In the Shadow of the Garrison State

Rating:
Summary: Shedding light on the Cold War Milieu
Review: For those interested in the dynamics and interplay of domestic and national security issues, this book is fantastic. Friedberg frames and then details key power transforming institutions and elements such arms, technology, supporting industrial complex, money and manpower, and how they formed the basis of both a powerful deterrence and a relative stable, non-garrison state that excelled economically.

Not a book for all readers, but for those pundits and novices of national security or Cold War history, this is a must have book. Sure to become required reading for top notice public policy and political science departments in leading universities.

Rating:
Summary: Shedding light on the Cold War Milieu
Review: For those interested in the dynamics and interplay of domestic and national security issues, this book is fantastic. Friedberg frames and then details key power transforming institutions and elements such arms, technology, supporting industrial complex, money and manpower, and how they formed the basis of both a powerful deterrence and a relative stable, non-garrison state that excelled economically.

Not a book for all readers, but for those pundits and novices of national security or Cold War history, this is a must have book. Sure to become required reading for top notice public policy and political science departments in leading universities.

Rating:
Summary: INSTANT CLASSIC
Review: Friedberg has written the best book on international relations since John Gaddis' "Strategies of Containment". Like Gaddis, Friedberg is one of a handful of authors who possess a sophisticated knowledge of both American diplomatic history and modern theories of international relations.

With the aid of his groundbreaking archival research, Friedberg shatters existing paradigms by showing that American culture played a leading, perhaps dominant role in the forging of the United States' Cold War grand strategy.

Friedberg's book is indispensable reading for every scholar and student of international relations. It is a classic that will be read and reread for generations.

Rating:
Summary: INSTANT CLASSIC
Review: Friedberg has written the best book on international relations since John Gaddis' "Strategies of Containment". Like Gaddis, Friedberg is one of a handful of authors who possess a sophisticated knowledge of both American diplomatic history and modern theories of international relations.

With the aid of his groundbreaking archival research, Friedberg shatters existing paradigms by showing that American culture played a leading, perhaps dominant role in the forging of the United States' Cold War grand strategy.

Friedberg's book is indispensable reading for every scholar and student of international relations. It is a classic that will be read and reread for generations.

Rating:
Summary: The Cold War as the Engine of American State-Building
Review: In 1947, Hanson Baldwin, the military correspondent for The New York Times asked whether the United States could "prepare for the next, truly total war...without becoming a `garrison state.'" According to Princeton Professor Aaron Friedberg, by the middle of the 20th, "the imminent threat of war produced pressures for the permanent construction of a powerful central state." Friedberg argues, however, that the size and scope of the federal government was held in check during the Cold War by a tradition and ideology of anti-statism. Although this book merely synthesizes previously- published works, it effectively argues that the apparatus of the American state grew less during the Cold War than might have been have been expected.

