Rating: 
Summary: debunked
Review: I wonder how all these bobbing heads feel now that Pollack's vision has been debunked. There are no weapons of mass destruction. Saddam was never a threat to the United States. No nuclear sales or development took place. If any of this were true, the Bush administration would be crawling over themselves to justify themselves to a doubting public. This book should stay in print just to prove how swindled a "democratic" society can be by their leaders, who clearly have their own personal, financial agenda at stake.
Rating:
Summary: No forgiveness for you, Pollack
Review: The passage of time has been devastating for this book, and the analysis of its author. While it could be argued that the removal of Saddam was certainly a plus for the people of Iraq, it was inconsequential on any geopolitical level. As was clear to anyone who properly studied the issue before the war, Iraq circa 2003 was no longer a threat to its neighbors, and now after the war this fact becomes doubly obvious. Those who had experience in Iraq, and specific knowlege of Iraq's weapons capabilities (Scott Ritter, the IAEA, Hans Blix, David Albright) were pretty uniform in their assessment that Iraq of 2003 was simply not the threat Pollack claimed.
Now that we can easily see firsthand the shattered infrastructure of Iraq, its depleted military, its decimated defenses and economy, it is clear that containment had worked--only too well, in many cases. The absurdity of Bush's--and Pollack's--claims have been laid bare.
The fact that Mr. Pollack essentially assisted Bush in making a case for an unwarranted, baseless pre-emptive attack and occupation on a defenseless, non-threatening nation is inexcusable. This level of appeasment is tantamount to a modern-day Chamberlain. Pollack is not, and should not, be forgiven. All those who supported this war, freely sacrificing our troops to this unworthy cause, bear a horrible scarlet letter. The blood of our troops is absolutely on Pollack's hands, as it is on any who supported this war.
Any evaluation on the pros and cons of the war must conclude that this has been a net loss for America, and the world. While undoubtedly an improvement for Iraqi citizens, it has made the world at large more dangerous, and America in particular more open to pre-emptive attack. The rationale of pre-emption is now a reality, waiting to strike America, or other nations, at an opportune moment. The overall geopolitical consequences of the Iraq War are devastating for America, and we now face a much larger conflict with the Muslim world than we ever did before. Sixty-year alliances are now shattered, and America is distrusted--for what? A free Iraqi soccor team?
I agree with a previous reviewer--this book should remain in print solely as a warning to future generations. When otherwise responsible, progressive intellectuals get into bed with thuggish warmongers, the results are disastrous. I now know what it was like in Germany during the 30's.
Rating: 
Summary: The benefit of hindsight
Review: I read this book when it first came out. I thought it was very well researched, well written and had some very useful insights into reasons for going to war with Iraq.
I've re-read parts of the book recently with the benefit of more than a year in hindsight. Pollack's claims of WMDs - similar to the claims by both US and foreign intelligence agencies - proved to be totally wrong. Some of Pollack's other reasons for going after Saddam (that he was a very bad man and did very bad things) could just as easily be applied to dozens of other countries all around the world. (One could take many of those arguments, apply them to North Korea, and ask why when we have totally verifiable proof that a rogue nation with a history of aggression towards its neighbors and the US is in possession of WMDs, our response is to do nothing more than talk.)
Yet although one premise of Pollack's book turned out to be totally wrong, the book still has useful background on recent Iraqi history, Saddam's rise to power, and the US approach to that part of the world. It also features some good information on the various factions and elements that make up Iraqi society. But it is difficult to read the last chapters and not chuckle sadly - Pollack makes some good recomendations on how to rebuild Iraq after a war. The problem is that his recomendations did not take into consideration the political realities of Washington or of the possibility that Iraqis might not be so amenable to dealing with an occupying force of coalition troops.
If Pollack's book is a good reflection of what Washington policymakers believed in the run-up to war with Iraq, then it shows how badly off the mark everyone was.
Rating:
Summary: debunked
Review: Concise, scholarly, and dispassionate, Pollack presents the definitive justifications for war in Iraq. It is healthy for all sides to understand rationally why America has embarked upon this task, and Pollack masterfully explains why it is necessary. So good, I finished the entire tome in one night. A brilliant work!
Rating: 
Summary: Scholarly and informative, even if partially incorrect
Review: Baghdad has fallen, and no chemical weapons have been found. Why, then, would Kenneth Pollack's "The Threatening Storm" still be relevant?"The Threatening Storm," though seemingly outdated, is still an excellent read. Even if Pollack's evidence for WMD has now been refuted, it at least gives some insight into the developments and modes of thought which guided the intelligence agencies in coming to their conclusions. The book's biggest strength is its history of contemporary Iraq and how American policy towards the Middle East was shaped. Rather than making simplistic statements like "Saddam bad" or "U.S. bad for helping Iraq fight Iran," Pollack delves into the unseen side of American diplomacy, such as Saddam's successful attempts during the 1980's to convince the world that he was a moderate leader who wanted to make peace with Israel. A good analysis of Operation Desert Storm also follows. Other bits of Pollack's history lesson include an objective look at the effect of sanctions on Iraqis and even the way that names are assigned to children in Iraq (explaining why the New York Times is wrong in referring to Saddam as "Mr. Hussein.") Pollack also offers up some advice that the Bush administration should not have ignored. He portrays Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi exile leader who wooed congressional Republicans, as a power-hungry egomaniac who can't be trusted. He also advises against letting inspectors return to Iraq because they won't find anything. The chapters that analyze the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan in the context of an Iraq war are also fascinating for their analysis of military strategy and how effective it really was. I read this book in July 2003 and I was glued to it. It's no longer regarded as an influential book on policy, but it's history is excellent and fascinating, and it serves as a time capsule that preserves the history of the march to war.
