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Rating: 
Summary: Concise New Natural Law
Review: Gomez-Lobo does a good job of bringing together neatly and systematically the basic lines of thought of the new natural law theory developed by John Finnis and Germain Grisez. It is crisp and concise. However because it lacks a discussion of the dialectical defense of the precepts, this book needs to be read with John Finnis' Fundamentals of Ethics for those who want to better appreciate the force of the claims of natural law theory, in particular claims that certain precepts are self-evident; or else one can leave with the wrong impression that the said evident precepts are mere assertions.
Rating:
Summary: Concise New Natural Law
Review: Gomez-Lobo does a good job of bringing together neatly and systematically the basic lines of thought of the new natural law theory developed by John Finnis and Germain Grisez. It is crisp and concise. However because it lacks a discussion of the dialectical defense of the precepts, this book needs to be read with John Finnis' Fundamentals of Ethics for those who want to better appreciate the force of the claims of natural law theory, in particular claims that certain precepts are self-evident; or else one can leave with the wrong impression that the said evident precepts are mere assertions.
Rating:
Summary: The Ideal of Human Flourishing
Review: Prof. Gomez-Lobo writes clear, concise, and cogent prose, and illustrates his arguments with a number of telling examples. Prof. Gomez-Lobo's approach to ethics is that of a moral philosopher, not that of a moral theologian, so he deals strictly in reason, not in Revelation. He does not include religion as a basic human good (a judgment I would dispute), but explores (and advocates) the viewpoint that the natural law/human goods approach to ethics is "accessible to anyone and therefore is binding on everyone without distinction" (p. 129). He points out, however, that his approach does not necessarily result in a moral chasm between religious conviction and the natural logic he employs. Asking the question, "Who did what, and why?" (p. 48) requires us, he says, to look at agents, acts, outcomes, and intentions, leading to the system of natural law ethics he explains and instantiates for readers. The formal principle, he maintains, is that we are to pursue good and to avoid evil (p. 2). We can differentiate the one from the other by analyzing and applying human goods reasoning, which is to say we must appreciate the "set of goods that provide the foundation for the objective moral order" (126). These goods are life and health, family, friendship, work and play, beauty, knowledge, and integrity. "The primary moral question when passing a moral judgment," he says, "is, how will human goods be affected in the action itself? Good consequences do not justify an evil deed" (p. 116). That principle--and this: "What is good for us is not just to choose freely but freely to choose what is good" (p. 28)
--should constitute the ethical worldview of anyone judging virtue from vice, right from wrong. For example, he writes that the innocent may never morally be killed, which creates a practical and prudential guideline for considering warfare (criminals and aggressors fall outside the scope of such protection [p. 61]), abortion (always wrong [p. 94]), and euthanasia ("the ultimate failure to care for someone in need" [p. 110]). He contends, quite correctly I believe, that such philosophies as utilitarianism and libertarianism are inadequate moral guides (p. 119), and there is always the danger of corruption of conscience resulting from the utilitarian notions "that entail that sometimes we ought to do unjust deeds" (p. 122). Gomez-Lobo explains a great deal of ethical thought economically and effectively. This is an excellent short introduction to ethics and could serve particularly well as a college course "textbook" if complemented a by a number of ancillary readings. Highly recommended.
Rating:
Summary: The Ideal of Human Flourishing
Review: Prof. Gomez-Lobo writes clear, concise, and cogent prose, and illustrates his arguments with a number of telling examples. Prof. Gomez-Lobo's approach to ethics is that of a moral philosopher, not that of a moral theologian, so he deals strictly in reason, not in Revelation. He does not include religion as a basic human good (a judgment I would dispute), but explores (and advocates) the viewpoint that the natural law/human goods approach to ethics is "accessible to anyone and therefore is binding on everyone without distinction" (p. 129). He points out, however, that his approach does not necessarily result in a moral chasm between religious conviction and the natural logic he employs. Asking the question, "Who did what, and why?" (p. 48) requires us, he says, to look at agents, acts, outcomes, and intentions, leading to the system of natural law ethics he explains and instantiates for readers. The formal principle, he maintains, is that we are to pursue good and to avoid evil (p. 2). We can differentiate the one from the other by analyzing and applying human goods reasoning, which is to say we must appreciate the "set of goods that provide the foundation for the objective moral order" (126). These goods are life and health, family, friendship, work and play, beauty, knowledge, and integrity. "The primary moral question when passing a moral judgment," he says, "is, how will human goods be affected in the action itself? Good consequences do not justify an evil deed" (p. 116). That principle--and this: "What is good for us is not just to choose freely but freely to choose what is good" (p. 28)
--should constitute the ethical worldview of anyone judging virtue from vice, right from wrong. For example, he writes that the innocent may never morally be killed, which creates a practical and prudential guideline for considering warfare (criminals and aggressors fall outside the scope of such protection [p. 61]), abortion (always wrong [p. 94]), and euthanasia ("the ultimate failure to care for someone in need" [p. 110]). He contends, quite correctly I believe, that such philosophies as utilitarianism and libertarianism are inadequate moral guides (p. 119), and there is always the danger of corruption of conscience resulting from the utilitarian notions "that entail that sometimes we ought to do unjust deeds" (p. 122). Gomez-Lobo explains a great deal of ethical thought economically and effectively. This is an excellent short introduction to ethics and could serve particularly well as a college course "textbook" if complemented a by a number of ancillary readings. Highly recommended.
