Perception and Reason

Rating:
Summary: Problems with Perception
Review: The issue of perceptual knowledge is difficult. This book provides us with a good discussion (and is often interesting) on this topic, which also has been recently discussed by McDowell, Peacocke, Heck, Putnam, Strawson, Stroud (Quest), S. Kelly, and McGinn, etc. One may also want to see Brewer's article in Boghossian, et. al., "New Essays...Apriori" (Oxford UP).

In P and R, Brewer provides more detailed arguments than McDowell does in his provacative M and W (often in agreement with him on conceptual content) and his prose style is much more clear (and correct) than Peacocke (who defends non-conceptual content).

Also, very much worth looking at is A. Brueckner's (UCSB) work on externalism (see Ludlow's anthology) (and Burge and Falvey/Owens).

I also recommend the recent dissertations and/or articles on this topic by S. D. Kelly (now at Princeton),Cheryl Chen (Brandeis), and Eddie Cushman (UCB veterans).

Brewer argues for: (C) "Perceptual experiences provide reasons for empirical beliefs," which seems harmless enough, but he gets to this conclusion by means of two controversial premises: (1) "The most basic beliefs about the spatial world have their contents only in virtue of their standing in certain relations with perceptual experiences," and (2) "Only reason-giving relations between perceptual experiences and beliefs could possibly serve the content-determining role required by (1)."

He has separate chapters that argue for (1) and (2)--Chapters 2, 3, and 5, but I think these respective arguments are a stretch. But definitely worth looking at.

The most interesting material here is his discussion on what he calls the "Strawson Argument" (Chapter 2.2, 3.1) and his coverage of externalism and a priori knowledge (chapter 8).

Overall, I recommend this text. It is a significant contribution to the field. I also recommend: MacDonald, Wright, et. al, Knowing our Own Minds (Oxford); Ludlow, Externalism and Self-Knowledge (CSLI); and DeRose, Skepticism (Oxford).