On Guerrilla Warfare

Rating:
Summary: a classic of strategic thought
Review: American military planners would have done well to study Mao during the Vietnam War and applied such knowledge to creating a viable counter-guerrilla strategy. Perhaps things would have turned out a little differently (or maybe not). At any rate, although the prospects of Communist insurgency in the modern world are probably quite slim, anyone interested in military strategy and/or history would profit from reading this short treatise (only 75 pages). The central element of Mao's guerrilla warfare is to destroy the enemy while preserving one's own forces. To accomplish this, speed, deception, and other methods are necessary, and here, Mao draws largely from Sun Tzu. However, Mao makes clear the importance of politics. Nearly everyone is familiar with Clausewitz's dictum on war and policy (too often quoted out of context), but Mao brings it to a new level, recognizing that guerrilla warfare is both military AND political. Hence, guerrilla units must have political and military leadership, and special pains must be taken in order to secure the support of the people, who are the basis of any successful struggle. While its direct applicability may diminish, Mao's book will retain value in its discussion of the political nature of conflict and of the role of ideology--and, thus, how ideology may be attacked and countered. This latter point remains especially pertinent in our fight against Islamism.

Rating:
Summary: a classic of strategic thought
Review: American military planners would have done well to study Mao during the Vietnam War and applied such knowledge to creating a viable counter-guerrilla strategy. Perhaps things would have turned out a little differently (or maybe not). At any rate, although the prospects of Communist insurgency in the modern world are probably quite slim, anyone interested in military strategy and/or history would profit from reading this short treatise (only 75 pages). The central element of Mao's guerrilla warfare is to destroy the enemy while preserving one's own forces. To accomplish this, speed, deception, and other methods are necessary, and here, Mao draws largely from Sun Tzu. However, Mao makes clear the importance of politics. Nearly everyone is familiar with Clausewitz's dictum on war and policy (too often quoted out of context), but Mao brings it to a new level, recognizing that guerrilla warfare is both military AND political. Hence, guerrilla units must have political and military leadership, and special pains must be taken in order to secure the support of the people, who are the basis of any successful struggle. While its direct applicability may diminish, Mao's book will retain value in its discussion of the political nature of conflict and of the role of ideology--and, thus, how ideology may be attacked and countered. This latter point remains especially pertinent in our fight against Islamism.

Rating:
Summary: Surprising
Review: Before reading this book, I thought guerilla warfare consisted of a farmer firing off his shotgun at passing helicopters. Mao's text reveals a great deal more planning, thought and organization must go into conducting a successful insurgency. Short and to the point, this book is a surprising modern account of employing guerilla warfare against a more powerful enemy. Some, though not all, of these strategies can be seen in America's intervention in Iraq.

One thing worth noting: this text is by and large theoretical. This was Mao's intention it seems, so those who expect to see indepth analysis of real battles might be disappointed. Through the text, Mao does reference several campaigns that buttress his arguments, but chances are they will be unfamiliar to a non-military history buff. It will require your own effort and thinking to observe these guerilla tactics in battles familiar to Americans, such as in Vietnam and Afghanistan.

Rating:
Summary: See the Roadmap for the Terrorists Right Here
Review: I first read this book in Nam as a young Marine Sniper. I served two tours there and have written about it in my book. When Sept 11 happened and I heard all this stuff about the new tactics and new war and how we've never faced this stuff I pulled this book off my shelves and read some pieces to my wife without telling her what it was from and she thought I was reading what they were saying on tv. (...) Worth reading folks.


Rating:
Summary: Nothing secret
Review: I read this in high school in the late 1980s and asked myself, "Why wasn't this mandatory reading at West Point in the late 1950s and 1960s?"
This book, in conjunction with Ho Chi Min's writings on the use of guerrilla warfare, is the absolute basic understanding of the Viet Nam War from back BEFORE the French Foreign Legion were fighting for their colony. EVERYTHING, and I do mean EVERYTHING, in this book is used in the fight against the French right up to Dien Bien Phue, and continued up until the fall of Saigon in 1975. EVERYTHING. Why did America lose the Viet Nam War? Read this. How could America have been so wrong to back Ho Chi Min, Chaing Chi Chek, and Kim Il Song, in the Second World War? Read this.
You will say, "Wow" many times throughout the book, and in the end you will ask, "When was this first printed? How the bleep could we have been so wrong?"

