Rating: 
Summary: incompetence versus ineptitude
Review: After reading the previous lengthly reviews, I have decided to add this insight to this book. Its appears that the author is trying to show how the French lost the war then how the Germans won it. Its seem pretty clear from the author's perception that French were pretty incompetenece from the top on down. But that didn't make it a sure thing for the Germans. The author also pointed out that Germans showed plenty of ineptitude of their own during the war. What made the difference between the two was that French military incompetenece and their reliance on their famed Chassepot rifle couldn't off-set German professionalism and their artillery - both elements which proves to be the main factors why the French lost.
I was also reminded that the French army of 1870 looked a lot like the French army of 1940. In both cases, the French were military incompetent and their leadership at the top were totally brain dead. The courage of the individual French soldiers kept them in the game as long as they could but Germans won out in the end. Both times, it was a speedy victory for the Germans.
I thought this book was well written, nicely researched and easy to read. It doesn't bogged you down with overwhelming details and its theme seem to be pretty clear from the beginning and it was from that point of view that the book seem to be written for. Well recommended even for casual reader, I agreed with one previous reviewer that this book won't replaced Howard's book but its a great fresh look.
Rating:
Summary: Don't Throw Howard's Book Out Just Yet
Review: For the past four decades, the most comprehensive English-language history of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 has been Professor Michael Howard's book, first published in 1961. Geoffrey Wawro, the U.S. Naval War college professor who in 1996 wrote an interesting revisionist history of the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, has now written a book to compete with Howard's classic. In a nutshell, Wawro's book is quite good, but it complements rather than replaces Howard's book. Wawro's assessment of the opposing military systems is rather biased in favor of the conscription-based German armies over the smaller French regular army. Wawro focuses on one problematic French regiment and uses it to categorize the entire French army as riddled with poor morale, incompetent leadership and lax discipline. Indeed, Wawro equates alcohol consumption in the French army with unsoldierly behavior - what about the famous alcoholic general named Grant who took Vicksburg seven years before? While Wawro frequently notes drunken German troops later in the campaign, somehow this did not represent German indiscipline. Wawro also makes a big point about the superiority of German pre-war planning, but this is questionable on two accounts. First, the French were hardly alone in lacking detailed contingency war plans in 1870 - few other nations had them either. Second, Wawro admits the German operational plan - to encircle both French armies on the frontier - failed (MacMahon's army escaped to Chalons and while Bazaine's army was encircled, it was due to French lethargy, not the German plan). Wawro's two main theses about the war are continuations of earlier themes from his book on the Austro-Prussian War. His first thesis - that incompetent French leadership was at the root of the defeat - equates General Bazaine's fumbling behavior at Metz with Austrian General Benedek's mistakes at Königgrätz. However, there are problems with this thesis. Bazaine had demonstrated real battlefield competence in previous wars, while Benedek was more of a paper-pusher. Bazaine's conduct indicates that political calculations - rather than incompetence - were at the root of the general's failure to act. Furthermore, Bazaine was a mere corps commander in 1870, not commander-in-chief like Benedek, meaning that the Austrian commander was in a much better position to ensure readiness for war and sound operational planning than Bazaine. The author's second thesis is that French defeat was attributable to tactical defects, namely that French superiority in the chassepot rifle was trumped by superior German artillery; these technical disparities made the French troops more defensive-minded while the Germans were more aggressive. It is unfortunate that Wawro does not delve deeper into the opposing infantry and artillery tactics. Both the German and French infantry used large numbers of skirmishers, but the Germans were more inclined to conduct reckless frontal attacks. Neither army had a doctrine for tactical withdrawals, which meant that retreats quickly turned into routs. As for the artillery, the German Krupp breech-loaders were certainly more advanced than the French artillery, but the range advantage was smaller than Wawro suggests only (150 - 750 meters further), giving the German artillerymen a 5-27% advantage in range and 0-60% advantage in rate of fire. German fuses were also better and the Germans pushed their artillery further forward, but none of this added up to a decisive advantage. Wawro fails to note that post-war analysis revealed that only 8% of all casualties were caused by artillery fire, which seriously undermines his tactical thesis.
