On Certainty

Rating:
Summary: A Very Useful Little Book from a Very Big Philosopher
Review: A compilation of loosely connected, aphoristic-like statements about the idea of certainty, taking off from G. E. Moore's famous assertion in favour of common sense, Wittgenstein here presents his thoughts, at the end of his life, concerning the question of how sure of anything we can ever be. Dealing with a fundamentally epistemological question, this little book follows the path Wittgenstein had defined for himself in the latter part of his career, concerning itself with language and how we talk about the ideas we have.

Some misread him very badly, which is not surprising given his penchant for cryptic brevity and his own tendency to avoid extensive explication of his ideas in favour of the brief observation or statement reflecting moments of insight. Indeed, insight seems to have been at the very core of his later philosophy . . . it's all about seeing things in a new way.

On the matter of certainty, his claims here, sometimes rambling and seemingly unconnected, seem to boil down to a couple of points, consistent with his general way of seeing things:

1) Being certain of anything, he seems to say, is a matter of what we mean in the context in which we are expressing certainty. That is, he suggests that "certainty" the word has different meanings, depending on the application, and that we can become too readily confused if we try to apply one meaning (or use) in a place where another is required. As a corollary of this, he clearly holds that there is no basic idea of "certainty" to which all can be reduced, but only a range of related uses of the word in our language. This is in keeping with his larger view of the world as "contained" in our knowledge of it, and our knowledge "contained" in the words we use which are, themselves, a function of our language, which last is a part of our behavioural continuum, representing a rule-governed activity in which we are embedded as what he called a "form of life". (There are significant metaphysical implications for this but he does not touch on these, either in this book or more generally elsewhere, since he felt that to do that was often to stray out of the bounds that language made for us.)

2) As an outgrowth of the above, his second insight here tells us that there are some things of which we can be certain in a way that does not require what we would normally expect, i.e., evidence or proof. That is, sometimes a statement is just grounded in the rules of the game itself, i.e., in order to play in the game we must just assert the certainty . . . and believe in it. While such assertions may look the same as assertions of empirical certainty ("there is a bird outside my window") they are not (e.g., "there is an external world," "there are other minds inside other human bodies," etc.). To doubt certain things like this would be to break the rules of the game in which we are operating, in which case everything else collapses and we can no longer play.

In keeping with his usual approach, Wittgenstein does not present an argument for any of this or even make these claims, quite as explicitly as I have just done, in this book but, rather, confines himself to musings and observations, examples and questions. But it is to these two main points that everything he is presenting in On Certainty leads.

A note: some seem to have concluded from Wittgenstein's penchant for aphorisms and indirection that he was saying things quite different than he really was saying. I note someone here who accuses Wittgenstein of solipsism and this is a woeful misreading of him. His philosophical approach, in fact, put paid to the solipsist argument if read aright! Others have thought he was just playing with words or posturing as some kind of faux mystic. I would suggest that such ideas are false but that they arise because he was so unwilling to explicate his thoughts in the usual discursive way and, perhaps because he thought to do that would just lead one in circles.

So when reading Wittgenstein, you have to do it as he thought it and join him in the gnawing of the intellectual bones he displays in his observations. It is a matter of our seeing his point and not of his establishing logically defensible claims and arguments which we can debate with him or ourselves.

Someone else here likened him to a Zen master and I would suggest that that is very apt, indeed. Although his philosophical interests were mainly epistemological and not "spiritual" (defined as trying to place the conscious self in relation to the world in which it finds itself a la Zen), his techniques were not much different from those of Zen and his outcomes, insights into what we really mean when we say things, were on a par with the Zen idea of achieving satori (the moment of enlightenment). Different focal points, indeed, but the same strategy and the same basic understanding of the way introspective knowledge is secured for both.

Still, this particular work is very incomplete, perhaps because he wrote it while ill and apparently died before he could "complete" it . . . . leaving us a very limited look at a very significant epistemological problem with a somewhat spotty analysis and "solution." The Philosophical Investigations, his last (and also incomplete) work written specifically for publication, has much more to offer on his overall view of things and relative to the basic insights he invokes here in understanding "certainty".

