Rating: 
Summary: A must-read for all deeply interested in WWII Eastern Front
Review: "The Battle of Kursk" is a must-read for anyone seriously interested in "operational" (i.e. batallion units and above) level warfare in the context of the pivotal 1943 World War II Eastern Front Battle of Kursk. If Stalingrad was the end of the beginning, Kursk was the beginning of the end for the Wehrmacht in Russia. What makes this book unique is the expert authors' access to and translations of crucial Soviet recently de-classified battle accounts. These provide an essential correlary (and, in some cases, corrective) to previously published German accounts of the battle. The mythical July 12 tank battle at Prokhorovka is critically examined and placed in a proper context. This book also does an excellent job of placing the entire Kursk battle in its larger context, from Manstein's early 1943 "Miracle" counteroffensive on the Don, to the subsequent Soviet summer offensive that resulted in the capture of Kharkov. The maps and index are excellent, and the many appendices contain a treasure trove of statistical information. The few minor errors re German forces (e.g. calling Rudolf von Ribbentrop a Tiger Company commander, when his 6th Company of the Leibstandarte division's Panzer Regiment actually consisted of less powerful Mark IVs) are trivial. No other book on the battle of Kursk presents so thorough and convincing an explanation of how and why Operation Zitadelle failed, especially pages 138-147 on the "fateful decisions" made on July 9. The technical information and tank photos provided by Steven Zaloga are the icing on the cake. At last, the battle of Kursk laid bare, with supreme diligence.
Rating:
Summary: A must-read for all deeply interested in WWII Eastern Front
Review: "The Battle of Kursk" is a must-read for anyone seriously interested in "operational" (i.e. batallion units and above) level warfare in the context of the pivotal 1943 World War II Eastern Front Battle of Kursk. If Stalingrad was the end of the beginning, Kursk was the beginning of the end for the Wehrmacht in Russia. What makes this book unique is the expert authors' access to and translations of crucial Soviet recently de-classified battle accounts. These provide an essential correlary (and, in some cases, corrective) to previously published German accounts of the battle. The mythical July 12 tank battle at Prokhorovka is critically examined and placed in a proper context. This book also does an excellent job of placing the entire Kursk battle in its larger context, from Manstein's early 1943 "Miracle" counteroffensive on the Don, to the subsequent Soviet summer offensive that resulted in the capture of Kharkov. The maps and index are excellent, and the many appendices contain a treasure trove of statistical information. The few minor errors re German forces (e.g. calling Rudolf von Ribbentrop a Tiger Company commander, when his 6th Company of the Leibstandarte division's Panzer Regiment actually consisted of less powerful Mark IVs) are trivial. No other book on the battle of Kursk presents so thorough and convincing an explanation of how and why Operation Zitadelle failed, especially pages 138-147 on the "fateful decisions" made on July 9. The technical information and tank photos provided by Steven Zaloga are the icing on the cake. At last, the battle of Kursk laid bare, with supreme diligence.
Rating:
Summary: A must-read for all deeply interested in WWII Eastern Front
Review: "The Battle of Kursk" is a must-read for anyone seriously interested in "operational" (i.e. batallion units and above) level warfare in the context of the pivotal 1943 World War II Eastern Front Battle of Kursk. If Stalingrad was the end of the beginning, Kursk was the beginning of the end for the Wehrmacht in Russia. What makes this book unique is the expert authors' access to and translations of crucial Soviet recently de-classified battle accounts. These provide an essential correlary (and, in some cases, corrective) to previously published German accounts of the battle. The mythical July 12 tank battle at Prokhorovka is critically examined and placed in a proper context. This book also does an excellent job of placing the entire Kursk battle in its larger context, from Manstein's early 1943 "Miracle" counteroffensive on the Don, to the subsequent Soviet summer offensive that resulted in the capture of Kharkov. The maps and index are excellent, and the many appendices contain a treasure trove of statistical information. The few minor errors re German forces (e.g. calling Rudolf von Ribbentrop a Tiger Company commander, when his 6th Company of the Leibstandarte division's Panzer Regiment actually consisted of less powerful Mark IVs) are trivial. No other book on the battle of Kursk presents so thorough and convincing an explanation of how and why Operation Zitadelle failed, especially pages 138-147 on the "fateful decisions" made on July 9. The technical information and tank photos provided by Steven Zaloga are the icing on the cake. At last, the battle of Kursk laid bare, with supreme diligence.
