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Summary: Why war makes us hate our allies more than our enemies.
Review: There's an old adage that posits that the real outcome of a war is to teach one to hate one's allies more than than opne's enemies. Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World by Margaret Olwen MacMillan and Richard Holbrooke outlines why this old adage exists. The book covers the 6 month period in mid 1919 where the victorious allies of WW I converged to carve up the spoils of war and how this exercise set the stage for most of the subsequent conflicts of the 20th century.While the book focuses on the Big Three Personalities of this exercise--Wilson (United States), Lloyd George (Great Britain), and Clemenceau (France) who dominated the critical aspects of the Paris Peace Conference-this focus doesn't detract from providing an encompassing review of the entire process as well as a detailed analysis of the devastating results of the conference. It delineates all too clearly how the best intentions can be overwhelmed by both insatiable avarice as well as unencumbered and unchecked egos in conflict. This is a timely book. As we are poised to invade Iraq and effect "regime change" it would be wise to look at a previous exercise in managing post war victory to be reminded of both the complexities as well as the risks involved in such an undertaking. Although an expressly historical tome, this is a well written and fast paced read. Probably the best historical work I read in 2002. Highly recommended.
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Summary: dragon's teeth
Review: Hindsight is valuable in history and Ms. MacMillan's work, coming now, puts more perspective on the Paris conference and the effects that haunt us to this day. Ms. MacMillan does assert that the Versailles Treaty - one of its products - should not bear sole blame for the catastrophe that came 20 years later (though she notes that Hitler found it a gold mine of propaganda). However, a reader can find in her story that the Paris conference, and the resulting treaties, sowed dragon's teeth that would erupt year after year: the bloody 1922 war between Turkey and Greece; the mutual suspicions between Poland and the new republics around her that left them divided later; the bad blood between Rumania and her neighbors over her new borders; the creation of fragile nations and economies in Hungary and Austria that would be easy prey for fascism; the Italian populist fervor over Fiume and Trieste that contributed so much to the rise of Mussolini; the Sudetenland issue that would awake in the 1930s; the Allied mandates in Arab lands that would cause so much resentment later; the creation of amorphous nation-states that would implode in the 1990s - Rwanda, Burundi, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Iraq. Ms. MacMillan does provide an epilogue to each decision, as well as a new look at Woodrow Wilson, the first U.S. president to travel outside the U.S. in his term, and whose 14 Points proved perhaps the greatest unrealized promise of the period. For a conference founded on such post-war hope and good intentions, it certainly proved a road to hell. All in all, a worthwhile read.
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Summary: Superb Intricate Tome On Peace Deliberations of 1919!
Review: One of the almost indescribable pleasures of great history is the fashion in which such authors successfully locates the people, places, and events under description in a meaningful social, cultural, and political context such that his or her very act of exposition becomes an enjoyable and even illuminating event, one that can literally transport the reader back to another time and to better appreciate the welter of such factors in assessing the historical milieu in which those events transpired. Many such creative acts of intellectual transport back in time are palpable in "Paris 1919", by historian Margaret Macmillan. Indeed, she has a personal stake in the events, as her great grandfather (David Lloyd George) was one of the principal actors in the events described in such breath-taking detail.
Indeed, it is in such loving details that the difference between this volume about the turmoil, intrigue, and pathos surrounding the generation of the Treaty of Versailles on the one hand, and the plethora of other such tomes, on the other, can be most usefully drawn. Little of import in the way of startling new information is actually offered here, which is not to say that this is not an incredibly bold and different interpretation of those events. Rather, it is in the mass of relevant details gathered together that this becomes such a convincing tour de force describing the folly of both individual men and specific nations to deliberate, discover, and design a just and lasting framework for peace.
What we are privileged to witness is just how fatefully the interaction of individually flawed egos from men such as Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George, and Georges Clemenceau recreated the world in a more congenial form for their personal and national interests and prejudices, although Professor Macmillan heartily disagrees with the notion that their actions, however ill-conceived, necessarily set the groundwork for such bitterness and rancor that the signing of the accord therefore created the circumstances literally guaranteeing another, even more terrible world war would follow. Instead, she argues, such an effort to scapegoat the participants is clearly not consistent with a careful consideration of the facts.
