Rating: 
Summary: Excellent
Review: By 'the end of history' Fukuyama means that humankind has found the ultimate form of governance and that the period of experimentation has come to an end. Hegel and Marx believed that the evolution of human societies would end when mankind had achieved a form of society that satisfies its deepest and most fundamental longings. For Hegel this was the liberal state while for Marx it was a communist society. Fukuyama believes that humanity will be led to liberal democracy.
The book is divided into five sections. Part I addresses the issue of universal history. As individuals we can be optimistic about the 20th century with its improving prospects of health and happiness but pessimistic at the slow progress towards liberal democracy. This 20th century pessimism is in contrast to the optimism of the 19th century marked by peace and improvements in material well being. Science was conquering disease and poverty and the spirit of 1776 and the French Revolution was spreading throughout the world. There was a feeling of accumulating knowledge, increasing wisdom and advancement from the lower to higher levels of intelligence and well being. Free trade was replacing empire building and it seemed that war would be economically irrational. But the 20th century started disastrously with thousands dying daily over a few yards of ground in World War I. Horrendous as this war turned out to be, it was only a foretaste of new forms of evil backed by modern technology and more sophisticated political organization. The ultimate evil of the holocaust emerged in a country with the most advanced industrial economy and one of the most cultured and well-educated populations in Europe, highlighting the need for technological progress to be accompanied by moral progress. Without moral progress, technology will be turned to evil purposes and mankind will be worse off than previously. However, the author argues that during the second half of the 20th century the world got better and the final quarter of the century saw communism and authoritarian governments collapsing or undergoing severe crisis. In most cases reforms were not imposed from the outside but were due to an internal crisis of confidence that had infected the ruling elite. In Fukuyama's opinion liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration spanning the globe and this is his basis of optimism. After a millenium of experimentation and false starts humankind can at last see the light at the end of the tunnel and this is his rational for drawing our attention to the need to plan the next steps. Part II uses natural science to explain the direction and coherence of history, based on the fact that technology confers a decisive military advantage and limitless wealth. The logic of natural science seems to dictate a move towards capitalism; the world's most developed countries are also its most successful democracies. Part III introduces the concept of man's struggle for recognition. Only man can move beyond self-preservation for the sake of higher, abstract principles and goals. Much of human behavior can be explained as a combination of desire and reason, but Hegel maintains that self-esteem drives the whole historical process. When we are not recognized we feel anger; when we fall short of our own sense of worth we feel shame; and when we are correctly evaluated we feel pride. It is self-esteem that drives men into a battle to the death, creating masters of those willing to risk their lives and slaves of those who give in. But the relationship of lordship and bondage would ultimately fail because humanity is not complete. Lordship and bondage led to the French and American revolutions to be replaced by the principles of popular sovereignty, the rule of law and universal and reciprocal recognition. Adoption of these principles should ensure that every citizen recognizes the dignity and humanity of every other citizen. Dissatisfaction with the flawed recognition available in aristocratic societies caused revolutions while Communism is being superceded by liberal democracy primarily because it has a defective form of recognizing man's self-worth. Seeking recognition has been the central problem of politics for the past millenium; it was the origin of tyranny and the desire to dominate. The author warns us that communities must cater to the desire for recognition while protecting themselves from its destructive effects. The deeper and more profound question concerns the goodness of liberal democracy itself and not only whether it will succeed against its rivals. The internal contradictions have already lead to such serious problems as drugs, homelessness, crime, environmental damage and consumerism. Part IV questions whether today's liberal democracy is completely satisfying because capitalism creates economic inequality and equal people are recognized unequally. In addition peace and prosperity leaves unsatisfied that part of us that seeks struggle, danger, risk and daring. Part V: The Last Man brings us to the important part of the book which can be summed up by these sentences: "Common sense would indicate that liberal democracy has many advantages over its 20th-century rivals, fascism and communism, while loyalty to our inherited values and traditions would dictate unquestioning commitment to democracy. But the cause of liberal democracy is not necessarily best served by unthinking partisanship, and by the failure to address squarely democracy's failings. And it is obviously impossible to answer the question of whether history has come to an end without looking more deeply at the question of democracy and its discontents." Left to itself can liberal democracy be indefinitely self-sustaining, or will it collapse from internal rot much as communism has done? This is the part of the book which we must study carefully to ensure that never again will technology and sophisticated political systems be turned to evil purposes leaving mankind worse off than he was before.
Rating: 
Summary: People Still Take this Seriously?