Rating:
Summary: Partly Cloudy
Review: To put this review in context I did not support the war in Iraq nor am I very fond of the current administration. Leading up to the war last year, it seamed that whenever I got into a discussion with a supporter to the war, this book was brought up as the end all - be all in reasons for the invasion. At the time I had not read the book because I was busy finding and reading books that supported the anti war view I held. Now that the war has taken place I thought it would be interesting to read the book. I was expected a neo-conservative extreme right wing rant about how Saddam was all things evil and the world was a hair breath away from being decimated by this despot of the desert. I actually thought it would be fun to sit down with the book and pick it apart page by page because, I assumed, it would be full of now proven lies, mistruths or just plain mistakes. What I found is that this was not the case. First off the book is actually written in a very well thought out and non-excited manner, there was no over the top crises wording to get the true believers fired up. The author takes the reader through a brief history of Iraq with a good amount of detail on the Gulf War and the 1990's. He spends a good amount of time detailing out what he views as the threats posed by Iraq and how the US can resolve them. He takes a good look at the pre war environment within Iraq and the sanction process. I have read a number of books on these topics and I found that, for the most part, this author stayed close to the facts. Sure, he had an end goal in mind, that the best course of action was a war with Iraq to get rid of Saddam and his conclusions worked the reader to that end, but his reasoning played on the real situation, not over the top fear mongering. He also did a very good job in guessing / assuming what the battle plan would be and the reaction of most of the Arab states. He even detailed out some items that the Bush Administration did not take into account, that it was more important to find and kill off the Al Qaeda network before an Iraq war, that the Iraqi military was in very poor shape and would have a difficult time in using chemical or biological weapons, if they had them, and that one of the most important parts of the process would be to have a solid plan for after the war. The only thing I found to be a problem was the premise of the book and argument he presents is based on Iraqi having or being able to produce WMD. They did not have them and we are learning that the Iraqi government were really not able to produce much of anything let alone sophisticated weapon systems. This massive error has lead the author to publicly apologize and made his book thought of as a joke. I would agree with the characterization that the WMD fears were misplaced, but I do think the book has some value, if nothing more then to help the pro war folks have a literary shoulder to cry on.
Rating: 
Summary: Pollack wrong despite "expertise"
Review: Pollack has recently (early 2004) apologized for his error in judgment.
Review of March 2003 still stands: "Expertise" is not the same as "wisdom". March 12, 2003
Expertise does not always produce wisdom, whether or not there is a definite agenda. Pollack has expertise and an agenda -- without the wisdom and honesty required to make the case compelling.
For example, can we trust casualty discussions when he uses knowingly low and outdated figures for Iraqi civilian deaths "by sanctions" (the US admitted to about 500,000 children under age 5 already by 1996) and neglects detailing the US active role in withholding many medical necessities after bombing 7 of 8 major damns and water purification plants? He plays down casualties of the first war - both theirs and 'ours' with nearly a third of our veterans on disability as well as nearly 11,000 of our troops dead from toxics and depleted uranium. Nor is he entirely forthcoming about the different war on their homeland and in cities that might well claim many more American lives. His focus does not, of course, require discussion of terrorism in the US in response to invasion. There is no wisdom without honest perspective! The case for democracy in Iraq is patently absurd! The US has never done it, no one knows how to impose democracy, Iraq is not a 'unitary' state like McArthur's Japan with the Emperor in place, military results in Afghanistan are certainly no political victory in this regard. Nor is it at all clear that the US would want democracy when controllable friendly autocrats and dictators have always been prefered. Except perhaps on invaders the chemical and biological weapons are of little use without terrorist cells that would have been used before now if Saddam were not primarily interested in his own survival - our defenses were lower before 9/11 and there was plenty of motive after the first war. Ignore that the Anthrax came from the US - both when used here and a strain held by Saddam. Nuclear weapons are no threat to the US with missiles that barely travel over 100 miles (except for those who include Israel as the 51st state?). In a short review one can not thoroughly counter each argument of a long book. The greatest strength of the book is that it does - however onesidedly - draw out details of the case. This is the strength and also the weakness of Pollack's book. It is not only about oil, but strategy and hegemony. Opponents who point out Cheney will get richer rebuilding Iraq fields as he and his company did in Kuwait, don't look ahead far enough. Oil is a serious issue both because of huge needs growing and the unrealiability of Saudi supply in the future. The US needs to find solutions to the three biggest problems of policy: nuclear proliferation; terrorism; secure oil and water supplies -- none can be done unilaterally or even by brazen military means alone. Pollack's case, and the administration's, largely ignore the real issues and rush to military solutions that make problems ultimately worse from immense disorder and blowback. They nuture conditions and hatred for more terrorists too. This unilateralism is revolutionary change in foreign policy when multilateralism is more needed than ever however frustrating this may be to the world hyperpower. Pollack does not see that far and 'buys' a military solution to what is not primarily a military problem. I don't think he is able to 'sell' it.
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