Surprise, Security, and the American Experience :

Rating:
Summary: An important book
Review: A remarkable book, short, concise, and to the point. He reviews the history of our strategies for security going back to the days of John Quincy Adams. He reviews our current strategy given this historical perspective. It is a timely book since we will now have the opportunity to vote for candidates with varying ideas as to how best to insure our security. It's a must read during this election season.

Rating:
Summary: Puts the U.S. Response to 9-11 in Historical Perspective
Review: After 9-11, when the Bush administration began laying out the framework for a new strategy to deal with security threats to the United States, several scholars and commentators judged elements of the nascent strategy to be without precedent in American history. John Lewis Gaddis, a scholar who has written extensively about the history of U.S. national security, argues otherwise. Rather than an unprecedented strategy, Gaddis says the Bush administration has put forward a security framework that reaches back into the nineteenth century for its central ideas.

This short book, which was based on a series of lectures Gaddis presented at the New York Public Library in 2002, builds its case of an evolving U.S. security strategy around three events: the 1814 burning of the White House by the British, the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, and 9-11. Gaddis argues that each of these events forced the U.S. to change its strategy to fit the new circumstances of the time. Bush's recent unilateral policies after 9-11 and FDR's multilateral response to the U.S. entry into WW2 (that was also the basis of the U.S. Cold War strategy) are familiar to most readers, but it is Gaddis's description of John Quincy Adams and his nineteenth century strategy (one that was largely followed by almost all American presidents until 1941), and the comparison of Adams's strategy with Bush's, that is likely to spark the reader's interest.

Gaddis makes the case that Bush's so-called "unprecedented" strategy combining preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony finds its precedents in Adams's policies. Like Bush, Adams felt it necessary to occasionally preempt neighboring states, non-state actors (Indians), and even failed states (Spain's faltering hold on its colonial possessions). Like Bush, Adams felt unilateralism was sometimes necessary to secure America's long-term interests. And finally, like Bush, Adams sought U.S. hegemony; the only difference between the two presidents was one of degree; Bush seeks to maintain U.S. global hegemony while Adams had to make due with the goal of regional hegemony in the Western hemisphere.

Gaddis does not claim that the Bush administration borrowed consciously from Adams, and the scholar concedes there are differences between the nineteenth and twenty-first century security environments for the U.S. He maintains, however, the similarities are striking enough to note. He also argues that there is a common thread to American strategy passing from Adams to FDR to Bush: whenever Americans have felt threatened, their response has been to take the offense, not to play defense; to expand, not to shrink behind walls; to confront and overwhelm, not to flee.

This is an excellent book, concise and strikingly persuasive. It makes the Bush case for a new U.S. strategy better than the administration itself has made it, and yet Gaddis is not a Republican supporter. By giving historical precedents to the controversial tenets of preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony, Gaddis attempts to show that Bush's new security framework is less radical than many now fear.

Rating:
Summary: The foreign policy debate we need
Review: After 9/11 George W. Bush has boldly transformed American foreign policy as John Quincy Adams and Franklin D. Roosevelt did in their eras That is the basis of Yale historian John Lewis Gaddis's book. Each man reacted to an attack on America with a decisively altered foreign policy, which in the first two instances remained in force for decades. In this book, Mr. Gaddis goes into detail about Mr. Adam's foreign policy built on pre-emption subsequent to the British attack on Washington in 1814. Secretary of state Adams acted against failing colonial powers in the Western Hemisphere, unilateralism by eschewing foreign alliances, and hegemony with the Monroe Doctrine. After the start of WW II, Roosevelt and his cold war successors mounted a foreign policy encompassing multilateralism (building large coalitions), legalism (the United Nations), and deterrence of communism.

