Surprise, Security, and the American Experience :

Rating:
Summary: Study the past to understand the present ...
Review: How does USA react when it is attacked on its own soil?. How does it deal with the knowledge that it is vulnerable, and that others can shatter its security?. Yale?s professor John Lewis Gaddis tries to answer these questions and a few more in this small but interesting essay...

The author studies the different ways in which USA has reacted throughout history, when its security has been breached. For example, he mentions the burning of Washington of 1814, and the Pearl Harbour attack of 1941. He points out that different strategies were conceived in those occasions in order to deal with the unexpected. On the one hand, the 1814 attack led to a strategy based on preemption, unilateralism and hegemony. But on the other hand, the attack on Pearl Harbour resulted in a rather diverse security policy, based on multilateralism.

Thanks to the fact that professor Lewis makes us remember our history lessons, we realize that the post 9/11 strategy applied by the Bush Administration has strong roots in the past, beginning in 1814. However, thanks to *Surprise, security and the American Experience*, we notice that American leaders also have other options, for example an strategy that gives its due importance to multilateralism, like the one Roosevelt employed after Pearl Harbour.

The author tries to reflect on the September 11 events, and what they meant for America. He shows those events as another instance in which USA?s security was shattered, and that motivated a reaction that had noteworthy effects on America?s *grand strategy*. Lewis wants to understand the implications of what happened, because even though it is remarkably more difficult to be accurate when studying recent events, it is important to do so if those events are essential turning points in history. He says that *We act in the present with a view to shaping the future only on the basis of what we know from the past. So we might as well try to know our recent history as best we can, however imperfect the exercise may be*.

On the whole, I think that this is a book that won?t make you lose your time. Even though it has only 116 pages and it is quite easy to read, it has a lot of useful information regarding USA?s past and present. In my opinion this is almost *obligatory reading material* for those who want to form an opinion regarding USA?s current *grand strategy*, and to know more about its security policy. After all, is there a better way of grasping the implications of what is happening in the present than studying the past?.

Belen Alcat

Rating:
Summary: A serving up of American narcissism
Review: I am tempted to five star this book for reasons sharply in conflict with those of most other reviewers. I bought the book today expecting an informed, sympathetic assessment of the Bush administration's national security policy post 9/11. This is an important book as it articulates a world view that is willfully self blinding, and also condescending. If you want an articulate endorsement of a narcissistic foreign policy by a occupant of a chaired professorship at an Ivy League college, buy this book.

The author's initial approach to post 9/11 national security policy is to compare favorably Bush's appetite for preemption in dealing with bad guys with the policies of John Quincy Adams while he served as Secretary of State in about 1818-1820. Gaddis sees Quincy as a visionary in constructing a competent, appropriately activist foreign policy. This is interesting reading in the context of Frederick Jackon Turner's observation that in the early years of the Republic our national security was vouched for by the expanse of the oceans. Since the expanse of the oceans does not protect us from terrorists I am baffled why this precedent has a bearing on today's national security situation -- except in a way that reflects a mechanistic, self-absorbed, view of national security, focused extremely narrowly on acts of surprise attacks.

Gaddis tends to frame national security decision making as beginning with surprise attacks and ending with the military response to these attacks. Most any military undertaking outside this narrow frame are ignored. NATO and other Cold War alliances are barely mentioned in passing. And I don't think Vietnam is mentioned once.

This odd prism through which to view post 9/11 developments removes from the picture economics, technology, health, education, religion, population trends, etc. and probably allows for the thin, anorexic feel of this book. For it were any longer he'd be forced to confront the world of greys, contradictions and regional politics. You would never know from the book that the Bin Laden "gang" as he calls it has an agenda other than to smite America, or that it can prosper without the protection of a state (witness Madrid). You would never know how prior to 9/11 the Bush administration expressed contempt for interventionist policies such as nation building. (Gaddis at one point writes that Bush has been more committed to cooperation among the leading nations that was Clinton.) The ambivilence of America about the Middle East -- is it our gas station, a den of thieves, or oppressed people yearning to be free? -- never casts a shadow. You would never know how the instability of the middle east may stem largely from a failure to transition from the Otttoman Empire some 85 years ago.

