Rating: 
Summary: Scholarly and informative, even if partially incorrect
Review: Baghdad has fallen, and no chemical weapons have been found. Why, then, would Kenneth Pollack's "The Threatening Storm" still be relevant?"The Threatening Storm," though seemingly outdated, is still an excellent read. Even if Pollack's evidence for WMD has now been refuted, it at least gives some insight into the developments and modes of thought which guided the intelligence agencies in coming to their conclusions. The book's biggest strength is its history of contemporary Iraq and how American policy towards the Middle East was shaped. Rather than making simplistic statements like "Saddam bad" or "U.S. bad for helping Iraq fight Iran," Pollack delves into the unseen side of American diplomacy, such as Saddam's successful attempts during the 1980's to convince the world that he was a moderate leader who wanted to make peace with Israel. A good analysis of Operation Desert Storm also follows. Other bits of Pollack's history lesson include an objective look at the effect of sanctions on Iraqis and even the way that names are assigned to children in Iraq (explaining why the New York Times is wrong in referring to Saddam as "Mr. Hussein.") Pollack also offers up some advice that the Bush administration should not have ignored. He portrays Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi exile leader who wooed congressional Republicans, as a power-hungry egomaniac who can't be trusted. He also advises against letting inspectors return to Iraq because they won't find anything. The chapters that analyze the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan in the context of an Iraq war are also fascinating for their analysis of military strategy and how effective it really was. I read this book in July 2003 and I was glued to it. It's no longer regarded as an influential book on policy, but it's history is excellent and fascinating, and it serves as a time capsule that preserves the history of the march to war.
Rating:
Summary: Essential Reading for the Public Debate
Review: Kenneth Pollack has provided essential background reading for every member of the public who wants to have an intelligent opinion on the question of what we should do about Iraq. If you're like me, you have a hard time remembering who did what to whom when and why it matters -- and the first section of "The Threatening Storm" is devoted to a brief (100 pages) summary of Iraqi history, from colonial government through Saddam's rise to power, US relations with Iraq, the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War and the tortured history of the UN sanctions. If you read only this much, you will at least understand why the containment/sanctions regime has failed (and has no realistic chance of being revived in any productive form). The second section of the book (another 100 pages) gives an overview of the situation today -- the massive police state run by Saddam, the nature of the threat he poses, and what other Persian Gulf states (and others in the area and in Europe) think of his regime. The description of Saddam's repressive policies and the threat he poses are both chilling (both more realistic and more scary than anything I have heard from our current Administration). The country-by-country overview of current attitudes toward Iraq and what US policy should be was particularly fascinating. Pollack carefully proceeds through each country, explaining their own particular interests in and policies toward Iraq, and how they wish the US to act. This section provides some very interesting perspectives that I have not seen elsewhere in the popular media, particularly on Jordanian, Syrian and Turkish interests. In the final 200 pages, Pollack turns to an analysis of US policy options. He carefully reviews all of the options, assessing their feasibility (the stumbling block of any renewed sanctions regime and of covert operations) and weighing the arguments pro and con. Pollack convinces me that the only real options are a fall back to "pure" deterrence (consisting of lifting the remaining sanctions, allowing Saddam to rebuild his military strength and eventually (soon) acquire nuclear weapons, while relying on the threat of US military intervention should he attempt to act beyond his own borders) or a full-scale invasion to remove Saddam and rebuild Iraq. As between deterrence and invasion, I wish that I could say that I think deterrence will work. I'm not excited about the US going to war -- ever -- and particularly not without an immediate provocation. I started this book looking to pick holes in the argument. But I have to confess that Pollack has convinced me that deterrence poses too many risks. Our Cold War deterrence of the Soviet Union is often cited as an example -- but what we deterred the USSR from doing was attacking the US. We did not deter them from Berlin or Prague or Afghanistan, nor did we keep them from meddling in any number of African, Asian and South American countries. Instead, Soviet nuclear weapons deterred *us* from intervening. Once Saddam acquires nuclear weapons, will we really risk a nuclear attack on the Saudi oil fields or Tel Aviv in order to defend Kuwait? Even if Saddam does not invade Kuwait, he will have the economic and military power to make other Gulf states bend to his will, and could wind up effectively controlling a substantial share of the world's oil supply, with potentially devastating economic effects. By comparison to these risks, the costs of war, high though they may be, seem amply justified. On the other hand, I also think that Pollack underestimates some of the problems associated with invasion. First, he more or less dismisses the need for a legal justification for invasion, saying it would be better if we had one, but it is not essential. I think that many Americans and most of our allies (in the Middle East and elsewhere) will find it hard to support