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Summary: Real history need not be dull
Review: A wonderful book, proving that 'real' history with exaustive research need not be dull or focus on minor issues of little interest to the general reader. The author is a great granddaughter of Lloyd George, but it is not biased in any significant way. Interesting portraits of the people and countries involved. While you may not agree with the analysis, you will find it both engaging and well researched by a professional historian. Oxford has done it again, why can't our American Uni's teach historians to write??
Rating: 
Summary: Superficial, overblown and biased account
Review: ...P>This is fashionable history seen through the prism of personalities, the 'great man' approach to history. No wonder that Blair, we are told, liked this book!
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Summary: Masterful
Review: The origins of many of the world's conflicts stem from the imperialist system set up by the US, England and France after World War I and the balance of power system set up by the US and Russia after World War II. To understand the world today...you have to understand the results of WWI and WWII. The book is a great authoritative work that, thankfully, balances out so much of the mindless ideology coming out of talk show hosts, the timid mainstream media and historically ignorant government leaders.
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Summary: Paris 1919. An apology.
Review: This book is highly interesting due to the rich detail in which the author relates the history of the peace-making after World War I. Much to the reader's joy she devotes a lot of attention to the settlements in the non-European parts of the world, in what is a lively treatment of the issues in 1919 and the subsequent events. What in my opinion is the major shortcoming of the book, is that the purpose it has been written for becomes so apparent all along. The book should be termed "Paris 1919. An apology". Highly critical on all other settlements (the farther away from Europe, the more critical the author allows herself to be: see Turkey, Palestine, China), she asserts that "Versailles is not to blame". Indeed, the author too easily jumps to conclusions. The most widely cited conclusion of her book is that the reparations forced upon Germany are not to blame for the rise of Hitler and WW II. Indeed events of 1919 never can be fully the reason for subsequent events say in 1933 or 1939. But it would be interesting to learn how much these events in 1919 were responsible for later developments. This would require a detailed study of the period 1919 to 1939 and one can only wonder how an author writing about a few months of peace negotiations in 1919 could ever come to a sensible conclusion about this issue! It is appalling to see that the author is even being applauded for this "research". In fact, the only supportive argument the author offers, is that Germany until 1932 only had paid a comparatively small amount of its reparations - as if any debtor would relish about the (small) amount paid so far instead of the (much larger) sum outstanding! The facts are never presented by the author, only her conclusions. Indeed every study of this issue shows the devastating impact on German public opinion, as the reparations were constantly present due to endless negotiations - 24 conferences alone until 1924 - and new plans for repayment. E.g. the plan of 1929 still asked for yearly instalments that would have continued until 1988 (!). One can imagine what would happen to Iraqi oil reserves in the next 70 years - i.e. until 2073 - if the Big Three had a say. The peacemakers in Paris in 1919 were a failure. Contrary to the hopes and inspirations of all the people of their age (victorious and defeated alike), they failed to establish new principles for peacemaking choosing to follow Wilson's principles where they fit the victors and to ignore them where they might have fit the defeated. There are two sets of piece treaties: the "just treaties", those that enforce the will of the victors according to certain, broadly fair principles and those that are imposed largely against the will of the defeated and which subsequently have to be kept with force. The "just peace" was not achieved, indeed there were not even negotiations with the defeated nations (producing calamities such as this, where Wilson only finds out after having agreed to the Czechoslovak borders that some 3 million Germans were also living there, indeed even more numerous than the name-giving ethnic Slovaks! "Why Masaryk - the Czech president - has not told me", Wilson famously asked). So the peace had to be a forced one, one that needed to be kept with force. The author actually mourns that Germany was not more severely defeated in 1918 and expresses regret that the allies have not marched upon Berlin. With the same reason she might asked herself who actually won the first World War? Was it really France, which on its own would have been defeated in 1914 already? Or in other words: Why at all should US-soldiers fight for France having coal mines in the Saar area? No new world order was established in Paris in 1919, instead the principle that the stronger nation imposes its will on others was once again confirmed. A discussion of the peacemakers of Paris 1919 should also include a reference to these other peacemakers (or "appeasers" as they now are called), those of 1938. Applying exactly the same principles as their fellows in 1919 Chamberlain & Co. gave away what was "just" in terms of the then prevailing equilibrium of power: E.g: exactly those 3 million Germans of the Sudetenland about which Wilson only learned so late in 1919. The Treaty of Versailles is indeed to blame. Like this other Treaty with the Turks at Sèvres it called for a revision. In the case of Turkey, due to the swift recovery of Turkish forces under Attatürk, the dictated Treaty of 1919 was never implemented and later on was substituted with a negotiated one, leaving Turkey intact in almost exactly its present borders. Unfortunately for Europe and for Germany especially, the person that - as Attatürk undid the Sèvres treaty - undertook to undo the Versailles treaty was Adolf Hitler. The Versailles Treaty asked for its revision, through war (WWII) or negotiations, so out of line it was with the actual balance of power and broad principles of justice. This is its ultimate failure and it is for this that "Versailles" and the peacemakers of 1919 can be blamed. But certainly they cannot be blamed for Hitler and his mass murders - nobody actually ever did. So the book is a must read due to the facts presented and the lively picture it draws of those critical months, but should be read with great care when it comes to the far-reaching conclusions, not supported neither by facts nor by subsequent history.
