Rating:  Summary: A Step Backward Review: Rattling the Cage is most disappointing book. Wise argues that chimpanzees--and no other animals--ought to have legal rights because chimps are like humans. Wise's position is not original. The 1992 book, The Great Ape Project, edited by Paola Cavalieri and Peter Singer, argued for the personhood of chimpanzees, orangutans, and gorillas on the basis of their genetic and cognitive similarity to humans. Wise's emphasis on chimpanzees and his exclusion of other great apes is actually a step backward in thinking from The Great Ape Project of almost tens years ago. Moreover, humans have throughout history justified their exploitation of animals on the ground that animals lacked certain human characteristics, such as rationality and abstract thought. Wise's argument that chimps really do have human-like rationality and ability to use abstract thought and belong on "our" side of the moral and legal equation does not address the problem of the billions of animals who have minds and who can suffer but who do not have human-like minds. We exploit very few chimpanzees relative to the 9 billion farm animals we eat every year in the U.S. alone; farm animals are not on "our" side, according to Wise. Rattling the Cage is a dreadfully dull and pretentious book.
Rating:  Summary: Rattling the Law Review: RATTLING THE LAWJust as Peter Singer and Tom Regan dramatically influenced the world of philosophy and environmental ethics by suggesting that nonhuman animals are worthy of moral consideration, this remarkable book by Steven Wise is a major contribution, if not the seminal work, in a developing body of jurisprudential writing that makes a case for the granting of appropriate legal rights to at least some non-human animals. Rattling the Cage is a comprehensively researched and captivating argument for the extension of legal rights to chimpanzees and bonobos (pygmy chimpanzees). It begins with an historical look at the origins of our pervasive and convenient cultural assumptions about the supposed inferiority of nonhuman beings and how that seemingly insurmountable prejudice is rooted in classical philosophy's concept of a Great Chain of Being that hierarchically places humans just below the Godly realms and all other animals far beneath man, and therefore deservedly subject to every human whim. Wise argues that the untold suffering of nonhumans at the hands of our species has been dubiously justified through the ages by seemingly infinite variations of this Great Chain of Being theme, and that the time has come, with the assistance of scientific revelations modern technology has afforded us (through such disciplines as psychology, anthropology, physiology, and ethology), to show that some nonhumans are far closer to us in both cognitive capacities and emotional makeup than we have previously believed or allowed ourselves to realize. Wise makes his case by analyzing exhaustive and unfailingly interesting (and sometimes riveting) studies of primate cognition and behavior, as well as anecdotal tales that indelibly etch his argument in our minds, and when one reads stories of such chimps as Lucy, who made tea for internationally renowned primatologist, Roger Fouts, each morning before her lessons in signing, our hearts as well. But, however thoroughly Wise makes the case for advanced cognition in chimpanzees, and in parts of the book such as his superb chapter on language and consciousness, he makes the case exceedingly well, the fundamental importance of his book lies elsewhere. As an accomplished attorney with over twenty years experience representing nonhuman beings in court, Wise walks us through the difficulties of finding relief, if not justice, for such a clientele. He explains the difference between legal thinghood and legal personhood, and here begins what this reader considers to be Wise's greatest contribution to the cause of animal rights. He claims that the crucial judicial distinction between the two concepts lies in the capacity for and degree of autonomy the subject or party in question possesses or exhibits, and suddenly his exhaustive presentation of non-human primate cognition takes on newfound meaning. Wise is seriously suggesting that non-human primates deserve to be elevated to the status of legal persons rather than things. While other highly accomplished attorneys and activists advocate legislation as the most effective route to animal legal rights (and he would surely and warmly welcome such legislation), Wise argues that the common law holds the greatest promise for the recognition of legal personhood and rights in animals. Conventional wisdom holds that common law judges make rulings solely on the basis of precedent, regardless of the ever-changing contexts in which cases are decided, but Wise shows us with convincing clarity that common law judges act not only in accordance with precedent, but on the bases of policy and principle as well, and that such considerations provide a jurisprudential window through which judges might legitimately elevate chimpanzees to legal personhood and afford them what appropriate rights they deserve. (Anyone who doubts the power of policy and principle to motivate judges need only reflect upon Justice Harlan's historical dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, where he argued that separate but equal was an unacceptable racial divide, and the fact that his reasoning was adopted almost whole cloth half a century later when the Supreme Court discredited that precedent in Brown v. Board of Education.) By no means does Wise believe that chimpanzees and bonobos are the only nonhumans entitled to legal rights, but feels the case can most readily be made for these creatures because they are "evolutionarily closest" to us. He no doubt understands the words of Harvard's legendary constitutional law professor, Laurence Tribe, who once wrote that "...the very process of recognizing rights in those...with whom we can already empathize could well pave the way for still further extensions as we move upward along the spiral of moral evolution." Steven Wise has written a profoundly important book that may well present a blueprint for open-minded judges of conscience to grant long-overdue legal rights to our closest genetic cousins. But it is also contains a very well-written and deeply moving message to the educated lay reader, a plea for compassion and justice so emotionally potent that one will laugh and cry while Wise gradually, logically, and powerfully builds his case, a case that, with no small thanks to his provocative book, may someday soon be won.
