The End of History and the Last Man

Rating:
Summary: Failing to consider War and Remembering
Review: Francis Fukuyama's thesis in The End of History and the Last Man is: the combination of liberal democracy and free market capitalism are the most essentially rewarding structure of government and technique of economic organization, embodies the concluding stage of human government and organization. Fukuyama, moreover, posits that capitalism is at the end of the day the only feasible economic system in the "modern" world and that all countries/states will eventually espouse free market capitalism. Essential to this thesis is that both science and technology performs the function of a "regulator or mechanism to explain the directionality and coherence of history." Eventually, according to Fukuyama, all human societies, irrespective of their cultural or historical configuration, are inescapably drawn into a global consumer culture. Fukuyama deftly argues but fails to eventually convince via a theoretical/philosophical discourse in an effort to argue his thesis. Taking his lead from Hegel (through Kojeve) Fukuyama tries to craft a tran-historical standard through which to judge history. The vehicle for this historical explanation is the concept of "thymos" or a Platonic sense of spiritedness. Developing his thesis, Fukuyama begins this argument with science and technology, as a fulcrum behind history. As mentioned previously, thymos is a platonic concept, which for Plato really denotes spiritedness. However, for Fukuyama means, "desire for recognition." For Fukuyama this sense of or need for recognition is the guiding force for or of history and its eventual culmination in liberal democracy and the coming to presence of the Nietzschean 'Last Man' in all of us. The problem, I believe with The End of History and the Last Man is how Fukuyama underestimates the power of remembering. Taking his concept of Thymos, I get the sense that Asia will have real difficulty forming a European Union like configuration mainly because of its war memories and the sense of thymos that is denied them. In most narratives, World War II in the pacific was fought between two countries - the US and Japan. This narrative is, however, not reflective of reality. In fact, the war in the pacific began as early as the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, on China's eastern seaboard, in 1931. The attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent attack on the Philippines are ingrained in the hearts and minds of all the countries that engaged Japan: Singapore, Malaya, the Philippines, and Korea - to name a few. If Fukuyama's thesis of thymos is correct, the re-creation of an Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and region-wide mistrust could very well be one factor that will hamper if not defeat a s possible Asian union. Moreover, end this is where the argument of Fukuyama begins to, at least for me, to falter is that in an effort for his model to work we need to accept the Hegelian Master/Slave dichotomy. Fukuyama believes that it is this tension that allows for the progression to the end of history. So like Meiji Japan we too as a world will experience a lull in development and become soft? Will we need the Meiji fear of conquest to get us jump-started? In Fukuyama's argument, when and if stability is reached we will need to jump-start the process all over again by contending that as well? Perhaps an argument can be made that we are constantly in a state of flux and there will be, at the end of the day, no REAL end of history. I appreciate the read and analysis of Kojeve and Hegel but when I looked at the list of references instead of finding anything on Kojeve I found several references to Leo Strauss instead. For anyone interested in finding out about Kojeve this might not be the best place to look. I have to admit that this is perhaps one of the most cogent and compelling read but just like Samuel Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations (also available on Amazon.com) the explanations are, ultimately, too simplistic.

Miguel Llora

Rating:
Summary: Controversial, well-argued book for political theorists
Review: The End of History and the Last Man is one of the most controversial and perhaps most misunderstood works of modern political theory.

Fukuyama's argument, originally developed in a shorter 1989 National Interest article, contends that the ideals of liberal democracy and free-market capitalism may "constitute the 'end point of mankind's ideological evolution' and the 'final form of human government.'" By conquering fascism and communism (and theocracy and monarchy before that), liberal democracy has emerged as the unchallenged political philosophy of choice, apparently free from "fundamental internal contradictions."

The first part of Fukuyama's book relies heavily on Hegelian philosophy and introduces the concept of History--a directional, evolutionary process resulting in some final ideological state. Synthesizing a combination of history, science, political theory, and philosophy, Fukuyama argues that liberal democracy may represent Hegel's End of History.

In the second part of the book, Fukuyama transitions to discussing the Nietzschean idea of the Last Man who would emerge at the End of History. While the End of History appears on the surface to be a source of human fulfillment, Fukuyama uses Nietzsche to question whether the Last Man would indeed be fully fulfilled or would rather live a purposeless existence.

While Fukuyama's thesis is extremely controversial, his argument is highly philosophical and well-argued. Throughout the book, he presents evidence from a wide range of fields to support his claims and anticipates and pre-empts several important counter-arguments.

Following September 11, 2001, many people simply scoffed at Fukuyama's audacious title. The Global War on Terror and the ideological battle between Western liberalism and Islamic fundamentalism seemed to undermine any notion that history was over. Much of this criticism originates from a misunderstanding of Fukuyama's original thesis. His End of History does not predict the end of struggle or major historical events. On the contrary, he predicts that their may indeed be great struggles between Western liberal democratic ideals, and competing Islamic fundamentalist or Asian ideals.

Because this book relies heavily on Hegelian and Nietzschean philosophy and makes subtle political, sociological, and psychological arguments, it is not an easy book for the general reader--it is clearly authored for political theorists. The book is very densely written and is occasionally overly repetitive in places. While the book is an important contribution to modern political theory, I believe that general readers will find Fukuyama's original National Interest article a more digestible and concise version of his argument.