Review: Fukuyama's book has become a somewhat amusing example of how not to practice history. Very few academics take this man seriously, perhaps we should. Essentially, the author allowed himself to be caught up in the wave of triumphalism that followed the fall of Communism 1989-91. Similar mistakes were made by such notable right-wing academics as Samuel Huntingon and John Lewis Gaddis, but none so completely as Fukuyama. When one cuts through the Hegelianism of the author's argument--which stands as a curiosity in itself to anyone with any familiarity with sub-altern studies--one is struck by the author's brazen arrogance: we are at the end of history, liberal-capitalism is the greatest thing ever, hooray for us. If discounting thousands of years of history that chronicle the rise and fall of every system and civilization conceived by mankind sounds reasonable to you, it won't be much of a stretch to accept Fukuyama's argument. Otherwise you may want to consider the momentous events (ethnic wars, religious conflict, etc.) that hint at the less-than-complete acceptance of the liberal-capitalist world order by significant portions of the world population and send this monograph to the pile of works, ancient and new, that ignore the past in favor of a self-serving version of the present.
Rating: 
Summary: He's not optimistic
Review: Fukuyama argues in The End of History that 'the last man [i.e., us] becomes concerned above all for his own personal health and safety, because it is uncontroversial.... For Americans, the health of their bodies - what they eat and drink, the exercise they get, the shape they are in - has become a far greater obsession than the moral questions that tormented their forebears'. He doesn't seem to think that the victory of market economies is much of a victory. It has become the universal way of organizing society, but life itself, in his view, has become worthless.
Rating:
Summary: The Most Influential Book of the 1990's?
Review: Without question, "The End of History and the Last Man" is one of the finest affirmations of liberal democracy which I've read. Perhaps a more suitable alternative title could be "The Triumph of Democracy" since Fukuyama makes a very persuasive case for democracy's rapid rise during the last half of the 20th Century and why it may be the best form of government ever devised by man. Fukuyama uses Marxist dialectic reasoning in his arguments, drawing upon science and capitalism as twin pillars of human endeavor which he believes have made democracy's rise inevitable. While addressing the rise and fall of the Soviet empire, Fukuyama makes some important comments on the rise of militant Islam which are revelant today, suggesting that it, too, will also fail. Admittedly this is a difficult book to read, and one appreciated most by those familiar with Hegel's or Weber's writings. Still, I don't think it's hyperbole to suggest that Fukuyama's tome was the most important, most influential book on political history published in the last decade of the 20th Century.
Rating: 
Summary: now?
Review: I first read this book in 1992/93. At the time I thought it was entertaining, and insightful, especially as it came on the back of the devolution of the Soviet Union. Since its publication, this book has been subject to considerable debate by both adherents and opponents. The book proposes that the liberal democratic system operating a capitalist system is the end point of political history - ie that mankind has settled on a system of government that provides the best approach to regulating human affairs. Given the failure of communism, the failure of dictatorships (of the left and the right), I think this thesis holds true. What opponents of the book/argument don't understand is that the author (I believe) is not suggesting that liberal democracy is not without its flaws, and occasionally will generate significant governance problems. (Take the seriously flawed Florida election ballot counting process in the Bush vs Gore US Federal Presidential election.) But what the thesis suggests is that the system is signficantly robust to work through problems, and deliver benefits on the other side. This ability to hande internal political problems without course to violence or repression is not a trait readily found in other political systems. Fukuayma gets 'beaten' up too often for just suggesting that liberal democracy overall is a good thing, that it works, and it has succeeded other political systems because it works and people overall like it. Opponents of this thesis ought to remember that only in liberal democratic systems can opponents of the prevailing political status quo argue for its change or abolition. Try doing that when subejct to a dictatorship!
Rating:
Summary: Fukuyama needs a dictionary
Review: ...to look up the meaning of the word 'teleology.'
Rating:
Summary: Consider the source . . .
Review: I did enjoy this book when i first read it two years ago. However, with the invasion of Iraq, I discovered the author, Professor Fukuyama, is a member of the warmongering group (Project for a New American Century PNAC) along with Rumsfield, Pearle, and i think Cheney. Upon relection, it seems this book serves to propagandize to assist in the inflicting of The American Way on weaker nations. Noam Chomsky is a much better source of information on what kind of democracy is practiced by the powerful nations.
