The Illusion of Conscious Will

Rating:
Summary: Readable, Entertaining, and Enlightening!
Review: Daniel Wegner, (Harvard Professor of Psychology) has written a technical book that is readable, entertaining, enlightening. My introduction to Dr. Wegner was in "White Bears and Other Unwanted Thoughts". His sense of humor combined with his presentation of details put that book on my top ten list.

Since my primary interest is in spirituality, I was anxiously awaiting The Illusion of Conscious Will. In my opinion there is no topic that can be more seductive in the study of spirituality or philosophy. If we think we have "free-will" our thought-life takes one path, if we come down on the side of determinism (or predestination in some circles) our life will follow a different path. The author jumps right into the fray at the very start:

"So here you are reading a book on conscious will. How could this have happened? If [a team of scientific psychologists] had access to all the information they could ever want, the assumption of psychology is that they would uncover the mechanisms that give rise to all of your behavior and so could certainly explain why you picked up this book at this moment.
However, another way to explain the fact of your reading this book is just to say that you decided to pick up the book and begin reading. You consciously willed what you are doing"

A sample of topics cover everything from spirit possession, animals that communicate, hypnosis, morality, and a host of other topics including a brief but interesting insight regarding a confession by the Amazing Kreskin.

Since my background is not in psychology, this became a challenging read but always entertaining. At the very least you will be impressed with how psychologists approach a problem that philosophers and theologians have debated for a thousand years. But if you are like me, this book is destined to change your outlook on life.

Rating:
Summary: Good, but fails near the end
Review: I loved the way this book started. For example, the evidence that people can feel they are controlling other people's actions is fascinating. The overall theory of how we feel we are willing things is well presented, as is the idea that such a feeling is an illusion. This isn't shocking stuff to some, but to others it will be a huge revelation.

I do have complaints. For the tiny ones first (big one at the end). First, I object to calling the loss of pain and loss of memory during hypnosis examples of increased mental control. By that definition, Alzheimers patients have increased control. What one isn't aware of one isn't aware of and this hardly seems like control.

As far as not being able to avoid thinking of things, it seems to me the explanation is simpler. Words conjure images, but negative words have no images associated with them so when you say "Don't think about a bear" the only word causing an image is bear, and so you think of a bear. Trying to monitor bear thoughts will lead to bear thoughts. Also he says, if you are distracted while you are trying not to do something you will be more likely to do it. I can see that since trying not to do something (like drop a jar) requires action in an opposite direction, i.e. it requires effort. But is this true when you are trying NOT to think of something? If I tried not to think of Wegner's white bear and was then asked to recite the Gettysburg address I strongly suspect I would forget the bear. Not thinking about something, unlike not doing does not require any positive action. Distraction ought to make it easier to forget and he never distinguishes between these and acts as if what is true of behavior is true of thoughts.

But my BIG complaint is the last chapter. He suddenly claims his own theories only explain why we feel will, but he tried to minimize the impact of all this on morality and even started talking about will as a causal force again. He even seemed at times when using the word will to indicate something that wasn't necessarily conscious. This is nonsense. If will isn't conscious it isn't will.

Our thoughts have causal impact on our actions, but then what is the cause of our thoughts? Clearly we don't control these either. They are a sum of what we are, what we have experienced, the way our brains are wired together etc. As far as morality I have to believe that the only thing we can judge is individual bits of behavior. Behavior is moral or not, acceptable or not and some people have a higher propensity to engage in unacceptable behaviors than others--whatever the reasons. As a society we have to judge behavior and engage in activities to modify the behavior of others when it is unacceptable and that is what our jutsice system should attempt. If an individual's behavior remains unacceptable or cannot be modified, we have an obligation to put them where they cannot engage in the behavior.

Wegner is clearly unwilling to give up on the idea that people will their behavior and are thus responbsible in the traditional way for what they do. The idea that we can use "mens rea" a guilty mind to show a person willed their actions seems like a dubious standard to me. A person may not will their behavior but later feels guilty because they realize their behavior is in violation of their own moral code. A person totally lacking a developed moral code (a sociopath, let's say) would never exhibit a guilty mind. Are such folks les guilty? Or less dangerous?

The whole issue of whether mental states should be considered in a legal system should be abandoned as far as I can see. I believe we should judge behavior and then decide what to do with the person engaging in the behavior. What we do should be motivated by our desire to 1) modify the person's behavior and 2) protect innocents. The strategy for each individual will vary depending on their mental abilities and their behavioral history etc and we may often get it wrong.