any war that does not have an adequate legal cause. In the absence of overt provocation by Iraq, we at least need a United Nations mandate behind us. How can we call others "rogue states," if we ourselves act without an international consensus behind us? Second, Pollack makes a persuasive case that we can invade only with the support of the Saudis and other Gulf states, who will support us only if the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is at least quiet. That hardly seems likely in the near future. If invasion also turns out not to be feasible, we may be left with no option but deterrence. At least having read "The Threatening Storm," I now know what risks that entails. Pollack is eminently well-qualified to write about Iraq, having served in the CIA and the National Security Council during the first Bush and the Clinton administrations. He writes well and provides enough detail to make his arguments compelling without bogging down in military detail. He gives all arguments a fair treatment, acknowledges that the costs of invasion will be high and vigorously advocates a rebuilding of the Iraqi state and economy as an essential element of any invasion policy. Nation-building is not Pollack's area of specialty, which shows in his chapter on reconstruction and probably makes him overly optimistic about what reconstruction will cost, its prospects for building a prosperous and stable Iraq, and its potential to rehabilitate the US in the eyes of the popular Arab world. Nevertheless, his point -- that it would be foolish for us to incur the cost of toppling one destabilizing regime only to allow chaos or another unstable regime to take its place -- is well taken, and undoubtedly other resources can fill in the nation-building picture. Highly recommended to all who wish to have an informed opinion in the debate on Iraq.
Rating: 
Summary: Partly Cloudy
Review: To put this review in context I did not support the war in Iraq nor am I very fond of the current administration. Leading up to the war last year, it seamed that whenever I got into a discussion with a supporter to the war, this book was brought up as the end all - be all in reasons for the invasion. At the time I had not read the book because I was busy finding and reading books that supported the anti war view I held. Now that the war has taken place I thought it would be interesting to read the book. I was expected a neo-conservative extreme right wing rant about how Saddam was all things evil and the world was a hair breath away from being decimated by this despot of the desert. I actually thought it would be fun to sit down with the book and pick it apart page by page because, I assumed, it would be full of now proven lies, mistruths or just plain mistakes. What I found is that this was not the case. First off the book is actually written in a very well thought out and non-excited manner, there was no over the top crises wording to get the true believers fired up. The author takes the reader through a brief history of Iraq with a good amount of detail on the Gulf War and the 1990's. He spends a good amount of time detailing out what he views as the threats posed by Iraq and how the US can resolve them. He takes a good look at the pre war environment within Iraq and the sanction process. I have read a number of books on these topics and I found that, for the most part, this author stayed close to the facts. Sure, he had an end goal in mind, that the best course of action was a war with Iraq to get rid of Saddam and his conclusions worked the reader to that end, but his reasoning played on the real situation, not over the top fear mongering. He also did a very good job in guessing / assuming what the battle plan would be and the reaction of most of the Arab states. He even detailed out some items that the Bush Administration did not take into account, that it was more important to find and kill off the Al Qaeda network before an Iraq war, that the Iraqi military was in very poor shape and would have a difficult time in using chemical or biological weapons, if they had them, and that one of the most important parts of the process would be to have a solid plan for after the war. The only thing I found to be a problem was the premise of the book and argument he presents is based on Iraqi having or being able to produce WMD. They did not have them and we are learning that the Iraqi government were really not able to produce much of anything let alone sophisticated weapon systems. This massive error has lead the author to publicly apologize and made his book thought of as a joke. I would agree with the characterization that the WMD fears were misplaced, but I do think the book has some value, if nothing more then to help the pro war folks have a literary shoulder to cry on.
Rating:
Summary: A Must Read for the ill-informed
Review: I've taken a look at a good number of the 1-2 star reviews and what they had to say, and it's fairly obvious they have little idea what they are talking about. Their arguments are incredibly unsophisticated and far too emotional to be taken seriously. As a person who is actually in the security studies field and taken the time to read some of the scholarship out there, I'd have to say that Pollack presents a very well-crafted, pesuasive argument and should serve as the point of departure for any discussion on the Iraq campaign. Whether or not you agreed with the war, you had to at least respect the way in which Pollack presented his views--through a substantive cost-benefit analysis of the policy alternatives the U.S. faced at the time. And with all due respect to the 1-2 star opinions, Pollack's book is well-respected by many scholars on both sides of the issue and by a significant portion of the informed foreign policy community. If I were deciding whether or not to read the book, I'd shy away from the questionable and not-so-sophisticated opinions of many 1-2 star reviewers.
