Philosophy and Social Hope

Rating:
Summary: Self-destructive philosophy.
Review: "Philosophy and Social Hope" is a typical Rortian collection of essays, in which he further espouses his pragmatic philosophy to achieve communal "solidarity." Having pretty much read and re-read all of Richard Rorty's books several times over the last couple of years, I can honestly say that all his pragmatism really ever comes down to, is both a self-contradictory excuse for socialism, and a vague understanding of what's pragmatically "useful." His books, however, are very entertaining.

Richard Rorty is unquestionably the most influencial and enthusiastic spokesman for postmodernism--a term he prefers not to use, even though his philosophy closely mirrors the many theories that have come close to defining it (it's basically an absolute rejection of absolutes). According to David Horowitz (and the autobiography which the book begins with), Rorty is the son of a Trotskyite, who counts polysyllabic Afrocentric name-dropper Cornel West among his faithful pragmatic proteges.

One of the salinet flaws I come across on Rorty's philosphy, is his equivocation towards the notion of "truth." This is because whenever Rorty writes that he denies the existence of absolute truth, he's denying to "absolutely." He has committed himself to an absolute by assertion, with "absolute truth" as its goal (and even if it isn't, either way he's kind of asking his readers not to believe him). As Roger Scruton has put it, Rorty and his contemporaries are just creating trouble for themselves by "their role in giving authority to the rejection of authority, and to their absolute commitment to the impossibility of absolute commitments." So by claiming that "truth is an illusion," Rorty asks you not to believe him. So don't.

Rorty's conception of communal "solidarity" is even more implausible than his rejection of absolute truth. For a community to achieve the goal of solidarity, Rorty claims, it must adhere to the following critera: non-coercive "general" agreement and "tolerance" of dissenting disagreement, a Kantian ethical system (i.e., the categorical imperative), a belief that no one individual is intrinsically superior to another, and voluntary participation in elections. All of which doesn't sound too extreme until Rorty says this critera musn't be accepted by virtue of its "absolute" truth; rather, it must be accepted because it promotes communal solidarity. When you stop to think about that (which shouldn't take long), you begin to realize how nutty this is.

In a society like ours, you have many, many divergent beliefs and ideologies, such as libertarianism, socialism, Christianity, Islam, atheism, anarchy, and even nihilism. If the goal here is communal "solidarity" instead of "general" agreement based on objective truth, then how do you discuss and debate all these issues? And is Rorty's community defined by its beliefs or does it include all of these beliefs? (Presumably the latter, but Rorty doesn't really say.)

Rorty's pragmatism is even more vague. It's "useful" to be a tediously Afrocentric black Marxist (like Rorty's buddy Cornel West) in contemporary American universities. Is that an example of pragmatism? It "works." It was also "useful" to be anti-Semitic in Hitler's Germany, like the subject of one of Rorty's essays here, Martin Heidegger. It was "useful" for him. Was that an example of pragmatism relative to the culture Heidegger was reared in?

Like all of Rorty's books, this is a little to paradoxical to swallow. If it's tenable political philosophy you're looking for, then I strongly suggest getting your hands on some of the late Michael Oakeshott's work.

Rating:
Summary: Not the Rorty I Grew up to Despise!
Review: After reading an endless number of books and articles where Richard Rorty is treated as the devil or just a bad joke, I realized that I'd never read him myself. This book not only served as a splendid introduction, it conlfirms and refutes some of the demonizations Rorty has recieved.

Rorty's often ben labeled as an anti-American lefty who spews forth dangerous 'relativism's and even worst 'postmodernisn's. Most of this, we learn, is quite wrong. Rorty is actually one of the more optimistic of the leftist intellectuals. Early in the book, he even takes them to task for being so gloomy, possibly due to an aggrandized nostalgia for Marxism and Postmodernism. The claim that Rorty is a relativist may or may not be true, depending on where you stand. He takes the unusual turn of denying the faculty of reason, but truly, I think there is a place for it in Rorty's philosophy. Instead of reason being the took that grasps reality as it is, in Rorty's framework, reason has the inflated role of choosing between alternatives. His denial of 'objective' human rights is bothering to some, but the same rules apply. What we call human rights, are simply agreed upon human preferences, although many see this (correctly?) as relativism.