French defeat was primarily due to the haphazard military reforms enacted by Napoleon III. While the emperor did push the chassepot and mitrailleuse, he allowed the legislature to veto funds for artillery modernization and he squandered millions on adventures like Mexico and his own personal embezzlements of public funds. Napoleon III also over-spent on his navy to match English strength, but this fleet was virtually useless against threats from Prussia; a smaller French navy would have provided the manpower for another French corps as well as funds for artillery modernization. The French logistic collapse - never mentioned by Wawro - was caused by lack of preparations for a mobile campaign, such as buying more horses. Once the French army moved away from its supply depots it quickly became an unfed and short of ammunition - is it any wonder that morale deteriorated? German logistics were equally close to collapse once they pushed deep into France, and this over-reliance on distant rail heads would come back to haunt Germany in future wars. Throughout the narrative, I was suspicious that Wawro was concealing facts that indicated French success or German failure. According to Wawro, the French naval blockade of Germany's coast accomplished nothing - he doesn't mention that they captured 80 German merchantmen in the first month of the war. Wawro is reticent about German losses, such as failing to mention the 10,000 German casualties at Froeschwiller. Later, Wawro omits critical details about the French counterattack to relieve Belfort in January 1871; he asserts that the French "sat idly on the road ..[to] Belfort from 10-13 January." In fact, Howard's account details the French victory at Villersexel on 9 January that led to a 5-mile advance toward Belfort in this period; why does Wawro ignore one of the few French tactical victories? The Franco-Prussian War can be viewed simplistically as a triumph of German aggressiveness and technical skill over French sloth - as Wawro does - or it could be viewed as an opportunistic event where one nation was better placed to exploit temporary advantages. The French army of 1870 was far better than the outcome of the war indicated and indeed, this was probably the best French army the Germans ever fought. In term of casualty ratios, the Germans inflicted 3.8 casualties for everyone of their own in the 1914 invasion of France, 2.5 to 1 in the 1940 campaign but only 0.7 to 1 in the 1870 invasion. Had the French army in 1866 obtained the 13 million francs it needed for artillery modernization, is there any doubt that the results of the Franco-Prussian war would have been much different - Bazaine or no Bazaine?
Rating:
Summary: Don't Throw Howard's Book Out Just Yet
Review: For the past four decades, the most comprehensive English-language history of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 has been Professor Michael Howard's book, first published in 1961. Geoffrey Wawro, the U.S. Naval War college professor who in 1996 wrote an interesting revisionist history of the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, has now written a book to compete with Howard's classic. In a nutshell, Wawro's book is quite good, but it complements rather than replaces Howard's book. Wawro's assessment of the opposing military systems is rather biased in favor of the conscription-based German armies over the smaller French regular army. Wawro focuses on one problematic French regiment and uses it to categorize the entire French army as riddled with poor morale, incompetent leadership and lax discipline. Indeed, Wawro equates alcohol consumption in the French army with unsoldierly behavior - what about the famous alcoholic general named Grant who took Vicksburg seven years before? While Wawro frequently notes drunken German troops later in the campaign, somehow this did not represent German indiscipline. Wawro also makes a big point about the superiority of German pre-war planning, but this is questionable on two accounts. First, the French were hardly alone in lacking detailed contingency war plans in 1870 - few other nations had them either. Second, Wawro admits the German operational plan - to encircle both French armies on the frontier - failed (MacMahon's army escaped to Chalons and while Bazaine's army was encircled, it was due to French lethargy, not the German plan). Wawro's two main theses about the war are continuations of earlier themes from his book on the Austro-Prussian War. His first thesis - that incompetent French leadership was at the root of the defeat - equates General Bazaine's fumbling behavior at Metz with Austrian General Benedek's mistakes at Königgrätz. However, there are problems with this thesis. Bazaine had demonstrated real battlefield competence in previous wars, while Benedek was more of a paper-pusher. Bazaine's conduct indicates that political calculations - rather than incompetence - were at the root of the general's failure to act. Furthermore, Bazaine was a mere corps commander in 1870, not commander-in-chief like Benedek, meaning that the Austrian commander was in a much better position to ensure readiness for war and sound operational planning than Bazaine. The author's second thesis is that French defeat was attributable to tactical defects, namely that French superiority in the chassepot rifle was trumped by superior German artillery; these technical disparities made the French troops more defensive-minded while the Germans were more aggressive. It is unfortunate that Wawro does not delve deeper into the opposing infantry and artillery tactics. Both the German and French infantry used large numbers of skirmishers, but the Germans were more inclined to conduct reckless frontal attacks. Neither army had a doctrine for tactical withdrawals, which meant that retreats quickly turned into routs. As for the artillery, the German Krupp breech-loaders were certainly more advanced than the French artillery, but the range advantage was smaller than Wawro suggests only (150 - 750 meters further), giving the German artillerymen a 5-27% advantage in range and 0-60% advantage in rate of fire. German fuses were also better and the Germans pushed their artillery further forward, but none of this added up to a decisive advantage. Wawro fails to note that post-war analysis revealed that only 8% of all casualties were caused by artillery fire, which seriously undermines his tactical thesis.