Wegner's thesis has much bigger implications for our ideas about personal responsibility than he wants to admit and ultimately he is unwilling to really stick with his guns. That was a dissappointment.

But the book has a lot of great stuff to say and I would definitely recommend it to anyone interested in mind/body questions.

Rating:
Summary: Great Read!!
Review: The Illusion of Conscious Will will radically change your view of human behavior, including your own. It manages to controvert the most basic of our intuitive assumptions about our actions and decisions -- that they are governed by our conscious thought processes. Wegner presents ample anecdotal and scientific evidence to suggest that what we call consciousness is just a byproduct of our underlying, unconscious decision making process. And, what is more, he does so with an entertaining and readily accessible writing style. A great read for anyone who is interested in learning why they do what they do!

Rating:
Summary: Frightening
Review: This book is frightening, and I am quite surprised (and doubting) about the reviews I've read so far. Surely the news that we do nothing out of our conscious (let alone free) will is a chilling idea. Am I to blame for my actions, am I to praise for my achievements? Well, according to Wegner: forget it!
Now I wonder why people (ie. reviewers) have to pretend to be brave in face of such a frightening idea. Yet there is no critical review here (the only ones are complaining that Wegner may be to soft in the end). Now, if you think it is nice to look in your grandparent's faces and know that you know something they don't know: namely that all their lives has been based on a grand illusion, then go ahead and enjoy. I for my part think this is chilling news. I only want to add that Wegner's view is not the standard view and that there are some at least equally respected researchers who come to very different conclusions. I write this in case that some of those incredibly brave people who applaud their next-to-non-existence may want to have second thoughts and look for more information. There is also a special issue of behavioral brain sciences coming in the next months which may offer a more balanced view of human nature and our conscious will.

Rating:
Summary: Workmanly, helpful step forward on a central question
Review: Wegner makes an interesting step forward in the free will/determinism debate. He argues that "conscious will" is indeed an important EXPERIENCE, which serves vital purposes; but he denies that ACTS of conscious will CAUSE the actions we believe them to cause. "Will" is not how I bring about the things I do, but perceiving and understanding what I do--though the "I" is mostly unconscious, and the causes of actions more or less entirely so.

Thus, Wegner does NOT deny that we are the authors of our own actions or that thoughts cause actions; but he denies that "will" is among the causally effective psychological events. "Will" is a way of keeping track of which actions are caused by me--by my intentions, beliefs, desires, and so forth. It is an indicator, and a vitally important one, but not more than that.

I will be surprised if this this theory turns out to be ultimately correct, mostly because Wegner seems to lack an adequate general theory of consciousness and its functions within which to house and understand will. Consciousness did not arise for no reason--any trait that occurs at a rate above chance must be naturally selected, hence evolutionarily important, and consciousness occurs in about 100% of humans and apparently huge numbers of other animal species. Consciousness could turn out to be just sort of a matter of taste, effectively useless, like the peacock's tail. But that seems unlikely, since consciousness seems to be much more universal that shiny big tails. Conscious will needs to be understood as part of consciousness, and very good science--theoretical and experiemtnal--demonstrates that consciousness has causal efficacy. (See, for instance, Bernard J. Baars' nice intro to "consciousness science" in his book, "In the Theater of Conscousness.")

That said, the feeling of willing remains distinct from other elements of consciousness--simply because each type of mental content is distinct from each other type--and thus much needs to be understood about its peculiar traits and function. Wegner certainly points in intriguing directions.

Two disappointment: First, and fairly trivial, Wegner knows very well that his theory is very, very far from being established, or even being the leading contender, and he often says so--e.g., that the evidence is "consistent with" the theory, or "suggests" the theory, or that the theory "would help" undertand various things. But being human, he can't avoid slipping into assuming and talking as though his theory is simply right--sometimes calling it an "assumption" and a "realization" in the same paragraph! I found the latter annoying.

More significant, Wegner sidesteps one central issue: Why does "will" feel free? We all know that we sometimes initate actions without feeling free to do otherwise--whenever "curiousity gets the better" of you, for instance. Other times we experience ourselves as free to will one thing or the other. Saying that will is perception of my causing my own acts does not explain the difference--and that difference is one of the main things the free will/determinism debate is about.