Rating:
Summary: A Very Good Argument for Liberal Democracy
Review: Fukuyama does an excellent job of arguing his case, that democratization is man at his political best and the telos of human political history. In other words, the book is great because it forcefully presents an argument and makes the reader think critically about man as a political creature and what ultimately satisfies. However, the book does have some distracting peculiarities. First, Fukuyama's obsession with Hegel. Sometimes, you get the feeling that Hegel is plugged in just for the name value; it often doesn't advance the case. Fukuyama spends forever defending the idea of the linearity of history, when it could have been done more succinctly. (On that note, Fukuyama invited critical scorn upon himself with such a pompous book title. Fukuyama totally ignores man's other pursuits, like religion, and puts political dreams as the ultimate.) And not all the chapters reinforced each other; (you get the feeling sometimes Fukuyama just strung together his journal articles or something.) But the book has real strenghts. Fukuyama's insights into Nietzsche's critique of democracy is priceless. Also, I really enjoyed Fukuyama's treatment of the Hegelian "thymotic" origins of state. In short, Fukuyama's ambitious work is a good read, will make you think, but not a masterpiece.
Rating:
Summary: A Misunderstood Masterpiece
Review: After 9-11, it became easy to make fun of "The End of History and The Last Man". The book's title suggested to some a triumphant valedictory for liberal democracy, and yet the epitome of liberal democratic values -- the West -- was now mired in another seemingly endless struggle. Especially for those who never read the work, the phrase "the end of history" became something one only said with scorn. Cynics felt obligated to point out that one more philosophy of the world had fallen into the meat grinder of history, never to be seen again. But this book still has relevance in the post 9-11 world. Despite the vulgarization of its title, Fukuyama did not predict an end to conflict. What's more, he also did not cast the future in an unremittingly optimistic light. In some ways his themes -- particularly in the second half of the book when he focuses on the Nietzschean concept of The Last Man -- are decidedly darker than even keen reviewers of the work have noted. Liberal democracy may have triumphed, but its victory had costs for the collective psyche of its denizens. "The End of History and The Last Man" came out in the wake of the fall and breakup of the Soviet Union. With the collapse of global communism, Fukuyama claimed the fundamental values of liberal democracy and market capitalism were now unchallenged. What's more, no other ideologies on the horizon appeared attractive or effective enough to usurp them -- ever. Yes, some countries or regions might fall under the sway of an ideology (Islamic fundamentalism) or a cultural conceit (Asian values), but too much of the globe now accepted that societies should be organized under the principles of liberal democracy and market capitalism for there ever to be a major reversal in its fortunes around the world. Thus, ideological conflict on a global scale was over. And so history -- in the Hegelian sense of the clash of competing ideologies -- was over as well. What kind of man would this post-historical world create? Fukuyama explores this in the second half of the book - a section I feel is neglected by too many readers. Here, Fukuyama shifts his conceptual lens from the philosophy of Hegel and its focus on ideological conflict as the motor of history to the psychological insights of Friedrich Nietzsche. Having used Hegel to show how history might be ending, he now uses Nietzsche to show how empty and meaningless this ending might become. We have reached the end of the history, Fukuyama claims, but Nietzsche shows how unsatisfying that endpoint is. What happens when men are all recognized as equal and the struggle for everything except the accumulation of more material goods is over? What will they value? "The End of History and The Last Man" and its themes will outlast its critics. 9-11 did not restart history, because Islamic fundamentalism does not represent the same serious ideological competitor that was once represented by communism. (It's highly doubtful that even a majority of Muslims desire it, and whatever the case in the Muslim countries, it's certainly true that its attractiveness is strictly limited to those of the Islamic faith.) This beautifully written book weaves different strands of philosophy, international relations, and political science into a brilliant argument that overwhelms simplistic criticisms of it. There are weak points to Fukuyama's arguments in the book - some of which he addressed himself later in his career - but few recognize them. The book still deserves a careful reading. Serious political and social commentators will be dealing with its arguments for some time.
Rating:
Summary: An Important Turn in an Ancient Debate
Review: I only wish I'd read Fukuyama's book after taking a slew of political theory courses in the early '90s. At a minimum, he brings a millenium-old debate over the ideal form of government and human nature up-to-date. The book reviews the contributions of Plato, Aristotle, Macchiavelli, Hegel, Hobbes, Locke, Marx and Nietzsche to political theory and inquires whether liberal democracy is the final outcome. Unfortunately, the book is erroneously interpreted by many as conclusive rather than inquisitive. Fukuyama has posed an important question that he knows only history in the making itself can answer. His analogies are not always logical, and the book's contents on Hegel are repetitive. Fukuyama's strength, however, is that he focuses on what is univeral in human nature and politics unlike Huntington and other academics who argue that some cultures are incompatible with liberal democracy. His work ranks among the most worthy political science books of the last decade that I have read.
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