Rating:  Summary: Lawyer meets linguist: predictable results Review: Read Wise's claims about animal cognition with Steven Pinker's The Language Instinct in hand, comparing what Pinker says about primate cognition with what Wise says about Pinker's claims. It quickly becomes clear that Wise neither has any grasp of what a logical argument is, nor much interest in accurate representation of the people he is criticizing. A truly contemptible performance. My recommendation to anyone who reads this book is to follow up on as many of the references you can, not taking for granted that Wise is representing them accurately. In all likelihood, he isn't. The adversarial mode of argument may work in a court of law, but it simply is not scholarship.
Rating:  Summary: A Must Read! Review: Steven Wise has written one of the most scholarly works since Peter Singer's "Animal Liberation" and Tom Regan's "The Case for Animal Rights". The arguments are cogent, lucid, and uncompromising. This is a bold work that will not only raise eyebrows but also incite change. The concept of rights is presented in detail in "Rattling the Cage", it will undoubtedly also contribute greatly to those interested in human rights. It should be noted however that Wise's work may be viewed as anthropocentric, for it uses human (legal) standards to define who deserves rights. For those who are interested in animal rights philosophy, please additionally consult works by Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Gary Francione.
Rating:  Summary: The case for chimpanzee and bonobo personhood. Review: Steven Wise, a professor of law at Harvard University presents a compelling case for re-defining the legal status of our closest relatives, the chimpanzees and bonobos (pigmy chimps) from "thinghood" to "personhood". He traces the history of the legal staus of animals from early middle- and near-eastern writings such as the Code of Hammurabi and the Pentateuch, through European and English common law up to the present, using material and precedents derived from the great human rights struggles of the past century. He demonstrates that the materials for such a shift in legal definiton already exist. All that is missing is a great judge who will make a decision that radically restructures already existing precedents while reaffirming fundamental principles. Professor Wise draws on a wide body of knowledge including the legal history of slavery, definitions of consciousness, similarities of chimpanzee and bonobo DNA and brain structure, the work of Jane Goodall and Roger Fouts and childhood developmental stages. This scholarly, excellently researched book (which is also very readable) brings us up to date on the arguments for re-defining creatures, who share with us 97% of DNA, as persons under the law.
Rating:  Summary: The case for chimpanzee and bonobo personhood. Review: Steven Wise, a professor of law at Harvard University presents a compelling case for re-defining the legal status of our closest relatives, the chimpanzees and bonobos (pigmy chimps) from "thinghood" to "personhood". He traces the history of the legal staus of animals from early middle- and near-eastern writings such as the Code of Hammurabi and the Pentateuch, through European and English common law up to the present, using material and precedents derived from the great human rights struggles of the past century. He demonstrates that the materials for such a shift in legal definiton already exist. All that is missing is a great judge who will make a decision that radically restructures already existing precedents while reaffirming fundamental principles. Professor Wise draws on a wide body of knowledge including the legal history of slavery, definitions of consciousness, similarities of chimpanzee and bonobo DNA and brain structure, the work of Jane Goodall and Roger Fouts and childhood developmental stages. This scholarly, excellently researched book (which is also very readable) brings us up to date on the arguments for re-defining creatures, who share with us 97% of DNA, as persons under the law.