Rating:
Summary: A landmark work
Review: Kenneth Pollack's The Threatening Storm is quite simply the nonfiction book of the year. As Stanley Kurtz has written, no one commenting on potential war with Iraq should be taken very seriously if he or she has not engaged Pollack's arguments. Reading this book was a very edifying and gratifying experience. Pollack, a former Clinton administration national security official and Middle East expert, brings years of close consideration of his subject to the table. As Pollack says, he has arrived at the conclusion that an invasion of Iraq is necessary only after exhausting all other potential options; hence an invasion is the "least bad option." The linchpin of Pollack's argument is that Saddam Hussein simply does not behave as deterrence theory says he should; therefore the argument that the threat of massive retaliation would prevent him from using nukes, should he acquire them, or other WMD simply doesn't wash. Pollack bases this point on Saddam's past behavior, such as (1) his decision to strike Iranian cities in the Iran-Iraq war despite the glaring vulnerability of Iraqi cities to counterstrikes, and (2) his behavior during the entire Gulf conflict, including his bewildering decision to remain in Kuwait and challenge the US in open-field conventional warfare.
Pollack does not argue that Saddam is crazy, but that he operates in a cloistered world of ideology and sycophancy that leads to enoromous miscalculations. At bottom, Pollack believes the risks of inaction outweigh the risks of action; he asks, do we really want to bet our national security on the chance that Saddam Hussein will not seek to acquire and use nuclear weapons? This is not to say that Pollack believes an invasion would be a "cakewalk." His appraisal of the Iraqi opposition is not high, and he strongly discourages using the "Afghan approach," pointing to the Kosovo war as an example of how this strategy can go wrong. Pollack is very mindful of all the potential disasters that could occur. He is also very critical of the Bush administration's approach to the situation. The ultimate effect of Pollack's book is to leave the reader sober and resigned. Pollack is excellent in impressing the gravity of the matter on his audience, without ever seeming like a "chickenhawk" (as hollow as that term and the concept behind it may be). Pollack is also excellent in dissecting and refuting the charges of "genocide" leveled at the sanctions regime by the far left, and he also points out the scurrilous behavior of France and Russia during the past decade--a point to consider for all those who act as if "multilaterialism" (i.e., Security Council approval) is some sort of moral, rather than strategic, imperative. Strongly recommended. The density of the book make it clear that this is not just another post-September 11 "instabook"; Pollack has obviously been thinking and analyzing this problem for some time. If you read one book about Iraq in the next few months, make it this one. If in invasion ultimately proves successful, Pollack's book will be seen as a landmark in foreign policy writing.
Rating:
Summary: Scholarly and informative, even if partially incorrect
Review: Baghdad has fallen, and no chemical weapons have been found. Why, then, would Kenneth Pollack's "The Threatening Storm" still be relevant? "The Threatening Storm," though seemingly outdated, is still an excellent read. Even if Pollack's evidence for WMD has now been refuted, it at least gives some insight into the developments and modes of thought which guided the intelligence agencies in coming to their conclusions. The book's biggest strength is its history of contemporary Iraq and how American policy towards the Middle East was shaped. Rather than making simplistic statements like "Saddam bad" or "U.S. bad for helping Iraq fight Iran," Pollack delves into the unseen side of American diplomacy, such as Saddam's successful attempts during the 1980's to convince the world that he was a moderate leader who wanted to make peace with Israel. A good analysis of Operation Desert Storm also follows. Other bits of Pollack's history lesson include an objective look at the effect of sanctions on Iraqis and even the way that names are assigned to children in Iraq (explaining why the New York Times is wrong in referring to Saddam as "Mr. Hussein.") Pollack also offers up some advice that the Bush administration should not have ignored. He portrays Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi exile leader who wooed congressional Republicans, as a power-hungry egomaniac who can't be trusted. He also advises against letting inspectors return to Iraq because they won't find anything. The chapters that analyze the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan in the context of an Iraq war are also fascinating for their analysis of military strategy and how effective it really was. I read this book in July 2003 and I was glued to it. It's no longer regarded as an influential book on policy, but it's history is excellent and fascinating, and it serves as a time capsule that preserves the history of the march to war.
Rating: 
Summary: Pollack wrong despite "expertise"
Review: Pollack has recently (early 2004) apologized for his error in judgment.