French defeat was primarily due to the haphazard military reforms enacted by Napoleon III. While the emperor did push the chassepot and mitrailleuse, he allowed the legislature to veto funds for artillery modernization and he squandered millions on adventures like Mexico and his own personal embezzlements of public funds. Napoleon III also over-spent on his navy to match English strength, but this fleet was virtually useless against threats from Prussia; a smaller French navy would have provided the manpower for another French corps as well as funds for artillery modernization. The French logistic collapse - never mentioned by Wawro - was caused by lack of preparations for a mobile campaign, such as buying more horses. Once the French army moved away from its supply depots it quickly became an unfed and short of ammunition - is it any wonder that morale deteriorated? German logistics were equally close to collapse once they pushed deep into France, and this over-reliance on distant rail heads would come back to haunt Germany in future wars. Throughout the narrative, I was suspicious that Wawro was concealing facts that indicated French success or German failure. According to Wawro, the French naval blockade of Germany's coast accomplished nothing - he doesn't mention that they captured 80 German merchantmen in the first month of the war. Wawro is reticent about German losses, such as failing to mention the 10,000 German casualties at Froeschwiller. Later, Wawro omits critical details about the French counterattack to relieve Belfort in January 1871; he asserts that the French "sat idly on the road ..[to] Belfort from 10-13 January." In fact, Howard's account details the French victory at Villersexel on 9 January that led to a 5-mile advance toward Belfort in this period; why does Wawro ignore one of the few French tactical victories? The Franco-Prussian War can be viewed simplistically as a triumph of German aggressiveness and technical skill over French sloth - as Wawro does - or it could be viewed as an opportunistic event where one nation was better placed to exploit temporary advantages. The French army of 1870 was far better than the outcome of the war indicated and indeed, this was probably the best French army the Germans ever fought. In term of casualty ratios, the Germans inflicted 3.8 casualties for everyone of their own in the 1914 invasion of France, 2.5 to 1 in the 1940 campaign but only 0.7 to 1 in the 1870 invasion. Had the French army in 1866 obtained the 13 million francs it needed for artillery modernization, is there any doubt that the results of the Franco-Prussian war would have been much different - Bazaine or no Bazaine?
Rating: 
Summary: An Excellent Study of the First Modern War.
Review: Geoffrey Wawro established himself as a preeminent military historian and author with his previous volumes, "The Austro-Prussian War" and "Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914". His latest work, "The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871" is yet another example of the brilliant research and presentation Mr. Wawro is known for. The world watched in surprise as Prussia easily defeated Austria in the Austro Prussian War (1866), nearly annihilating the Austrian army at the Battle of Koniggratz. The new Prussian breech-loading rifle, the Dreyse Needle Gun, allowed the Prussian forces an overwhelming superiority in fire power over the slower muzzle-loading weapons of the Austrian army. In addition, Prussian "swarm" infantry tactics, which called for units advancing in supporting skirmish lines until they overlapped the enemy's flanks, confused the Austrians. Lastly, the Prussians had completely revised their tactics regarding the use of artillery, allowing batteries to be quickly moved and concentrated anywhere on the field of battle, pulverizing enemy forces. Military strategists all over the world analyzed the conflict and tried to adapt their doctrine to the new style of waging war introduced by the Prussians. The Franco-Prussian War forever changed the social, political and economic balance in Europe. The major European powers were stunned as the military might of France was devastated by a newly united Germany, and the seeds were sown for the constant political maneuvering and arms race that lasted until the start of the First World War. France was largely caught unprepared when war came in mid-July 1870, even though war with Prussia had nearly occurred every year since 1866. Prussian leaders, King Wilhelm Hohenzollern and the Statesman Otto von Bismark, were motivated by a desire for revenge against France stemming from the Napoleonic Wars, the possibility of regaining Alsace and Lorraine, formerly German territory, and providing a national motive for uniting Prussia and the independent German States. The French sought to "keep Prussia in it's place", and maintain France's position as the leading power in Europe. The French defeat was owed as much to deficiencies on the part of the French themselves as it was to Prussian superiority. Emperor Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte III was corrupt, indecisive and unschooled in military matters. France's generals had a penchant for political infighting and bitter rivalry, created in large part by the Emperor's habit of passing over senior officers to promote his friends and supporters, subordinating the more experienced commanders to their juniors. France's generals also were indoctrinated to believe that their strengh lay in defense rather than attack, and French officers repeatedly passed up opportunities to attack and destroy smaller or weaker Prussian units, even when French forces were overwhelmingly superior. Organizationally, the French had a larger professional army than Prussia, as well as a system of reserves. The French army, however, proved to be poorly disciplined and the reserve system was wholly inadequate, as were mobilization plans, railways, etc. The Prussian army, though smaller, was better educated and trained, and backed up by a vast, quickly mobilized reserve. The one bright spot for France was their superb infantry rifle, the Chassepot. This powerful breech-loading rifle had double the effective range of the Prussian Dreyse, allowing the French troops to cut Prussian infantry to pieces before they closed. Unfortunately for the French, the Prussians more than offset this advantage with their overwhelming artillery, blasting French units to pieces under a rain of high explosive shells. Aside from the discussion of the actual fighting, Mr. Wawro treats all the facets of this brief but bloody struggle, from personal accounts of soldiers of both antagonists and the foreign observers and reporters of the conflict (which included US General Phillip Sheridan) to the Republican rebellion after the Prussian capture of Emperor Louis-Napoleon. For those interested in military or European history this book is a must have!
