Map is not Territory : Studies in the History of Religions

Rating:
Summary: Cargo Cult Cosmos
Review: "The Map Is Not The Territory" expresses Alfred Korzybski's second principle of general semantics: namely, Non-All-ness. By this Korzybski meant that no word ever says "all" about anything and no map ever represents "all" of any territory. We can profitably use words and maps, Korzybski said, as long as we constantly submit them to rigorous examination so that we may keep them accurate and up-to-date. This helps us avoid constructing maps of territories that do not, in fact, exist.

The author of this book, Jonathan Z. Smith, has plainly taken Korzybski's words for his title, dropping only the definite article "the" from before the words "map" and "territory." Yet he makes no mention of Korzybski in the book's index and waits until the last line of the last essay (page 309) to insert the following line:

"For the dictum of Alfred Korzybski is inescapable: 'Map is not territory'--but maps are all we possess."

This faint and belated acknowledgement represents both a misappropriation and a misinterpretation of Korzybski's words. Korzybski would say that we not only have maps but that we also have compasses, sextants, chronometers, global-positioning satellites, and any number of other means by which we assure ourselves of their accuracy. Smith, for his part, uses the word "map" in vague and ill-defined ways. When he refers to a "cosmos," we must assume that he refers to an astrologer's hallucination rather than the careful catalogue of an astronomer.

Korzybski first enunciated his system of general semantics in 1933 with the publication of his major work, "Science and Sanity." Since then, numerous distinguished authors such as S.I. Hayakawa, Wendell Johnson, Irving J. Lee, and Anatol Rapoport--to name just a few--have developed and expanded Korzybski's principles of general semantics. They have all written clearly, forcefully, and at great length of how delusional words and maps lead people to wrap themselves in verbal cocoons from which, in Wendell Johnson's words, "they seldom hatch." Had Smith carefully studied this literature and then applied general semantics to his own efforts, he might have cleared up much of his own confused thinking. Instead, he has associated his rather nebulous conceptions of human symbol-making with a methodology, discipline, and philosophy that he does not clearly understand.

This book has nothing whatsoever to do with general semantics, Alfred Korzybski's life work, and the author's disingenuous attempt to associate himself with that work needs repudiating in the strongest terms.

Ironically, the author speaks of Melanesian "cargo cults" while apparently unaware of Richard Feynman's 1974 commencement address at Caltech, published in his autobiography, "Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman!" in which the late physicist spoke of "Cargo Cult Science." In professor Feynman's words:

"In the South Seas there is a cargo cult of people. During the war they saw airplanes with lots of good materials, and they want the same thing to happen now. So they've arranged to make things like runways, to put fires along the sides of the runways, to make a wooden hut for a man to sit in, with two wooden pieces on his head to simulate earphones and bars of bamboo sticking out like antennas--he's the controller--and they wait for the planes to land. They're doing it all right. The form is perfect. It looks exactly the way it looked before. But it doesn't work. No airplanes land. So I call these things cargo cult science, because they follow all the apparent precepts and forms of scientific investigation, but they're missing something essential, because the planes don't land."

Given Jonathan Smith's preference for such sweeping generalizations as, "The historian's task is to complicate not to clarify" and "The historian's manner of speech is often halting and provisional" and "The historian provides us with hints that remain too fragile" (all on page 290), I have to wonder what historians he has in mind, since he doesn't say. The book may contain useful footnotes of interest to scholars of this sort of thing, but--in my humble opinion--Richard Feynman's cargo cult synopsis serves well for the last word here:

"The planes don't land."

Rating:
Summary: Cargo Cult Cosmos
Review: "The Map Is Not The Territory" expresses Alfred Korzybski's second principle of general semantics: namely, Non-All-ness. By this Korzybski meant that no word ever says "all" about anything and no map ever represents "all" of any territory. We can profitably use words and maps, Korzybski said, as long as we constantly submit them to rigorous examination so that we may keep them accurate and up-to-date. This helps us avoid constructing maps of territories that do not, in fact, exist.

The author of this book, Jonathan Z. Smith, has plainly taken Korzybski's words for his title, dropping only the definite article "the" from before the words "map" and "territory." Yet he makes no mention of Korzybski in the book's index and waits until the last line of the last essay (page 309) to insert the following line:

"For the dictum of Alfred Korzybski is inescapable: 'Map is not territory'--but maps are all we possess."

This faint and belated acknowledgement represents both a misappropriation and a misinterpretation of Korzybski's words. Korzybski would say that we not only have maps but that we also have compasses, sextants, chronometers, global-positioning satellites, and any number of other means by which we assure ourselves of their accuracy. Smith, for his part, uses the word "map" in vague and ill-defined ways. When he refers to a "cosmos," we must assume that he refers to an astrologer's hallucination rather than the careful catalogue of an astronomer.

Korzybski first enunciated his system of general semantics in 1933 with the publication of his major work, "Science and Sanity." Since then, numerous distinguished authors such as S.I. Hayakawa, Wendell Johnson, Irving J. Lee, and Anatol Rapoport--to name just a few--have developed and expanded Korzybski's principles of general semantics. They have all written clearly, forcefully, and at great length of how delusional words and maps lead people to wrap themselves in verbal cocoons from which, in Wendell Johnson's words, "they seldom hatch." Had Smith carefully studied this literature and then applied general semantics to his own efforts, he might have cleared up much of his own confused thinking. Instead, he has associated his rather nebulous conceptions of human symbol-making with a methodology, discipline, and philosophy that he does not clearly understand.

This book has nothing whatsoever to do with general semantics, Alfred Korzybski's life work, and the author's disingenuous attempt to associate himself with that work needs repudiating in the strongest terms.

Ironically, the author speaks of Melanesian "cargo cults" while apparently unaware of Richard Feynman's 1974 commencement address at Caltech, published in his autobiography, "Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman!" in which the late physicist spoke of "Cargo Cult Science." In professor Feynman's words:

"In the South Seas there is a cargo cult of people. During the war they saw airplanes with lots of good materials, and they want the same thing to happen now. So they've arranged to make things like runways, to put fires along the sides of the runways, to make a wooden hut for a man to sit in, with two wooden pieces on his head to simulate earphones and bars of bamboo sticking out like antennas--he's the controller--and they wait for the planes to land. They're doing it all right. The form is perfect. It looks exactly the way it looked before. But it doesn't work. No airplanes land. So I call these things cargo cult science, because they follow all the apparent precepts and forms of scientific investigation, but they're missing something essential, because the planes don't land."

Given Jonathan Smith's preference for such sweeping generalizations as, "The historian's task is to complicate not to clarify" and "The historian's manner of speech is often halting and provisional" and "The historian provides us with hints that remain too fragile" (all on page 290), I have to wonder what historians he has in mind, since he doesn't say. The book may contain useful footnotes of interest to scholars of this sort of thing, but--in my humble opinion--Richard Feynman's cargo cult synopsis serves well for the last word here:

"The planes don't land."

Rating:
Summary: Awesome book!!!!!!!
Review: ...This book is insightful, stimulating and truly well written. JZS injects excitement, and even humor, into what many would consider a 'dry' topic.

I first read it in college over a decade ago, and I still have the original hardcover copy sitting right next to me on the shelf, even though my current studies would *appear* to have little in common :) I can only say this once: this book gets the #1 place in my list of essential reads.

Rating:
Summary: A classic in the history of religions
Review: This book is one of the classic texts for methodology in the history of religions. A must read for those interested in serious scholarship on the study of religion.

Rating:
Summary: A classic in the history of religions
Review: This book is one of the classic texts for methodology in the history of religions. A must read for those interested in serious scholarship on the study of religion.