Gaddis is an incurious about the complexities of the world as Bush (as we know now) was incurious about all those warnings he was receiving in mid 2001.

Rating:
Summary: Utopian vision
Review: In his book Professor Gaddis tried to convince a reader that current US course of preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony is legitimate and even feasible and realistic. He found legitimacy in the past US experiences - during John Quincy Adams administration. I agree with author up to a point. But it was never a doctrine but a set of practical tools, and hegemony was applied to the American land and sea, not Okinawa or Tashkent. I also agree that security is a raison d'etre of the governments everywhere. But Gaddis hyperbolically pictures preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony as a coherent doctrine, which ought to dominate US foreign policy, while John Quincy Adams applied as it as a set of tools to be used for the practical necessity of protecting American lands from intruders. In reality, it is not a coherent doctrine, but a hotchpotch of ideas developed in various times by various nations. Thus preemption was first developed and applied by Bismarck and Moltke. The Germans successfully used against the French in 1871. But since then in proved to be a double-edge sword and, in wrong hands, brought a disaster back to the Germans, for example, Hitler's invasion in Russia in 1941. Hegemony is a Greek concept, where hegemon means a Chieftain. How realistically US can be a chieftain in this post-modern world, where every state insists to be a sovereign of its own land, remains an open question. Unilateralism is a less controversial concept, but the US was always a unilateralist by nature, except a brief period of World War II, but this was rather an aberration. American exceptionalism is a strong undercurrent and unilateralism is just a manifestation of this idea. Although Gaddis is subtler than most neocons, his book inadvertently helps to justify neo-conservatives' rejection of diplomacy in dealing with other states under the banner of unilateralism.
But I have other criticism - It is interesting to me that Gaddis mentioned Adam Smith at the end of the book. In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed - in effect burying the idea of possibility of Western-style modernization in Russia. Thus Marxian doctrine of rapid progress and modernization based on coercive and hegemonic power of proletariat appears to be dismissed. However Marx's ideas were based on the ideas of European Enlightenment thinkers, most notably Adam Smith. Smith was the most influential economist of his time and he was in effect a creator of idea of leissez faire or unfettered capitalism. Smith's ideas were based on one central premise of Homo Economicus. Re-emergence after the end of the Cold war of religion, ethnicity and rivalry to territory and recourses makes a mockery of the idea of rational, economical man - the bedrock of the Western civilization, or better said the Enlightenment civilization, which strongest and last outpost is the US. Gaddis dismisses that as he dismisses Mujaheddin as 'pirates, marauders, and agents of predatory empires' (page 110). But fundamentalism is a post-modern phenomenon, not a 'blast from the past'. It is a thought-provoking book, but unfortunately, Gaddis resembles to me a scholar who lives in proverbial Ivory Tower not noticing tectonic shifts everywhere around him.

Rating:
Summary: Quick, Fun, and enlightening
Review: In the past few months I have read a number of recently published works that might fall into the general category of "political science." Other reviewers do a far better job of recapping the salient points of the books, so I leave it to myself to comment on the readability and ability to contradict the facts and assertions of each book. Fantasists and conspiracy theorists see only what they want to see. Historians argue (what else do they have to fill their time,) but historians at least base their opinions in fact.

This book is a little gem. I read it in about 2 hours, learned a great deal about the political history of the United States (all those old dead Presidents actually did stuff!) I came away with new insights and new lines of inquiry. This is not an in depth study but rather an essay that introduced me to an interesting interpretation of the "grand strategies" of the United States through history. A fun read, I recommend it as a wonderful breath of fresh air when the more dense (what do we do after 9/11?) writing gets you down.

Rating:
Summary: The Bush Doctrine: Preemption, Unilateralism, Hegemony
Review: John Lewis Gaddis presents a very persuasive argument in his book, about the shifts undertaken in American foreign policy once American security was challenged by foreign threats. Surprise, Security, and the American Experience is a concise well-thought argument interpreting the history of American foreign policy reaction to surprise attacks and security threats to the homeland. And how these threats have altered the way the US acts on the world stage, whether isolationist, neutral, or ally. He uses three principle events in American history to outline the three Bush administration's foreign policy strategies of, preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony. The three principle events in which these shifts in strategy occurred were the burning of Washington by the British in 1814, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the Al-qaeda terrorists attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001.

