Rating: 
Summary: Exhaustive analysis of foriegn policy?
Review: The situation analyzed in Of Paradise and Power is certainly an intriguing one. Kagan paints with a broad brush and is thus prone to overlook some finer points. His main thesis, summarized, is that Europe, and European countries, are not quite as important today as they were in the 20th century. In this case 'importance' refers to military capability and hence global influence. Mr. Kagan argues that although Europe (considering it as the European Union) and European countries are economically important and powerful, their economic might does not translate into international influence. For instance, European countries are major consumers of Middle Eastern oil, but when discussing diplomacy in the Middle East, Europe is, as far as the Middle Easterners are concerned, slightly irrelevant: the United States is, because of its economic and military power, the only country that commands enough respect to be taken seriously. The author surveys Europe's military power and, rightfully, concludes that it is insufficient to exert appreciable force in its own backyard, much less in Asia or Africa or the Middle East.
Mr. Kagan also argues that Europe's military weakness is a result of World War II and Cold War dependency on the United States. After WW II Europe was devastated and unable to oppose the Soviet Union, Kagan writes, and therefore relied on the U.S. to pursue international activities and diplomacy and keep global order. What military was maintained by Western Europe was designed solely for defense against a Soviet invasion. This psychology of weakness has supposedly led to a championing of international law and order. The desire for international law to be respected and obeyed is thus really an attempt to wield power while being weak: if the United Nations calls the shots, then the U.S. is cut down to size.
For all of Europe's praise of peaceful negotiations and orderly, multilateral international diplomacy, though, Kagan maintains they are failing to acknowledge that it was in fact devastating war that enabled them to nurture a peaceful society. Prior to the destruction of WW II, Europeans were primarily concerned with winning international glory via military conquests: it took that final destruction to finally tame them. Thus, Europeans are in a sense blinded in that they don't understand the best way to pursue peace is through war. America understands, however, and Americans should accept that Europeans should not, especially in the post-Cold War era, have the authority to lead the world. We need to, for the good of the world, get used to a little bit of American hegemony.
Kagan's ultimate goal, of course, is to justify relatively unrestrained American military action. The most honest point he makes is that sometimes war is necessary to produce the right environment for peace; too many peaceful people ignore that truth. I doubt that most Americans are quite so altruistic: I'll be surprised if the day comes when many Americans are willing and determined to go off to battle in the name of humanitarian purposes. I also doubt that Kagan is likewise such a high-minded humanitarian. Producing a peaceful and prosperous society takes more than laying a country to waste, and Kagan conveniently ignores this point. It takes a genuine cultural desire for peace and willingness from all segments of society to work toward widespread prosperity - ingredients that don't magically appear when a country has been defeated in war. American people, on the average, do not appear willing, either domestically or in foreign affairs, to seriously work toward creating those conditions.
Also, Kagan's 'psychology of weakness' accusation against Europe doesn't sit well with me. There is certainly some truth that a weaker group will avoid conflict when possible, i.e., the bear/hunter analogy. But was that the case with Europe and the Soviet Union (I wonder if Kagan purposely uses a bear to symbolize danger, as in the 'Russian Bear"?) Here I think Kagan, as well as many others, slightly misunderstands the Cold War and exaggerates the Soviet threat. How often did the Soviet Union launch a military invasion to conquer a country? Not very. It gained all of Eastern Europe en masse after World War II. In the rest of the world the strategy was to arm and supply indigenous militants, such as in Vietnam, or Cuba. All of the countries that the Soviet Union sought to turn Soviet had, before the Soviets became involved, unstable governments. The Soviets weren't ever seriously considering sending out Russian armies to conquer the free world; they were preying on downtrodden peoples with unstable governments and instigating internal revolution. Europe, with a satisfied populace genuinely engaged in government and striving to improve life for all, presented little opportunity for the Soviets. Vietnam, China, Cuba, Korea, Laos, etc. were fertile ground.
So, the Europeans, for the past 50 years, haven't been weak - they've been strong. Does the definition of national greatness require a powerful military and military conquest? But what about terrorism? Kagan doesn't try to explore or analyze the reasons for anti-American terrorism. And are terrorists like bear? As long as we're using simple woodland analogies, terrorists seem more like bees. It's curious, too, that the 'strong' hunter seems to rely mainly on his rifle.
