Images of Terror: What We Can and Can't Know About Terrorism (Social Problems and Social Issues)

Rating:
Summary: A Special Book
Review: There's just too many terrorist books. It's as simple as that. Every author that ever had any relation to terrorism seems intent on flooding the market place with his or her opinion on the current threat of terrorism, with about 99% of this output being meaningless or repetitive. This horrific ratio was one reason I was so pleasantly surprised with this book written by Philip Jenkins, an academic known for his books on the history of Christianity. Jenkins has not only transcended the limitations I would place on a religion professor writing a terrorist book, but has produced one of the more brilliant and thorough looks at international terrorism. Not satisfied with that, Jenkins looks at government response and the public perceptions of terrorism throughout history, all in a slim volume.

Jenkins has always prided himself in honest scholarship that breaks through what might be considered the "modern" and "politically correct" views on religious dogma. He does the same in Images of Terror, suggesting that terrorism is not some kind of new revelation on the American scene. It is not a question of the actual physical extremes of terrorist actions, but rather the political and national mind set in which the attacks occur. Jenkins points out that terrorist attacks in the United States during the early 1970's carried out by members of the radical left were actually far more momentous than the shared national conscious would have us believe, but this cold fact would run counter to our views of the political situation at the time. Political perceptions of terrorism and the calculations of our election minded leaders also intertwine with the response and thinking about terrorism. In the late 1930's and into the 40's, various left leaning politicians pointed to Nazi related fascist groups as the mortal internal danger. In the 1920's, conservative groups pointed to various communist fronts as the real threat. This blame game continued into our modern age, with conservatives usually placing blame on Islamic terrorists while ignoring the actions of anti-Castro groups, while liberals warned of right wing paramilitary groups at the same time turning a blind eye to attacks carried out by Puerto Rican military groups. The role played by the press and the politicians are the real arbiter to our response and thoughts about terror, and as Jenkins argues, this is not always the most effective way to approach these threats.

Even when a society decides to confront terrorism, it is still presented with a challenge to actually define it. What is terrorism, what are its boundaries and goals? Many leading academics of the present day have couched their own virulently anti-American rhetoric with the vogue term, further diluting public clarity concerning the subject. This lends to the confusion and moral uncertainty that seems to cripple societies faced with grave threats. These enemies cannot be described as "crazy", as some would wish to do. They often have political goals, military strategies, and are armed with the knowledge that men like them have succeeded in the past and they can as well. Governments are usually ill equipped to deal with such groups, often because of the relatively simple chaos related goals of the terrorists. However, Jenkins lays out several tactics used by governments in the past that would seem to represent a special abhorrence level for most western governments. Such measures include pseudo gangs, where the government actually sets up its own terror groups to destroy or disrupt the actual terrorist fronts. Assassination and other tricks of the trade are documented in the historical sense, laying out a dangerous arsenal that governments have utilized in the past and may do so again.

Jenkins should be commended for his brilliant and concise study of terrorism and our study of it. The author seems to have a unique way of looking past the veneer of "official" or academic study and analyzing it on a far more basic level, dealing with human emotion and perception. He also identifies the way governments can use terrorist attacks, such as the American experience with Iraq. When Saddam served US interests, he was described as a thoroughly "secular" leader, but when he strayed from the plan, he was seen as a typical Middle Eastern terror master. Rather than relying on a point by point history of terrorism, Jenkins takes his readers to a far deeper explanatory phase, one rarely broached by other readers. It is an excellent book that should serve to foster a better conception of the current war on terror and what our response to subsequent attacks should be if we hope to be successful on a long term basis.