After the September 11 attacks, Bush responded as similarly as Adams had, with pre-emption and unilateralism when necessary. In Gaddis's thesis, this was a rational response to the threat of terrorism and is seriously explained in the 2002 National Security Strategy, though not always conducted flawlessly. Gaddis believes that most political leaders would find themselves obliged to carry out much the same foreign policy as Bush, despite the recent campaign rhetoric. I think there is something to that. And Bush's policy is not as unilateral as his detractors point out. The National Security Statement is filled with statements about the desirability of acting multilaterally when possible. Gaddis postulates that Muammar Qadhafi decided to give up his nuclear weapons program because he feared Bush was willing to pursue him down a spider hole in the desert. Would he have made the same decision if a more liberal person were about to take the oath of office? "Bush's determination to act against threats is not in doubt". This book is a great read and should be read by all Americans so that we can have an informed debate about the future of our foreign policy direction.

I especially recommend this book for military, political professionals and for philosophers.

Rating:
Summary: Gaddis Gives Us Some Much-Needed Perspective
Review: American foreign policy and international relations are made up of wars, treaties, doctrines, and so forth. A lot of details and sometimes a unifying perspective (e.g., Cold War and containment of USSR/Communism) gives us the sweep of history and content for many other books.

This little book offers something a little different: the meta-policy of America. The even larger scale of American foreign policy. On this scale the grounding in the country's principles together with the continuity of concerns and decisions becomes clear and understandable.

Three attacks surprised Americans - the burning of the capital in 1814, the attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941, and 9/11/2001. Based on concern for security and national principles the foreign policy (on this scale) was set, driven by three leaders.

The first leader was John Quincy Adams. The meta-policy combined notions of preemptive action, unilateral authority, and hegemonic power. The scope for these was this hemisphere. The meta-policy lasted pretty well until Pearl Harbor, though in practice it was not regi;ar;y (or even at all?) applied after World War I.

Second was Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the policy altered the notions somewhat. For WW II and the Cold War era. The scope was world wide and the actors were nation states and alliances of nations.

Third is George Walker Bush. In this era America has reverted somewhat to the Adams era approach. The scope is still world wide however the actors include transnational entities (such as al Queda).

I will leave the review there. The author marshalls events, documents, and the usual historical elements to support this continuity of American meta-policy. While President Bush's doctrine of preemption has far more historical context and perspective than many give him credit for (the neocons hardly invented this), there are also deviations and expansions that the author calls into question.

This book is neither a critique of Bush, nor a full fledged critique of these policies. The author does not attempt to compare President Bush to President Roosevelt for greatness.

The book left me considering a much larger historical perspective for American actions, and a greater sense of continuity and even consistency than the chattering press credits. It might also be good for a few foreign correspondents to read since it seems many outside American are unaware of American foreign policy (there is none, or it is shoot-from-the-hip Cowboyism) and American perspective on security. For all who read this book tomorrow's newspaper articles on the war, Iraq, terrorism, etc. will read just a little bit different.

Rating:
Summary: Gaddis Gives Us Some Much-Needed Perspective
Review: American foreign policy and international relations are made up of wars, treaties, doctrines, and so forth. A lot of details and sometimes a unifying perspective (e.g., Cold War and containment of USSR/Communism) gives us the sweep of history and content for many other books.

This little book offers something a little different: the meta-policy of America. The even larger scale of American foreign policy. On this scale the grounding in the country's principles together with the continuity of concerns and decisions becomes clear and understandable.

Three attacks surprised Americans - the burning of the capital in 1814, the attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941, and 9/11/2001. Based on concern for security and national principles the foreign policy (on this scale) was set, driven by three leaders.

The first leader was John Quincy Adams. The meta-policy combined notions of preemptive action, unilateral authority, and hegemonic power. The scope for these was this hemisphere. The meta-policy lasted pretty well until Pearl Harbor, though in practice it was not regi;ar;y (or even at all?) applied after World War I.

Second was Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the policy altered the notions somewhat. For WW II and the Cold War era. The scope was world wide and the actors were nation states and alliances of nations.