Rating: 
Summary: Clear but Superficial
Review: This is a primer on natural law ethics. Inspired by Aristotle and developed by Aquinas, this was for centuries the predominant European approach to ethics, in large part because it carried the imprimateur of the Catholic Church. This book is written clearly and organized well. The natural law approach is interesting and has been supported by some impressive thinkers. This book, unfortunately, slides by some of the real problems with this approach and is consequently not very convincing. A basic approach here is to think or converse about what constitutes appropriate goals (basic goods) for human existence. From these goals, some type of moral standards are constructed. Leaving aside the powerful Humean criticism that one can't easily move from "is" to "ought", this is only one form of moral realism. There are other forms of moral realism which yield very different conclusions. For example, the philosopher Judith Thomson produced a book on the nature and application of rights which is based on trying to clarify and abstract our moral intuitions about rights. Some of Thomson's applications of her lines of reasoning lead to very different conclusions that those reached by Gomez-Lobo. The point is not that Thomson is correct and Gomez-Lobo incorrect (though Thomson's arguments, written for an academic audience, are much more rigorous) but that this general approach is difficult to apply and doesn't necessarily lead to the conclusions Gomez-Lobo affirms. Even conceding that Gomez-Lobo's basic approach, there are difficulties with his list of basic goods. Why this particular list? Why not add power or dominance over others? Why not other features that we would generally find repulsive? Aristotle, for example, found subordination of women and the existence of slavery quite acceptable. Even individuals within the natural law tradition differ on the basic goods. As Gomez-Lobo concedes, other contemporary natural law theorists have somewhat different lists of basic goods. Within Gomez-Lobo's list, there are some difficulties. For example, he identifies life as a basic good. He subsequently discusses some other goods, such as freedom and dignity, but doesn't accord them the status of basic goods. In an interesting piece of rhetoric, he states that freedom is in some sense antecedent to the basic goods but not a basic good because it is a necessary condition for achieving the basic goods. If this reasoning is correct for freedom, it applies equally to life, which is a precondition for pursuing all goods, basic or not. Based on his reasoning, Gomez-Lobo would have to classify freedom as a basic good or treat life the same way as freedom. The consequences for the development of actual moral guidelines are significant and would lead to very different conclusions that the ones he affirms. I think similar problems occur with his classification of dignity. Another difficulty is that Gomez-Lobo argues for equivalence of all basic goods. Well and good, but what happens when there is conflict? There is no obvious procedure for resolving conflicts. At one point, he argues that negative responsibilities (do not do something) take precedence over positive claims (you must do this) but provides no convincing argument for this distinction. Further, what happens when positive claims conflict with positive claims, or negative with negative? He also places a good deal of emphasis on the so-called principle of double effect as a decision making device, which is often difficult to apply because it places a great deal of weight on agent intentions. A good deal of the book is relatively vague about actual moral problems. He does discuss two major problems, abortion and euthanasia. Neither of these discussion is satisfactory. In the abortion section, Gomez-Lobo developments his own line of reasoning well but misrepresents the arguments of some abortion freedom advocates. In the euthanasia section, he slides by some really difficult issues and simplifies problems is a very unrealistic way. While I actually agree with most, perhaps even all of his conclusions, the way in which he purports to reach conclusions about euthanasia is suspect. If this is an example of how natural law ethics is to be applied, then it is not very useful in addressing real moral problems. To be fair, trying to develop a single scheme to encompass and guide human moral behavior is extremely difficult, probably impossible. As recognized by Hume and affirmed by some contemporary moral philosophers, moral philosophy is not going to be reducible to a single system. Natural law theories do have something to offer but readers interested in pursuing these ideas should turn to other sources. A very good starting place is the article by Mark Murphy in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which is available on the Internet. This is a concise, sympathetic yet critical overview with a superior bibliography.