SWM

Rating:
Summary: important
Review: A very important book for understanding the current debates about the nature of consciousness. W distinguishes between being certain of something because it is certainly true, and being certain of something because nothing would make sense without it.

Very readable, for W.

Rating:
Summary: Highly Recommend
Review: An absolutely fantastic read! Unlike linear philosophical works, this writing is a fragmented collection of thoughts. This is a real treat allowing the reader marvel at certain statement or point of reasoning without being burdened by precedence. Perhaps another engaging aspect to this book is that even-page side is printed in German, while odd side is an English translation. I couldn't help but to compare, and must say that has made the reading so much more enjoyable. Highly recommend this book for casual or dedicated philosophy reader. Most intriguing, fascinating, and brilliant work.

Rating:
Summary: Philosophy all philosophers should take note of
Review: Here is a book written by an analytical philosopher which ends up leading to conclusions not all analytical philosophers would find themselves comfortable with. For, so my reading goes, it leads to contextualist and pragmatic points of view. It suggests that in the use of words and thoughts we have to take into account the context, the situation we find ourselves in at the time. It suggests that "what stands fast for me" (the groundings for what I say I think which themselves are ungrounded) affects (and is presupposed by) what I say. This rocks the foundations of some thinkers, or rather, it tunnels underneath their arguments and gives (implicit and certainly unintended) support to many of today's postmodern thinkers who want to make as much as they can out of the idea of "social constructionism". This is the idea that what's real is always subject to contingent linguistic description, that when we say that something is real we also say, to be crude and vulgar, that we made it that way too; that is, that we are saying real things are things which fulfil our human rules for what's real.

And Wittgenstein does this with all the rigour and all the detail that he is known for. After all, he was a star pupil of Betrand Russell and he did write the minutely logical "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". That Wittgenstein is still here and his logical powers have led to rather different conclusions than they did in his early thinking, I think better ones. This book is going to ask you exactly what you mean when you say that you "know" something, anything at all. Its going to ask you what you mean by certainty. And its going to ask you to justify any claim to knowledge that you make and situate it coherently, sensibly and logically. This can only be to the reader's benefit.

PoSTmodERnFoOL

Rating:
Summary: So damn right, it ought to bleed
Review: If you want to read a book by Wittgenstein, just so you can say you have read him, or because you feel the need for some direct intellectual contact with a leading philosopher of the twentieth century, ON CERTAINTY is certain to be the one which you will understand the best, because it even tells you how you eventually understand something by finally stopping yourself from asking any more questions about it. As Wittgenstein's last book, close to being his dying words, it is something like a final opportunity for readers to surrender to Wittgenstein's power as a philosopher to keep thinking `I doubt it.'

After World War One, Wittgenstein attempted teaching at an elementary level in a few small Austrian farm villages. Wittgenstein came from a large family which employed an enormous number of tutors to provide its children with individual instruction. You could read Ray Monk's biography if you are interested in disputes about how many grand pianos were in Wittgenstein's house when he was growing up, and how many he said he had without implying that he could play them all at the same time, later on among Englishmen, who were capable of being impressed by numbers between one and ten, all of which might have been true at one point, if the Wittgensteins brought in a few extra grand pianos for some special occasion. ON CERTAINTY seems to be driven by the kind of attempt to produce intellectual slaves that was most recently attacked by the decision of the United States Supreme Court striking down the affirmative action program, which granted 20 points out of 150 possible points scored for undergraduate admission to the University of Michigan.