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Summary: Monumental History
Review: I found the most appropriate summarization and critique of Margaret MacMillan's masterpiece on the back jacket...MacMillan lays out the situation facing the world leaders in 1919. Europe, the unquestioned center of world power, was now a wasteland. A whole generation of young men had been slaughtered or maimed in graveyards known as the Somme or Verdun. Economies and debts had imploded, leading to social crises of unheard of proportions. Monarchies and aristocracies fell, revolutions broke out in the lands of the east. Russia had fallen into chaos, France teetered on the edge of anarchy, Eastern Europe including the Balkans was a horrible debacle. To add to that, Germany, once the keystone that held Europe in a kind of balance, was now almost totally destroyed. It was a situation only really comparable to the period after World War II, but a strong case could be made that the 1919 situation was even worse. So, in really one of the most important conferences in human history, the leaders of the world met in Paris. Most of MacMillan work centers on three men, Wilson of the United States, George of Great Britain, and Clemenceau of France. They were known as the big three, and together, for better or for worse, they would shape the post war world. I found MacMillan's studies of Wilson and Clemenceau to be absolutely brilliant. These men are looked at intensely, examined for all their faults and attributes. All of them were under intense pressure from various interest groups. Wilson, extremely intelligent but hopelessly arrogant and stubborn, came to the situation with an almost messianic impulse, that the untarnished United States would set mankind's situation right, finally. Clemenceau shared none of his colleagues optimisms, he was in the game for France and France alone. Germany would be forever crippled, and France would be the power in Europe. They had earned that position by blood, Clemenceau, somewhat justifiably, felt. The exhaustive work goes through all the disparate regions of the world and how they had been effected by the war. Probably the most interesting parts touched on Russian and the Balkans, which were handled extremely badly by the Allies. The reader must cringe when they read how men who were totally unschooled on the situation made drastic and uneducated decisions on boundaries and borders. These problems would haunt Europe even into the present day. The fate of the colonies and the colonial system was also very intriguing, as it was just another set piece for the tragic problems coming up later in the 20th century. MacMillan is at her best when describing the situation involving the fate of Germany and the creation of the League of Nations. Germany became the most divisive issue in front of the conference participants, as it elicited such passion from all sides. Many wanted Germany to rebuild at least in a limited fashion, as they feared revolution from the east. France was in no mood for conciliation, and their side of the argument largely carried the day. However, MacMillan examines the simplistic view that Versailles was the absolute cause for German failure and eventual development into an expansionist fascist state. It was more of a faulty decision making structure that doomed Germany to that fate, where the Allies were too wary of making any hard and final decisions or promises. Concerning the League of Nations, the long dreamt of utopian world vision lasted about a week. Wilson's high and lofty fantasy was almost immediately destroyed by European realism, and Wilson was far too tactless to defend his American dream. Wilson really comes off as a bullheaded fool at some parts of this book, including his absolute inability to discuss his plans with domestic opponents who were going to decide the fate of his plan. Although the League would have probably been a failure even if the United States was involved, it was more of a causality of selfish state policy. So, with that, I definetly place Paris 1919 as one of the top history books written in the last decade. It is so sweeping in its scale, yet so exhaustive in its detail. As the coup detat of this literary trinity, Dr. MacMillan delivers an eminently readable book open to all kinds of readers, serious or popular fans alike.
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Summary: History with Bite!