Rating:
Summary: Nothing secret
Review: I read this in high school in the late 1980s and asked myself, "Why wasn't this mandatory reading at West Point in the late 1950s and 1960s?"
This book, in conjunction with Ho Chi Min's writings on the use of guerrilla warfare, is the absolute basic understanding of the Viet Nam War from back BEFORE the French Foreign Legion were fighting for their colony. EVERYTHING, and I do mean EVERYTHING, in this book is used in the fight against the French right up to Dien Bien Phue, and continued up until the fall of Saigon in 1975. EVERYTHING. Why did America lose the Viet Nam War? Read this. How could America have been so wrong to back Ho Chi Min, Chaing Chi Chek, and Kim Il Song, in the Second World War? Read this.
You will say, "Wow" many times throughout the book, and in the end you will ask, "When was this first printed? How the bleep could we have been so wrong?"

Rating:
Summary: Learn from the master
Review: I think Mao intended this essay to be another one of his theoretical Marxist works (Mao thought of himself as a first-class Marxist theoretician). But without question it also served as an instruction manual for his ragtag Red Army while fighting among the tortuous terrain in northwestern China, in part against Japan, in part against Chiang. Considering his success as a practitioner of guerrilla warfare, one would have to be insane to ignore this work.

I'm struck how short that chapter is on guerrilla wars in history. Mao was widely read in Chinese and world history and it would have been his style to display this knowledge in a work like this had he chosen to do so.

Perhaps Americans should not think of themselves as only at the receiving end of guerrillas. Washington learned this kind of fighting during the French and Indian Wars, and he put some of this experience to good use against a British army better armed, better trained, and greater in numbers than the Continentals. He exploited geography, made surprise raids, used mobility and patience to wear out the red coats - all hallmarks of guerrillas. The all-important Battle of Trenton was such kind of unconventional warfare: an Indian raid, essentially. But it sure got results. Regular or conventional battles like Yorktown only came later, when British impatience was at the breaking point. As Franklin had predicted, the British could and did occupy all the towns - including Philadelphia, New York, and Charleston - up and down the eastern coast but they could not hold onto them. (The comparison with Iraq is irresistible. The redcoats never numbered more than 30,000 or so men, fighting among 2.5 million American civilians. Now America has 5 times as many troops in Iraq (about 150,000) as there were redcoats in the 13 colonies. But Iraq's population is 25 million! And that's not counting foreign fighters from Iraq's neighbors. American guerrillas probably had better geography than Iraqi insurgents but the Iraqis seem more eager to commit suicide missions.)

Mao really could have done better than just cite Russian resistance to Napoleon as an example. (Never mind his other Chinese examples. for the moment.) Apart from Washington, the Spaniards also tore the Grand Armee to pieces with guerrillas - in fact, Spain's where the word came from. Lawrence of Arabia sabotaged Turkish railways in northwestern Arabia (rather like insurgents blowing up Iraq's pipelines) - to great effect. Of course, another great example of guerrilla warfare was the block-by-block, street-to-street fighting at Stalingrad. But always, to my mind, the Teutoberg forest was where guerrillas first made their greatest name in Western history. (I know little Greek history to comment further.) Octavian lost three Roman legions thanks to the German barbarians, and Rome hadn't suffered a panic quite like this since Spartacus.

Believe it or not, Mao got his inspiration not from Lenin (though he paid much lip service to him), not even from Sun Tsu (whom he read only when his military career was over), but from the classic historical novels of ancient China, especially The Water Margins and Three Kingdoms. That he didn't cite these is understandable enough: he always insisted on learning truths from facts, and novels don't provide facts though they do generate interest in the motivated reader. And Mao was nothing if not motivated.

