Quantum Theory and the Flight From Realism : Philosophical Responses to Quantum Mechanics

Rating:
Summary: just can't copenhagen
Review: Norris is admittedly motivated to defend a realist interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (QM) largely due to his own past as a literary cultural relativist type. Having seen the light, he is now concerned to show the rest of the constructivists out of the cave of their own making. (Of course, for them, EVERYTHING is of one's own making.) Surely this is an admirable task. Where Norris differs from many with the same agenda vis-à-vis strong relativism is in the sincerity of the attempt to treat with sympathy his opponent's anti-realism, and not simply write it off as so much obscurantist mumbo-jumbo, as others are want to do. Of course, Norris has a strong agenda- to preserve the basic physicalist concepts that seem to underlie all actual (and perhaps possible) human understanding of the natural world, like determinate position/ trajectory, causality, observer and mind-independence, and the like.

His exposition of the Bohr/Einstein debates is particularly illuminating. Although history has clearly viewed Bohr and his Copenhagen acolytes as the victors, Norris presents interesting arguments that expose certain "sociological" and philosophical prejudices of the "judges", coupled with a brand of realism peculiar to Einstein as causes of Einstein's having "lost" the debate. Norris is equally astute a critic when pointing to manifold inadequacies or confusions in the thinking of Bohr and Heisenberg.

Norris is clearly a skilled critic and expositor of very complicated subject matter, which he renders clear and understandable. He is certainly adept at identifying the major issues at hand, and for anti-realists of various stripes, this is a book to be reckoned with.

However, I must admit I find his main thesis unconvincing. Norris constantly relies on the notion that a "Bohm type of `hidden variables' theory," (a phrase found perhaps on every page,) would restore the classical physicalist picture and (dis)solve the so called "quantum paradoxes." Yet Norris does not satisfactorily explain what this amounts to, or give (let alone argue for) any general principle of what the connection between ontology and mathematical formalism is, such that similar if not identical formalism may permit divergent ontological commitments. (Although I'm not sure I've seen this anywhere.) Moreover, and perhaps most importantly for Norris' project, if such a theory as Bohm's is entirely scientifically/observationally tenable, surely Norris must explain why more physicists and philosophers are not jumping at the opportunity to reinstate the good ol' one world, determinate causality and observer-independence picture. After all, wouldn't scientists love to end this embarrassing phase in our history when physics can so easily be aligned with the holism of Eastern mystics? And to the extent to which Norris is concerned with "sociological" factors in considering why, historically, the Copenhagen interpretation wound up the victor, surely the fact that a putatively tenable "realist" alternative continues to fail to this day (now 70 years removed from the EPR debates) to gain acceptance is a fact requiring both "sociological" and strong philosophical explanation.

In the same vein, he must explain why, and not simply that, great philosophers (not just scientists qua philosophers,) like Putnam have been so influenced by the `bizarre' considerations presented by orthodox QM theory (which I think Norris ultimately fails to do even in his book on Putnam, Hilary Putnam: Realism, Reason and the Uses of Uncertainty.) Norris provides little in the way of these arguments, but rather just seems to assume that one can simply take the de Broglie pilot wave or Bohm `hidden variables' theory and use it to ward off the allegedly unwarranted global anti-realistic interpretation that has been, rightly or wrong, interpreted to be constitutive of the Copenhagen interpretation.

So in the end, Norris is just another table-thumping realist who insists that no amount of empirical knowledge could ever possibly undermine the classic realist notion of mind-independence, for the simple reason that no matter what we come to know, the world is already out there waiting to be known.

Nonetheless, this book is fascinating, and a must-read for those interested in issues of realism and anti-realism as they pertain to the history and philosophy of 20th century physics.