Third is George Walker Bush. In this era America has reverted somewhat to the Adams era approach. The scope is still world wide however the actors include transnational entities (such as al Queda).

I will leave the review there. The author marshalls events, documents, and the usual historical elements to support this continuity of American meta-policy. While President Bush's doctrine of preemption has far more historical context and perspective than many give him credit for (the neocons hardly invented this), there are also deviations and expansions that the author calls into question.

This book is neither a critique of Bush, nor a full fledged critique of these policies. The author does not attempt to compare President Bush to President Roosevelt for greatness.

The book left me considering a much larger historical perspective for American actions, and a greater sense of continuity and even consistency than the chattering press credits. It might also be good for a few foreign correspondents to read since it seems many outside American are unaware of American foreign policy (there is none, or it is shoot-from-the-hip Cowboyism) and American perspective on security. For all who read this book tomorrow's newspaper articles on the war, Iraq, terrorism, etc. will read just a little bit different.

Rating:
Summary: The New Old American Way of War
Review: Excellent, Concise and Illuminating

Professor Gaddis does not have a Military background but don't let that deter you. This book, although short; excellently captures the essence of National Security and American Grand Strategy in light of 911

The book is a series of essays, 5 chapters, for a total of 118 reading pages. The first 80 pages of the book are devoted to building the very compelling case that professor Gaddis articulates. It is rich with primary and secondary resources that support his case.

If you are a Military Studies, Military Science, Military History or Political Science Major and are comfortable with your knowledge of Early American History then you may skip to page 73 and begin reading there. If you are in the Military, I recommend that read the entire book; HOWEVER, I also understand time and operational constraints and make the following exceptions; If you are an O-4 and above or an E-8 and above, and are comfortable with your knowledge of History and Military Science then you may skip to page 80 and begin there

For those that need a brief refresher, and even those that do not, it is important to read the first 73 pages in order to understand the case that Professor Gaddis builds.

The real meat and potatoes of this book begin on page 73. The results of the historical perspective begin on page 80; the most illuminating explanation and comparison of the National Security Strategy of Clinton and Bush begins on page 83 and the heart of the doctrine begins on page 86.

This is a must read book.
Terry Tucker, US Army, SGM, Ret; Adjunct Professor Military Science


Rating:
Summary: A masterpiece of American foreign policy
Review: For all that has been written about the American reaction to September 11, who could have thought that a mere 128 pages could offer a sweeping and refreshing look into America's historic quest for security-and to do so while demonstrating the relevance of that historical exercise for the present.

John Lewis Gaddis, a historian at Yale University, aims at "an admittedly premature effort to treat, as history, an event that remains inescapably part of our present": the September 11 attacks on America and the Bush Administration's response to them. The product is an intellectual and historical tour de force, which dissects the American desire for security by looking at what its government did the last two times it was faced with a similar predicament: after the British burned the White House and Capitol Hill in 1814, and after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941.

The three dominant themes employed (or conceived) by John Quincy Adams were unilateralism, preemption, and hegemony. Roosevelt's reaction to Pearl Harbor, on the other hand, rested on multilateralism and a rejection of preemption; ironically, he still achieved the third: hegemony. The book then proceeds to carefully craft an analysis (and critique) between those two historical precedents and President Bush's reaction after September 11.

It is hard to imagine another book that can look so clearly and refreshingly at the major security issues confronting American foreign policy at the time; and to do so in so few pages. Nor is it imaginable that anyone could have summarized in a single paragraph his or her suggestion about what America foreign policy should be aimed at (no spoilers here: read the book). Yet, this is precisely what one will encounter reading "Surprise, Security, and the American Experience."

Rating:
Summary: Continuous American policy applied to non-state actors
Review: Gaddis attempts to walk us through two previous suprise attacks in American history, the sack of Washington in 1814 and Pearl Harbor. Both of these resulted in revolutions of foreign policy. John Quincy Adams, as Monroe's Secretary of State, articulated a strategy for maintaining American safety and values in the Western Hemisphere. Later, FDR invented a functional multilateral world order that the United States could harness to fight World War II and the Cold War.