Rating: 
Summary: Almost definitive
Review: David Glantz writing the definitive assessment of the Battle for Kursk? Sounded like a dream come true. After all, colonel Glantz is the leading authority (along with the now much less active John Erickson) on the Eastern Front topic. After all, he wrote such amazing in-depth analysis on several EF campaign (from a much needed Soviet perspective) like "From Don To Donets" or "When Titans Clashed" - this one probably the best one-volume general history of the Russia's war. After all, Glantz did a wonderful job on demolishing (hard numbers at hand) a lot of Cold War fabricated myths on how good (and unlucky) were Nazi Generals, and how dumb (and lucky and faceless) where the Soviets. So, when "The Battle of Kursk" landed in my hands, I felt a comprehensible shiver of anticipation. The first thing I must say consider is that - probably following many complaints for the very dry style (someone called it a "syntactical slog") of his previous work - col. Glantz finally decided to team with someone providing him with a much needed editing work. Not to say that Mr. House's collaboration solved all the problems: we're treated here and there with repetitions and convoluted passages, and, yes, the style is still a bit on the dry side. For instance, nearly every quote from a primary source describing the actual firefight is preceded by the same "A quote for a (German/Soviet) account vividly depict the intensity of the battle", or a variation of the same. And the maps - ok, a bit more time spent on polishing and editing them would have helped immensely. But these are really minor issues. As far as the content goes, "The Battle Of Kursk" is (nearly) the definitive thing. Glantz manages to put order in the former chaos, and gives us a perspective that, if not new as the dust jacket's notes would make us believe, is possibily the current state-of-art on the subject. Ten years ago, the battle for the Kursk salient (fought between July 5th and 16th 1943) was, thank to the then mandatory uncritical reading of German literature on the subject and a complete disregard for Soviet sources, alternatively known as a footnote at the Stalingrad campaign, as the last significant German offensive effort in the East, as the largest tank battle ever fought, as another evidence of Hitler's strategical ineptitude, the demonstration that if Germany's military brains had free hands they could have won., an Herculean effort almost doomed from the beginning by Soviet espionage, bad timing and many other things. So, Kursk became another lost opportunity for the ubermenshen to revert the Stalingrad disaster and win the war. Also, the whole battle ended up focused on the Prokorovkha maelstrom, giving to that single episode a bigger importance of what was in reality. Not really a battle, but rather a confused collation of events that historians seemed uneasy to define as the turning point of WWII or just another "big" battle.. "The Battle Of Kursk" convincingly demonstrates that Kursk was a Soviet victory AND a German defeat - because Soviet strategy was more sound (even if their execution of the same was often flawed) and German strategy was wrong - based on a very rigid framework of incorrect assumptions, and leading to some big operational mistakes. It shows also that, if the southern portion of the German assault pushed deep in the Soviet defensive belt, its management was faulty at least, especially after the crucial 10th July decision to shift the axis of the attack from North (towards Oboyan) to NE (towards Prokorovkha), a huge mistake that was NOT a pre-planned move (as German memoirs made us believe in the past), but the result of an incorrect assessment of Soviet forces position and conditions. Also, it somehow manages to de-emphasizes the importance of Prokorovkha itself: if the 12th July battle was indecisive (Soviet Guards 5th Tank Army failed its mission to destroy the II SS Pzkrp, but made any further German dream of "operational freedom" unrealistic), continuous combat on the 13th, 14th and 15th show us that Manstein was 1) overestimating the real effect the 12th July battle had on the Soviets and 2) continuing operations in spite of Hitler (correct) belief that Citadel had failed. So - here goes the big deal - Hitler DIDN'T called off Citadel prematurely against Manstein's will (another much discussed myth), but the 16th July ends of the southern offensive was inevitable, facing mounting losses, Soviet pressure on the flanks and Soviet operations in the north. Just a couple of days more, and 4th Pz Army would have been crushed beyond recovery. The bottom line is that German generals lost Kursk most in their own - and not because of Hitler's meddling. It must be said that, beyond this, Glantz simply confirm what was known in the past by anyone serious in the subject, and there's no shocking revelation based on some untapped primary source. Even the "numbers" issue it's a bit of an anticlimax: Glantz chooses a conservative approach taking for granted archival numbers for both sides. But, if we're now confident about Soviet initial numbers and losses, the same cannot be said for the Germany's, especially as far as the SS corps is concerned. In my humble opinion, the numbers here should be drastically increased, but, as they said, who am I to contradict colonel Glantz? Also, a bit more courage underlining German troubles at the command level would have been welcome..So - how's "The Battle Of Kursk"? An absolute must for any WWII enthusiast, an enjoyable work of scholarship even if somehow flawed style-wise, and a much needed ray of light in a still confused topics. Buy it!