Even in free countries, law is expected to dominate in the intellectual slavery of free peoples, and judges, the majority of whom are white people dominated by the kind of logic that appeals to their interests, ultimately control the kind of decisions which can be made when the equality of the systems of the United States is directly challenged. Michigan is a state which is highly developed industrially and intellectually, with a large portion of black descendants of the kind of slaves who made the white masters of the south so financially successful in the years before the American Civil War. The affirmative action program at the University of Michigan was an attempt to make a large number of the black leaders in Michigan intellectual slaves of a tradition that is so inclusive that the normal political understanding of the politically astute slaves of mediocrity will not allow this kind of uppity boosting to take place. 20 points is outrageous, as a number to be used against the average white applicant, because it suggests a level of intellectual and social attainment that an average politically mediocre individual could never hope to attain.

ON CERTAINTY should be a perfect guide for understanding how the 20 point system works, because each individual's score was determined with the kind of mathematical precision that anyone with a brain like Wittgenstein's could only applaud, and any U.S. Supreme Court opinion to the contrary, hoping for some kind of individual evaluation which refuses to stick numbers on particular kinds of distinctions, while trying to achieve the same results, only more indistinctly, raises the possibility that for those who rule, everything is seemingly hidden from the ruled, in the kind of intellectual slavery that could be most aptly described as a secret circus stunt method of swaying vast multitudes, and which damns the state which would try to teach people to think any differently.

Rating:
Summary: Readable Wittgenstein, tackles epistemological relativism
Review: On Certainty is an excellent introduction to Wittgenstein's thought, especially for those who may be turned off by the terseness and impenetrability of the Tractatus. This piece is still terse by any standard but Wittgenstein's, and many statements are just clever one-sentence aphorisms that float by themselves, seemingly disconnected from the main thread of argument. Assertions are often left unproven, and the numbered-statements style can be tiring. Still, some numbered statements are actually several sentences long (!), and many actually go into detail -- this makes it is somewhat unusual among Wittgenstein's works. As is often the case with philosophers' works, a beginning student would be well advised to proceed into Wittgenstein's works in reverse chronological order. The early Wittgenstein -- of perfect edifices of language and logic -- may be better understood in light of the later Wittgenstein, of social constructs and language games.

Where does Wittgenstein come down on the question of epistemological relativism? In classical paradoxical Wittgensteinian fashion, he is both for and against, sort of. He admits that he is certain of some things, and that he often thinks that someone who is not certain of these things (e.g., "This is my hand." etc) as not "reasonable." But he does not go so far as to say there is an objective truth on a Platonic plane. Certainty is more personal than that (a la Michael Polanyi?), and in some deep axiomatic way, has to be taken on faith. We are ultimately certain of things just because we are certain of them, and, as Wittgenstein writes about the statement "this is my hand," any evidence we could muster to support such a statement is not as strong as the original statement itself.

Overall, this is a fascinating look at the interplay of language, belief, and epistemology, from one of the 20th century's master philosophers.

Rating:
Summary: Zen master for the 21st century...
Review: Wittgenstein hastily wrote "On Certainty" in his last days - several places he seemed frustrated that he was unlikely to be able to get his ideas across. However, this work distills most of his work on the foundations of knowledge in a manner that is quite accessible. In fact, this book should have been entitled something like "cutting through centuries of misguided notions" - you only get clarity of vision such as contained in this volume if you are lucky enough to get samadhi from "show me your original face".

Wittgenstein used Moore's (in)famous paper that started with "knowing" his hand and then deduced the universe. Wittgenstein showed the inherent fallacy of this attempt and in the process paraded the naked emperor of metaphysics around in all its dualistic glory. For Wittgenstein really attacked the 'mapping' of what is really psychology into the analytic framework of philosophy.

Wittgenstein pointed out that doubt is a 'game', in the sense that doubting must follow logical rules. The game runs aground when it attempts to doubt the actual framework - such as doubting your own existence. This is no longer part of the 'game' but instead is simply nonsense or, better, psychology.

Wittgenstein wrote the book in his familiar style utilizing short semi-paragraphs to map out his arguments. I find the format quite similar to Eastern philosophy such as Tao Te Ching and the Zen koans and feel it is quite readable. Other people may want to buy Avrum Stroll's excellent "Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty" for a more 'standard' overview of the argments.

