The Case for Animal Rights

Rating:
Summary: Beats the heck out of Peter Singer
Review: As I suggested long ago in my review of Peter Singer's _Animal Liberation_, while I applaud Singer for pointing out numerous ways in which our treatment of animals could be improved, I don't find his "utilitarian" ethical arguments very persuasive.

But Tom Regan's now-classic book -- this one -- is a different story. This is a tour-de-force of ethical argumentation that makes the titular case about as well as it's ever going to be made. Regan doesn't simplify any issues and he's very much alive to fine ethical nuances. And he sets out his case with both rigor and vigor.

Probably most of us won't have any problem agreeing that at least some nonhuman animals are conscious, but there _have_ been people who have denied it (most famously, Rene Descartes). So for completeness, Regan begins with a careful discussion of the question. Avoiding simplistic answers and over-eager claims about research on e.g. animal language, he mounts a solid case that at least some nonhumans do possess consciousness.

(Some of his arguments are a bit weaker than he thinks they are, although I still agree with his conclusions. For example, he argues that possession of language skills can't be an indicator of consciousness because human infants are presumably conscious before they acquire a language; how else, indeed, would they acquire it? But this shows only that _present_ possession of linguistic ability isn't a necessary condition of consciousness; it doesn't show that the _ability_ to learn a language isn't such a condition. As I said, though, I agree with his conclusion; I'm merely criticizing the way he gets to it.)

The remainder of the book is a wide-ranging discussion, not just of animal rights, but of ethics generally. Even aside from Regan's nominal topic, the volume could serve as a fine introduction to ethical thought in general. (Among its many highlights: a short refutation of Jan Narveson's "rational egoism" that could double as a refutation of Ayn Rand's even sillier version.)

In the end, what this gets us is a careful case for regarding mammalian animals which are at least a year old as possessors of "rights." (Regan also argues that for other reasons, we could and should want to extend "rights" to other animals; he has limited his discussion to mammals in order to keep to what he takes to be a fairly clear-cut case.) These "rights" do not, he holds, trump every other ethical consideration under the sun; in particular, in emergency situations in which either (say) a human being or a dog (or a million dogs) must be killed, we should kill the dog (or dogs) every time. These "rights" are _prima facie_ moral claims -- strong, but not indefeasible.

What I think Regan has successfully shown is that living beings don't have to be moral _agents_ in order to count in our moral deliberations. And with most of what he says on this subject, I heartily agree; in particular I think he has made just the right distinction between moral agents and moral patients, and correctly argued that moral patients have _some_ sort of "right" to consideration.

I cannot, however, follow him _quite_ all the way to his conclusions -- for example, that we are morally obliged to be vegetarian and to refrain from using animals in all scientific research. Mind you, I've been a vegetarian myself and I think there _are_ good reasons for avoiding meat; I just don't think they're morally conclusive. I agree completely that many current practices are inhumane, and I also agree with a point Regan argues repeatedly: that moral limitations on what we can do with animals do _not_, as such, interfere with the operation of the free market. But I'm still not altogether sold.

(The problem -- to put it briefly and inadequately -- is that I think Regan assigns too much to moral _patients_ in the way of "rights." I'm not persuaded that in order to have a "right," it's enough that someone else could make a moral claim on your behalf. In other words, I disagree with Regan's contention that moral agents and moral patients are entitled to exactly the _same_ sorts of moral consideration.)

I don't, however, mind admitting that Regan has changed my mind on some points and may yet change my mind on others. If I ever _do_ change my mind on this last point, he will be in part responsible.

And at any rate I highly recommend this volume to any readers interested in the topic of animal rights. Moral reasoning doesn't get any better than this.

Rating:
Summary: The best discussion of animal rights.
Review: This book accomplishes two goals: First, it is the best available discussion of the many aspects of animal welfare. Second, it is an excellent example of a fine philosophical mind grappling with a difficult issue. I have often recommended the book to those who just wish to follow the workings of rigorous thought. But reader beware--do not look for simple answers or slogans here. This is difficult reading indeed, but Regan has, better than anyone else (and this is characteristic of all his writing)carefully worked through the many arguments, objections, counter-examples, etc., with thoroughness and clarity unapproached by similar books. If you recognize that the question "Do non-human animals have rights?" is extraordinarily complex and thereby can produce only complex answers, then this is THE book for you.