The first monumental shift in American foreign policy occurred in 1814 after the destruction of the capital by the British. The US had not ventured into this realm of diplomacy at this point. America had not recognized that its interests lay in taking part on the world stage, whether with the world or against it, but always engaging with it. President Jefferson had kept the US out of war with the British in the early 1800s by hiding from the direct conflict.

Jefferson had used a multi-faced policy of expansion, belligerency and appeasement. He acquired the Louisiana Purchase from the French, and at the same time reduced the size of the army and the navy. During the Napoleonic Wars when both Britain and France were violating American maritime rights Jefferson called for a trade embargo. He contracted American interests, eliminating the threat to America by disengaging from the field, refusing to defend America's right to trade. This was humiliating to the Congress and the people, and by 1811 both began calling for a defense of all American interests, whether it was possible or not. The British response was to invade the US and burn down Washington.

After negotiating the Treaty of Ghent to end the War of 1812 John Quincy Adams became US Secretary of State in 1817 and began a major reformation of American foreign policy. The US was in a difficult position after the war. It had a huge land mass with vast borders to defend and only limited means to defend them. It was therefore prudent to acknowledge that the US must first be willing to take action before a crisis ensues. That is to use a doctrine of preemption. Adams first applied this idea to the `failed state' of Spanish Florida. (pg. 17) The vast open border of that territory allowed many non-state actors, such as Native Americans, slaves and the French to cross into the US and attack its citizens. Adams instructed Spain to ensure that this no longer occurs by staffing it with more soldiers or Spain must cede Florida to the US to prevent future attacks. This doctrine of preemption came to justify many subsequent American foreign policy engagements, from the annexation of Texas in 1845 by President Polk, to the American invasion of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898 by President McKinley.

The next diplomatic strategy that Adams helped establish was the doctrine of unilateralism. This doctrine would be spelled out clearest in the Monroe Doctrine, which states that the US would have been the exclusive participant in the western hemisphere. The Europeans were forbidden from intervening in the affairs or colonizing any country in the western hemisphere. This was a dramatic shift in American policy considering the fact that the US had no way of enforcing it without the participation of the British Navy. Adams had checkmated the British attempt at a joint Anglo-American statement about future European involvement in the western hemisphere, presenting instead a unilateral statement from the US determining the course of events in its own backyard.

The third strategy presented by Adams was the doctrine of hegemony. As he saw it the US had time on its side, while the Europeans time was running out. Population, economy, and potential strength were all increasing meanwhile the Europeans were beginning to reach the limit of their potential. For Adams there was no reason to hide hegemonic aspirations. The US was by far the strongest nation on the continent and shared that stage with no one else. It was not enough to conquer lands and create empires, `security could best be assured, instead, by making certain that no other great power gained sovereignty within geographic proximity of the US.' (pg. 29)

The preponderance of power lay with the US in 1941 but a surprise attack using new weapons and tactics brought the weaknesses of that power home to millions of Americans on December 7th. President Roosevelt choose to embrace a different a course for American policy then did Adams. FDR accepted America's role in the world and formed alliances with other nations to protect our hegemony. He did not sacrifice American power but dropped two key components of Adams strategy, preemption and unilateralism. Americas' hegemony and preponderance of power ensured that the US could almost simultaneously bring to a close two separate wars, with the US coming out stronger. FDR never let proclaimed interests extend beyond actual capabilities. This was the genius of his strategy, unlike Wilson whose ideals for democratizing the world was not feasible and made the US look hypocritical and weak. FDR believed US security was enhanced by embedding `unilateral priorities within a cooperative multilateral framework.' Global American hegemony was now to `arise by consent.' (pg. 54)

After the Cold War American political leaders had neglected the building threat of global terrorism. It was a symptom of the American psyche to ignore the invisible threat in the absence of visible danger. They assumed that American power was supreme that with the fall of the Soviet Union no other country could or would directly challenge US power. They believed they had won the game and they assumed that the `rules by which the United States, its allies, and its defeated adversaries had played' could never be challenged or broken. (pg. 80) None state actors, terrorists acting without sovereign support became a foreign policy reality on September 11th.