This is essential reading for anyone interested in the future of philosophy.

Rating:
Summary: Zen master for the 21st century...
Review: Wittgenstein hastily wrote "On Certainty" in his last days - several places he seemed frustrated that he was unlikely to be able to get his ideas across. However, this work distills most of his work on the foundations of knowledge in a manner that is quite accessible. In fact, this book should have been entitled something like "cutting through centuries of misguided notions" - you only get clarity of vision such as contained in this volume if you are lucky enough to get samadhi from "show me your original face".

Wittgenstein used Moore's (in)famous paper that started with "knowing" his hand and then deduced the universe. Wittgenstein showed the inherent fallacy of this attempt and in the process paraded the naked emperor of metaphysics around in all its dualistic glory. For Wittgenstein really attacked the 'mapping' of what is really psychology into the analytic framework of philosophy.

Wittgenstein pointed out that doubt is a 'game', in the sense that doubting must follow logical rules. The game runs aground when it attempts to doubt the actual framework - such as doubting your own existence. This is no longer part of the 'game' but instead is simply nonsense or, better, psychology.

Wittgenstein wrote the book in his familiar style utilizing short semi-paragraphs to map out his arguments. I find the format quite similar to Eastern philosophy such as Tao Te Ching and the Zen koans and feel it is quite readable. Other people may want to buy Avrum Stroll's excellent "Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty" for a more 'standard' overview of the argments.

This is essential reading for anyone interested in the future of philosophy.

Rating:
Summary: Good for a laugh maybe
Review: Wittgenstein was a man who despised all things metaphysical and spiritual. He fancied himself a no-nonsense objectivist who would not be hoodwinked by false religious promises or tricked into seeing intangible ghosts. However, Wittgenstein's philosophy seems to have centered around a type of solipsism, which strikes me as the most outlandish, metaphysical, and fantastical philosophy imaginable. He refuses to acknowledge the existence of anything that he is not able to see before him; it is ironic that someone who so vehemently denies the existence of ghosts wants to regard nearly every being and entity on the face of the earth a ghost, if he is not there to see it. Wittgenstein has quite literally put the very existence of the concrete universe into question. Everything has become some type of hallucination, and is reduced to pure irreality when a subject is not present. This strikes me as a very metaphysical philosophy indeed. Wittgenstein's solipsism has spiraled out of control and taken on a life of its own. For him the self is everything; all so-called objective entities spring from the subjective self, leaving us with no real objctive reality or atomic facts at all. All we are left with is Wittgenstein, the self-appointed possessor, owner, and sovereign monarch of the known universe. None of us exist unless Wittgenstein invites us into his little world, and we cease to exist the moment we exit his field of vision. I, for one, take exception to this. Hey Wittgenstein: - I exist - get used to it - I'm here to stay - you cannot expel me from the universe - the world does not revolve around you! What could be more non-objective than denying the very existence of any and all objectivity? What could be more outlandishly speculative and fantastic than denying the conscious sentience of all other beings? Wittgenstein's solipsism has quite simply mutated into an astonishingly egotistical megalomania. This philosophy lacks common sense.

That said, I have nothing but the utmost respect for the intellectuals who are able to decipher this philosophy. It is an important and inevitable philosophic movement, and can be very helpful and informative with regards to how NOT to think. All philosophers must at least consider and come to terms with Wittgenstein's solipsism; we must work our way through this philosophy and find a way to transcend it. Regardless of your attitude towards this philosophy, I must recommend Brand Blanshard's great book, _Reason and Analysis_, as an eloquent respose to the philosophy of Wittgenstein. No one can be a true expert on Wittgenstein unless they are able to answer to the criticisms directed at his concepts. If you are ever going to be able to uphold this philosophy you must be able to answer to your critics and know what people on the other side are saying. If you read Blanshard's _Reason and Analysis_, you will be much better equipped to deal with Wittgenstein's detractors.