The End of the American Era : U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century

Rating:
Summary: Strategic Capitulation
Review: Almost everyone agrees the current U.S. ascendancy in global politics is temporary. Even conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer says Americans should enjoy their current geopolitical dominance because it will not last. In "The End of the American Era," Charles Kupchan also thinks that American dominance is temporary and believes a strategy is needed by which the U.S. transfers some of its global responsibilities to other emerging powers.

He begins his book by addressing the shortcomings of other recent major conceptual frameworks of global politics as conceived by Frances Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, Paul Kennedy and Robert Kaplan (who Kupchan groups together), John Mearsheimer, and Thomas Friedman. The flaw in all of these thinkers, according to Kupchan, is that none of them have recognized the most important fundamentals of the present global system, which is America's current overwhelming power and the fact that its hegemony cannot last.

If the U.S. is in decline, who will take its place? Kupchan believes a united Europe is rising and that East Asia (China and Japan) is not far behind. In this global environment, and because of U.S. domestic tendencies towards isolationism, he thinks a grand strategy is necessary for the U.S. to smoothly make the transition from a unipolar world to a multipolar one. While Kupchan is not entirely clear about the timing of this transition, in at least one area of the book he says Europe is about a decade away from forming a credible alternative axis of world power and East Asia about three decades away. Other countries - mostly Russia, sometimes India - are also mentioned in places throughout the book as potential poles, but without much detail.

Europe is the main object of Kupchan's attention. According to his argument, Europe's ever-growing economic and political solidarity will soon naturally give rise to geopolitical power. If the U.S. cedes some of its power to Europe now in preparation of that development, a healthy relationship will grow between the two; if not, then we can expect a bumpy ride on the way to multipolarity.

While I agree with some of Kupchan's premises, such as the inevitable relative decline of U.S. power and the likelihood that the new world will be multipolar, I disagree with both his vision of what that new world will look like as well as his suggestion for a grand U.S. strategy on how to handle it.

Contrary to Kupchan's thinking, Europe has neither the will nor the military to become a geopolitical force within the next decade. If economics and some shared values were all that was required, Europe would have become an alternative axis of power rivaling the U.S. years ago. Instead, as the crisis over the U.S.-led war in Iraq makes clear, if the Europeans are ever going to be a geopolitical force, they will need institutions to make common and *binding* diplomatic and defense policies that override the national priorities of their constituent states. And even if they have these institutions, the money will have to be found to build a first-rate military. With many European nations heavily in debt, and a demographic crisis looming on the continent, where will this money come from? Kupchan brushes aside these difficulties.

Europe's common military does not have to rival America's, but it must have power projection capabilities to both Eastern Europe and the Middle East. If it doesn't, then Europe will still require the United States to enforce stability in those areas using its military power when other measures have failed. After all, a resurgent Russia might still haunt the future of Eastern Europe, and Europe, as a whole, is far more dependent on Middle East oil than the U.S. Nothing we see today shows Europe will be ready to handle those responsibilities any time soon.

The less said about Kupchan's thoughts on East Asia, the better. His brief sections on the region and the countries in it are surprisingly thin, devoid of fresh thinking, or even proof he did anymore than just remedial reading on the area. What's more, his vision of how U.S. strategy fits into the region is shockingly naïve, envisioning the United States leading the way towards a sort of united East Asia by - among other things - helping Japan and China to forsake old enmities. That's not strategy; that's fantasy. Even Kupchan admits as much.

There is a common theme to this book. No matter what the region or area - whether it's to Europe, East Asia, or international institutions - Kupchan's strategy calls for the U.S. giving up power. This seems an odd strategy for what is still by far the most powerful country in the world and what is likely to remain the most powerful country in the world for the foreseeable future. Wouldn't a realist at least call for giving up power in one region where it is less needed so that it could be at least partially redeployed somewhere else where it is more needed? Instead, Kupchan seems to think that U.S. power is a cheap currency to be spent on dubious schemes such as pushing Chinese/Japanese reconciliation.

