The Biology of Moral Systems (Foundations of Human Behavior)

Rating:
Summary: A great book with a fatally flawed model of human behavior
Review: I don't want readers to be dissuaded from reading this excellent book. I do, however, want to claim than contemporary evidence show his major thesis to be flawed. Here are some key quotes and my critique of the assertions made in the quotes.

Quote from p. 3: "ethics, morality, human conduct, and the human psyche are to be understood only if societies are seen as collections of individuals seeking their own self-interest..."

Critique: This is of course the model of human action in standard economic theory, and I have spent my whole life dealing with its inadequacies and proposing alternative models more in line with the empirical evidence on human behavior. As I said above, Alexander's description of human behavior ignores strong reciprocity (spontaneously contributing to social goals and punishing shirkers and other non-contributors when there is no reasonable probability of future payoffs for the individual. We now have lots of behavioral evidence in favor of the existence of strong reciprocity, as well as its ability to foster sustainable cooperation when self-interest would lead to social breakdown. See, for instance Herbert Gintis, "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality", Journal of Theoretical Biology 206 (2000):169-179 and Ernst Fehr and Simon Gaechter, "Cooperation and Punishment", American Economic Review 90,4 (2000). See also my web site.

It also believe that empathy and shame are counterexamples to Alexander. Indeed, sociopaths who have neither empathy nor shame can be considered as "self-interested" in Alexander's sense in that they refrain from harming other human beings only if they calculate that the personal costs (e.g., of being caught) exceed the benefits flowing from harming others.

Quote from p. 34: "That people are in general following what they perceive to be their own interests is, I believe, the most general principle of human behavior."

This is false for the same reason as in my critique of the previous quote, since people who punish violators of group norms often "perceive" their actions to be for the benefit of the group, and understand quite well that it is not in their own self-interest.

But there are other problems with Alexander's statement. (a) If I am addicted to smoking I might perceive that I am not acting in my own self interest when I smoke, and do it anyway. (b) I may "perceive" it in my own interest to help the poor, or contribute to environmental groups, or perform other prosocial acts when in fact it is not. If humans systematically misperceive their self-interest, as in this case, and if the misperception is very likely in a prosocial direction, then violations of self-interest might be central to human social cooperation, even were Alexander's statement correct (which it is not).

Quote from p. 77: "Moral systems are systems of indirect reciprocity."

This is the first statement of Chapter 2, "A Biological View of Morality." It is not an aside, but Alexander's fundamental explanation of moral systems. By "indirect reciprocity" he means almost exactly what Robert Trivers calls "reciprocal altruism," but which in fact is just enlightened long-term self interest. It is fundamentally wrong. The evidence is that virtually all moral systems exhort forms of altruism that do not reduce to self interest, even in the long run, and large numbers of people subscribe to and to some extent follow these non-self-interested principles.

I should note that even criminals and psychopaths often exhibit non-self-interested behavior, as when, for instance, a man takes revenge on his "enemies" and then kills himself.

Of course, a lot of human behavior is self-interested, and some non-self-interested behavior is just random noise in the behavioral system. But the types of systematic prosocial behavior promoted by strong reciprocity, shame, empathy, and identification with "insiders" is, unless I am mistaken, the key to the particular strength of human cooperation.

Rating:
Summary: Profound work of theoretical biology
Review: Richard Alexander's pioneering work of theoretical biology was one of the first attempts (in the current cycle of sociobiological interest) to apply Darwinian thinking to human morality. The book is profoundly disturbing. Like any work of theory, many of the specifics of Alexander's analysis will be revised but the main argument that morality can only be understood within the Darwinian framework is important. Subsequently many authors have pusued the same line of thought but Alexander's treatment is one of the most interesting. The discusison of deception is particularly provocative.