Rating: 
Summary: Interesting book but ignores European subtleties
Review: Being a latecomer to this book and having read the other reviews, I agree with almost all of them -- both positive and negative. Still the book is well-written and avoids the pitfall of recounting already known facts. The author's main objective is to put forward a simple thesis -- thereby ignoring or brushing aside a lot of the complexities of the "real" world events. But the question is not whether everyone agrees or disagrees with Dr. Kagan's thesis. The book succeeds, in my opinion, in making the reader think about a number of issues: the role of military power, the role of US in the world, the meaning of "the West", and what might happen in the future. It provides a framework with which one can both agree and disagree, but a framework nevertheless. For that, Dr. Kagan needs to be commended. Yes, Dr. Kagan can be reproached -- as he is in some of the reviews -- the simplicity of his broadbrush approach.
But the book still manages to shed an interesting light -- albeit in a single wavelength -- on this complex subject. No one book can account for the complexity and many facets (trade, culture, politics, military power, relations with other 3rd parties, etc.) of the issue of US-European relations. The informed reader can fill in a lot of the other wavelengths.
The main shortcoming of the book, in my opinion, is that it paint Europe as One, when in fact reaction to the US invasion of Iraq (or liberation as your point of view might be) has been far from united there -- unveiling major divergences between UK and Spain on the one side and France and Germany on the other, as well as between the "old" europe and the "new". And Europe's recent diplomatic success in bringing Iran to open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection is something to be noticed. [Can "the West" now succeed with a new good cop -- bad cop routine?] In that respect, I would agree that Dr. Kagan's conclusion falls short. He misses the rift between European nations -- which may well become large than the divergence between the US and Europe as portrayed in this book. The future will tell. Still, I encourage you to read this short and easy to read book. I, for one, feel smarter for having done so.
Rating: 
Summary: A Genuine Page Turner On U.S.-European Relations
Review: Robert Kagan has just made it easy to understand the uneasy relationship between Europe and the United States. This surprisingly short book - the hardback version is only 103 pages - is filled with valuable insight into the nature of U.S.-European relations. Of Paradise And Power is exceptionally well written. It can be read in one setting. Unlike so many other books on international affairs, this is a page turner. If you are frustrated with the French, think the Germans are no longer germane or that the Americans arrogant, this book will help you to understand the motives and historical trends behind the behavior in these nations. Francis Fukuyama described this book as "brilliant." He may be right. This book gives you the context you need to understand and interpret today's news articles about Europe and the U.S. If you want to know why there has been so much bickering between French and the U.S. over Iraq, this book is for you.
Rating: 
Summary: Scattered. Wandering. Laughable.
Review: I can't believe this rambling essay made it past the editor. Kagan is way too verbose, using far flung examples to reach his conclusions. The essay is awful. It will have no impact on anyone in the state dept., and will be forgotten in very short order.
To make a point, Kagan's constantly personifies countries. "US determination", "American hegemony", "European passivity". Is he kidding? Does he really believe countries have personalites, goals and desires? He speaks in terms of America as if it's a monarchy. He speaks in terms of Europe as if it's a cohesive whole, consistent in it's decision making, unified in it's statecraft. The examples he uses are scattered, ranging from pre-1776 to 1998. At the end of this essay, he actually relies on using Jefferson's and Frankin's "ideals and intentions for this new country they founded." Huh? Does he actually think the thoughts of these dead forefathers have anything to do with 21st century diplomacy? He speaks of America's "Manifest Destiny when it was founded". Does he really believe that is important when nations compete for dominance?
He doesn't speak of "France's Napoleonic Destiny" though. For France, he speaks of their "inherent European sensibilities." He selectively chooses examples and metaphors to force his conclusions. He isn't presenting ALL the information, just interpretations to support his pre-conceived conclusions.
Kagan is inconsistent in the examples he uses to prove a point. When he wants the reader to feel the US is spending a large amount on defense, he speaks in terms of "$300 billion". When he wants the reader to feel the US is spending a small amount, and the country should increase it's spending, he states "The US spends only 2% of their entire budget on defense."
I find this choosing of statistics and numbers manipulative. I find the books of Huntington and Kaplan to be realistic and thorough. Kagan's essay is manipulative and selective. Kagan could have written this in 20 pages, instead of the 120 he uses.
It's literally impossible for any diplomat to use the information in this book to make a single policy decision. It's a bunch of rambling, scattered ideas, bunched together and thrown on the pages. No conclusion is ever reached, other than "America should continue to rule the world with it's Pax Americana".