Rating:
Summary: Authoritative & Compelling Overview of The Battle At Kursk!
Review: It is perhaps a considerable understatement to argue that history has not been kind in interpreting the German conduct of the war against the Russians along the Eastern front. Nowhere was their conduct more self-defeating or more disastrous than at Kursk, in one of the most epochal battles in the war. In this book, authors David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, noted authors of other such singular tomes about Operation Barbarossa and the later Russian campaigns into Germany as "When Titans Clashed", concentrate provocatively on the particulars of the epic exchanges at Kursk that changed the calculus of the Second World War, not only for the Russian front of the war, but for the entire Allied war effort in Europe. In this regard, if Stalingrad was the point at which the fortunes of the Wehrmacht were first so fatefully reversed, then Kursk was the point of no return, where the unavoidable destiny of the eventual defeat and horrific destruction of the Nazi regime was all that lay ahead. The Battle of Kursk was one of the most pivotal and epochal struggles in the Allied war against the Germans. It was one of the largest tank engagements in military history, and through its devastating destruction in terms of the number of functional and operating armored vehicles left for the Wehrmacht to continue their prosecution of the war, it was the turning point in the war, the catastrophic defeat the Nazis could no longer afford to absorb. In this regard, considerable controversy has revolved around the extent to which Hitler himself was to blame, given his fabled micromanagement of the Eastern campaign in general and the battle at Kursk in particular. In this book the authors meet this controversy head on, and while many readers may not agree with the interpretations and conclusions of the authors, they will certainly appreciate the verve, scope, and details contained in their overview of the events at Kursk, and their import for subsequent events all along the Eastern front as well. Too many Americans familiar only with the Cold War aspects of Russian history tend to be ignorant of the critical contribution the Soviets made in winning a war so essential to the survival of democracy. It is an uneasy truth that without the Russian contribution in battling up to 200 divisions of German Wehrmacht troops for over four years, our entry onto the continent in France would not have been possible in 1944. Indeed, risking such a large sea borne assault would have been problematic against a force of the numbers of troops who would have been available had they not been otherwise preoccupied and engaged in an epic effort attempting to stem the terrible onslaught they were receiving at the hands of a resurgent Soviet Army. This isn't to claim the Russians could (or would) have won the war themselves, although there are serious and scholarly arguments forwarding such propositions. Rather, my point is that the Russians single-handedly repeatedly smashed (and cumulatively diminished) the vast and critically important war-fighting capabilities the Wehrmacht continued to thrust against them, and that in doing so they changed the course of the war both along the Eastern front and for the war against the Allies in general. The evidence of just how formidable, ferocious, and inexhaustible opponents they had become in the two short years since the inauguration of Operation Barbarossa is detailed and documented in this terrific book, which shows how the series of hasty, chaotic, and disastrous German attacks at Kursk led into the largest armored confrontation in the war and precipitated the devolution of the Wehrmacht into a fragmented, fractious, and mortally wounded fighting force that soon was compelled to retreat, step by tortuous step, all the painful way back to Berlin, losing millions of soldiers along the way. This is an authoritative, scrupulously documented, and quite entertaining account of one of the most important battles of WWII, and I highly recommend it. Enjoy.
Rating:
Summary: Authoritative & Compelling Overview of The Battle At Kursk!