By showing he has only one general prescription to fit every region's future, Kupchan signals he is less interested in seeing the shifting balance of world power as it is, and putting forth a strategy to deal with it, than he is in pushing an ideology of world power that he feels comfortable with. The final section of the book gives a clue as to why, showing he is highly downbeat about America's future. Interestingly enough, having dismissed Robert Kaplan's vision of a splintering world divided between north and south, he buys into Kaplan's view of the United States as a splintering country. Kupchan believes that even as the U.S. helps the rest of the world come together (Europe and Russia/China and Japan/north and south), regions within the states themselves are destined to grow apart. This ending is a contradictory and absurd coda to an already faltering book.

Rating:
Summary: Possibly one of the silliest things I have ever read
Review: Between the book and several reviews here, I'm just astounded. I'll try to take on several matters here:

1) America will never 'fade from the world stage'. She may eventually no longer be the _sole_ superpower, but she will always - always - be _a_ superpower. She will never be 'overshadowed' by another superpower, as no one will be a full-spectrum power in all measures as is America. The European Union does not have the desire to rival America militarily, which is fortunate for it because it does not have the money; those who think even a fully integrated EU could simply 'build a military' to match America in 10 years - or even more - are completely naive as to the actual balance of power. Europe _will_ have a comparable economy in terms of overall GDP once full integrated (beyond even the 2004 expansion), and it _will_ have the ability to project credible military power regionally. On the other hand, it is simply not possible for the EU to build a matching military without a) scrapping most of its social programs and b) spending all that money and more every year for two decades in a massive military buildupng and c) fundamentally reshaping a large portion of its industrial and overall economic capacity to absorb these changes.

2) America has an economy worth nearly 11 trillion dollars. This is not old Britain where a small native population spent a majority of its overall economy maintaining a military deployed around the globe, nor a Spain or other past empire in a time when the global economy was a static pie and the rush was to grab the biggest slice. As America gets richer, others get richer (this is why the current account and trade deficits aren't simply a liability or even necessarily a negative). As others get richer, America gets richer. No other economy comes close to the size of America's. Should China continue growing as it has been, it will not be of a comparable size until 2050. Integrated the entire European continent would be required to 'overshadow' America's economy, and even then you would simply have to gargantuan economies towering over all others.

3) America's military power ridiculously overmatches all others. The EU could integrate its military capabilities and modernize for a decade and not be anywhere near a 'match', though they would then be a military superpower. America's military capacity is not going to fade. It may stop growing the gap between itself and others, but it is not going to fade or fall behind.

4) America's population will continue to balloon. 3 years ago estimates for 2050 were around 400 million. A year ago estimates for 2050 were 500 million. Today, 500 million is increasingly being considered as a possible low-range, with a possible 1 billion Americans by 2100. By sometime after 2050 America will likely surpass even the expanded EU in population. Even at 300 million, America is too massive to 'fade from the world stage'.

In short, America's economy is so massive that it cannot fail to be an economic superpower. The arrival of a basket economy of comparable size in the form of the EU does not change the fact that now instead of one 10+ trillion dollar economy there are two 10+ trillion dollar economies, both of which massively eclipse all others. Budget deficits? Current account deficits? Been there and done that. Even accepting some sort of wrenching economic free-fall to correct both of these, America's economy would still be absolutely massive and roughly comparable to that of the European Union. It could be wrenching for unemployment, and could cause us to see stagnation for several years in terms of GDP growth, but then if that happened we might end up looking like Europe with very slow growth rates and high unemploymeny - yet no one seems to be discounting Europe for already being in such a position.

America's military capability is so overweening that it cannot fail to be a military superpower. The arrival of other credible militaries with the capability to project power regionally and to an extend globally does not mean America is no longer a superpower; the Soviet Union's military capability outstripped the dreams of the EU or the Chinese, yet when it existed there was not a 'sole' military superpower but two.

America's population is already more than large enough to ensure that with its wealth it is a superpower, and that population will continue to balloon as the population in Europe shrinks (the EU population will grow via adding more nations, but that only goes so far).

These simple facts cast a dubious light on any book such as this. No one will 'replace' America as the sole superpower. Other superpowers may rise, but none will 'replace' her or push her aside, she will simply become the largest of a likely handful of such powers. These same simple, basic facts dictate that the EU will become a sort of superpower alongside the U.S. in economic and political terms and to a much lesser degree military terms, and that China will eventually follow suit.