Rating:  Summary: Informative, entertaining, witty, and humorous Review: The author combines deep and broad scholarship with eminently readable prose to produce an informative, entertaining, witty, and humorous book - an amazing feat for an attorney! His compassionate passion for improving the lot of non-human primates, whose intelligence he startlingly documents, infuses his analogies to children in general and to his own children in particular (including the Twin Soldiers of Entropy) with warmth and insight. To use a favorite word of the author, this work is profoundly enculturating.
Rating:  Summary: Mixed Bag Review: The author presents in-depth history, but blames religion (mostly western of course) for all the suffering today at the hands of scientists, who are by and large atheists. As a devout Christian I am also an animal rights person and feel somewhat insulted by the notion that I am partly to blame for all the ills perputrated by those who claim science as their religion and feel free to subject nonhumans to all sorts of horrible torture...
Rating:  Summary: Logical, Articulate, Compelling Review: The author's main goal is to effectively motivate the importance of establishing the legal "personhood" of chimpanzees and bonobos based on, among other things, their astounding genetic similarity to humans. His arguments are strong and convincing. Early on, the book guides the reader through the basics of modern and ancient legal systems. Later, many cases of chimpanzee and bonobo intelligence are meticulously documented. I learned a lot not only about animal cognition, but also about legal traditions. The possibilities for grand-scale changes are tantalizing. I predict this book will be the first rumble in an earthquake of changes to the way non-human animals are viewed by the law. A book like this will inevitably generate controversy and harsh criticism. Back when women were considered inferior to men, there were countless opponents to granting all humans the right to vote regardless of gender. Similarly, people who enslaved African Americans spoke out against establishing human rights that would apply to all regardless of race; in fact many threatened or even physically harmed folks who took a view counter to their own. Along the same lines, there will be many cowardly individuals who feel falsely endangered by an argument that paves the way toward the introduction of basic rights for non-humans. But the revolution has begun. Steven Wise has earned my profound respect. This is an excellent book.
Rating:  Summary: Ex Parte Bonzo Review: The oxymoronically named "Wise" thinks that animal "rights" are linked to "proven intelligence". Proven to whom? To quote Wise, "It boils down to this: If they can desire, can intentionally try to fulfull desire, and possess a sense of self-sufficiency, they deserve rights". Nonsense. Jefferson wrote that all "men" are created equal, and endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights. While the meaning of "men" has been expanded to be more inclusive than it was held to be in 1776, I don't think it can be expanded to include dogs, cats, and rats. Only humans are potentially moral beings, and therefore can be held morally responsible for their actions. Consequently, only humans can have rights in correlation to their civic responsibilities. A cat may see the object of its desire, let's say a mouse, and possess a sense of intentionality toward the object, i.e. the intent to catch and eat the mouse, and the will to act to carry out it's intent, but the cat possesses no moral sense that would check it's desire. Humans, on the other hand, can make moral distinctions. A human can murder another human, murder being the intentional, wilfull taking of human life by another human without justification or excuse. The human therefore also has the correlative civic right not to be murdered. We don't try cats for "murdering" mice, nor hold them liable for damages for wrongful death...at least, not yet. Wise, and his ilk, continue to blur the distinction between man and beast that is the inevitable outcome of Rousseau's misguided romanticism. Should the law further decline into such nonsense, our already overburdened courts will be forced to hear cases of homeowners violating the property rights of cockroaches and coyotes, and perhaps the courts will appoint a Guardian ad Litem for cats to sue their human co-habitors for infringing upon Kitty's First Amendment Right to freely express itself by spraying the house with kitty urine. Actually, Wise may be onto something here since postmodern performance art is much like unto animal fecal matter. Perhaps he can argue cases involving doggy poop as "Intellectual Property". In sum, this book is most suitable for lining the bottom of a cage.
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