Thus, as the six months of effort in Paris transpired, the so-called peacemakers proceeded to maximize their personal and national interests by carving up old empires, creating new ones in the process and shoving Russia to one side, alienating them as well as China, and of course, the biggest loser of all, Germany. But while their corrupt decisions did often either magnify existing national animosities or even create new ones, they also made a serious effort to deal with such problems as the ethnic problem in Kosovo, the Arab question (Lawrence of Arabia was a keynote participant in the deliberations), and even attempted to deal with the question of a homeland for the Jews. This is a wonderful book, one that will help to reacquaint lovers of good history with a master of the craft. Enjoy!
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Summary: Peace Work
Review: A quarter of the French men between the ages of 18 and 30 died in World War I. Clemenceau insisted the Peace Conference be held in France. Wilson and Lloyd George acceded to the request with reluctance.
Politics and France were Clemenceau's great passion. He had contempt for convention and profound cynicism. Lloyd George had known Clemnceau since 1908. From January to June, except when Wilson went back to the U.S, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Wilson met daily.
The Allies were not really ready for the end of the fighting. The big four included the above-noted men along with Orlando of Italy. The Supreme Council had ten members, but procedure could not be agreed upon. Complicating things was the fact that eventually the representatives of 29 nations arrived in Paris. The Supreme Council underwent intense scrutiny from scores of journalists.
In effect in 1919 Paris was the seat of a world government. At the time no one knew the limits of such an endeavor. Russia's absence was noteworthy. The new regime operated under a virtual blockade.
The Treaty of Versailles had 440 clauses. Historical research has shown that Germany was not crushed by an unfair peace treaty. Hitler used the treaty for his propaganda.
In 1919 nationalism was still gaining momentum. The League of Nations lasted for twenty years and was a template available to planners at the end of World War II when the United Nations was being proposed. The book is a marvellous compilation of facts still pertinent to today's disputes.
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Summary: Sloppiness Beyond Belief - A Mark of Our Times?
Review: I can't comment on the entire work because so far I have only read Chapter 17, titled "Poland Reborn" (207-228). Unfortunately, after what I have found there, I am very reluctant to read further this so much praised book. I am just afraid that if saturation with errors distributes uniformly throughout the book, then editorial sloppiness will distort history with factual and typo inaccuracies too much for not a historian; I just happen to know quite a bit about Polish history, but not enough to sift grain from chaff in Greek, Albanian, or Japanese affairs. Some facts: (1) the battleship that brought Paderewski from England to Poland was Concord* not Condor (pg. 213) - the name of the ship, although accidental, was for Paderewski's mission like an omen, thus it would be imperative not to twist it with "who cares?" attitude; (2) Paderewski did not come from Austrian Galicia (pg. 213), moreover the entire quotation from Nicolson on the same page is a fib of a buffoon and notorious liar Count Potocki that MacMillan uses without any credibility research - it is more than easy to verify that Paderewski was born in Kurylowka in Podolie, a region that after the partition of Poland belonged to Russia; (3) "Were Lithuanians a separate nationality or variety of Pole"? (pg. 216) - this kind of a question, asked by a scholar [historian (!) particularly] gives one ultra-super chills; (4) Dmowski's name has been distorted so many times that it is really hard to believe there was any editorial review at all. I will skip some other flaws. There are of course some extremely good remarks, opinions, and quotations as well, but all that so much bedimmed by the "un-classy" slipups ... Ooopsss!
* see: Ignacy Jan Paderewski Pamietniki, PWM, Krakow, Poland 1992, pg. 63
Rating:
Summary: Nice but In the End Lots of Eye Candy
Review: Margaret MacMillian's book Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed The World is foddler for the next Trivia Pursuit game. What is lacks in true scholarship it more than makes up for in interesting trivia points worthy of a parlor game or a "gee did you know..." contest.
