Rating: 
Summary: A Little Bit of New Wine in Old Bottle
Review: The crux of this volume is new Soviet archival material on STAVKA decision-making but there is actually little new here. At less than 300 pages, this is somewhat short-shrift to a major battle. There is no discussion of air operations or partisans. Very limited profile of commanders and their forces, but excellent order of battle information. The Germans placed their faith in the 407 heavy tanks available (102 Tigers, 200 Panther and 105 Ferdinands) but they split them up too much; they should have massed their best weaponry in one sector. It is no surprise that ArmeeGruppe South made much better progress; they had much more artillery support (Center relied mostly on assault guns in direct fire mode), and much better engineer support (South had about eight corps-level engineer battalions but Center had no corps-level engineers). Glantz asks and answers several key questions: did Hitler really push Zitadelle (no, Zeitzler, Kluge and others pushed it beforehand but then blamed Hitler later), could the attack have succeeded in May (unlikely, given the weather and the disparity in forces) and what if the Germans had eschewed the attack and opted for a mobile defense (this would have bought them time, but there was no consensus for this strategy so it was highly unlikely to be adopted. It would also have required Hitler to relinquish command in the east to a CinC). Maps ok but uses cumbersome abbreviations. No terrain analysis.
Rating: 
Summary: Too many numbers, no human angle!
Review: The main problem with this book is that it is largely unreadable. This is unfortunate, since the authors are obviously capable researchers who have unearthed and made use of hitherto unavailable sources. Instead of presenting their interesting and valuable findings in an easily digestible format, they have opted to bombard us with never-ending figures, numbers and names which make it incredibly hard to follow the course of events. Compare the turgid prose of this work to such recent classics as Anthony Beevor's 'Stalingrad' or Martin Gilbert's 'First World War' to see how historical facts and data can be woven into a much more readable and flowing narrative. Military history can also benefit greatly from a more human slant, and this is sadly lacking in 'The Battle of Kursk'. I don't need to know the minute-by-minute positional details of every unit, rather, I'd like to hear more about the feelings and experiences of individuals from both sides who took part in this massive struggle. This book may well be a useful tool and resource for specialised historians, but for those of us less fixated on lists and figures it is hard going indeed, like the battle itself!
Rating:
Summary: Well Researched Account of WW2 Pivotal Battle
Review: There is no denying that this account of Kursk by David Glantz and Jonathan House is extremely well researched. The amount of detail is awe inspiring with 165 pages in the appendixes dedicated to OB's, strengths & losses, comparative armour strengths and key German & Soviet documents. The maps, some 32 in all, are very detailed however I must admit that at time they were still hard to read due to the amount of detail. The book itself was well presented and the photos were excellent. The only fault that I could find with the book was that at times it dragged. With the amount of detail being presented you need to catch your breath and close the book. It was not the type of book that had a free flowing narrative that kept you glued to the story, well not for me at least. Beside that however this would rank as the definitive account of this major Eastern Front battle and well worth the effort to read. No decent WW2 library would be complete without this book.
Rating:
Summary: Comprehensive
Review: This book starts off with a brief look at the Eastern front situation and the opposing armies leading up the battle and the reasons it was fought. The authors then lead us into the preparations taken by both sides and how the Germans continually delayed the offensive. The Russians, well aware of the German plans were able to plan and create an intricate network of defensives and they were defenses of depth that finally frustrated and prevented the Germans from gaining any momentum. The Germans were also forced to continuously probe the Russians for potential weak spots. Unfortunately for the Germans there were none. The authors make a point that the German High Command placed too much faith in their new technically advanced tanks (Panthers & Tigers) and were continuously forced to divert forces to protect their flanks that were under constant counter attack. The accounts of the battle are very detailed and at times it is easy to get lost in the description of movements of the vast number of units. Glantz & House make good use of personal accounts, unit's history accounts and even memoirs of the leading participants such as Mainstein. Their conclusions in regards to the battle are hard to dispute after such a detailed and comprehensive research which brings together both Russian and German sources of information. Recommended reading.