The Bush Doctrine states that the US will identify and eliminate terrorists wherever they are, together with the regimes that sustain them.' (pg. 86) This policy no longer respects sovereignty and implies that the rules that by which the world was playing were no longer going to be respected by the US. The Bush administration was embracing preemption to find the terrorists threats before they attack us, which is also the policy of unilateralism which is needed when the world community is unwilling to recognize the threat. Preemption in the Bush doctrine requires American hegemony, `the capacity to act wherever one needs to without significant resistance from rival states.' (pg. 87)

Gaddis cites Fareed Zakaria whom I wholeheartedly agree. Zakaria says that order, prosperity, and justice, the necessary building blocks of a stable society are not found in democracies. They are found in liberal autocracies like China, Taiwan, Singapore and Chile. According to our political ideologies these places are not democracies. But they are ordered stable secure societies with limited freedoms. Unlike the present situation in Iraq where massive amounts of freedom exists things are extremely unstable and insecure. Democracies according to Zakaria do not do a successful job at providing the necessary order and stability to maintain a civil society like Iraq.

I believe that Gaddis has written a very informative and effective argument for the current strategies of the Bush administrations War on Terror. I think his reasoning is sound and his method of merging commentary and history is excellent. I was however not that impressed with his minor criticism of the Bush Doctrine in the last portion of the book. I had hoped to read more on the criticisms of the Bush Doctrine and its many flaws in presenting this strategy to the world and its failures at maintaining the good relations the US had had after the September 11th attacks. Their exists many outcomes to the present Bush administration strategy, since this book was written, those outcomes have not been looking good for American interests in Afghanistan or Iraq.

I believe Gaddis has written an outstanding book that ultimately changed my perception of the Bush administration and its strategy for change in Iraq. I was not convinced of America's right to act unilaterally or preemptively in this case. I always believed that the threat of WMD was a sales pitch for the war and not evidence of anything. I still agree with one of the merits for our invasion of Iraq, such as spreading democracy, but the methods for achieving this are proving disastrous. I believe that we cannot simply throw-out the rules to the game because the terrorists no longer play by them. I do not trust unchecked American hegemony where we no longer respect the rules we helped write and cherish.


Rating:
Summary: A flawed historian is better than no historian at all
Review: John Lewis Gaddis, an apologist for the War on Iraq, claims, "The American ideal -- the reason so many people over so many years were willing to risk so much to become Americans -- had been to insulate domestic life from a violent external world: to avoid the collision between the personal and the historical that causes dates to be divorced, in our minds, from the years in which they occur."

Unknown to Gaddis, many other lands let people "insulate domestic life from a violent external world." Australia is a classic example. In the 1860s, Canada offered the security of "life, liberty and good government;" an alternative was going to the US to enlist in the Union armies and face "death, injury and constant risk." The US was the overwhelming choice.

Why? The lure of the US was the absence of intrusive government, stifling tradition, a static state religion and the old habits and ancient customs of one's fellow villagers. "Freedom" isn't the right to vote for George Bush or John Kerry -- it's the right to be left alone, to live as one pleases and to chart one's own future.

Gaddis is also weak on the history he uses to justify the war on Iraq. The basis of his book is the American reaction to three surprise attacks on US soil -- the burning of Washington in August 24, 1814; the attack on Pearl Harbour on Dec. 7, 1941; and the attacks of September 11, 2001. However, no reputable historian can claim "the first surprise attack on United States soil" was the burning of Washington.

This attack was part of a war which the United States unilaterally launched on Canada in 1812. However, the US had been soundly defeated at Detroit, the Niagara Peninsula and enduring a total blockage of New England to the extent that some states considered seceding to join Canada. The raid on Washington was in response to American troops who burned the capital of Ontario and ravaged farms along the St. Lawrence -- the British had to buy much of their supplies from farmers in New York state, who refused to sell produce to the US Army.