Yet regardless of any of that, America remains. She remains on the world stage, she remains with the largest single economy and one so massive that it's as large as the combined EU economy, she remains with the greatest military power and the greatest ease of paying for that power, she remains with the third largest nation-state population and one which will grow to eclipse that of the combined EU population through the century.

It's very simple, it's very obvious, and the only way to arrive at any other conclusion is by the physical destruction of the United States itself ..

And this is where Kupchan eventually tries to take us in a desperate attempt to avoid the basic realities I've listed above. It's also the same place Kupchan has been trying to take us for three entire decades. Perhaps in another 10 years he can modify his theory a bit for the times and re-publish it again to explain how just annny old time now we're going to 'decline'.

Rating:
Summary: A great read...
Review: I just finished reading this book and I think its a fairly elaborate thesis on Kupchan's vision of what the future will look like and what it should look like (if the US follows his grand strategy as the epicentre of its foriegn policy). Kupchan heavily draws from historical comparisons and parallels, despite himself making clear the fact that history cycles but moves forward at the same time. This shortcoming notwithtanding, I think his predictions are as rational and have as much a probability of occurence as any reasonable assumption by an intelligent human. I agree with Kupchan that Europe will increasingly posture itself as a rival pole to US supremacy. Clearly the emergence of France, Germany and Russia as a rival pole in the Iraq situation highlights this fact. With homegrown and Russian military help coupled with economic might of a united Europe, it is not inconceivable to think that European military can rival that of the US by 2010. I also agree with Kupchan that US hegemony is but temporary and like all civilizations before it, will come to an end. The emergence of East Asia as yet another pole is another prediction of Kupchan. This is where I disagree with Kupchan. I think China and Japan will not forge an alliance to establish their collective might. The big question is - Will there develop an India-Russia-China axis or will Russia align itself more with Europe. In effect, I think the direction Russia will tilt in, will be the eventual deciding factor in the development of the main adversarial pole to the US. I think Japan will at best be a player in the sidelines. Geopolitics aside I think Kupchan makes some interesting points about economics and culture. I think most American people do not realize the fragility of the world economy, where is everything is based on speculative forces in the market. With huge deficits, China (and the rest of the world) is in effect financing the US government for now. The moment Asian and European countries stop investing in US treasuries and bonds, it will lead to very bad times for the US economy. And nobody knows if Europe will be there to pick up the pieces and establish hegemony. In any case I would have liked Kupchan to elaborate more on this aspect. I also disagree with his premise of the motivations of the terrorists. I think increasingly the term "terrorism" will be misapplied and used to quell legitimate democratic aspirations of non-state actors by professed nation states. As the distiction gets increasingly murkier, I think the impact and power of non-state actors will rise and increase the chaos that already exists in the world. In any case, I think this book is a valuable addition to any collection on contemporary foriegn policy.

Rating:
Summary: The Trees Were Felled in Vain
Review: Kupchan boldly predicts the decline of Americanism - the passing of an era of America as the only superpower. He predicts the rise of Europe to counterweigh the United States in a bi-polar world.

Predicting the future is a risky business. Luckily, whereas those who made the right predictions are anxious to remind others, as for those who were way off, hardly anybody remembers or cares. This book, in my judgment, belongs to the latter heap.

It is true that America will not forever be far stronger than the rest of the world economically, militarily, technologically, and culturally. Not only is this unsustainable, it is simply not good for the America and for the world to have such an permanent and pronounced imbalance. But unless we screw up big time (and there are barbarians within the gate who try very hard to screw ourselves up!), America will be a strong leader for many generations. American should welcome a strong Europe, a strong Asia, and America should welcome any country or groups of country to be strong, as long as they are peaceful. That said, Europe can never be integrated like America, people who speak different languages and have deep differences in their culture will not function well under the same political and legal system except sustained by force, nor will they trust each other enough to give up their own defenses. On the other hand, the English-speaking world will always be a reliable alliance in times of crisis.