Griffith's extraordinary credentials are not worth repeating here. His intro is excellent. He is dead right that guerrillas thrive anywhere: from the dense jungle of Vietnam to the flat deserts of Iraq. Where there are clear political objectives (knowing the difference between long- and short-term goals), men willing to fight (and die), a will to win, and lots of patience, all it takes is a little hard thinking to make the worst-equipped great guerrilla warriors. Let us learn from the master, not by regurgitating his rules, which he would never have done himself, but by thinking critically and philosophically through his logic.

Rating:
Summary: Learn from the master
Review: It might not be a bad idea to make this book compulsory reading at all military academies...and then ban it in Iraq while America still has the authority to do so.

I think Mao intended this essay to be another one of his theoretical Marxist works (Mao thought of himself as a first-class Marxist theoretician). But without question it also served as an instruction manual for his ragtag Red Army while fighting among the tortuous terrain in northwestern China, in part against Japan, in part against Chiang. Considering his success as a practitioner of guerrilla warfare, one would have to be insane to ignore this work.

I'm struck how short that chapter is on guerrilla wars in history. Mao was widely read in Chinese and world history and it would have been his style to display this knowledge in a work like this had he chosen to do so.

Americans should not think of themselves as only at the receiving end of guerrillas. Washington learned this kind of fighting during the French and Indian Wars, and he put some of this experience to good use against a British army better armed, better trained, and greater in numbers than the Continentals. He exploited geography, made surprise raids, used mobility and patience to wear out the red coats - all hallmarks of guerrillas. The all-important Battle of Trenton was such kind of unconventional warfare: an Indian raid, essentially. But it sure got results. Regular or conventional battles like Yorktown only came later, when British impatience was at the breaking point.

Mao really could have done better than just cite Russian resistance to Napoleon as an example. (Never mind his other Chinese examples. for the moment.) Apart from Washington, the Spaniards also tore the Grand Armee to pieces with guerrillas - in fact, Spain's where the word came from. Of course, another great example of guerrilla warfare was Stalingrad. But always, to my mind, the Teutoberg forest was where guerrillas first made their greatest name in Western history. (I know little Greek history to comment further.) Octavian lost three Roman legions thanks to the German barbarians, and Rome hadn't suffered a panic quite like this since Spartacus.

Believe it or not, Mao got his inspiration not from Lenin (though he paid much lip service to him), not even from Sun Tsu (whom he read only when his military career was over), but from the classic historical novels of ancient China, especially The Water Margins and Three Kingdoms. That he didn't cite these is understandable enough: he always insisted on learning truths from facts, and novels don't provide facts though they do generate interest in the motivated reader. And Mao was nothing if not motivated.

Griffith's extraordinary credentials are not worth repeating here. His intro is excellent. He is dead right that guerrillas thrive anywhere: from the dense jungle of Vietnam to the flat deserts of Iraq. Where there are men willing to fight, and a will to win, and patience, all it takes is a little hard thinking to make them great guerrillas. Let us learn from the master, not by regurgitating his rules, which he would never have done himself, but by thinking critically and philosophically through his logic.

Rating:
Summary: This Book Is the Consummate Classic on Guerrilla Warfare
Review: It remains a timeless masterpiece. No person fighting either a guerrilla war or fighting in counter-guerrilla warfare operations should do so without having read and digested the contents of this book. This is what is meant by knowledge is power.

Rating:
Summary: A condensed view of Sun Tzu's Art of War.
Review: Mao Tse Tung's Book on Guerilla Warfare is basically a condensed version of Sun Tzu's Art of war. Most of the text and even layout follow that of Samual Griffith's translation of Sun Tzu's Art of war. For those not familar with Sun Tzu's Art of war it is a treatise on warfare and the things that effect it. Considered a classic along with Jomini and Clauswitz, With that said, Is Mao Tse Tung's Book on Guerilla Warfare worth getting? In my opinion, yes. Why? Both Sun Tzu's and Mao Tse Tung's book on warfare are directly translated into from the original Chinese. As a result the translator often take some liberties with the translation. As such it is good to have a few different copies to compare so that your own interpretation can come about