Review of March 2003 still stands: "Expertise" is not the same as "wisdom". March 12, 2003
Expertise does not always produce wisdom, whether or not there is a definite agenda. Pollack has expertise and an agenda -- without the wisdom and honesty required to make the case compelling.
For example, can we trust casualty discussions when he uses knowingly low and outdated figures for Iraqi civilian deaths "by sanctions" (the US admitted to about 500,000 children under age 5 already by 1996) and neglects detailing the US active role in withholding many medical necessities after bombing 7 of 8 major damns and water purification plants? He plays down casualties of the first war - both theirs and 'ours' with nearly a third of our veterans on disability as well as nearly 11,000 of our troops dead from toxics and depleted uranium. Nor is he entirely forthcoming about the different war on their homeland and in cities that might well claim many more American lives. His focus does not, of course, require discussion of terrorism in the US in response to invasion. There is no wisdom without honest perspective! The case for democracy in Iraq is patently absurd! The US has never done it, no one knows how to impose democracy, Iraq is not a 'unitary' state like McArthur's Japan with the Emperor in place, military results in Afghanistan are certainly no political victory in this regard. Nor is it at all clear that the US would want democracy when controllable friendly autocrats and dictators have always been prefered. Except perhaps on invaders the chemical and biological weapons are of little use without terrorist cells that would have been used before now if Saddam were not primarily interested in his own survival - our defenses were lower before 9/11 and there was plenty of motive after the first war. Ignore that the Anthrax came from the US - both when used here and a strain held by Saddam. Nuclear weapons are no threat to the US with missiles that barely travel over 100 miles (except for those who include Israel as the 51st state?). In a short review one can not thoroughly counter each argument of a long book. The greatest strength of the book is that it does - however onesidedly - draw out details of the case. This is the strength and also the weakness of Pollack's book. It is not only about oil, but strategy and hegemony. Opponents who point out Cheney will get richer rebuilding Iraq fields as he and his company did in Kuwait, don't look ahead far enough. Oil is a serious issue both because of huge needs growing and the unrealiability of Saudi supply in the future. The US needs to find solutions to the three biggest problems of policy: nuclear proliferation; terrorism; secure oil and water supplies -- none can be done unilaterally or even by brazen military means alone. Pollack's case, and the administration's, largely ignore the real issues and rush to military solutions that make problems ultimately worse from immense disorder and blowback. They nuture conditions and hatred for more terrorists too. This unilateralism is revolutionary change in foreign policy when multilateralism is more needed than ever however frustrating this may be to the world hyperpower. Pollack does not see that far and 'buys' a military solution to what is not primarily a military problem. I don't think he is able to 'sell' it.
Rating: 
Summary: What Threatening Storm ?
Review: What a wonderful view into the pathetic rationalizations that helped trigger the deaths of thousands of innocent women and children. We can now give pause and take a deep introspective look into the mind set of America's 'true believers' knowing in retrospect that as a species mankind can be easily manipulated in mass to accomplish the insane biddings of a small group of impotent goons as it always has been. Whatever Mr. Pollack's true motivations were in writing this book he still bears the responsibility (along with his publisher) for empowering an obviously criminal administration in it's drive to war. It is pitiful to read his post invasion comments in the Atlantic Journal and painfull to think that approximately one American per day is still being killed in that "threatening" country! I hope Mr. Pollack reflects daily on the mass murder his propoganda has wrought.
Rating:
Summary: let it go, people
Review: The last time a book with such short-sighted logic influenced so many people, it was written in german. God help all the fear riddled souls that are still holding on to the myths contained in this book. At least Pollack himself has moved on, after all he could afford top notch psychoanalysis with all our money.
Rating:
Summary: he should never be allowed to be an "expert" again
Review: Mr. Pollack is actually a bit more sympthathetic than the typical pundit who gets it all wrong time after time and yet is never taken to task for this, or suffers any adverse consequences. At least Pollack admits he's wrong, but this shouldn't give him a pass, if he had the courage of his convictions, he should quite this discipline and go into something else where he can offer his opinion but have it not matter at all, taxi driving, selling newspapers on the corner maybe. Remember this, his book and his thoughts were front in center before the invasion and occupation of Iraq and helped to sell this incredibly immoral occupation with its attendant destruction. Remember this too, when he was asked about Scott Ritter's analysis which very accurately described how Iraq had been disarmed, Pollack dismissed Ritter's analysis. Ritter should be given Pollack's "job" Pollack should shine his shoes.
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