Drawing parallel from history to make future predictions surely sounds rational. However, historic parallels are more often than not superficial. The Roman Empire fell chiefly because of the rot from within, but also because the empire was an overextension of an empire covering disparate people and cultures. The decline of the British Empire was also inevitable because of the same reasons. America has never built an empire with our military might and we should be vigilant not to allow politicians to do that. We do have a large contingent of liberals who are intent on weakening those institutions that make our country and our people strong. What do they do? They creatively interpret our Constitution; they appoint judges who make laws at the bench; they encourage immigrants to not learn English; they teach our children to equivocate right and wrong; they fan class envy; they agitate the race and gender divides, and they intimidate and silence their critics, they even hijacked the term "liberal" to describe themselves. These liberals are the barbarians I alluded to earlier. America's decline, when and if it irrevocably happens, would be due to the liberal's good work, and NOT the rise of Europe.

Rating:
Summary: The Boy and the Wolf
Review: Nearly a year after it first appeared, Kupchan's book is looking more prophetic than ever. Suddenly, the arrogant, bombastic talk of American supremacy (nearly every other book/article in 2002/early 2003 seemed to be called 'American Empire' or something similar) is looking hollow as plastic pipe. The warning signs were apparent a year ago-a budget deficit *and* trade deficit both larger than any in American history, an army far smaller than its Cold War height, but expected to police half the world; and the weakness of America's despotic client-states in the Middle-East. Because Paul Kennedy (and many others) wrote wrongly about America 'decline' and 'overstretch' in the 80s, Kupchan is easy to dismiss. That is unfortunate, because unlike P.K., Kupchan has a very good case to make.

Kupchan's most original contributions are not those dealing with the obvious limits on empire-money and men, especially tax revenue and soldiers. Instead, Kupchan focuses on culture and politics, pointing out what Orwell called 'unpleasant facts': First, most Americans (unlike most US intellectuals and politicians-reviewers take note) are neither 'Internationalist' or 'Unilateralist'-they are Isolationist. Second, they are likely to become more so-especially as Latinos and Asians tend towards isolationism more than earlier immigrants.

Kupchan's point is that even if US retains the strength to intervene abroad, the will is likely to be absent. Terrorism may lead to spasmodic 'revenge strikes' (ala Afghanistan), but support for long-term involvment abroad will continue to wane.
This isn't necessarily a bad thing, considering the mess we have made in Iraq and elsewhere. But it is a fact that has yet to trickle up to the 'grand strategists' of NYC and DC, who see no problem with ordering a largely Black/Hispanic/Rural White soldiery to their death for their own power and profit.

Beyond the US, Kupchan makes the general point that Asian (especially Chinese) power is exaggerated, while European power is underestimated. Though nearly every reviewer below considers this outrageous, Kupchan is again quite right. The culprit is a fixation on population as a measure of power. It should be obvious that given modern technology, a wealthy nation of 200 million is far more powerful than a poor nation of 1 billion.

But this remains a hard concept for people to grasp-hence the paradoxial hysteria over unemployment *and* underpopulation; if the first is a serious problem (as it is nearly worldwide) than the second is probably not. Consequently, 500mil malnourished peasants do not make India more powerful than the US-if anything, the opposite. High growth rates in poor countries do not directly reflect an increase in national wealth, but largely the entry of huge numbers of peasants into the money economy. As Kupchan puts it, 10 years from now China will be 'Italy with nuclear weapons'; fears over China's rise have more to do with cheap-labor-competition and racial phobia than geopolitics.

By contrast, if Europe can integrate politically and military as well as economically it will not just match the US but overshadow it. The 'Iraq Hysteria' of 2002/3 contained a large element of Europhobia-precisely because a large section of the American 'chattering classes' sees Europe as a rival. It isn't yet, but the arguments that it never will be (demographics, disunity, 'socialism') are ridiculous. The main obstacle to EU integration since the USSR's collapse has been, still is, and will remain...the UK. Only if the US is dumb enough to completely antogonize the UK will it agree to military and political integration in the EU. This is unlikely, but (given current US leadership) still quite possible.

Kupchan's book is a much-needed antidote to the delusions of contemporary armchair strategists. Highly Recommended.

Rating:
Summary: Europe`s point of view...
Review: Prof. Kupchan has a very agreeable style. Most - not all - of his ideas are right. He claims the internet is bad for Democracy in the US. I claim the internet is good for Democracy on a global scale. The internet is positive for transatlantic relations. If this is the end of the American Era just as WW II was the end of the European Era could this be the beginning of the Global Era?! He owes me an answer...