What this book lacks is historical perspective. After nearly 90 years since the war came to an end, certainly there is enough material to trace events at Versailles through to the modern era. The material on Arabia and present-day Iraq, for example, was priceless especially given the current US problems in Iraq, but is totally useless within the context the book gives us.
The inability of the USA to assert its role as world policeman was another perspective largely left from the book. It was American entry into the war that tipped the balance toward France and Great Britain yet Wilson too often caved to the British and French. Imagine if he'd have been as tough as Harry Truman or John Kennedy were years later. MacMillan rarely acknowledges this fact, preferring to recite history.
Let's face it, what she has here is a serious 10th grade history text on World War 1. What she doesn't have is a treatse on the modern world and how we got here.
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Summary: Compromise of ideas
Review: Macmillan, in Paris 1919, has presented an excellent narrative of the Paris Peace Conference detailing the events that shaped the making of the Treaty of Versailles. Her account blends all components of modern history, utilizing biographies, focusing specific events within the peace conference, and provide an excellent analysis, all to bring the reader to an understanding of what helped to set the stage for the beginning of the next world war. In her account, Macmillan does not leave necessary details out, but presents them in combination with unique anecdotes to help the reader into Paris of 1919.
The thesis of the book is not entirely new, that the compromises that were made within the peace conference between the idealism of Wilson and his inability to push for more of the ideals of the 14 points and the old European order helped to set the stage for a more dangerous European conflict. In many ways Wilson is presented as an idealist who has an understanding of what is going to happen if the traditional European peace settlement is reached. However, because of the influence of both Loyld George and Clemenceau he is unable to do what is necessary to prevent the older European settlements from being enforced.
Macmillan also highlights how both the French and the British because of selfish interests unintentionally (or perhaps intentionally) do more harm than good in establishing the peace that would ultimately fail. Because the terms that both the French and the British have, the terms of the Peace become contradictory to the desired outcomes and while satisfying the needs of the victors, have diasterous results for the world in the years to follow. Her explanation as to why this happens is well detailed and well documented, especially given the importance of the new forces of public opinion that all the victors had to face at home.
Her account overall is well written, well documented, and provides an excellent analysis. The account is detailed, but not in such a fashion that the reader is overwhelmed with information. It is written in a very accessible manner to most readers and provides an excellent account of a very significant historical event.
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Summary: The now-definitive work about the Treaty of Versailles
Review: At the end of World War I, between January and July 1919, many of the world's leaders gathered In Paris to draw up a peace treaty and to plan the formation of a League of Nations. Although hundreds of delegates arrived from nearly every would-be state in Europe and from as far away as Australia, Japan, and Vietnam, most of the important decisions at the Paris Conference were made by Woodrow Wilson, England's Lloyd George, and France's Georges Clemenceau, with Vittorio Orlando of Italy playing a secondary role.
In spite of (or, perhaps, because of) Wilson's uncompromising idealism, Lloyd George's lack of confidence, and Clemenceau's fears of German reemergence, the Conference assembled a treaty that "grappled with huge and difficult questions," and, MacMillan argues, "if they could have done better, they certainly could have done much worse." One thing is clear, however: regardless of their rightness or wrongness, expertise or incompetence, the peacemakers made decisions that resonated for the rest of the century and still echo in the 21st century: between Serbia and Croatia; among Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus; throughout the Middle East (especially Iraq and Palestine); across the African continent; and in the Korean peninsula. Because of the importance of the Treaty of Versailles on subsequent events, "Paris 1919" is essential--and riveting--reading for understanding the world today.
At times, the conference proceedings display all the gravity of a game of Risk. The major participants repeatedly exhibit an appalling ignorance of geography, an artlessness in dealing with non-European powers, and (for all their talk of self-determination) a callousness towards territorial viability. During one of the Conference's nadirs, when the future of Asia Minor was thrashed out, Arthur Balfour exclaimed in disgust: "I have three all-powerful, all-ignorant men sitting there and partitioning continents with only a child to take notes for them." MacMillan acknowledges that the "offhand treatment of the non-European world" caused serious problems that we are still paying for today. And, among many other examples, she indicates how actions taken at the Peace Conference led to the horrifying destruction of Smyrna three years later.