Rating: 
Summary: The Best on Kursk
Review: This is the definitive book on the battle of Kursk. It is by far the most complete assessment of the battle that has yet been offered. The authors do an excellent and thorough job of establishing the context of the battle (battlefield events up to the summer of 1943, as well as the situations that both armies were in, and what their leadership was trying to accomplish). Glantz and House offer a very detailed description of the fighting, often identifying regimental or battalion-level units. The description of combat is not particularly vivid or exciting, but if the reader is looking to find out where a particular regiment was and what enemy unit it was fighting on, say, July 12, the book is likely to have the answer. In this sense, the sheer volume of detail and factual material is enough to allow me to judge the book a success; it contains information that could otherwise be gained only by consulting many different sources. That said, the real value of the book is in its assessment of several important analytical questions. Due to Glantz's unprecedented (at least on this topic) access to Soviet archives, the book is the first real assessment of Soviet troops, tactics, and plans. While Dunn's book on Kursk was able to offer some of this, Glantz and House are able to go much further. They are able to show how the Soviets used their knowledge of German plans to set their own plans. Glantz and House are also able to convincingly demonstrate, with Soviet archival sources, that the German delays did not change the result. Had they attacked earlier (May 1943), they still would have lost. Furthermore, they convincingly show that the initial period of defense against the German attack was but one step in an overarching operational plan to launch an offensive in the late summer of 1943. This defense was cleverly laid out, with deep lines to be defended flexibly, and with powerful reserves located in the rear/center to blunt breakthroughs quickly. It was the classic elastic or mobile defense; the Soviets were good at making war by this time and the authors make this clear. This is juxtaposed against Glantz and House's analysis of German leadership. They demonstrate that Citadel was proposed not by Hitler, but by his generals. The battle was fought and lost by the generals, not by Hitler, although he got the blame after the war. These are important assessments, because the implication is that the Soviets by this time were simply better at making war than the Germans. Finally, Glantz and House go much further than Cross in putting the clash at Prokhorovka in perspective. Through their battle descriptions, it becomes obvious that the "clash" was instead a series of very disjointed, independent, small-unit battles. Caidin's story (and the popular myth) of the epic charge of tanks across the plains resulting in the swirling melee of combat vehicles at point-blank range never appears. Through detailed examination of orders of battle, tables of organization and equipment, and unit strength reports, Glantz and House show that the "clash" is probably best thought of as a draw rather than the Soviet victory that is usually described. The Germans nearly destroyed the 18th and 29th tank corps in front of Prokhorovka, in exchange for negligible losses. Yet, to the Germans this signaled the arrival of the large Soviet reserves at a time when their own divisions were bogging down (due primarily to a lack of infantry divisions). It was also at this time (or shortly before) that the Soviets launched their own offensives on the flanks of the German armies involved at Kursk. Thus, the authors show that the inability to affect a true breakthrough, combined with Soviet attacks of their own, forced the Germans to abandon Citadel. This is essentially the argument offered by authors like Cross, but Glantz and House are much more effective. Further, due to the wealth of Soviet information, their book is much more complete. Skip Cross's book and proceed directly to Glantz and House. If you own but one book on Kursk, it should be this one.
Rating:
Summary: The Best on Kursk
Review: This is the definitive book on the battle of Kursk. It is by far the most complete assessment of the battle that has yet been offered. The authors do an excellent and thorough job of establishing the context of the battle (battlefield events up to the summer of 1943, as well as the situations that both armies were in, and what their leadership was trying to accomplish). Glantz and House offer a very detailed description of the fighting, often identifying regimental or battalion-level units. The description of combat is not particularly vivid or exciting, but if the reader is looking to find out where a particular regiment was and what enemy unit it was fighting on, say, July 12, the book is likely to have the answer. In this sense, the sheer volume of detail and factual material is enough to allow me to judge the book a success; it contains information that could otherwise be gained only by consulting many different sources. That said, the real value of the book is in its assessment of several important analytical questions. Due to Glantz's unprecedented (at least on this topic) access to Soviet archives, the book is the first real assessment of Soviet troops, tactics, and plans. While Dunn's book on Kursk was able to offer some of this, Glantz and House are able to go much further. They are able to show how the Soviets used their knowledge of German plans to set their own plans. Glantz and House are also able to convincingly demonstrate, with Soviet archival sources, that the German delays did not change the result. Had they attacked earlier (May 1943), they still would have lost. Furthermore, they convincingly show that the initial period of defense against the German attack was but one step in an overarching operational plan to launch an offensive in the late summer of 1943. This defense was cleverly laid out, with deep lines to be defended flexibly, and with powerful reserves located in the rear/center to blunt breakthroughs quickly. It was the classic elastic or mobile defense; the Soviets were good at making war by this time and the authors make this clear. This is juxtaposed against Glantz and House's analysis of German leadership. They demonstrate that Citadel was proposed not by Hitler, but by his generals. The battle was fought and lost by the generals, not by Hitler, although he got the blame after the war. These are important assessments, because the implication is that the Soviets by this time were simply better at making war than the Germans. Finally, Glantz and House go much further than Cross in putting the clash at Prokhorovka in perspective. Through their battle descriptions, it becomes obvious that the "clash" was instead a series of very disjointed, independent, small-unit battles. Caidin's story (and the popular myth) of the epic charge of tanks across the plains resulting in the swirling melee of combat vehicles at point-blank range never appears. Through detailed examination of orders of battle, tables of organization and equipment, and unit strength reports, Glantz and House show that the "clash" is probably best thought of as a draw rather than the Soviet victory that is usually described. The Germans nearly destroyed the 18th and 29th tank corps in front of Prokhorovka, in exchange for negligible losses. Yet, to the Germans this signaled the arrival of the large Soviet reserves at a time when their own divisions were bogging down (due primarily to a lack of infantry divisions). It was also at this time (or shortly before) that the Soviets launched their own offensives on the flanks of the German armies involved at Kursk. Thus, the authors show that the inability to affect a true breakthrough, combined with Soviet attacks of their own, forced the Germans to abandon Citadel. This is essentially the argument offered by authors like Cross, but Glantz and House are much more effective. Further, due to the wealth of Soviet information, their book is much more complete. Skip Cross's book and proceed directly to Glantz and House. If you own but one book on Kursk, it should be this one.
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