Review: It is perhaps a considerable understatement to argue that history has not been kind in interpreting the German conduct of the war against the Russians along the Eastern front. Nowhere was their conduct more self-defeating or more disastrous than at Kursk, in one of the most epochal battles in the war. In this book, authors David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, noted authors of other such singular tomes about Operation Barbarossa and the later Russian campaigns into Germany as "When Titans Clashed", concentrate provocatively on the particulars of the epic exchanges at Kursk that changed the calculus of the Second World War, not only for the Russian front of the war, but for the entire Allied war effort in Europe. In this regard, if Stalingrad was the point at which the fortunes of the Wehrmacht were first so fatefully reversed, then Kursk was the point of no return, where the unavoidable destiny of the eventual defeat and horrific destruction of the Nazi regime was all that lay ahead. The Battle of Kursk was one of the most pivotal and epochal struggles in the Allied war against the Germans. It was one of the largest tank engagements in military history, and through its devastating destruction in terms of the number of functional and operating armored vehicles left for the Wehrmacht to continue their prosecution of the war, it was the turning point in the war, the catastrophic defeat the Nazis could no longer afford to absorb. In this regard, considerable controversy has revolved around the extent to which Hitler himself was to blame, given his fabled micromanagement of the Eastern campaign in general and the battle at Kursk in particular. In this book the authors meet this controversy head on, and while many readers may not agree with the interpretations and conclusions of the authors, they will certainly appreciate the verve, scope, and details contained in their overview of the events at Kursk, and their import for subsequent events all along the Eastern front as well. Too many Americans familiar only with the Cold War aspects of Russian history tend to be ignorant of the critical contribution the Soviets made in winning a war so essential to the survival of democracy. It is an uneasy truth that without the Russian contribution in battling up to 200 divisions of German Wehrmacht troops for over four years, our entry onto the continent in France would not have been possible in 1944. Indeed, risking such a large sea borne assault would have been problematic against a force of the numbers of troops who would have been available had they not been otherwise preoccupied and engaged in an epic effort attempting to stem the terrible onslaught they were receiving at the hands of a resurgent Soviet Army. This isn't to claim the Russians could (or would) have won the war themselves, although there are serious and scholarly arguments forwarding such propositions. Rather, my point is that the Russians single-handedly repeatedly smashed (and cumulatively diminished) the vast and critically important war-fighting capabilities the Wehrmacht continued to thrust against them, and that in doing so they changed the course of the war both along the Eastern front and for the war against the Allies in general. The evidence of just how formidable, ferocious, and inexhaustible opponents they had become in the two short years since the inauguration of Operation Barbarossa is detailed and documented in this terrific book, which shows how the series of hasty, chaotic, and disastrous German attacks at Kursk led into the largest armored confrontation in the war and precipitated the devolution of the Wehrmacht into a fragmented, fractious, and mortally wounded fighting force that soon was compelled to retreat, step by tortuous step, all the painful way back to Berlin, losing millions of soldiers along the way. This is an authoritative, scrupulously documented, and quite entertaining account of one of the most important battles of WWII, and I highly recommend it. Enjoy.
Rating:
Summary: A book for anyone serious about the subject
Review: Simply put, Glantz and House deliver the goods in this, their latest collaboration. Slow in places, yes, but that's due to the amount of information they're imparting to you. I can't recommend this book highly enough to people.
Rating:
Summary: The Battle of Kursk
Review: The battle of Kursk by David M. Glantz & Jonathan M. House is the latest installment of a series of books and studies presenting Soviet archival writings of their war with Axis powers 1941-1945. Original after-action reports to the Soviet high command and to Stalin himself are finally available to military historians to compare and to supplement existing information on this massive confrontation, the decisive theater of World War II. The information presented in this book details the Soviet army's actions in this battle to a level not before presented to readers, the overall picture of this battle is little changed from what was known before by writers as Erickson, Ziemke, and Jukes. The day-to-day action of the July 43 battle draws primarily from the Soviet side, details small unit actions and commanders perceptions and decisions affecting the ultimate outcome of this battle. The informational maps and unit's Order of Battle are excellent and help the reader follow the chain of events in a most detailed manner. While detail and image of this battle are masterfully portrayed, the conclusions reached by the author(s)? leave the realm of historical fact and lead the reader into conjecture and 'revisionist' wanderings. The current theory that the German generals changed their insights and recollections of the events of the war after the defeat of Germany, to appear somehow less odious and sympathetic in their actions is something strongly grasped by the author(s). That they (the German generals) planned and walked hand-in-hand with Hitler regarding the operations of the German army is historical nonsense. The author(s) cast doubt on the German generals ability to retreat without routing their own forces, that mobile defensive operations were somehow beyond the grasp of the generals at this time. The author(s) somehow forget that Hitler relieved dozens upon dozens high ranking generals not because they were following 'his' orders, rather disobeying them to save their commands. Hitler would have no need to relieve a general who followed 'his' orders, 'that' general would have been captured or destroyed with his units. This is a very important work in a readers understanding of this landmark battle of the eastern front. The information contained seems to round out the knowledge of this battle between German and Soviet sources. In that it is useful and necessary addition to anyone's works on this very complex and important theater of war. However the dubious conclusions of German strategy and operational abilities should have been left to future endeavors with collaborative historical facts.