Friedberg examines "five main mechanisms of power creation: those intended to extract money and manpower and those designed to direct national resources toward arms production, military research, and defense-supporting industries." Friedberg explains: "In the span of only two decades the United States was engulfed in three waves of crisis as depression, world war, and cold war followed each other in rapid succession. The onset of each emergency produced a powerful impetus toward state-building." The early-Cold War debate about defense spending demonstrates Friedberg's point. He writes that "the American people wanted a state that was strong enough to defend them against their foreign enemies but not strong enough to threaten their domestic liberties," defending the country was expensive. In 1949, when President Truman wanted to hold defense spending for the next fiscal year, to $14.4 billion, the Secretary of Defense instructed the service chiefs to base their estimates "on military considerations alone," which resulted in a "wish list with a staggering $30 billion price tag." Truman's final budget message estimated the annual cost of sustaining his planned long-term force posture to be $35 to $40 billion. According to Friedberg, President Eisenhower's "commitment to holding down defense spending was a logical outgrowth of his essentially anti-statist philosophy of political economy," and, in June 1954, he warned that a massive new buildup would involving transformation of the United States into "a garrison state." In 1960, John Kennedy asserted that Eisenhower's "excessive attention to the budget" had "resulted in a serious weakening of the nation's defenses." Compulsory military service also generated intense debate. Senator Robert Taft warned that the adoption of universal military training would transform the United States into a "militaristic and totalitarian country." According to Friedberg, "the strongest and most consistent congressional opposition to came from the Republican party, and in particular from its conservative midwestern wing. It was in this part of the country that principled anticompulsion arguments struck their most responsive chord." According to Friedberg: "The widespread animosity to statism that characterized the early post-war period...played a critical role in blocking the creation of new, powerful governmental industrial planning institutions." Friedberg explains: "Even in the face of an enemy, and to a remarkable degree even in wartime, the American system has proven itself to be highly resistant to centralized industrial planning." Friedberg writes: "[T]he push for privatization, and the ideological language in which it was couched, also raised troubling questions about the legitimacy of the military's large-scale industrial activities, even those with long traditions. In the context of a worldwide contest with communism, private ownership of the means of production came to be regarded...as morally superior to any alternative form of economic organization." According to Friedberg: "The postwar privatization of American arms production was the end result of a protracted process of debate and political struggle...At the most general ideological level the burgeoning anti-statist sentiments in the 1940s and 1950s tended to strengthen the hands of the privatizers and to discredit those who advocated anything that savored of socialism." In discussing the structure of the U.S. research and development system and its performance during the Cold War, Friedberg asserts that the "large, open, and loose-limbed American system was well suited for promoting innovation, and it tended over time to outperform its more rigid, closed, and hierarchical Soviet counterpart." According to Friedberg: "[F]or nearly a half century, the pursuit of qualitative superiority [in military technology] was a central, persistent feature of the entire American defense effort." Friedberg explains: "Before the Second World War had ended and the Cold war began, senior American scientists and top military planners were already agreed that the preservation of a `preeminent position' in weapons technology must be a central goal of peacetime defense policy." "The clear emergence of the Soviet Union as the most likely enemy in any future war added urgency and a clear focus to the discussion of the role of technology in American strategy." Friedberg reports: "`Atomic weapons used tactically are the natural armaments of numerically inferior but technologically superior nations,' declared one congressional enthusiast in 1951." He explains: "The Eisenhower administration elevated the substitution of firepower for manpower to the position of key organizing principle of national strategy. Atomic and thermonuclear weapons of every conceivable yield were...at the heart of Western defenses;" and "For the West, by the mid-1950s, preserving technological supremacy had become even more essential and urgent than it had appeared only a few years before." According to Friedberg: "Critics and enthusiasts alike agree that the American research and development system was highly productive of technological advances, that it tended over time to outpace its Soviet counterpart, and that the superior performance of the American system was connected in some way to its structure."

Was there ever a real likelihood that Cold War America would turn into a "garrison state?" The clear answer is: No. References to the garrison state were rhetorical devices used most often by congressional opponents of the concentration of power in the executive branch in Washington, D.C. But Friedberg is absolutely correct that anti- statist rhetoric had powerful antecedents in American history and, therefore, resonated deeply with the public. The specter of creating a garrison state was ominous, even when it was intentionally exaggerated.

Rating:
Summary: The Cold War as the Engine of American State-Building
Review: In 1947, Hanson Baldwin, the military correspondent for The New York Times asked whether the United States could "prepare for the next, truly total war...without becoming a 'garrison state.'" According to Princeton Professor Aaron Friedberg, by the middle of the 20th, "the imminent threat of war produced pressures for the permanent construction of a powerful central state." Friedberg argues, however, that the size and scope of the federal government was held in check during the Cold War by a tradition and ideology of anti-statism. Although this book merely synthesizes previously- published works, it effectively argues that the apparatus of the American state grew less during the Cold War than might have been have been expected.