Rating:
Summary: An image of the future ? distorted by static
Review: The advent of Europe and America's reluctant internationalism (followed by a withdrawal from international affairs) are going to be the defining moments of this century. America ought to be come to grips with this reality and prepare for the inevitable, by ensuring that no major war breaks out as a result of this emerging multipolarity.

That is the image of the future conjured up by Charles Kupchan, a professor at Georgetown University, in the "End of the American Era." The thesis is built on a historical journey, which turns out to be both an asset and a liability -- at times, history captures the reader and elucidates contemporary trends; often, the historical narratives seem irrelevant, over-emphasized or under-analyzed (i.e. distorted to support a hypothesis rather than used to form one). And, the recitation of obvious or familiar points is likely to bore those with a sound background in foreign policy.

If the geopolitical image painted in this book is interesting, the geo-economic one is less so. That is mainly because Professor Kupchan has spent little to no time analyzing economics -- either in their own might, or in their relation to international politics. Where economic analysis is found, it is usually too superficial to impress.

The books' recommendations -- broadly speaking, multilateralism and humility in conducing foreign policy -- are neither novel nor counterintuitive. The highpoint rests in the rationale Professor Kupchan provides for his policies: the inevitability of America's relative decline and the need for the United States to ensure a peaceful transition rather than try hold on to its power indefinitely. Whether anyone in Washington takes these ideas at heart is a whole other story, especially since implementing his ideas could be a self-fulfilling prophesy.

Rating:
Summary: The Search for a 'Grand Strategy'
Review: The End of the American Era deals with a crucial and very timely task. It endeavors to find a 'grand strategy' for the United States in an era of power transition in years or decades to come.

It is by and large about peaceful change of international order, which is highly going to be shaped by American policies. Kupchan's work is remarkable as it makes an effort to bridge theory, history and present time. It draws attention to power or balance of power in international politics. This realist base, however, is also complemented by liberal notions of strategic restrain and the need for international cooperation. In this sense, Kupchan's analysis is based upon a mixture of realist-liberal framework. Moreover, Kupchan makes several policy recommendations for current American foreign policy. He criticizes unilateralist drives of the Bush administration, which lead to counter-balancing behavior against the United States by major powers in international system. For this reason, the author recommends American foreign policy elites to follow strategic restrain for the sake of peaceful change of international order as well as the on behalf of American interests.

This book is a well-written and timely one on American foreign policy and it is highly recommended for students of international relations and American foreign policy. Alike, this book is recommended for the informed public. No doubt, Kupchan's work seems to remain as an important key to understand the potential implications of the current Iraqi crisis on the relations between the United States and other major powers.

Rating:
Summary: Faulty reasoning vieled anti-americanism
Review: This book is very faulty, very weak in its analysis. Lets first look at the author, Mr. Kupchan. He was a staffer under clinton and an admirer of Carter. He is a devotee of the Noam Chomsky school of politics which states "everything American is evil and America has reached its zenith and is declining". Mr Kupchan has been predicting the 'fall of america' for many years. He began voicing these ideas in the 70s and 80s when he thought America would lose the COld War. Kupchan and his fellows predicted that Communism was rolling us back in the third world and at our very doorstep(Central America) and that soon America would be isolated and alone. He saw people like WIlly Brandt and Ostpolitic as the new wave of anti americanism sweeping europe that would soon cripple us. And then suddenly we won and Russia collapsed.

So not Mr. Kupchan has writtena book trying to explain how realists like Huntington and Fukuyama are wrong, when the only wrong person here is Mr. Kupchan. THe central point in the Kupchan matrix is that the rise of China(he says asia but we know what were talking about here) and the rise of the EU(which just lost a vote in Sweden to join the Euro so how united they are is a mystery) will threaten america in the next decade and overturn us as the sole Hegemon in the world.

Kupchan simply doesnt understand what he is talking about. He never takes into account the FACT that Russia will return strong once again. he does not analyze the Islamic threat to western civilization(Muslims will soon dominate most european countries where they will make up more then 40% of the people due to their high birth rates and immigration). He also doesnt analyze the fact that the two strongest EU power centers(France and Germany) are both in violation of EU debt standards for membership. The only strength in the EU is the small nations like Denmark and those nations are no match for america and have neither the vision nor the resolve for being world powers.