Review: This book sparkles! History with opinions, researched facts coupled with unvarnished opinions. Love them or hate them, you can't ignore them. Macmillan feels that there was too much sentimental tosh about the Versailles Treaty being harsh on the Germans. She tellingly points out that within twenty years of the treaty the Germans had Europe at their feet, so how could their nation and peoples have been vanquished, humiliated and rent asunder? She has a sceptical eye for the 'do-gooders' in the tale such as Woodrow Wilson and the various English Liberals - J.M Keynes, Harold Nicolson etc. who sought virtue rather than victory. There are a huge cast of characters - Jan Smuts, Robert Cecil, Lord Curzon, who are described with economy and skill. Her main soft spot is for the French Prime Minster Clemenceau, a man usually portrayed as infirm,stubborn and racked by desire for vengeance on Germany. Macmillian gives us all of his stubbornness - when leaving the official opening of the Paris peace conference "Balfour (the languid British Foreign Secretary) turned to Clemenceau and apologized for his top hat. ' I was told', he said, ' that it was obligatory to wear one'. 'So', replied Clemenceau, in his bowler, ' was I'.
The book illustrates the importance of events (dear boy!) and personalities on history, and paradoxically shows the impotence of the personalities assembled at Versallies to come to terms with the changes unleashed by the fall of the Central European Empires and the aspirations unleashed by Wilson's fourteen points [ 'God himself was content with ten commandments' - Clemenceau again, quoted with no little relish!]. Their personal foibles - Lloyd George's manipulation, Wilson's arrogance and Clemenceau's stubbornness - made the group dysfunctional, and Macmillian gives a brilliant description of this process. The question which is begged, and unanswered, is whether the task was achievable in the first place. Each of the main characters went to Versailles hoping the set the world to rights. Can the forces unleashed by the desire for self-determination among peoples who self-definition is exclusive and antagonistic, be controlled by political agreement of the larger powers? Who arbitrates right versus might? These are questions we are still asking today.
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Summary: Aftermath of war
Review: It appears odd, but often it is easier to win a war than it is to formulate the peace treaty that follows. This extremely well-written book shows us that dilemma is great detail, from the end of World War I, and the peace treaties that followed. The author goes into great detail about the peace conference and the diverse personalities who attended. She also covers the various countries involved, with all of the associated ethnic problems, and the border changes. In addition, she shows how many of the conference decisions resounded down through history, even until today. There are many consequences of this peace with which we are still living, and they are explained to the reader within the pages of this book. If you want one volume that gives you just about everything you might be likely to wish to know about the Peace Treaty of 1919, this is the book to read!
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Summary: Extremely informative and eminently readable
Review: I was amazed at how much I learned from reading this excellent book. If I had read it as the events of 1937-1939 were going on I would have understood those events much better. The author is a great-granddaughter of Lloyd George, but it does not appear this has influenced her in any way I could detect. Chapter by chapter this book illuminates the issues before the Peace Conference and explains what was done, how it was done, and some of the effects of the decisions and of the course of events after the decisions. The chapters on the Middle East are most timely (tho Kuwait was not mentioned--apparently it was not a subject at Paris of the supplementary treaties). There is scarcely a page in this clearly written book which does not tell interesting and important information. And the book is well-footnoted, tho the footnote only gives the name of the author of the source, and to get the name of the book from which the information is drawn one needs to go from the footnote to the bibliography. (Something I never heard of before: the author says the Founding Fathers considered adopting ancient Greek as the official language of the USA!) This is the best book I have ever seen on its subject and I think it is a great book.
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Summary: A Blockbuster
Review: If a book could in anyway advertise itself for a time this one would be the book that should do so. There are just so simply so many links between the age this book describes and our own. We find outselves now at the end of the Cold War with so many shifting alliances none of which relates to the reality of our times. And that is simply where Clemenceau, Wilson, and Lloyd George found themselves. Trying to deal with a fractured world and confronting threats from all directions, these people tried to reconfigure the world.
Messes in the Balkans, a question concerning Turkey, the end of empires, an expectent Japan and China, a divided and subdivided Africa and the German question all confronted them and in the wings awaited the League of Nations. Sound familiar? We are simply reliving their failures to confront problems we face today. Their failures are our problems even today. And the breakup of the Soviet Empire has simply added to the equation. So if you are interested in where we are today I would commend this book to you. All of our problems today are problems not really solved by the powers that met in 1919. Lastly the division of the Middle East during this time revisits us daily. So I would commend this great book to anyone who wishes to ascertain the root causes of the problems we face today. Ms. MacMillan has served it all up on an easy platter to take in. When you pick up the book it looks like a real long challenge, but it is quick reading and she is an excellent author. I rated this one 5 stars, but it is more valuable than that. It is the foundation of our current history and offers us a look at where our current challenges have evolved from. A great work and thanks to the author.
