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Rating: 
Summary: In the finest traditions of the Royal Navy
Review: A superior autobiography. Although the focus is plainly on the Falklands, the author provides a fascinating account of the RN's submarine training program -- which reminds one of why the British military, though tiny in size, still maintains some of the best trained warriors in the world. The meat of the book retells the story of PM Thatcher's courageous decision to retake the Falklands. The author provides a fine defense of the UK's controversial decision to sink the Argentine crusier Belgrano and a compelling account of the terror visited upon his task force by (French-made) exocet anti-ship missles. Unlike many commanders' post-mortems, this book contains little of the standard blame shifting usually found in such works. The Admiral takes you through his decision-making process step-by-step never letting the reader forget that the decisions he made often were made on the basis on VERY incomplete information under intense time-pressure (from the US, the UN and the coming South Atlantic winter) and, often, under fire. Overall, one comes away thinking the author would have done a bang-up job at Trafalger or Jutland . . . or even taking on the Soviet Navy in the North Atlantic. A must have for those interested in finding out what -- to paraphrase the Iron Duke -- a damn near run thing the Falklands campaign really was.
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Summary: Feel the responsibility and tension of war!!
Review: Admiral Woodward's account manages to deliver the sense of being in charge of tens of ships loaded with thousands of men, all involved in a modern armed conflict at sea.
The professionalism necessary to handle the situation is clearly conveyed. As well as the stress that life-or-death decisions place on the shoulders of those "managing" a war-front.
Rating:
Summary: Great Book at the right level of detail
Review: Co-written with Patrick Robinson (fiction novelist and author of USS Seawolf, Nimitz Class, and others), this biographical/historical book is a detailed and enjoyable look at a very difficult and tense military deployment. Woodward's writing is honest and open, revealing his concerns and doubts about his leadership while at the same time providing the reader with a wonderful background into the strategy and tactical planning of the British command.
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Summary: Required reading for anyone studying naval history
Review: I read this book as a midshipman in my efforts toward professional development as a future naval officer. This is an EXCELLENT book. Admiral Woodward provides insight into some very important lessons learned from the Falklands War - the first time the Royal Navy went to war since WWII and using weapons systems that had not been tested in battle and the first war in the age of instant satellite news networks. I couldn't put the book down.
Rating: 
Summary: a navy commander at modern war
Review: In this book Admiral Woodward has provided the reader with an informative and candid view of a task force commander at war. His myriad of concerns; logistics, weather, technology, numbers, and the interference of politics and the modern media in the campaign are presented in a very readable format. It was interesting to read his asessments that Argentina could have won the war by concentrating their air attacks on the 2 British carriers (fortunately the Brits hadn't sold them) or the amphibs. As a naval officer, and a student of military history, it was refreshing to see a modern commander admit that such things as acceptable losses and expendable commands really do exist in the conduct of warfare. His humor and leadership style, warts and all, are a primer in command and control under fire. The book presents dramatic descriptions of many tragic episodes, such as the sinkings of the HMS Coventry and the Atlantic Conveyor. Unfortunately, since the book was written from a naval officer's point of view, the land campaign was given rather short notice therefore leaving out an important portion of the fight. I highly recommend the book for professionals and buffs alike.
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Summary: Woodward/Courage 101
Review: Into the finest traditions of The Royal Navy ( and any other righteous, but self-anylizing, self-depricating, hero-by-fire war-tested veteran), we are allowed an inside view into a theater-of-war that we, who have never paid the price, secretley covet. Gallentry, selflessness, pride of country, pride of duty, discipline, all seem to be the lost arts of the past, but Woodward and others in this telling instruct us that, to this day,our young men and women rise to the occasion, as in the days of old. What is that extraordinary part of us that is able to trandsend all our own limitations and push beyond to victory, over our enemy and over ourselves? This book may help you to answer that question!
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Summary: Woodward denies HMS Invincible was hit on 30 May
Review: The fact that HMS 'Invincible' had a damaged gas turbine engine replaced under the cover of darkness on 5 June 1982 (See Rodney Burden et al, Falklands: The Air War, p. 238, Arms & Armour Press, 1986) and that with the fighting at an end the aircraft carrier anchored on 1 July 1982 off the Islands sporting a new coat of sea grey paint (See John Godden, Harrier: Ski-Jump to Victory, Brasseys, 1983, p. 79) seemed in Argentinian eyes to confirm their belief that some damage had been inflicted on the 'Invincible' during 30 May. It is of some interest that Admiral John Woodward does not mention these facts in his memoirs. (See Sandy Woodward with Patrick Robinson, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander, HarperCollins Publishers, 1992) It should be stated that painting 'Invincible' in the foaming brine, the cold, the yawning swells, with General Winter whipping up 20-foot waves would have been extremely difficult. Worser still the British Ministry of Defence claimed shortly after that the last Exocet missile was fired into the smouldering hulk of the 'Atlantic Conveyor' (See Paul Eddy & Magnus Linklater, The Falklands War: Sunday Times Insight Team, Andre Deutsch, 1982), a story which was disproved the following year in Air War South Atlantic by Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price. Admiral Woodward may persist in denying the 'Invincible' had been attacked, but the night of 30-31 May was indeed marked by a single Vulcan bomber fitted with Shrike anti-radar missiles mounting an attack on the Westinghouse long-range radar in Stanley which had been tracking the aircraft-carrier.