Having launched an aggressive war to seize Canada -- the "surprise attack" on Washington was as surprising as Jimmy Doolittle bombing Tokyo a few months after Pearl Harbour, or the US Navy sinking Japanese ships at Midway in 1942.

Granted, American defeats in the War of 1812 did produce major changes in US military and civil policy -- but not for the reasons cited by Gaddis. If he can mess up such a simple experience, what hope does he have in analysing Bush policies?

In his defense, Gaddis offers a concise articulate explanation of current Bush administration policy. He also suggests adoption of "federalism" to enhance Bush's recent brilliant successes in pacifying Iraq. His conclusions may have some validity. After all, if a flawed watch dog is better than no dog at all, then a flawed historian may be better than no historian at all.

Rating:
Summary: An analysis of US security from a historical perspective.
Review: Mr. Gaddis clearly and concisely delineates the various changes in grand strategy the United States has embarked upon over the course of it's existence. He frames his thesis by contrasting the first significant external attack on America's sovereign soil in the burning of the White House in 1814, and then the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 with 9/11. He follows up with an insightful analysis of TDR's statesmanship that enabled Truman to set up the successful Cold War grand strategy of containment. He then continues with a generalized analysis of the post-9/11 change in grand strategy and traces that to the present situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. He analyzes the intent behind our engagement in the Middle East, and while it is well meaning, he considers it unlikely to provide the beneficial results the present administration is hoping for. Unlike most pundits and naysayers however, he actually has a couple of useful suggestions, that are quite constructive within the context of present US doctrine. Overall an excellent overview of US strategic thought and an excellent analysis of strategic security psychology from the US perspective. This book definitely makes the indivudal think about differing historical perspectives, and cause and effect in the international system. Highly recommended for the educated lay person.

Rating:
Summary: The Vision Thing
Review: Mr. Gaddis has written one of the best books on current US foreign policy available. His grasp of history provides a strong context for analyzing the Bush administration's policy in a way many commentators, particularly from the left, overlook. Gaddis clearly sees the grand strategy (the Vision Thing) that animates Bush and his foreign policy team. Gaddis connects this vision to similar events in American history, then provides an analysis that compares and contrasts our times with those earlier "suprises" of 1814 and 1941. This brief book (you can read it in a couple of hours) operates at a wide scope of time, yet provides a clear structure that links the past with the present in a rational and empirical way. Regardless of your political philosophy, this is a book you should read if you want to form a thoughtful opinion.

There are not many people who could write a book that is this wide, deep, and clear (the Vision Thing again, but it belongs to Mr. Gaddis - what kind of seminar this guy must run); I am moved to a great deal of respect for Mr. Gaddis and his skill as a thinker and writer. I also appreciate that he considers in his analysis other strong writers like Francis Fukuyama (End of History and the Last Man), Samuel Huntington (Clash of Civilizations), Fouad Ajami (Dream Palace of the Arabs), and Bernard Lewis (What Went Wrong).

This is a very strong book.

Rating:
Summary: Required Reading
Review: One could make the case that Surprise, Security and the American Experience by John Lewis Gaddis, should be required reading. A small volume consisting of very readable essays on the evolution of American foreign policy particularly as a result of attacks on our soil.

Starting with John Quincy Adams' security policies, developed while Secretary of State to James Monroe, they were a direct result of the War of 1812 and particularly the burning of Washington. These policies became the Monroe Doctrine and the subsequent development of a continental security policy anchored by unilateralism and preemption.

The next phase occurred under Franklin Roosevelt because of Pearl Harbor and our entry into WWII; this policy was a major shift in that for the first time America began to develop alliances with foreign countries and truly establish us as an international power militarily and economically. A post WWI flirtation in global politics ended in the isolationism of the '20's and '30's. Roosevelt's strategy of multilateralism as a method to both defeat and contain authoritarian regimes would remain our policy up to September 11, 2001. Gaddis notes that our foreign policy had been lacking direction following the collapse of the Soviet Union and primarily relied upon economic growth and trade as a means to provide security.

