The Democratic Dilemma : Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Rating:
Summary: Interesting View of Voter "Ignorance"
Review: Arthur Lupia and Mathew McCubbins' The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? offers an alternative view to the idea that voter ignorance hinders rational political decision making. Instead, Lupia and McCubbins argue that access to limited information by certain political players and under certain conditions allows voters the methods to make rational decisions.

First, a note about the researchers reference to Aristotelian ethos. In the theoretical foundation of the text, Lupia and McCubbins correctly interpret Aristotle's writings in On Rhetoric as asserting the power of ethos (perceived speaker credibility) on persuasive success. However, the researchers suggest:
"[I]t may be impossible for us to know much about another person's character. Aristotle concludes that persuasion requires such knowledge. We disagree...By contrast to Aristotle, we base our explanation of persuasion on the premise that people need not know one another well" (p. 42).
I believe that this assessment and interpretation of Aristotle's writings on persuasion is flawed. Aristotle was not arguing that we must know speakers well before we will listen to them; in contrast, Aristotle believed that a speaker also creates credibility during a speech, (e.g., derived credibility) and the perception of the speaker's credibility in progress affects our likelihood of being influenced in addition to the speaker's initial credibility.

I wouldn't argue that their interpretation negates their underlining theroetical foundation, but instead, that what Lupia and McCubbins argue in their theory is actually consistent with this classic view of credibility and influence. In my view, their take is not a "different" take, but instead, is a more nuanced take.

Nevertheless, this is a relatively minor point of contention. This text contains a very carefully laid out theory of voter knowledge and influence under very specific conditions, adding important nuance to our understanding of political influence and decision-making. The latter part of the book provides solid empirical research to support their theory.

A solid read for the political scholar. The researchers make a novel argument, one that raises immediate questioning by most readers, but then lays out their case in a refreshingly convincing manner.

Rating:
Summary: Making the bad guys do the right thing
Review: This book can be a useful introduction to a series of problems in modern democratic theory. It also intends to lie foundations of a new theorethical approach to institutional design. In a most persuasive fashion, McCubbins and Lupia erroneously acknowledge Aristotle's theory of persuasion of the Ars Rhetorica a polis-centered context of justification, therefore they fail to prove that for Aristotle "people know each other well to see lies coming in advance". Nevertheless, they present their own theory of persuasion in terms of game theory. Based in a series of explanational concepts, backed by all the experiment data of the second part, they conclude that personal character may no play any role in persuasion, as in Aristotle's supposed theory of persuasion, as long as external forces, such as verification, penalty for lying or observable speaker's costly effort, can make the speaker tell the truth about what he knows. In their subsequent theory of delegation, they erroneously acknowledge Weber an impossibility theorem in the realm of political expertise, while presenting their own theory of delegation, again, in a game theorethical fashion, and give examples of how external forces may play a role in electoral campaigns, burocracies and courtrooms.