There are though, a few major flaws with Rorty. His notion of progress is 'evolutionary.' What is the pragmatic view of the future? To make things better. How? We'll know when we get there. Rorty likens this to evolution, and in some ways he is correct. Biological evolution though, can only be judged in retrospect. We know that adapatations survive because they work, but we can only judge their effectiveness in hindsight. Contrary to Rorty's view, culutral evolution doesn't work that way. Here, the question NEEDS to be framed. WHEN EVER we ask a question of how to increase efficiency (social or personal) we must have some goal, purpose or focus. 'We'll know when we get there' is bogus.

Also, for a fellow who sees things as having meanings only in their relation to other things, there are three concepts Rorty seems to accept on their own: Democracy, Evolution, and John Dewey. As for the first, although we see that it is the best around, this is only because of it's results so I was displeased when Rorty wrote of democracy as an absolute, not relational value. The second, Rorty has a misconception of (see above) and the third, Rorty has very little in common with. "Anyone posessing even a modest grasp of his moral philosophy could not confuse Dewey's insturmentalism...with the sentimental philosophy of Rorty." [Moral Writings of John Dewey, introduction]. Dewey never denied reason, Rorty does. Dewey didn't take the 'linguistic turn,' Rorty did. I'm not even sure that Dewey denied that things COULD have intrinsic natures, only reasons's ability to grasp them. Rorty goes whole-hog.

Overall though, I was impressed by Rorty's optimism,writing ability and some of his insights: especially on education. Philosophers may want to read his technical writings for more depth, but this book is a good place to start, ESPECIALLY IF , LIKE ME, YOU'VE ONLY READ RORTY'S CRITICS!!

Rating:
Summary: Social Democratic theory by way of Neo-Pragmatism
Review: As I am only a moderetly well-read senior in High school, I really can't comment on this book from the perspective of a philosopher. I will openly admit that many of the names and a few of the concepts that Rorty presented flew right over my head. Yet I really enjoyed the book. I may be wrong in thinking this, but I believe this book to be a great stepping stone between the sort of "50 Great Philosophers" books and hard-core theory, wether it be James, Nietzsche, Dewey, Kant, whoever. A sort of Intelligent layman introduction to modern Pragmatist thought. While I do realize that much of Rorty's works are nothing to spectacular in the academic world, but, speaking as an outsider to that world, I must say that his ideas seemed revolutionary, compared with the traditional wisdom and common sense most of us are taught day in and day out. I mean, up until I read this book, the most supreme philosophical concept that tore me apart was the objective-subjective dualism. And here comes Rorty telling me that objective-subjective is a diachotomy that doesn't matter. Not really mind blowing, but definetly more to chew on, and I do so love that. Thus, philosophically, I think this is a great collection. Politically though...Well, let's just say when it's possible for *ME* to find the holes in the arguments, they are shallow arguments indeed. It's not so much that I disagree with Rorty (infact, I whole heartedly agree with 90% of the politics he presents in this book) so much as the fact that he comes off more as a political outsider with a sort of Everyman understanding of History, Economics, and Politics. But, as Rorty says in this collection (another thing that's obvious yet I can never seem to manage), we should not judge a philosopher by his politics, and vice versa. To sum up: Intelligent layman trying to work their way in to hardcore philosophy, this book acts as a gate-way to the world of Hegel and Kant, but there is most likely little to be found here for the hardened phisolophy junkie.