As for China, the Chinese are all becoming capitalists as they reorganize their consumer banking system. Soon China and America will see eye to eye.

This book also does not take into account the rise of India and its impact on China and Islam. Countries like India and Brazil are ont he rise and we must discount this.

Not a very credible analysis by someone who has a personal hatred for AMerica.

Rating:
Summary: It could be a very ugly world
Review: We all know the first, most basic lesson from history - civilizations rise and fall. There are several parameters that will ensure that a powerful nation secures its supremacy for a prolonged period of time - but the key is enlightened leadership. How is it that one of our leading accounting firms whose founder worked to the highest ethical standards fell during the Enron era? How is that just one American President could turn the world's biggest creditor nation into the world's biggest debtor nation in just eight short years. How is it that Japan lost its supremacy in a decade? Surely the answer lies in having enlightened leadership and a system that ensures that a steady succession of enlightened leaders take the helm and are ready in the wings whenever the call arises. Our present system of electing the leader who can blow his own trumpet the loudest has the seeds of self-destruction. My hero in this respect is Lucius Quintius Cincinnatus, the Roman General who tilled the land in retirement until the empire was threatened and he was twice called to the dictatorship of Rome in 458 and 439 BC. In 458 BC he defeated the Aequians in a single day, and after entering Rome in triumph and with large spoils returned to his farm. No blowing his own trumpet and holding onto power by this general!

A wise nation does a simple SWOT analysis - strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats - and formulates a strategy to ensure that it holds on to power. Kupchan reminds us of Churchill's policy in response to the German threat prior to the First World War when, over much opposition, he brought the British fleet back to defend the homeland. But the British leadership was not so enlightened prior to the Second World War; fortunately Churchill was there waiting in the wings. "The End of the American Era" is primarily about the lessons from history applied to present day America and as you might imagine from the title the author gives a thumbs down on the degree of enlightenment of the American leadership today. The author points out that there are already signs that American preponderance and the stability it breeds are slipping away. American internationalism was at its high-water mark during the last decade but is now on the wane despite that fact that today's problems require a multilateral approach and reliance on international institutions. Terrorism poses a collective threat and requires a collective response. The tragic events of September 2001 served as a wake up call to America, alerting the country that the homeland is no longer inviolable and that the US would be wise to take greater interest in crucial foreign policy issues. The central challenge of the future will be the same as the past - managing relations between contending centers of power. Other concerns will pale in comparison to the dangers that will emerge if America believes that its primacy is here to stay. The US has unparalleled potential to shape what comes next but lacks a grand strategy; America is a great power adrift. Unfortunately, the intellectual initiative and institutional creativity of 1815, 1919 and 1945 are missing in Washington today. In addition, we do not have a clearly identified enemy but a much more elusive enemy in terrorism - an enemy schooled in guerrilla tactics where patience and tact are more useful weapons than military power.

Think tanks turn out work with a short shelf life while universities generate scholarship of little relevance to policy. What should America's new map look like? Is Fukuyama in The End of History right in that liberal democracy is taking the world by storm? Is Samuel Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order right that a struggle among Judeo-Christian, Islamic and Confucian civilizations is in the offing? Is Thomas Friedman in The Lexus and the Olive Tree right that globalization has changed the rules for good? In Kupchan's opinion each vision has its merits but all are wrong. The defining element of the global system is the distribution of power, not democracy, culture, globalization, or anything else. As the US withdraws from multilateral institutions in favor of unilateralism the vacuum will be filled by a new era of geopolitical rivalry. If history is a guide, the end of US primacy will bring with it a more unpredictable and unpleasant world.

It is impossible to predict your opponent's next move in chess, let alone predict moves and counter moves on the international scene. However, Kupchan has presented a convincing argument of how the future might unfold. Homeland security must not stand in the way of efforts to address the more dangerous challenge of the return to rivalry between the world's power centers. All this comes together in the final chapter with the closing sentence "It is now the task of those convinced by the warnings to get on with the difficult, but essential, duty of preparing for the end of the American era." This book has as its prime audience policy makers and decision-makers. Personally, I think every American voter should read this book and understand that voting for the person who blows his trumpet loudest is not going to put the most enlightened leader in the White House and without enlightened leadership we will most certainly see the end of the American era soon. Then it is likely to be a very ugly world.