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Summary: Falklands war from the Admiral's bridge
Review: This fine naval autobiography takes us behind the scenes of the Falklands sea/air (not ground) war and modern battle management in general. Admiral Woodward didn't exactly know what he was sailing into back in 1982, and makes no attempt to hide his personal sense of vulnerability as Britain's first fighting admiral in high-tech warfare. In fact, the entire book is refreshingly down-to-earth. Woodward is quick to note that he was tapped for the job because he happened to be the navy's closest flotilla commander at the time (in Gibraltar)--and confides that his superiors almost replaced him with a higher-ranking officer even as he led the task force into danger. This is no stuffed-shirt memoir. Woodward and co-author Patrick Robinson weave accounts of grand strategy and military politics through a genuinely absorbing narrative of men and machines in heavy weather, incessant tactical maneuvering, and flashes of terrifying combat. Along the way, there are plenty of 'what-if's to chew on. We learn that Woodward had to manipulate London to get HMS Conqueror to sink the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano (British subs weren't under his tactical command). He explains why the sinking was both necessary and tragic, and how Conqueror watched but spared Argentine ships coming to Belgrano's aid. He also reveals that his ships almost shot down a Brazilian airliner mistaken for a pesky Argentine recon jet; he personally gave the order to withhold fire. And Woodward's character shines through his account of ordering HMS Alacrity on a potential suicide mission to scout mines--in an exceptionally gracious mea culpa of command, he praises the captain's sterling courage while faulting his own mundane direction. Also fascinating are the individual stories of the high number of British ships damaged or sunk, and Woodward's frustration with underperforming anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems. This was more of a close call than the world knew at the time, as he makes abundantly clear. Ultimately, his modest approach on paper belies the fact that he and his task force pulled off a truly impressive naval feat. And it's a credit to Woodward the author-analyst that 'One Hundred Days' transcends the Falklands War to give an illuminating, first-person view of campaign and tactical battle coordination. It could find a home on bookshelves of Fortune 500 executives as well as students of naval and air operations. The style is also breezy (and occasionally humorous) enough for the casual reader. I've never seen it in a U.S. store, so thanks, Amazon.
Rating:
Summary: Falklands war from the Admiral's bridge
Review: This fine naval autobiography takes us behind the scenes of the Falklands sea/air (not ground) war and modern battle management in general. Admiral Woodward didn't exactly know what he was sailing into back in 1982, and makes no attempt to hide his personal sense of vulnerability as Britain's first fighting admiral in high-tech warfare. In fact, the entire book is refreshingly down-to-earth. Woodward is quick to note that he was tapped for the job because he happened to be the navy's closest flotilla commander at the time (in Gibraltar)--and confides that his superiors almost replaced him with a higher-ranking officer even as he led the task force into danger. This is no stuffed-shirt memoir. Woodward and co-author Patrick Robinson weave accounts of grand strategy and military politics through a genuinely absorbing narrative of men and machines in heavy weather, incessant tactical maneuvering, and flashes of terrifying combat. Along the way, there are plenty of 'what-if's to chew on. We learn that Woodward had to manipulate London to get HMS Conqueror to sink the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano (British subs weren't under his tactical command). He explains why the sinking was both necessary and tragic, and how Conqueror watched but spared Argentine ships coming to Belgrano's aid. He also reveals that his ships almost shot down a Brazilian airliner mistaken for a pesky Argentine recon jet; he personally gave the order to withhold fire. And Woodward's character shines through his account of ordering HMS Alacrity on a potential suicide mission to scout mines--in an exceptionally gracious mea culpa of command, he praises the captain's sterling courage while faulting his own mundane direction. Also fascinating are the individual stories of the high number of British ships damaged or sunk, and Woodward's frustration with underperforming anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems. This was more of a close call than the world knew at the time, as he makes abundantly clear. Ultimately, his modest approach on paper belies the fact that he and his task force pulled off a truly impressive naval feat. And it's a credit to Woodward the author-analyst that 'One Hundred Days' transcends the Falklands War to give an illuminating, first-person view of campaign and tactical battle coordination. It could find a home on bookshelves of Fortune 500 executives as well as students of naval and air operations. The style is also breezy (and occasionally humorous) enough for the casual reader. I've never seen it in a U.S. store, so thanks, Amazon.
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