Rating:
Summary: Conceptual Asylum 101
Review: Conceptual Asylum 101

This is a work in epistemological mayhem. Richard Rorty believes that communal solidarity can be achieved by a suspension of any inclination or obligation we have to detect the truthfulness or untruthfulness of a principle, and, instead by a focus on its communal usefulness. Oh really? Racial apartheid in South Africa, the cultural nationalist rhetoric of Slobodan Milosevic and the national Socialism of Adolph Hitler created a gargantuan sense of �communal solidarity,� for its defenders and practitioners. This sort of specious reasoning depends on who gets counted in the pantheon of the human community. If Jews, blacks in South Africa or good old fashioned moral thinkers begin to feel a tad uncomfortable with a �communal solidarity,� that they do not feel a deep connection to (even though some may belong to such communities�I think of Nadine Gordimer) because they don not qualify as community members, then the simplistic non-coercive agreement and overall sentimental tolerance of dissenting disagreement that he upholds will need a more robust basis, short of bloodshed, to disarm the nefarious premises on which those truth claims assuring �communal solidarity,� are based.
His proclivity for eschewing litmus tests, or at least, plausible criteria for determining whether ideas have a referent in reality reminds me of a statement the writer Shelby Steele once made. It was something on the order of: ideas come dime a dozen. What is increasingly rare is their right fit with reality. How can Rorty discount this? A scientist, policy maker, or businessman advocating this stance would respectively face derision for trying to pass off a hypothesis as a valid theory, chaos and bankruptcy. If ideas achieve the goal of creating a more just society, then those ideas must have, in some sense, corresponded to reality.
I�m sure that Ricahrd Rorty is a decent man who cares about humanity. But he is proof of what happens to those who surrender even a tiny piece of their cognitive machinery to the irrationality of postmodernism. They become members of the Cult of the Irrelevant because common sense, thinking through the logical implications of one�s arguments as well as acknowledging the conceptual antecedent of one�s ideas take a backseat to sophistry and rhetorical gamesmanship.

Rating:
Summary: some interesting essays, but overall, not worth the time.
Review: Essays such as "Globalization, the Politics of Identity and Social Hope" and "Looking backwards from the year 2096" are interesting reads and are well written. Rorty offers some valid criticisms of academia and some interesting viewpoints on important issues. I don't generally find myself disagreeing with too many of his ideals as I do with his approach to them. His relativistism meets pragmatism style makes me feel like I'm reading the Economist. Now the Economist writes some pretty good articles that seem to be observing "both sides" (as if there were only 2 sides in any given issue.) but in the end simply settling on some slightly redressed version of the status quo. Both Rorty and the Economist give me the same feeling, they will say that there is so much to be done in the world and wouldn't it be nice if we could do something, but there is no lively spirit to their writings, just posturing from some lofty height. If you like reading Pat Buchanan's yearnings for the mythical old days, you might find some interest in this book. Otherwise, stay away. Besides, how many times have you read a good philosophy (I'm sorry, "anti-philosophy") book published by Penguin?

Rating:
Summary: Social Democratic Anglophonic Insignificance
Review: It is difficult to criticize Rorty, steeped as I am in the tradition of American pragmatism. I tend to agree with Rorty's conception of truth as "an expedient" we use to propel ourselves into the future. I am also anti-essentialist to the hilt and distrustful of all dualisms. However, as much as Rorty and I share - and a common philosophical tradition is no small thing - we do not share much else.

For starters, this book is tragically bland. If for some reason you have to read this, I recommend coffee, nicotine, amphetamines or any other stimulant - because it will put you sleep. Though that's neither here nor there. The main problem is that Rorty's politics are lukewarm, or to put it more aptly he has none. I found myself saying 'OK, so what?' over and over again after page after page of generalizations. Like an impressionist painter, he merely touches the surface of those issues a questioning soul would delve deeply into, offering scant 'facts' (of any kind) and superficial analysis, at best. But that's OK, I guess, he's getting old.

At rock bottom, Rorty's politics are imploring: He beckons his readers to embrace the "principle of fraternity" and "siblinghood", or in other words, "the ability to sympathize with the plight of others" and "a sense of shame in having much when others have little." Yes, shame on you, Western Civilization! Shame, shame, shame! (You can, it should be noted, get these same admonishments from the Bible, albeit in older, more philosophically essentialist language.)

Nor is the book particularly original or transforative. What we find here, rather, is a blathering old 'Redblooded American' who cannot stop waging theoretical warfare against an amorphous enemy - an enemy that would seem to be more the construct of his imagination than some real threat to the social order. That is, most of us are not suffering from Platonism, 'logocentrism,' or a highly acute case of philosophical 'essentialism.' In fact, were America full of hardheaded Platonists, I for one would find living here much more suitable. The stark reality is that, instead of Truth, Beauty and Justice (the holy platonic trilogy) we find such things Ball Park Franks, cosmetic surgery, pro-wrestling and monster truck rallies.