George W. Bush outlined in his West Point speech in June 2002 a "Doctrine" that marked a major departure from multilateralism and a return to a security policy more like Adams' but on a global scale. Dealing with an enemy like none other we had previously faced, without countries or governments presented a challenge. To address this challenge Bush proposed the destruction of terrorism and countries that sponsor it. Following Afghanistan and Iraq the issues of preemption, sovereignty, world opinion and attitudes and just what is the role of the world's lone "superpower" are some of the factors that still have to be addressed. Gaddis maintains, "The jury is still out".

This book makes one realize that foreign policy decisions evolve over decades even centuries, in our instant, information driven world the pundits would have you believe that the choices our leaders make today have immediate result and that is simply not the case. The "outline" we have today to deal with the threats of terrorism will no doubt be developed over the coming decades by people we don't know and who may not even be born.

An excellent complimentary book to this one is Robert Kagan's Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order; another small book with a wealth of information that explores the relationship of Europe and the US in a post Soviet Union world. Maybe Amazon will offer them together.

Rating:
Summary: Rushed but Thought-Provoking
Review: Readers should take note of Gaddis' disclaimer in the opening chapter of this compact volume, that, "... we might as well try to know our recent history as best we can, however imperfect the exercise may be." This largely describes this thought-provoking, yet ultimately intellectually rushed volume.

Gaddis argues that the United States has historically ensured its security through expansion rather than isolation and that the current administration's policy of preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony has roots in American 19th century foreign policy. What can be easy to miss in the theory is that Gaddis delineates a difference between preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony limited to the Western Hemisphere and that which is used today to protect American global interests.

In my opinion, Gaddis' historical examples do not specifically define what he believes preemptive action is and he does not answer the critical question that exists today: Is it justified? He writes that in the 19th century the US employed the doctrine of preemption in several instances. Along the Western frontier, President Jackson argued that preemption was necessary to safeguard the lives of pioneers and settlers against potentially hostile Native Americans. The resulting preemption evenutally expanded the boundaries of the US to the Pacific Ocean and pushed these populations into easily controllable reservations.

On the international stage, Gaddis writes that President Adams believed that in any situation where a state within the US sphere-of-interest might fail or create a power vacuum, the US could preempt this occurrence by force. So, for example, the possibility that a canal might be built by European powers in Panama allowed the US to foment the secession of Panama from Colombia and then create a Canal Zone controlled by it.

Seen from a realists' geopolitcal perspective, these actions make perfect sense, but Gaddis' correctly states that the US believes in its exceptionalism and in the "empire of liberty". These two divergent strands of realism vs. idealism are not fully explored, and with regard to the justification for preemption, Gaddis simply writes that we must, "acknowledge the moral ambiguity of our history."

The US unilateralism and hegemony that Gaddis links from the present to the 19th century was only possible then because of America's unique geopolitical situation. The US had no equal in the Western Hemisphere and never had to engage in balance-of-power relations as did the nations of Europe. What Gaddis calls American unilateralism was indeed so when it came to issues in the Western Hemisphere, as put forth by the Monroe Doctrine, but was also a refusal to enter into any binding relationships with European nations and the balance-of-power dynamic on the continent. America's hegemony rested on its isolationism that was itself guaranteed by the buffers of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Whenever the US reversed its isolationism and entered into relations with the Eastern Hemisphere, it was on the principle of collective security and multilateralism, as seen in China's Open Door Policy, President Wilson's Fourteen Points, and the creation of postwar institutions such as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods organizations.

It is a shame that after all the historical background, Gaddis only spends 20 pages on questions about the translation of preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony from a Western Hemispheric sphere of influence to a global one under President Bush's grand strategy. Gaddis briefly writes that the invasion of Iraq was a military success but diplomatic failure. He raises questions about whether democracies can be created among cultures that share different values, and even whether such democracies would not become tyrannies of the majority. He also asks whether the US can be seen by the rest of the world as an "empire of liberty," and even says that the parallel he previously drew between President Adams' and President Bush's policies ends here in, "an American government that deliberately goes abroad in search of monsters to destroy - lest those monsters attempt to destroy it."

I would have liked the book more if Gaddis had spent less time trying to force the words preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony to fit historical events, and more time elaborating on the questions he raises near the end, but the book is nevertheless ambitious in its scope and immensely thought-provoking.