Rating:
Summary: Emmanuel Todd vs Robert Kagan
Review: Emmanuel Todd is a Europhile of the first degree. His arguments for the 'decline' of America are laughable, demonstrating virtually no grasp of even the most basic of economics. Todd sees all current events through the prism of history, likening American variously to any number of past European empires - including the Soviet Union - depending on which aspect you ask him about. At a time when America spends a paltry portion of its economy on its military and is increasing its military capability and lead by the measures of all other countries as well as independent analysts, Todd claims that power is actually "barely affordable" by America and is declining. Todd's main claim to fame - other than making extravagant and ludicrous claims about America - is that he "predicted the fall of the Soviet Union" in a 1976 book based on such things as rising infant mortality rates. Gosh, not many people predicted the fall of the Soviet Union, did they? Attempting to compare the hysterically Europhile Todd to Kagan is questionable, to put it kindly.
Rating:
Summary: Illuminating and accurate - except for Europhiles
Review: There is little more I can say about this book that hasn't been accurately summed up in previous reviews, and it's rather telling that a handful of Europhiles had such a strong negative reaction (claiming that America is no longer economically dominant, that Europe could possibly build up a 'matching' military capability, and that generally the book "panders" to Americans who need to face the reality of some sort of inevitable decline). Kagan undoubtedly presupposed many of these hysterical criticisms and counter-arguments, and has included more than enough content do dispose of each and more. The fact is that America is militarily dominant to a degree that simply cannot be matched by anyone in the first half of this century, if ever should it actually decide to maintain that dominance. Europe - even a 'united' Europe - has neither the will nor the resources to try to compete; and to what end would such an attempted buildup move the two continents? If no nation has undertaken tremendous military build-ups out of the knowledge that attempting to do so would be a losing proposition economically and ultimately militarily in the face of America's power, then an attempted European build-up could only be aimed at one target - America itself. Given that for Europe to even attempt to build a comparable military capability would require massive shifts in European industry, the wholesale scuttling of costly social programs upon which much of European society is predicated, and decades of military production and expansion, it's hard to see how this is even a pipe dream to anyone but the most ardent Europhile who has no actual grasp of the military and technological disparity. And this doesn't begin to get into the matter of American economic dominance, which so many Europhiles like to claim no longer exists. The fact is that America's GDP, even after EU expansion beyond 2004, will always be at least comparable to the basket of 25 or 30 or more European nations, and will move as, grow as, and be taxed as a single entity. That entity feeds an already-existing, nearly insurmountable American military lead to the tune of a paltry 4% of GDP. I short, America is already a good decade ahead of Europe in military technology, is literally trillions ahead in already-implemented military hardware and capacity, and is maintaining it all while growing its lead with a smaller percentage of its economy than it's used to spending. This is not something that someone simply "builds up" a match for. And from this situation springs the crux of Kagan's thesis, and the 'awful truth' so difficult for Europhiles to swallow. The EU will undoubtedly develop its own defense capability independent of NATO (and hence of America), and it will very likely be a very credible one able to project small but capable regional power for periods of time. It will develop more smart weapons, its own GPS system, acquire much-improved logistical capability, and even a few small aircraft carriers. But it will still not remotely match America's power. By the end of this or the next decade you will see an America and an EU with roughly similar economic resources, but with dramatically different capabilities for tapping and spending those resources on the global stage. Barring a voluntary draw-down by America, the military imbalance will persist for as far as anyone can see, and America will continue to be more willing to use its power while Europe will continue to be less willing to support such use. (Again, unless it benefits strictly European interests, as in the Balkans when there was no Security Council authorization for action yet the Europeans had no qualms about American application of force.) I do not find these realities to be as depressing as some reviewers here have, however, and I don't believe Kagan does, either. America founded the United Nations and fostered European integration, just as it has similarly fostered Chinese entrance into the WTO and integration into the global economy. While our current administration may be less 'multilateral' than the previous, Americans as a whole wish to work whenever possible within multilateral institutions. This is a long-standing current in American philosophy and society that will almost certainly - after a time - dispose us again more to the United Nations. For Europe's part, as it gains further independence of military operations and feels its oats as a united 'great power' it will invariably find less distaste for military action, and will exert itself more forcefully in global politics. Should relations with Europe remain relatively steady, this should bode favorable for less conflict between the EU and America when one feels it needs to act with force. (Whereas today Europe is loathe to so much as consider the use of force for fear of its inability to so much as contribute becoming a major issue for the third or fourth time in a decade.) While none of this ensures smooth sailing ahead by any means, even the most casual student of international politics knows the sailing has never - ever - been smooth. Kagan simply proposes that we put down the accusations of 'cowboy'-ism and 'wimpiness', accept certain realities for what they are, and find a way to work together toward our otherwise common goals and philosophies together in an increasingly diverse and complex world.