Yet to get the real flavor of Rorty and his writing, there is no better place to look than Rorty himself. As he says, "The left's favorite word for me is 'complacent,' just as the right's is 'irresponsible.'" I shun the dualism and I say he is both. As a philosopher who decries the need for democratization and social justice, Rorty fails miserably. He would have been better off protesting the WTO or going down to the local homeless shelter to ladle soup than write this book. Rising unemployment, the exclusion of homeless citizens from political participation, unequal education opportunities, ruthless economic warfare between nations, the globalization of the labor market, foreign debt, the arms industry, the militarization of American culture, nuclear proliferation, interethnic wars, the CIA and FBI messing things up at home and abroad, the mafia and drug cartels, rampant consumerism, massive drug use, environmental degradation, corporate imperialism, and the impotence of international law - aside from being casually mentioned, Rorty offers no useful discussion of these topics in this book.

In the end, Rorty's philosophy does nothing to halt or combat the undemocratic development project of the Western World. Indeed, this 'complacent,' 'irresponsible' and playfully written book on 'social hope' (we don't need hope, we need action) is nothing more than a distraction. In essence and detail, it is merely the repetition of the old pragmatic injunction to be weary of those who believe they have discoverd the Truth (with a capital T) and to keep your chin up! That said, Rorty's writing style is fluid and can be highly entertaining at times. He employs many cute catchphrases like 'hick logocentrics' and 'polylingual sophisticates.' If you want philosophical banter, look no farther. If you want to be moved, transformed, engaged or inspired, this is not your book.

[...]

Rating:
Summary: Acid on the Dross
Review: Rorty is one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries not because he offers a new theory or new system, but precisely because he is so good at warning us about getting addicted to theories and systems. For this he is hated by many philosophers, despised by many in the literati, scorned by metaphysicians and clerics (as a nihilist or relativist), and reviled by philosophical purists who believe he gleefully misreads the works of their heros and masters.

But like acid on the dross of idiotic or, to be more charitable, useless ideas which have led many a thinker into the deep and twisted woods of high theory, never to be seen again, Rorty pours out his neo-pragmatist criticisms on the various "isms" that claim to be more in touch with the "real world" than their competitors. What is left after the acid bath is a stark realization that there is little that we have to build a better world than our strenuously forged concessions, compromises, agreements, collaborations, and conversations about what in fact having a better world means. This antifoundational view leaves wholly unsatisfied people who believe that something more concrete is needed to build the world into something more salutary and livable than it was yesterday. Rorty tells the reader that there is nothing more concrete than he or she, that the need for rationalist foundations is a diversion from the true font of social hope and freedom. In this, he surpasses even John Dewey in democratic credentials, although this is seen as heresy in many philosophical circles. Unlike Dewey, Rorty offers no decision procedure for democratic practice. He bids us only to go and be democrats (his preference), or come up with your own good reasons for going in another direction. He will not clobber you with arguments proving the link between democracy and human nature. He will ask you to consider the advantages of his own preferences, and try to convince you to give them a shot.

While Rorty does overstate his case, it isn't by very much, for in his view we must shake off the idea that we need more (or will get more) to resolve issues such as cloning, capital punishment, abortion or hyper-nationalism than consensus. Ultimately, every attempt to lay a philosophical foundation, to provide a rationalist bedrock for our choices and conduct, fails. Even the notion of "unalienable rights" is a fiction, but a good one that we embrace because of its use, because of how it organizes the societies that believe in it. Each foundation can be picked to pieces by other arguments and other social imperatives, or other changes in what the culture believes is relevant to itself. Democracy isn't better than Islamic or Christian fundamentalism; it is only better if a certain kind of freedom is more relevant than paradise in the next life. Rorty argues in this volume and elsewhere that we must get over philosophy and theory and instead roll up our sleeves and get to work in public debate, meaningful social criticism, engagement. The best a philosopher can hope to do is help along conversations big and small about issues big and small, bringing no particular expertise to the process save for the value of a good education and the intellectual virtues honed during play with arguments and ideas.

For those who find Rorty's message unsettling, all I can say is that they should take up Philosophy and Social Hope, allow the unsettling to take place, enjoy the ride where enjoyment is possible, and then put the book aside. They may return to it years hence, to challenge it, to find new points of agreement, to throw it across the room as an attack on their souls and the Gods of their fathers and of their countries. But, like so many important thinkers, Rorty cannot be ignored -- whether you like him or not.

