the author seems less thorough when it comes to looking at Iran within the context of the ongoing Iraqi conflict. One can deduce that Pollack's aversion to war has something to do with leaving a power vacuum in the region that would make it particularly ripe for a greater flourishing of the al-Qaeda network. What he does far more effectively is put America's relationship with Iran into historical perspective. This level of understanding is critical in any negotiations with the Iranians. For instance, many are still furious at the Shah twenty-five years later for a multitude of sins, from his creation of a repressive police state to his squandering of money on military equipment. Unfairly or not, they continue to blame the U.S. for being colonial allies to his master plan. Pollack is actually generous in pinning the blame entirely on the Shah, and he even forgives U.S. policymakers in the 1970's for their failure to anticipate Ayatollah Khomeini's ascendancy.

According to Pollack, Iran is at a pivotal cusp in history at this very moment. Depending on how well Iraq fares as a democracy, Iran could follow suit or continue on its path toward a complete Islamic autocracy. Just how the Bush administration deals with Iran for the next four years will be a real test of the global leadership to which the U.S. aspires and needs to define if there is going to be any inroads in thwarting the ongoing terrorist threat. Pollack provides valuable reading, critical for anyone who wants to understand the broader Middle East political situation.