The Franco-Prussian War : The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871

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Summary: Preview to the 20th Century
Review: The Franco-Prussian War may be the most unknown of "modern" conflicts: like most people, I was aware that the French army was destroyed at Sedan, but knew little else. This book remedied that shortcoming. The author not only describes the campaigns in sufficient detail, he also is able to provide an overview that is most enligtening. It is fascinating to contemplate this war in light of the events of 1914 and 1940. This is simply an excellent book.

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Summary: The Franco-Prussian War : The German Conquest of France in 1
Review: Wawro (Naval War College) has written an extraordinary history of the Franco-Prussian War, one of the most significant wars in modern European history. This conflict changed European history, aided Otto von Bismarck in creating an imperial Germany, and, in so doing, help to cause the bloody slaughter of 1914-18. In brilliant writing, the author describes the terrible battles in which the French troops, with one of the best rifles available, were slaughtered by the superior Prussian artillery. Wawro uses a wide variety of documentary sources to create a dazzling, often moving account of the conflict that brought down the Emperor Louis Napoleon and changed the map of central Europe. The bloody battles that caused heavy casualties in both armies are portrayed in striking detail. The author shows the marked contrast between the two armies: the Prussians, fit, younger, and better educated; the French, older, prone to drink too much, and poorly disciplined. There is a striking portrait of Marshall Achille Bazaine, France's premier general, who was too lackadaisical and whose slothfulness contributed mightily to France's defeat. ^BSumming Up: Highly recommended. All modern European history collections.

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Summary: An excellent history of the Franco-Prussian War
Review: Wawro has written an excellent history of the Franco-Prussian War that details why the Prussians won and the French lost the conflict. According to Wawro the French had inferior tactics because they would mass their soldiers in defensive formations to take advantage of the superior French rifle over the dispersed German formations but these tactics made the French army unable to counter attack or take personal intiative in combat. The Prussians would take advantage of these French weaknesses by outflanking and eventually surrounding the immobile French formations despite the high causalties that the Prussian army took from the superior French rifles. The Germans also massed their artillery batteries to follow in close formation with the infantry and replied on time to any threats from the French riflemen. As a result the French were pounded mercilessly by the Prussian artillery and could not use their rifles or reply to Moltke's armies. Wawro also blames the inept performance by General Bazaine for the French defeat. Bazaine did not take advantage of the situation at Mars-la-Tour and failed to reinforce his vulnerable right wing at St Privat during the battle of Gravelotte. Wawro believes that Bazaine's greatest error was leaving his forces at Metz to be surrounded rather than marching east to German territory and threataning Prussian supply lines or marching north to relieve MacMahon's besieged forces at Sedan.I would strongly reccomend this book for anyone interested in a concise account of the Franco-Prussian War.

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Summary: Superb Military History
Review: Wawro's book on the Franco-Prussian War is thoroughly researched and well-written. This book offers a detailed look at the causes of the war, the major political and military figures on both sides like Napoleon III and Otto von Bismarck, developments and improvements in military tactics and weaponry, and of course the major battles of the war between France and Prussia.

The contrasts between the French and Prussian armies were stark. The French officers and soldiers were on average older, less disciplined and lacking in high morale. Many of the highest ranking French officers were poor leaders and many were plagued with a defeatist mentality even early on during the conflict. Marshal Bazaine was a good example of this. One of the few advantages the French had was their primary infantry rifle known as the Chassepot, which had a longer range of accuracy and could fire more rounds per minute than the Prussian rifle. However, Prussian artillery would be far superior to that of the French and would play a decisive role in many of the battles.

The Prussians were indeed fortunate to have confronted such hesitant and generally poor French military commanders. Prussian victory was no sure thing at the beginning of the conflict, but they did seem to catch all the lucky breaks they needed to secure victory. This is not to say that the Prussians did not make mistakes. Several impetuous officers who launched several of the battles, including the battles at Spicheren and Gravelotte, paid a high price in terms of heavy casualties for their units as a result of their over zealousness to start a battle. Overall, however, they did seem to demonstrate better mastery of military tactics, including better use of reconnaisance and skirmish lines than their French counterparts. They used massed artillery at pivotal points on the battlefield with major effect and their infantry units could break down into smaller more mobile units to exploit any advantages on the battlefield.

The end result was victory for the Prussians and a humiliating defeat for the French. The results of this war would lead to further political unease and instability in Europe that would only further the tensions leading up to World War I nearly fifty years later. This book is definitely worth reading.