Friedberg examines "five main mechanisms of power creation: those intended to extract money and manpower and those designed to direct national resources toward arms production, military research, and defense-supporting industries." Friedberg explains: "In the span of only two decades the United States was engulfed in three waves of crisis as depression, world war, and cold war followed each other in rapid succession. The onset of each emergency produced a powerful impetus toward state-building." The early-Cold War debate about defense spending demonstrates Friedberg's point. He writes that "the American people wanted a state that was strong enough to defend them against their foreign enemies but not strong enough to threaten their domestic liberties," defending the country was expensive. In 1949, when President Truman wanted to hold defense spending for the next fiscal year, to $14.4 billion, the Secretary of Defense instructed the service chiefs to base their estimates "on military considerations alone," which resulted in a "wish list with a staggering $30 billion price tag." Truman's final budget message estimated the annual cost of sustaining his planned long-term force posture to be $35 to $40 billion. According to Friedberg, President Eisenhower's "commitment to holding down defense spending was a logical outgrowth of his essentially anti-statist philosophy of political economy," and, in June 1954, he warned that a massive new buildup would involving transformation of the United States into "a garrison state." In 1960, John Kennedy asserted that Eisenhower's "excessive attention to the budget" had "resulted in a serious weakening of the nation's defenses." Compulsory military service also generated intense debate. Senator Robert Taft warned that the adoption of universal military training would transform the United States into a "militaristic and totalitarian country." According to Friedberg, "the strongest and most consistent congressional opposition to came from the Republican party, and in particular from its conservative midwestern wing. It was in this part of the country that principled anticompulsion arguments struck their most responsive chord." According to Friedberg: "The widespread animosity to statism that characterized the early post-war period...played a critical role in blocking the creation of new, powerful governmental industrial planning institutions." Friedberg explains: "Even in the face of an enemy, and to a remarkable degree even in wartime, the American system has proven itself to be highly resistant to centralized industrial planning." Friedberg writes: "[T]he push for privatization, and the ideological language in which it was couched, also raised troubling questions about the legitimacy of the military's large-scale industrial activities, even those with long traditions. In the context of a worldwide contest with communism, private ownership of the means of production came to be regarded...as morally superior to any alternative form of economic organization." According to Friedberg: "The postwar privatization of American arms production was the end result of a protracted process of debate and political struggle...At the most general ideological level the burgeoning anti-statist sentiments in the 1940s and 1950s tended to strengthen the hands of the privatizers and to discredit those who advocated anything that savored of socialism." In discussing the structure of the U.S. research and development system and its performance during the Cold War, Friedberg asserts that the "large, open, and loose-limbed American system was well suited for promoting innovation, and it tended over time to outperform its more rigid, closed, and hierarchical Soviet counterpart." According to Friedberg: "[F]or nearly a half century, the pursuit of qualitative superiority [in military technology] was a central, persistent feature of the entire American defense effort." Friedberg explains: "Before the Second World War had ended and the Cold war began, senior American scientists and top military planners were already agreed that the preservation of a 'preeminent position' in weapons technology must be a central goal of peacetime defense policy." "The clear emergence of the Soviet Union as the most likely enemy in any future war added urgency and a clear focus to the discussion of the role of technology in American strategy." Friedberg reports: "'Atomic weapons used tactically are the natural armaments of numerically inferior but technologically superior nations,' declared one congressional enthusiast in 1951." He explains: "The Eisenhower administration elevated the substitution of firepower for manpower to the position of key organizing principle of national strategy. Atomic and thermonuclear weapons of every conceivable yield were...at the heart of Western defenses;" and "For the West, by the mid-1950s, preserving technological supremacy had become even more essential and urgent than it had appeared only a few years before." According to Friedberg: "Critics and enthusiasts alike agree that the American research and development system was highly productive of technological advances, that it tended over time to outpace its Soviet counterpart, and that the superior performance of the American system was connected in some way to its structure."

Was there ever a real likelihood that Cold War America would turn into a "garrison state?" The clear answer is: No. References to the garrison state were rhetorical devices used most often by congressional opponents of the concentration of power in the executive branch in Washington, D.C. But Friedberg is absolutely correct that anti- statist rhetoric had powerful antecedents in American history and, therefore, resonated deeply with the public. The specter of creating a garrison state was ominous, even when it was intentionally exaggerated.