Rating:
Summary: An Excellent Study of the First Modern War.
Review: Geoffrey Wawro established himself as a preeminent military historian and author with his previous volumes, "The Austro-Prussian War" and "Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914". His latest work, "The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871" is yet another example of the brilliant research and presentation Mr. Wawro is known for. The world watched in surprise as Prussia easily defeated Austria in the Austro Prussian War (1866), nearly annihilating the Austrian army at the Battle of Koniggratz. The new Prussian breech-loading rifle, the Dreyse Needle Gun, allowed the Prussian forces an overwhelming superiority in fire power over the slower muzzle-loading weapons of the Austrian army. In addition, Prussian "swarm" infantry tactics, which called for units advancing in supporting skirmish lines until they overlapped the enemy's flanks, confused the Austrians. Lastly, the Prussians had completely revised their tactics regarding the use of artillery, allowing batteries to be quickly moved and concentrated anywhere on the field of battle, pulverizing enemy forces. Military strategists all over the world analyzed the conflict and tried to adapt their doctrine to the new style of waging war introduced by the Prussians. The Franco-Prussian War forever changed the social, political and economic balance in Europe. The major European powers were stunned as the military might of France was devastated by a newly united Germany, and the seeds were sown for the constant political maneuvering and arms race that lasted until the start of the First World War. France was largely caught unprepared when war came in mid-July 1870, even though war with Prussia had nearly occurred every year since 1866. Prussian leaders, King Wilhelm Hohenzollern and the Statesman Otto von Bismark, were motivated by a desire for revenge against France stemming from the Napoleonic Wars, the possibility of regaining Alsace and Lorraine, formerly German territory, and providing a national motive for uniting Prussia and the independent German States. The French sought to "keep Prussia in it's place", and maintain France's position as the leading power in Europe. The French defeat was owed as much to deficiencies on the part of the French themselves as it was to Prussian superiority. Emperor Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte III was corrupt, indecisive and unschooled in military matters. France's generals had a penchant for political infighting and bitter rivalry, created in large part by the Emperor's habit of passing over senior officers to promote his friends and supporters, subordinating the more experienced commanders to their juniors. France's generals also were indoctrinated to believe that their strengh lay in defense rather than attack, and French officers repeatedly passed up opportunities to attack and destroy smaller or weaker Prussian units, even when French forces were overwhelmingly superior. Organizationally, the French had a larger professional army than Prussia, as well as a system of reserves. The French army, however, proved to be poorly disciplined and the reserve system was wholly inadequate, as were mobilization plans, railways, etc. The Prussian army, though smaller, was better educated and trained, and backed up by a vast, quickly mobilized reserve. The one bright spot for France was their superb infantry rifle, the Chassepot. This powerful breech-loading rifle had double the effective range of the Prussian Dreyse, allowing the French troops to cut Prussian infantry to pieces before they closed. Unfortunately for the French, the Prussians more than offset this advantage with their overwhelming artillery, blasting French units to pieces under a rain of high explosive shells. Aside from the discussion of the actual fighting, Mr. Wawro treats all the facets of this brief but bloody struggle, from personal accounts of soldiers of both antagonists and the foreign observers and reporters of the conflict (which included US General Phillip Sheridan) to the Republican rebellion after the Prussian capture of Emperor Louis-Napoleon. For those interested in military or European history this book is a must have!
Rating:
Summary: I have read enough of this book.
Review: I thought that America and Isreal were the only ones fighting on the side of Christ as a christian nation.
