Rating: 
Summary: To be read in all possible worlds.
Review: Naming and Necessity is one of the most important works in contemporary analytic philosophy. It has wide ranging effects from philosophy of language to the mind-body problem. Kripke's three lectures at Princeton have the clarity similar to actually being in one of his classes and the comedy is as... well, one review put it this way: "funny as hell." Kripke responds to descriptivist theories (Frege & Russell) and providing a new theory (roughly). Consider the name 'Aristotle.' Some have held that when we use that name to make reference, the name connotes one or more propositions (e.g., 'Aristotle is the student of Plato,' and 'Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander the Great.'). Kripke's points out that when we use the name 'Aristotle,' we are denoting a certain object - the person Aristotle. So, even if Aristotle were not a student of Plato and not the teacher of Alexander, we are still refering to the same object. On Kripke's view, names have denotation, but not connotation. Kripke says that he is not giving a new theory because there is a historical problem taken up by Frege concerning how identity statements can be both true and informative. Kripke does provide what looks like a theory, but he doesn't take up the project Frege took up (c.f. "Sense and Reference"). I take it that the central thesis of all three lectures appears here: "The modern logical tradition, as represented by Frege and Russell, seems to hold that Mill was wrong about singular names, but right about general names. More recent philosophy has followed suit, except that, in the case of both proper names and natural kind terms, it often replaces the notion of defining properties by that of a cluster of properties, only some of which need to be satisfied in each particular case. My own view, on the other hand, regards Mill as more-or-less right about 'singular' names, but wrong about 'general' names" (127). I personally found Kripke's arguments quite compelling. He also has a great discussion about the relationship of a priori and a posteriori beliefs in relation to their alethic properties. Briefly, it was historically held that a priori truths are necessary and a posteriori truths are contingent. Kripke challenges this with several examples. As a result, in the last fifteen pages, Kripke constructs an argument regarding the mind-body problem. This section presents what is known as Kripke's modal argument for property dualism. If you like the mind-body problem, you will have to be able to articulate Kripke's argument here. Does he succeed? That depends on if you think his argument is circular or not. Despite its size, this is book is literally a gold mine. I highly recommend it (and reading it aloud like lectures ought to be heard!).
Rating:
Summary: Couldn't put it down
Review: No, really. Kripke maintains a vigorously-argued and important thesis here: the surprising conclusion that statements involving identity (e.g., when calling something or someone out by name) involve a posteriori necessity. This is quite striking because many have assumed that necessity was somehow substantially correlative with the a priori: but that involves a confusion of metaphysical necessity with epistemological necessity. With that idea in place, Kripke goes on to apply (all too briefly, unfortunately) it in some extremely thought-provoking--nay, well-nigh mind-blowing--ideas about things like natural kinds and the mind-body problem. I just wish he had gone into way more detail on these fascinating issues than the three oral lectures transcribed on these 180 or so pages.
If you're reading this review, you've either a) already read this and I don't have to tell you how unique and important it is, or b) maybe have just taken an undergraduate philosophy course that had some lectures on Kripke, and are thinking about checking out the primary literature yourself. If the latter, do so. You'll be enriched, and you might just be taken on a journey from which you'll never return. Philosophers are still, and undoubtedly will continue for some time, discussing the thesis of _Naming and Necessity_ and its implications for at least philosophy of language and metaphysics, and probably philosophy of mind and philosophy of science as well.
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