Rating:
Summary: Good book, but missed an interesting aspect or two
Review: All in all, this is good book for anyone interested in the relationship between Europe and the USA, and how each views the world and their role in it. Kagan shows how, to no surprise, both Europe and the USA use the tools available to them to their own advantage. Because those tools differ, their approaches to the world differ - and as the difference in their tools increases, so do their approaches.
One thing it would have been nice for Kagan to discuss is how Britain appears to differ significantly from the other large European countries. Britian sides with the USA much more often than Germany or France, and isn't shy about it. This will put Britian in a position where it will have to choose between the two at some point. Discussing how this impacts Britian, the overall EU, and Britian's role in the EU, would be an interesting topic.
Rating:
Summary: So what?
Review: Interesting to read and a credible explanation of the European and American POV of the world since WW2. So Europe thanks to the USA has solved a paradox that baffled Kant and lives in a post-modern age of peace. If only it were so. True, the great wars of the 20th century broke within just 30 years not only the power but also the will of the European nations to intervene abroad. But they also created the will to form the European Union and to live together in peace. This situation is not unique: Canada, Australia and Latin America also view the world that way. The USA (and to a certain degree Russia, who is overlooked in this essay) differs: they get involved. The picture Kagan presents is from a movie like "High Noon". The sheriff (USA) and the barkeeper in the saloon (Europe): one faces the gang, the other accommodate it and tries to be overlooked. The interesting question will be who survives and who prospers in the future. The USA grows in population and power; the burden of being the sheriff is a relatively small one. Which makes an interesting comparison with the late 19th century when Britain was in a similar situation. Unfortunately Kaman does not discuss the cost-benefit ratio of being the leading power. True, you get lots of enemies and conflicts, but also lots of capital and the best and brightest people from abroad. Britain had to fight "Queen Victoria's Little Wars" (an excellent book BTW) but she got much in return. The situation the USA finds itself in today looks similar. That the perspective of the other nations (the has-beens) is different is also not exactly news. So in the end Kagan's essay tells us that the USA and Europe see the world differently, that this has in reality been so since WW2 and will continue for the foreseeable future. So what? Big news! Therefore and since the essence of this essay can be found in a quality paper every other weekend you need not buy this book to get the message.
Rating:
Summary: A great read but just a little too simplistic
Review: This, along with the original article, was a fascinating read, but the whole thesis is just a little too simple. I think it would probably be fairer to say that neoconservative Republicans are from Mars - but then so too are "liberal hawks" in the Democratic party. Likewise, few people could have been more pro-American than the Poles, who are very proud of being Europeans but are very much on the hawk side when it came to the war on Iraq. So not that straightforward! Christopher Catherwood, author of CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS AND ISLAMIC RAGE (Zondervan, 2003)
Rating:
Summary: Concise and illuminating; puzzling conclusion
Review: The many months of debate prior to the invasion of Iraq highlighted a conflict in philosophy and viewpoints between America and Europe. America, as Kagan describes it, maintains a "Hobbesian" view of international affairs, especially after September 11th, 2001. That is, the world can be a dangerous place where existence can be "nasty, brutish and short" and diplomacy, negotiation, pacification, simply do not work and can in fact lead to the death of many more innocents. On the other hand, there is Europe, which Kagan labels "Kantian," with an outlook of perpetual peace with emphasis on diplomacy, negotiation, etc. Kagan emphasizes that much of Europe's rejection of military action and power politics stems from American military protection since the World Wars as well as a weakening of Europe's own military force. Kagan draws a comparison between Europe of today vs. America at its founding. In both instances, the countries were militarily weak and diplomacy was the wise thing to do. (Conversely, Europe during the 1700s and into the 1800s was militarily powerful as is America today.) This is significant in explaining Europe's pacifism and America's perceived "aggression." When one has a "big stick," he will likely see threats more clearly and will act on them with greater conviction. Those without such a "stick" will seek to avoid trouble or atleast not confront it until necessary. Hence, most of Europe's constant rejection of invasion with Iraq and America's insistence that Iraq was already menace and was bound to harm millions with WMDs. Kagan's explanations are concise and usually clear but his ending was puzzling. After arguing that both sides are far apart, he concludes by emphasizing the importance that both the US and Europe "communicate" with one another. Has that not been happening all along? Communication can occur and need not lead to agreement, right? He gently criticizes the US advising it to "play nice" with Europe and not "fear" it. Kagan does not point out that if any fear is occuring, it has been Europe fearing any use of US military force (unless that US military force is protecting Europe, then all is well); it is not the US "fearing" anyone else.
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