I have found out that France is also a country that is also fighting the good fight of faith.
You could even say that their heroes were very christlike.
Who can forget that France helped save America when they used their ships to block the military support that Britain was sending.
The Statue of Liberty also showed their support.
When it comes down to it. God blesses those who bless the children of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.
We as children are included in this through the death of Christ. So, basically, America started out as a christian nation, and will remain a christian nation.
God has shown France favor too. I don't know when it started, but it did.
-Calvin Newman
Rating:
Summary: lively writing, good storytelling
Review: I was not familiar with this part of history, and wondered if the author could hold my attention. Well written, entertaining and informative, with intelligent judgments and a thoughtful closing chapter.
Rating:
Summary: Franco Prussian War
Review: In the Franco-Prussian War Geoffrey Wawro once again demonstrates a solid command of his subject, from researching minute details to crafting impressive theories with logical conclusions. This book is a follow up to his Austro-Prussian War and often uses that war as a backdrop for events a half a decade later. The book is an indictment of French generalship that in many ways should have either won the war or at least battled Moltke?s forces to a bloody stalemate. Prussia was not the military machine of perfect tactical execution myth would have us believe. In fact both France and Prussia committed blunders during battles, but Prussia owed much of its early success to the accuracy of its artillery. Bismarck and Moltke were willing to throw thousands of men to their deaths at the hand of the dreaded French Chassepot rifle, while French generals Bazaine and Bourbaki squandered every advantage through inactivity. In a course of five weeks, German forces had routed every French army leaving Paris open for conquest. But here is where France?s indecisiveness actually aided it. With Napoleon III out of the way, there was no legitimate French government to negotiate a peace. Prussia dispatched forces to the Loire Valley in attempts to defeat any French force in the field, which confounded Bismarck and strained the Prussian economy. In the end Bismarck forced France to accept a humiliating peace that festered in French politicians hearts and minds for four decades. Though this war represents the end of Bismarck?s use of conflict to realize his realpolitik, the impression on France had been made. One cannot really understand the First World War without first understanding the Franco-Prussian War. Wawro?s knowledge is incredibly detailed and his writing style is very readable, though casual ?history buffs? will probably not grasp the full comprehensiveness of this magnificent work. If the book has a fault, perhaps it is the lack of coverage of the Paris Commune and the revolution of post-Second Empire France. He gives this topic brief coverage, but the detail of which he described the road to war and the conflict itself is surprisingly missing.
Rating:
Summary: Franco Prussian War
Review: In the Franco-Prussian War Geoffrey Wawro once again demonstrates a solid command of his subject, from researching minute details to crafting impressive theories with logical conclusions. This book is a follow up to his Austro-Prussian War and often uses that war as a backdrop for events a half a decade later. The book is an indictment of French generalship that in many ways should have either won the war or at least battled Moltke?s forces to a bloody stalemate. Prussia was not the military machine of perfect tactical execution myth would have us believe. In fact both France and Prussia committed blunders during battles, but Prussia owed much of its early success to the accuracy of its artillery. Bismarck and Moltke were willing to throw thousands of men to their deaths at the hand of the dreaded French Chassepot rifle, while French generals Bazaine and Bourbaki squandered every advantage through inactivity. In a course of five weeks, German forces had routed every French army leaving Paris open for conquest. But here is where France?s indecisiveness actually aided it. With Napoleon III out of the way, there was no legitimate French government to negotiate a peace. Prussia dispatched forces to the Loire Valley in attempts to defeat any French force in the field, which confounded Bismarck and strained the Prussian economy. In the end Bismarck forced France to accept a humiliating peace that festered in French politicians hearts and minds for four decades. Though this war represents the end of Bismarck?s use of conflict to realize his realpolitik, the impression on France had been made. One cannot really understand the First World War without first understanding the Franco-Prussian War. Wawro?s knowledge is incredibly detailed and his writing style is very readable, though casual ?history buffs? will probably not grasp the full comprehensiveness of this magnificent work. If the book has a fault, perhaps it is the lack of coverage of the Paris Commune and the revolution of post-Second Empire France. He gives this topic brief coverage, but the detail of which he described the road to war and the conflict itself is surprisingly missing.
Rating:
Summary: Preview to the 20th Century
Review: The Franco-Prussian War may be the most unknown of "modern" conflicts: like most people, I was aware that the French army was destroyed at Sedan, but knew little else. This book remedied that shortcoming. The author not only describes the campaigns in sufficient detail, he also is able to provide an overview that is most enligtening. It is fascinating to contemplate this war in light of the events of 1914 and 1940. This is simply an excellent book.
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