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Summary: post-metaphysical philosophy for the rest of us
Review: Rorty is rightfully a controversial philosopher, rejecting his philosophical post, assimilating Continental thought (a no no for many analytic philosophers), actually taking Derrida seriously, claiming the absolute/relative dichotomy has been dissolved, etc. This particular book stands out as a gesture to those who haven't the know how or the time to read philosophy journals to see what's been going on. Rorty is easy to read and concerned about the "public" and the conditions of philosophy in regular life.
While Rorty likes to be associated with pragmatism, I think any reader who finds Rorty's arguments to be interesting or convincing should not look ONLY to Dewey and James, this would be all too anglo-centric. While the British American tradition of philosophy has, in general, ignored the big questions (until recently anyway), Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida, Kierkegaard and a whole slew of so called Continental philosophers have been making phenomenal work/commentaries on the same sorts of issues, and Rorty owes as much to them as to pragmatism. I only mention this to encourage the reading of these other great authors who stand with Rorty as post-metaphysical thinkers - in other words, I think pragmatism as a movement needs to be placed in a post-metaphysical context so that it is read in companionship with similar, too often neglected thinkers.

Rating:
Summary: A great introduction to Rorty and pragmatism
Review: The essays collected in Philosophy and Social Hope cover a pretty wide span, from philosophy (of course) to academia to literature to politics, but they rarely fail to be interesting and accessible. I particularly enjoyed some of the early essays, which serve as an excellent introduction to pragmatism, an set of ideas I previously wasn't very familiar with. This was because I'd recently thought myself into an intelllectual corner of sorts, and certain aspects of pragmatism provided a neat way out. I don't agree with all aspects of it, but the ones I disagree with were still useful to read about.

On the less philosophical topics, Rorty is a bit less consistent. His perspectives on academia are quite interesting, and certainly backed up with personal experience, but on politics he is not as good. His knowledge of politics and economics doesn't seem to be particularly exhaustive, and he often fails to back up his assertions with specific examples or verifiable evidence. Rorty's political writings are still worth reading, and I agree with most of his opinions, but he isn't nearly as cogent or authoritative there as in philosophy.

There are also a couple of essays that I just skipped over because they seemed to be obscure commentaries on intellectual disputes I knew nothing about. This is not a widespread problem in the book, though, and it is well worth reading whether or not you have philosophical background knowledge. (My own knowledge of that area is pretty limited.)

Rating:
Summary: Now offering a newer, truer Heidegger.
Review: The Preface of this book notes the distinction between the items in this book, "lectures intended for a so-called `general audience' (that is, students and teachers in colleges and universities, as opposed to gatherings of specialists in philosophy); second, occasional contributions to newspapers and magazines," (p. xii) and the three volumes of PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS which were published previously. This collection is for the wider audience, and it demonstrates an understanding of how society functions in the absence of what has usually been considered philosophy. It shows an awareness of philosophy, but with a realistic appraisal of how little it might control our thoughts. "This means, for example, that we cannot employ the Kantian distinction between morality and prudence." (p. xvi).

The philosophical case for the existence of irony is acute in this book's consideration of the alternatives possible in the life of Heidegger. As it is and was, "For those of us who wish to pick over the tools in Heidegger's box, the fact that the man who designed these remarkable tools was first a Nazi and later a cowardly hypocrite is just one of history's many ironies." (p. 192). In the world as Rorty would prefer it, Heidegger's books could have been slightly different, and he imagines "the INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS contains a contemptuous identification of the National Socialist movement with the mindless nihilism of modern technology, as well as the remark that Hitler is dragging Germany down to the metaphysical level of Russia and America." (p. 195) Heidegger's philosophy would still boil down to "This struggle, this private pursuit of purity, was the core of his life. It was incapable of being greatly influenced either by his love for particular persons or by the political events of his time." (p. 195). Ultimately, the privacy which the real Heidegger sunk into is condemned by Rorty as denial of the torment which he chose to ignore. "In our actual world, he turned his face away, and eventually resorted to hysterical denial. This silence brought on his unforgivable silence." (p. 196). What really hurts this book is the realization that reality could be so bad that eventually any country's greatest philosopher might end up getting his share of the blame.