Rating:
Summary: A Classic!!!
Review: Warning: this book is not for people new to ethical philosophy or philosophy in general. Try Singer's book for an introduction to some of the themes discussed in this book. Essential reading for those tired of hearing the same old recycled arguments used to justify the torture and murder of sentient living creatures. As such, it appeals to two groups of people: 1) those who are already living or considering adopting an ethical lifestyle and 2) those interested in philosophy, especially ethical philosophy. Do your intellect a favor and READ THIS BOOK!

Rating:
Summary: Overlong, out of focus and dangerous, but still recommended
Review: What surprised me the most about this new edition of Tom Regan's 1983 classic "The Case for Animal Rights" is how little of the book bears directly on the animal issue: while chapters 1 through 3 are concerned with such questions as whether animals are conscious, have beliefs and desires, and can be considered to have a welfare; and the last chapter deals with the application of Regan's moral philosophy to the treatment of animals, the great bulk of the book (chapters 4 through 8, more than half of the volume) is devoted to what I understand modern philosophers call "meta-ethics", i.e. the kind of thinking one has to engage in before one actually gets to the point and starts fleshing out actual moral principles and rules.

This discrepancy between what the title announces and what the book actually focuses on is all the more annoying as Regan keeps avoiding what appear to be highly relevant issues by claiming they "fall outside the scope of the volume", so much so that one almost feels now and then that he is using animal rights as a selling point for a book whose main preoccupation is flogging the dead horse of utilitarianism (or as an excuse for the cute Durer rabbit on the cover.)

"The Case for Animal Rights" does have its virtues, though, if you are prepared to be patient with its inordinate length and ad hoc redefinitions of its scope. First, its "rights view" approach to the animal problem is an improvement over Peter Singer (a.k.a. Dr Death)'s utilitarian defense of animal welfare, the many flaws of which Regan convincingly points out. And second, the fine-grained conceptual distinctions Regan develops do help the reader clarify his thinking on the issues raised, though he himself misses a few distinctions he should have made (his attack on what he calls the "innocence principle" for instance ignores the principle of double effect and therefore targets a straw man.)

However, I was very dissatisfied with several points of the book. For instance, Regan claims his approach is not anti-human. But this is belied by his (Darwinian) assertion that humans are in no fundamental way different from the beasts, and that some beasts are actually superior to some humans (any belief to the contrary being "speciesist" and based on "prejudices... insulated by... religious beliefs.")

I also found Regan's attack on what he calls "perfectionist" ethics (according to which "what individuals are due, as a matter of justice, depends on the degree to which they possess a certain cluster of virtues or excellences") to be based on nothing more than a politically correct, leftist penchant for egalitarianism, and an inability to recognize that the two kinds of system are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. Classical liberalism for instance, is politically egalitarian and economically perfectionist. (Perfectionism is then redefined p325 to give it much more unsavoury connotations, perhaps because Regan himself felt he had a weak case against it.)

Most objectionable of all is the idea that "the harm that death is, is a function of the opportunities for satisfaction it forecloses" (p324.) Though this enables Regan to reassert that humans are generally more worthy to live than beasts (since they can enjoy types of satisfactions that elude even our closest mammalian cousins) and can therefore throw the odd dog out of the lifeboat, it is a huge step back from the Christian respect for the sanctity of human life, all the more so as this position is compatible with the idea that "the death of a normal, adult animal is... a greater harm, than the death of a less aware, retarded human" (p314.)

"The Case for Animal Rights" is not the definitive treatment of the subject I expected it to be. While it presents itself as *the* "rights view" on the issue, it is only a rather idiosyncratic approach within that category, one that will not fit a Christian framework without major modifications. However, though I am very concerned with the potential consequences of some of Regan's more objectionable principles, I think it is a step in the right direction, given that the natural law tradition is utterly deficient on the issue, and modern defenses of animal welfare had so far been made from points of view utterly inimical to this tradition.