Rating:
Summary: The Battle of Kursk
Review: The battle of Kursk by David M. Glantz & Jonathan M. House is the latest installment of a series of books and studies presenting Soviet archival writings of their war with Axis powers 1941-1945. Original after-action reports to the Soviet high command and to Stalin himself are finally available to military historians to compare and to supplement existing information on this massive confrontation, the decisive theater of World War II. The information presented in this book details the Soviet army's actions in this battle to a level not before presented to readers, the overall picture of this battle is little changed from what was known before by writers as Erickson, Ziemke, and Jukes. The day-to-day action of the July 43 battle draws primarily from the Soviet side, details small unit actions and commanders perceptions and decisions affecting the ultimate outcome of this battle. The informational maps and unit's Order of Battle are excellent and help the reader follow the chain of events in a most detailed manner. While detail and image of this battle are masterfully portrayed, the conclusions reached by the author(s)? leave the realm of historical fact and lead the reader into conjecture and 'revisionist' wanderings. The current theory that the German generals changed their insights and recollections of the events of the war after the defeat of Germany, to appear somehow less odious and sympathetic in their actions is something strongly grasped by the author(s). That they (the German generals) planned and walked hand-in-hand with Hitler regarding the operations of the German army is historical nonsense. The author(s) cast doubt on the German generals ability to retreat without routing their own forces, that mobile defensive operations were somehow beyond the grasp of the generals at this time. The author(s) somehow forget that Hitler relieved dozens upon dozens high ranking generals not because they were following 'his' orders, rather disobeying them to save their commands. Hitler would have no need to relieve a general who followed 'his' orders, 'that' general would have been captured or destroyed with his units. This is a very important work in a readers understanding of this landmark battle of the eastern front. The information contained seems to round out the knowledge of this battle between German and Soviet sources. In that it is useful and necessary addition to anyone's works on this very complex and important theater of war. However the dubious conclusions of German strategy and operational abilities should have been left to future endeavors with collaborative historical facts.
Rating:
Summary: A Little Bit of New Wine in Old Bottle
Review: The crux of this volume is new Soviet archival material on STAVKA decision-making but there is actually little new here. At less than 300 pages, this is somewhat short-shrift to a major battle. There is no discussion of air operations or partisans. Very limited profile of commanders and their forces, but excellent order of battle information. The Germans placed their faith in the 407 heavy tanks available (102 Tigers, 200 Panther and 105 Ferdinands) but they split them up too much; they should have massed their best weaponry in one sector. It is no surprise that ArmeeGruppe South made much better progress; they had much more artillery support (Center relied mostly on assault guns in direct fire mode), and much better engineer support (South had about eight corps-level engineer battalions but Center had no corps-level engineers). Glantz asks and answers several key questions: did Hitler really push Zitadelle (no, Zeitzler, Kluge and others pushed it beforehand but then blamed Hitler later), could the attack have succeeded in May (unlikely, given the weather and the disparity in forces) and what if the Germans had eschewed the attack and opted for a mobile defense (this would have bought them time, but there was no consensus for this strategy so it was highly unlikely to be adopted. It would also have required Hitler to relinquish command in the east to a CinC). Maps ok but uses cumbersome abbreviations. No terrain analysis.
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