Remarks on Colour

Rating:
Summary: Unfair to Goethe, Witty disappointingly missed Schopenhauer
Review: **** - Four Stars, and not two as shown above.

--Remarks on Colour-- is the last fruit of what might well have been the greatest mind of the XXth century, Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is a book that allows a most clear view of how intuitively brilliant the philosopher is. But in more than one sense, it is disappointing. Above all because he writes it largely on the shoulders of Goethe's -Farbenlehre-- and Runge's observations (Runge was the painter who presented the `sphere of colors' in the XIXth century), without dedicating a single bit of thought to him who has been increasingly disclosed as his mentor and master of youth: that unsurpassed creature of insight named Schopenhauer.

As a whole, Wittgenstein's book can be considered a bundle of topic additions and observations to the Farbenlehre. As everything he wrote, it is extremely sharp and illuminating, indeed of inestimable value. However, it lacks what Goethe's readers would be expecting to see: a personal position on those which were Goethe's main aims; firstly, the critique of the worldwide famous spectrum of colors defended by Newton in his --Opticks--: two centuries ago, Goethe brilliantly challenged the Newtonian notion, still held in utmost esteem up to these days, that white is composed by a mélange of seven colors through a prism. Secondly, a judgment on Goethe's attempt to postulate what he intuited as the original phenomenon, Urphaenomen, without being able to explain why: colors complement each other qualitatively in pairs - the most important examples would be orange and blue; yellow and violet; and, above all else, green and red.

Wittgenstein is also unfair to Goethe: criticizes him for not having presented a finished theory, as if he had ambitioned that (III, 125); whereas Goethe expressly states in his work that what he has to offer is but "Data zu einer Theorie der Farben". In fact, to translate --Farbenlehre-- in any language as "Theory of Colors" would be to incur in the same mistake. This gap in Goethe's objective observations is filled precisely by Schopenhauer's treatise of 1816, --On Vision and Colors--, an attempt to provide its foundations and its transcendental, formal justification from the subjective side; Wittgenstein does not mention it once.

Maybe one could, very scholarly speaking, call this a case of `bad bibliographical review' on the part of a genius thinker. For --Remarks on Colour-- does bring the impression that Wittgenstein did not really know Schopenhauer's treatise at all. But this can only bring astonishment to the reader: the same astonishment that arises when one sees how unnoticed it has slipped through almost 200 years; for example by Rudolf Steiner, the brilliant thinker who prepared and commented upon the intents of Goethe in the present edition of the Farbenlehre (3 vols. Verlag Freies Geistesleben - being he himself an important Orientalist, Steiner's never having written about Schopenhauer seems still more incredible). In the case of Wittgenstein, this is especially striking when one considers how much he dwelled with the philosopher's works as he prepared his earlier projects, particularly as the Tractatus was written. Had Wittgenstein read --On Vision and Colors--, things would have been a lot different, and maybe this entire book would have followed a completely alternate path, since it would have to rise up to the task of judging the treatise of 1816. A sad instance of this neglect can be seen when, on page III-26, Wittgenstein makes comments which he does believe are quite decisive and original, and which would be indeed, had Schopenhauer not already explained why. Witty writes: "Blue and yellow, as well as red and green, seem to me to be opposites - but perhaps that is simply because I am used to seeing them at opposite points on the colour circle". It is something to be truly mourned that a man with such a marvelous intuitive grasp of this fact has missed the chance to meditate on the theory that seeks to explain his perceptions. Because they bring no novelty to whomever has had the chance to see Schopenhauer's explanation of why colors are qualitatively complementary.

At the end, the general impression that arises is that, theoretically, Wittgenstein's comments on color stand one step below Schopenhauer's theory of colors, corroborating and indeed confirming it; exactly in the same way in which the --Tractatus-- stands one step below the --Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason--, corroborating and confirming it; and, likewise, not mentioning it.

For a few years, Schopenhauer's treatise has been available only in German, its English translation has been out of print; although it is a must for all those who reach the fine border between philosophy and physiology, which is where Wittgenstein stands with his little red book, so acclaimed by his own fans. A warning to specialists and editors alike.


Rating:
Summary: Unfair to Goethe, Witt. disappointingly missed Schopenhauer
Review: --Remarks on Colour-- is the last fruit of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Although it allows a most clear view of how brilliant the philosopher is, in more than one sense it is disappointing. Above all because he writes it largely on the shoulders of Goethe's --Farbenlehre--, and Runge's observations (Runge was the painter who presented the 'sphere of colors' in the XIXth century), without giving a single bit of thought to him who has been increasingly disclosed as his mentor and master of youth: that unsurpassed creature of insight named Schopenhauer.

As a whole, Wittgenstein's book can be considered a bundle of topic additions and observations to the Farbenlehre; as everything he wrote, it is extremely sharp and indeed of inestimable value. However, it lacks what Goethe's readers would be expecting to see: a personal position on those which were Goethe's main aims; firstly the critique of the worldwide famous spectrum of colors defended by Newton in his --Opticks--: two centuries ago, Goethe brilliantly challenged the Newtonian notion that white is composed by a mélange of seven colors through a prism. Secondly, a judgment on Goethe's attempt to postulate what he intuited as the original phenomenon, Urphaenomen, without being able to explain why: colors complement each other qualitatively in pairs - here, the most important examples would be green and red; orange and blue; yellow and violet.

Moreover, Wittgenstein is unfair to Goethe: criticizes him for not having presented a finished theory, as if he had ambitioned that (III, 125); whereas Goethe expressly states in his work that what he has to offer is but "Data zu einer Theorie der Farben". This gap in Goethe's objective observations is filled precisely by Schopenhauer's treatise of 1816, --On Vision and Colours--, an attempt to provide its foundations and its transcendental justification from the subjective side; Wittgenstein does not mention it a single time.

Maybe one could, very scholarly speaking, call this a case of 'bad bibliographical review' on the part of a genius thinker. For --Remarks on Colour-does bring the impression that Wittgenstein did not really know Schopenhauer's treatise at all. But this can only bring astonishment to the reader: the same astonishment that arises when one sees how unnoticed Schopenhauer's treatise has slipped through 150 years; for example by Rudolf Steiner, who prepared and brilliantly commented upon the most complete edition of the --Farbenlehre-- available. In the case of Wittgenstein, this is especially striking when one considers how much he dwelled with the philosopher's works as he prepared his earlier projects, particularly as the Tractatus was written. Had he read -- On Vision and Colors --, things would have been a lot different, and maybe this entire book would have followed a completely different path, since it would have to rise up to the task of judging the treatise of 1816. A sad instance of this can be seen when, on page III-26, Wittgenstein makes comments which he does believe are quite decisive and original, and which would be indeed, had Schopenhauer not already explained why. Wittgenstein says: "Blue and yellow, as well as red and green, seem to me to be opposites - but perhaps that is simply because I am used to seeing them at opposite points on the colour circle".

And so they are no novelty to the student who has already seen Schopenhauer's explanation of why colours are qualitatively complementary. At the end, the general impression that arises of what Wittgenstein wrote is that, theoretically, his comments on color stand one step below Schopenhauer's theory of color, corroborating and indeed confirming it; exactly in the same way in which the --Tractatus-- stands one step below the --Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason--, corroborating and confirming it.

For a few years, Schopenhauer's book has been available only in German, its English translation has been out of print; although it is a must for all those who reach the fine border between philosophy and physiology, which is where Wittgenstein stands with this little red book, so acclaimed by his own fans. A warning to specialists and editors alike.