By the end of such a fascinating narrative, one that almost insistently seems to portray the superpower leaders as unsophisticatedly idealistic and patronizingly egocentric, it is still startling for the reader to come across this argument: "The Treaty of Versailles is not to blame" for World War II and the subsequent rise of Germany.
True, MacMillan makes a strong and convincing case (as have other historians before her) that German reparations were not as injurious as many have claimed. She further argues that the real problem was not the treaty itself but that it "was never consistently enforced." But this begs the question: what good is a treaty that, as she repeatedly indicates, never had a chance of enforcement?
I think what MacMillan truly means here is simpler: given the mess that was Europe in 1919, it's probable that no treaty would have prevented the rise of Hitler and the Second World War. She never quite says this, but she comes close when she defines what was surely the Conference's most insurmountable problem: "The Allied victory had not been decisive enough and Germany remained too strong." To blame the treaty, then, is to ignore both German strength at the end of World War I and "the actions of everyone--political leaders, diplomats, soldiers, ordinary voters--for twenty years between 1919 and 1939."
But she is mistaken, I think, to insist so absolutely that World War II "was a result of twenty years of decisions taken or not taken, not of arrangements made in 1919." Her own evidence (not to mention the arguments and predictions she cites by Keynes, Balfour, Foch, and others who were dissatisfied with the treaty in 1919) proves it must be seen as a mixture of what happened (or didn't happen) before, during, and after the Peace Conference. The Treaty may not have "caused" World War II, but it's difficult to see how it helped prevent it.
Fortunately for the reader, however, it matters little whether or not you agree entirely with the categorical nature of her underlying thesis. "Paris 1919" is the type of "big picture" narrative history that is both enlightening and engrossing, and it must be regarded as the now-definitive work about the Treaty of Versailles.
Rating: 
Summary: Political Idealism Meets Real-Politik
Review: Margaret MacMillan won numerous prizes and recognition for her book and with good reason. Her book takes an historical subject, i.e. the Treaty of Versailles, and breaths life and vitality into the intriguing characters at Versailles and beyond. Unlike so many accounts of the much-maligned Versailles Treaty, MacMillan gives the treaty creation process a thorough and honest appraisal. Like all human endeavors, the treaty was a product of its creators, principally Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau, and all the contemporary pressures they faced. The second-guessing and 20/20 hindsight of many modern day authors really fails to appreciate the conditions of upheaval, unprecedented change, and lack of enforcement power on the ground which the peacemakers faced.
The book begins with an enlightening, chapter-length personality and character review for each of the three peacemakers. From this segment the reader can grasp the varying perspectives of each leader and his goals for the peace. Wilson wants his League of Nations, Lloyd George sets out to expand the British Empire, and Clemenceau is determined to emasculate Germany's military threat to France. The following part then looks at the popular mandate given to the peacemakers from people all over the world for 'a just and fair peace for all', the question of Bolshevik Russia, the League of Nations, and the concept of League mandates. The remainder of the book is organized by regions with a chapter each covering the more significant nations discussed in the treaty (Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Japan, China, Greece, Iraq, Syria, Israel, and Turkey). And, of course, there is a detailed investigation of the treaty with Germany, which covers territories to be ceded, reparations, war guilt, arms limitations, etc.
MacMillan's focus on the individual personalities and their constituent political pressures reveals how and why the treaty's provisions originated. And she does a wonderful job of demonstrating how the enlightened ideals of 'Professor' Wilson quickly clashed with the European world of real-politik, secret wartime treaties, and countless practical considerations. While many new eastern European nations were founded on the principle of self-determination, these new nation-states exhibited a profound capacity to be more aggressive and rapacious than the defunct empires they replaced. Indeed, while the Big Three haggled over borders in far away lands, their decisions were often simply ignored by troops on the ground. (Diplomatic power ultimately rests on military muscle.) In addition, there was still much old-fashioned imperial, land-grabbing camouflaged as League mandates by the victorious European combatants, especially in the increasingly important Near and Middle East. Finally, despite the idealism expressed in Wilson's famous 14 Points, there was certainly no doubt that Germany was really being punished.