He then observes that, contrary to chattering-class opinion, Bush's post-9/11 foreign policy is perfectly well inline with these traditions. He also relates the ideas in the National Security Strategy, which tragically few people read, to these policies, previous expressions of doctrine, and concrete changes in the world context. There is a shocking lack of discussion of this new context.

Now the threat is non-state actors beyond a couple of significant hold-overs like China, North Korea, Iran, etc. Today threats emerge from terrorist organizations (and their allies such as international organized crime, etc.) It is important to realize that multinational corporations and NGOs have also become signifcant non-state actors on the international scene. These are not participants in our multilateral world order, and they cannot be swayed, in the end, by the same tools that we use in an international order. Thus, President Bush has asserted that politics is the root cause of terrorism and threats, and has started down a, possibly too bold, path to change the political culture of the world. While his problems are radically different than Adams and FDR faced, his solutions are completely continuous and completely American. This must be grasped to think about serious policy alternatives in our new context.

Rating:
Summary: a flawed arguement
Review: Gaddis is wrong to compare the foreign policy of George Bush II to American foreign policy in the nineteenth century because America only intervened unilaterally in its region and Bush II's foreign policy invovles unilateral military actions outside of North and South America. Gaddis believes that the period of American unilateralism lasted until Pearl Harbor but leaves out the fact the United States was a member of mutlitateral alliances during the Boxer Rebellion and the First World War. Also in Gaddis's so called multilateral period during the Cold War, the United States acted unilaterally in its invasions of Grenada and the Dominican Republic. Plus the American involvement in Vietman was a unilateral affair with minimal assistance from both Asian and European allies. Bush's involvenment in Iraq seems to have more in common with the Vietnam War than any regional actions by the United States during the nineteenth century.

Rating:
Summary: Study the past to understand the present ...
Review: How does USA react when it is attacked on its own soil?. How does it deal with the knowledge that it is vulnerable, and that others can shatter its security?. Yale's professor John Lewis Gaddis tries to answer these questions and a few more in this small but interesting essay...

The author studies the different ways in which USA has reacted throughout history, when its security has been breached. For example, he mentions the burning of Washington of 1814, and the Pearl Harbour attack of 1941. He points out that different strategies were conceived in those occasions in order to deal with the unexpected. On the one hand, the 1814 attack led to a strategy based on preemption, unilateralism and hegemony. But on the other hand, the attack on Pearl Harbour resulted in a rather diverse security policy, based on multilateralism.

Thanks to the fact that professor Lewis makes us remember our history lessons, we realize that the post 9/11 strategy applied by the Bush Administration has strong roots in the past, beginning in 1814. However, thanks to "Surprise, security and the American Experience", we notice that American leaders also have other options, for example an strategy that gives its due importance to multilateralism, like the one Roosevelt employed after Pearl Harbour.

The author tries to reflect on the September 11 events, and what they meant for America. He shows those events as another instance in which USA's security was shattered, and that motivated a reaction that had noteworthy effects on America's "grand strategy". Lewis wants to understand the implications of what happened, because even though it is remarkably more difficult to be accurate when studying recent events, it is important to do so if those events are essential turning points in history. He says that "We act in the present with a view to shaping the future only on the basis of what we know from the past. So we might as well try to know our recent history as best we can, however imperfect the exercise may be".

On the whole, I think that this is a book that won't make you lose your time. Even though it has only 116 pages and it is quite easy to read, it has a lot of useful information regarding USA's past and present. In my opinion this is almost "obligatory reading material" for those who want to form an opinion regarding USA's current "grand strategy", and to know more about its security policy. After all, is there a better way of grasping the implications of what is happening in the present than studying the past?.

Belen Alcat