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Summary: Intensely Significant - Strange Conlusion
Review: Paris 1919, by Margaret Macmillan, ought to be required reading for anyone alive in 2003. A previous reviewer entitled his "An overlooked historical event of importance," which, in my opinion, is a rather large understatement. The Balkan Wars of the 1990's (and most recently the assasination of the Serbian Prime Minister) were/are a continuation of the conflicts that the "band-aid" called The Treaty of Versailles tried to fix. So is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. So too was the fundamentalist revolution in Iran in the early 1980's (remember The Ayotollah?) that propelled Ronald Reagan into power. And don't forget Iraq! The country of Iraq was created by the treaty...another "can of worms" held in check under the point of a gun, just like Yugoslavia. (Yugoslavia was conceived at Versailles and it didn't work either). Arab nationalism ignored, Kurdish nationalism never addressed, American idealism vs. isolationism, British Imperialism, French Colonialism and the other two extremes of timidity and paranoia (you think this is new?) jump out at you from the pages of this book. Oh yes - did I leave out Bolshevism? - that's in here too! (It wasn't created by Versailles, but it certainly affected the decision-making.) This is history the way it ought to be written. The subject of each chapter is a major field of study, yet each superbly written so that anyone with even a cursory understanding of world history can follow it. Best of all, each chapter is concluded with a time-line right up to the present making it easy to trace how today's world (and our lives) have been, and are continuing to be, influenced by what took place in Paris - in 1919. Macmillan's conclusion is, in my opinion, a little odd. She goes easy on the peacemakers, claiming that they did their best. I agree with her on that. But I disagree with her claim that WWII would have happened anyway, Versailles or no Versailles. Macmillan contends Hitler would have wanted living space, and would have exterminated the Jews no matter what. But she downplays that without Versailles, and most importantly how the treaty was perceived by the Germans (as humiliation), not how it was actually adminstered or not administered, was what created the collective state of mind in Germany which allowed a Hitler to easily come to power. The best that can be said for The Treaty of Versailles is that it was a "learning experience," a series of (at best) under-thought-out solutions, or (at worst) momentous mistakes made by a small, powerful group of well-intentioned humans - with emphasis on the word "humans." For human they were, as this book unabashedly reveals. What we learned from Versailles was how NOT to make a peace. The US did learn from those mistakes - graphically illustrated by its adoption of the Marshall Plan after WWII, its entry into the UN, and its rebuilding of Japan. What is happening in the World today...Arab nationalism in the form of terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, the Balkans, Iraq, Israel & The Palestinians are all leftovers from the fall of the Ottoman Empire after WWI and the Treaty of Versailles. The cultural, religious, and political conflicts are still being played out on the world stage after, in many cases, years of suppression amid the bi-lateral nuclear standoff known as the Cold War. We did much better after WWII in regards to Europe and Japan. Let's hope we do better now in regards to the Middle East. To illustrate how difficult the peacemaker's job was in 1919, one only has to look at the complexities of today beause they haven't changed much. There needs to be an Israel. There needs to be something other than the oppressive ruling families in the Arab kingdoms. There needs to be someplace for the Kurds. The Arab countries need to join the 21st century. Cultures that have clashed for thousands of years need to live in close proximity to each other - and somehow get along without threatening the entire world. So how many of you out there think we should go blasting our way into Iraq as a start toward addressing all these complexities? By a show of hands, I see its about even. Which only goes to prove that hindsight is easy, and I commend Margaret Macmillan for presenting a different point of view about the value of the work done by the peacemakers in 1919. (The previously held prevailing wisdom was that they were a collection of bumbling idealists and failures). But even though I agree with her that Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George may have done the best they could given the enormity of the changes taking place in the world in which they were living and that it all was new, I remain convinced that if Versailles had reflected the actual outcome of WWI (it was, more or less, a tie) then three or four years of diplomacy (rather than 6 months) would have, could have, and should have, prevented WWII. The world could have learned by 1919 the lesson of the Treaty of Austria. (Leniency does not breed the humiliation that breeds contempt, that breeds war.) Now it is up to us, those who have inherited Versailles,as Macmillan accurately points out, to pick up the baton and create situations in which the world can work.
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