Rating:
Summary: Clear but Superficial
Review: This is a primer on natural law ethics. Inspired by Aristotle and developed by Aquinas, this was for centuries the predominant European approach to ethics, in large part because it carried the imprimateur of the Catholic Church. This book is written clearly and organized well. The natural law approach is interesting and has been supported by some impressive thinkers. This book, unfortunately, slides by some of the real problems with this approach and is consequently not very convincing. A basic approach here is to think or converse about what constitutes appropriate goals (basic goods) for human existence. From these goals, some type of moral standards are constructed. Leaving aside the powerful Humean criticism that one can't easily move from "is" to "ought", this is only one form of moral realism. There are other forms of moral realism which yield very different conclusions. For example, the philosopher Judith Thomson produced a book on the nature and application of rights which is based on trying to clarify and abstract our moral intuitions about rights. Some of Thomson's applications of her lines of reasoning lead to very different conclusions that those reached by Gomez-Lobo. The point is not that Thomson is correct and Gomez-Lobo incorrect (though Thomson's arguments, written for an academic audience, are much more rigorous) but that this general approach is difficult to apply and doesn't necessarily lead to the conclusions Gomez-Lobo affirms. Even conceding that Gomez-Lobo's basic approach, there are difficulties with his list of basic goods. Why this particular list? Why not add power or dominance over others? Why not other features that we would generally find repulsive? Aristotle, for example, found subordination of women and the existence of slavery quite acceptable. Even individuals within the natural law tradition differ on the basic goods. As Gomez-Lobo concedes, other contemporary natural law theorists have somewhat different lists of basic goods. Within Gomez-Lobo's list, there are some difficulties. For example, he identifies life as a basic good. He subsequently discusses some other goods, such as freedom and dignity, but doesn't accord them the status of basic goods. In an interesting piece of rhetoric, he states that freedom is in some sense antecedent to the basic goods but not a basic good because it is a necessary condition for achieving the basic goods. If this reasoning is correct for freedom, it applies equally to life, which is a precondition for pursuing all goods, basic or not. Based on his reasoning, Gomez-Lobo would have to classify freedom as a basic good or treat life the same way as freedom. The consequences for the development of actual moral guidelines are significant and would lead to very different conclusions that the ones he affirms. I think similar problems occur with his classification of dignity. Another difficulty is that Gomez-Lobo argues for equivalence of all basic goods. Well and good, but what happens when there is conflict? There is no obvious procedure for resolving conflicts. At one point, he argues that negative responsibilities (do not do something) take precedence over positive claims (you must do this) but provides no convincing argument for this distinction. Further, what happens when positive claims conflict with positive claims, or negative with negative? He also places a good deal of emphasis on the so-called principle of double effect as a decision making device, which is often difficult to apply because it places a great deal of weight on agent intentions. A good deal of the book is relatively vague about actual moral problems. He does discuss two major problems, abortion and euthanasia. Neither of these discussion is satisfactory. In the abortion section, Gomez-Lobo developments his own line of reasoning well but misrepresents the arguments of some abortion freedom advocates. In the euthanasia section, he slides by some really difficult issues and simplifies problems is a very unrealistic way. While I actually agree with most, perhaps even all of his conclusions, the way in which he purports to reach conclusions about euthanasia is suspect. If this is an example of how natural law ethics is to be applied, then it is not very useful in addressing real moral problems. To be fair, trying to develop a single scheme to encompass and guide human moral behavior is extremely difficult, probably impossible. As recognized by Hume and affirmed by some contemporary moral philosophers, moral philosophy is not going to be reducible to a single system. Natural law theories do have something to offer but readers interested in pursuing these ideas should turn to other sources. A very good starting place is the article by Mark Murphy in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which is available on the Internet. This is a concise, sympathetic yet critical overview with a superior bibliography.
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