Rating: 
Summary: Good Introduction
Review: This is my favorite book of Bertrand Russell's, both as an introductory and technical work, and it is probably so because he wrote it before he went too deeply into analytical and empiricist philosophy to remember his rationalist roots. ...His summaries of Rationalism vs. Empiricism are also excellent, though 20th century rationalism is probably today what he describes as the middle ground position between both views in his book. Most 20th century rationalists accept the *causal* importance of sensory perception in forming many *a priori* beliefs, so the new term is not *a priori* knowledge, but *a priori* justification. Empiricism is the dominant school in philosophy today, but I think that will change in time because empiricism cannot justify many of its epistemological conclusions in any way that do not undermine the justificatory role of thought.Some of the accounts of "sense data" and "knowledge by description" are a bit tortured, partly because Russell tried to avoid metaphysics as much as possible, and I personally do not believe that they are ultimately correct. However, the discussions are still good introductions. People who read more rationalist philosophy from the likes of Brand Blanshard and Laurence Bonjour as well as analytic philosophers like David Armstrong will get a better insignt into where the real debates about some of these issues lie. On the whole, a good introduction to philosophy, even though it doesn't touch upon ethics and politics. However, philosophy is a difficult subject and one book, even the best introduction, cannot make clear all the problems that some of the best minds in history have wrestled over...
Rating: 
Summary: A Major 20th Century Contribution
Review: When one considers that the great philosophers of the twentieth century stand on the shoulders of Bertrand Russell, Alfred North Whitehead, A. J. Ayer, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, one has to place Russell in the foreground as the philosophers' philosopher. He writes with clarity and lucidity. His concerns are largely logical and epistemological. And this book centers around his principal concerns. I doubt that Russell would write this same book today, but I also doubt that he would fundamentally alter the positions he takes, if he were writing today. There is something neat, eloquent, and elegant about his epistemological premises that make this work (well beyond its 17th printing and more than eighty years old) such a venerable treasure trove. Could his positions be better articulated? Yes, but not by much. Would he delve more deeply into logic? Almost certainly. And he does, in other books written during his lifetime. This book is really for the novice. My only complaint is that the novice will probably remain lost if his readings did not encompass more logic and criticism of rational and empirical epistemology. What makes Russell a true "modern" in contemporary philosophy is his bridge to resolving both the rationalist and empiricist schools of thought. One not knowing these dichotomies might find Russell's resolution difficult to follow. Elsewhere in the book, Russell identifies "three" rules of thought, when these rules are no longer considered all that are extent. Generally, there are seven, sometimes nine, taught in most symbolic logic courses, and this discrepancy may needlessly cause confusion. So while the book is written for the novice, it bears re-reading after covering other contemporary writers. Russell and the others mentioned above are often associated with logical atomism, either directly or indirectly. Reading Russell or Ayer gives the student the best opportunity to do philosophy whilst learning it first hand. Both are explicit writers with Ayer perhaps having the upper hand. But, as with any philosophical school, such as logical atomism, there is always a counter reaction, and A. L. Austin's "Sense and Sensibility" is just such a reproach. Russell, like Ayer, uses the construct of "sense data" to explain the theory of knowledge; Austin and Gilbert Ryle redress both author's use of such "metaphysical" interpolations, which makes for an interesting contrast. Any reader of Russell or Ayer should counterbalance his reading with Austin's work. "The Problems of Philosophy" is not without gaps that may leave the reader puzzled by the omissions. Perhaps they weren't as obvious when Russell wrote this book, but they are clearer now in hindsight. An egregious omission is the absence of anything to do with ethics or moral theory. Since ethics is one of the few domains particular to philosophy alone, this omission is particularly troublesome in a book of this name. If I were to title the book, it would be "The Problems of Epistemology."
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