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Rating: 
Summary: Excellent Example of Doing Ontology First
Review: Andrew Newman claims that not only must a correspondence theory explain how sentences and/or propositions correspond with the world, the theory must also have an account of propositions and facts, if facts are needed. This work attempts to do just that to give a more robustly defended correspondence theory of truth. Newman pays special attention to other accounts in the 20th century, specifically Wittgenstein, Russell, and briefly Austin. His own view heavily relies on Armstrong and Russell; it is an Aristotelian account if that helps. Over all, I was especially pleased with his rigour and clarity. At this point, I'm not sure if Newman is correct; but his account is definitely worth taking seriously, even if he denies the facts are relevant for correspondence. The book description lists this book as written for professionals and graduate students. While that is true (the book is not dumbed-down), I think that advanced undergraduate students could follow this work. Very little background knowledge is required since he explains most of the material. However, this book is *not* for those without any background in metaphysics. I highly recommend this piece for those interested in correspondence theories of truth and how ontology (perhaps) ties into truth (see also Richard Fumerton's book, Realism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth).
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