Despite all its shortcomings, the Versailles Treaty did help millions of people finally realize their nationalist dreams out of the ruins of the defeated empires. Most of these nations still exist, although some countries have further sub-divided into multiple states (e.g. Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) while the for other peoples unified national existence still remains but a fantasy (Kurds, Armenians). And Germany, though punished, was treated much better than every one of the countries it defeated (e.g. Russia, Romania). The primary fault with the treaty lay not so much in the German punitive provisions, as the Allied government's later unwillingness to enforce them and the dangerous consequences thereof. In short, this book gives a realistic look about how deals (e.g. international treaties) are really made and what the Versailles Treaty actually created.
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Summary: WWI Treaty Tragic and Timely in Exceptional "Paris 1919"
Review: Last month marked the 90th anniversary of the start of World War I, for 20 years thereafter known as "The Great War" and "the war to end all wars." A series of books and magazine articles (including thought-provoking New Yorker and National Review pieces) demonstrated the war's tragedy and senselessness.
World War I ended June 23,1919 with Germany's signing of the Treaty of Versailles. Its strict terms (Germany accepting full blame for the war, losing territory across three continents, huge reparations) for generations were blamed for Adolf Hitler's rise and the start of World War II. In "Paris 1919," Margaret MacMillan, history professor and great-granddaughter of peace negotiator David Lloyd George, refutes that argument yet draws a line from that day in Paris to nearly every subsequent battle and border dispute.
MacMillan sketches individual personalities, motivations, fears and leadership styles: the charming, befuddled negotiator Lloyd George, idealistic US president Woodrow Wilson, and wily French prime minister Georges Clemenceau (joined briefly by Italian leaders Vittorio Orlando and Sidney Sonninno.)She draws evocative pictures of Paris during that period, remaining compelling even when chronicling their leisure time.
From stuffy palace conference rooms, MacMillan pulls back to the personalities within a world map circa 1919 (and includes drawn maps to start the book). Nations defeated (Rumania, Austria-Hungary, Turkey) emerging (Albania), or victimized (Belgium) parade past the Big Four pleading their cases. Some hope to restore glory, (chapters on Poland and Greece), maintain political and territorial security (Italy's pursuit of Fiume includes the fascinating adventures of Italian hero Gabriele D'Annunzino) or seek national identity. To that end, Japan's emerging nationalism and military strength is sadly predicted; Allied refusal to include anti-discriminatory language in the treaty is blamed for Japanese nationalism, aggression in China, and its eventual attack on Pearl Harbor.)
Wilson's "Fourteen Points," which he compromised in Paris then obstinately held to for in a losing Congressional cause, makes him this book's tragic figure and, if not America's worst president, certainly its most disappointing. His lofty principles (briefly making him a messanic figure in MacMillan's first chapters) tragically fall to nationalism, ambition, fear, and politics.
Wilson's vague concept of "self-determination," which with the League of Nations were lynchpins of his Fourteen Points, arises consistently as leaders settle claims and untangle treaties across the Balkans to Palestine (and Zionism) and the Ottoman Empire. MacMillan concludes by saying traditional European paternalism and imperialism in the Third World helped undermine the peace process, causing hatreds and subsequent battles the reader can trace to the ongoing US liberation of Iraq. She even shows the concept's gruesome irony in that succinct conclusion.)
"Paris 1919" does more than drop names and dates and redraws maps (This as future world leaders from Hoover to Churchill to FDR to Ho Chi Minh step into scenes throughout). Ms. MacMillan allows not only individuals but nationalities, even countries and histories their own personality. She tells each story empathetically as much as achievable, to its ironic, often tragic conclusion. Understanding the dashed hopes following those six months in 1919 is essential to understanding world conflict since. Ms. MacMillan's near-flawless book is a thorough, entertaining way to read it. Essential.
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