Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order

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Summary: Brilliant Analysis of the Euro-American Relationship
Review: Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order
Robert Kagan
Albert A. Knopf, 2003.
103 pages.

In the months prior to the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, European statesmen captured headlines as they expressed their solidarity in rejecting American appeals for decisive action. What was first European reluctance slowly degenerated into acrimonious debate and intransigence, which exposed the previously latent distrust between continental Europeans and Americans. Robert Kagan, a monthly columnist for the Washington Post, explores the sources of this trans-Atlantic conflict in his brilliant essay, Of Paradise and Power. Kagan's analysis of the American and European psyches is incisive. Although both communities are "children of the Enlightenment" with a common cultural and philosophical lineage, Kagan argues that their dissimilar histories and current geopolitical realities have created deep and lasting fissures in the trans-Atlantic relationship. Kagan opines, "On the all-important question of power---the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power---American and European perspectives are diverging." Although the existence of a Euro-American tension is readily apparent to any informed person, Kagan elucidates the debate with his unique perspective as an expatriate and gifted scholar.
The concatenation of sheer desperation (distilled from centuries of internecine conflict) with brave diplomacy transformed cautious steps toward cooperation in the form of the European Steel and Coal Community to the current European Union. Economic unification led to tentative first steps towards political unification in the form of supranational organizations which led many foreign policy mavens to believe that the emergence of a powerful European bloc capable of rivaling the United States was within sight. The Balkans crisis served as the first true test of European power. Confronted with real challenges within their own continent, Europeans exposed their own "military incapacity and disarray" , undoubtedly products of decades of neglect in defense spending in the member countries. With the NATO air campaign in Kosovo, Europeans were confronted with the awful truth that their "ability and will...to project decisive force into regions of conflict...were negligible" compared to their technologically superior American allies. As Americans engaged in a decades long armaments race with their Communist foe, Europeans enjoyed relative peace and prosperity under the American nuclear umbrella, indeed a "sizable peace dividend" , as they devoted their energies to economic rehabilitation and social welfare programs. According to Kagan, the existence of an almost insurmountable Euro-American gap in military hardware and force projection capabilities is a primary but not exclusive source of trans-Atlantic tension.
Significant corollaries to this "power gap" are the resulting divergent perspectives on the utility of military force and perceptions of threats to security. Lacking the military means to significantly influence, let alone resolve, international conflicts, Europeans have adopted "strategies of the weak" . Europeans abjure the use of military power and opt instead for resolutions that appeal to their strengths: diplomacy and economic inducements. Alternatively, America's "unipolar moment has an entirely natural and predictable consequence: It makes the United States more willing to use force abroad."
This disparity also leads to the paradox of power. Europeans, though militarily impotent, have a higher threshold for perceived threats to security than do Americans. Raising the bar lowers the occurrence, which appeals to a continent self-conscious of their declining military. In contrast, America's "unipolar moment" and economic prosperity not only make her more vulnerable to attacks of jealousy and rage as in September 11, but also equip her with Roosevelt's "big stick", capable of decisive action anywhere on the globe.
Kagan's examination of Europe's philosophical evolution is particularly insightful. The authors of Machtpolitik and raison d'etat, Europeans finally realized the futility of militarism and power politics following the sheer scale and scope of the horrors they witnessed in the twentieth century. Kagan quotes a senior British diplomat Robert Cooper, "In the 'postmodern world' raison d'etat and the amorality of Machiavelli's theories of statecraft...have been replaced by a moral consciousness." Kagan argues that the "power gap" alone does not explain European unwillingness to even attempt to compete as a dominant military power. For much of Europe, the first half of the twentieth century is remembered with revulsion, and "the modern European strategic culture represents a conscious rejection of the European past, a rejection of the evils of European Machtpolitik." In their current bliss free from the fires of war and conflict, Europeans willingly traded Hobbes for Kant in their pursuit of the "state of universal peace".
Kagan's seminal essay on the historical and philosophical foundations of the current Euro-American split is brilliant in its analysis and content. He provides order to the current debate and his blend of realism and idealism (although more former than latter) resonates with the current tenor of American sentiment and more importantly, diplomacy. His roadmap for repairing the current split, though assuredly not palatable to all, is sound. Kagan advocates American sensitivity to European concerns when American vital interests are not at stake and pursuit of a unilateralist policy when it does. For Europe, Kagan encourages "the atavistic impulses that still swirl in the hearts of Germans, Britons, and Frenchmen" and rearm in order to regain influence commensurate to their economic and moral status. But most of all, "the task, for both Europeans and Americans, is to readjust to the new reality of American hegemony." Perhaps then, both Europe and America will realize their interdependence. After all, a paradise without power is a short-lived one, and power without hope of paradise is simply un-American.

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Summary: Time for a 'decent respect for the opinion of mankind'?
Review: Power makes its own morality.

That, in essence, is the message of this book. It's an old theme. As Walther von der Vogelweide (c. 1160 - 1230) once said, "Might is right." Kagan justifies the unilateral use of power with the argument of the schoolyard bully, "He did it first."

The book is a brief, eloquent and brilliant exposition of the arrogance of American machtpolitik that infuriates Europe and much of the rest of humanity. Kagan explains, East Europeans who lived under dictators understand the imposition of American power; those who were force-fed democracy by the Americans and British after World War II, such as Germany and France, oppose the new American unilateralism.

Kagan skillfully outlines how, during the Cold War, Europe relied on American power to safeguard their freedom. When nations entrust others to defend their freedom, which is basically the meaning of the American nuclear deterrent, it's hardly surprising that one country becomes all-powerful and others atrophy into paper weasels.

The book is clearly relevant to the current war in Iraq, and Kagan asserts, "Had Al Gore been elected, and had there been no terrorist attacks on September 11, these programs -- aimed squarely at Bush's 'axis of evil' -- would still be underway."

Great Britain is now the only European nation with a lion's heart, as the Falklands' war showed. France, under De Gaulle, built a "force de frappe" merely to bolster their self-esteem ("frappe" translates as "milkshake"). Kagan makes the point, "The American nuclear guarantee deprived Europeans of the incentive to spend the kind of money that would have been necessary to restore them to military great-power status."

It wasn't risk-free. Rather than retreat to a Fortress America, Kagan says, "It was American military strategy to risk nuclear attack upon its otherwise unthreatened homeland in order to deter both nuclear and conventional attacks on European and Asian allies."

Americans expect gratitude and support for taking such risks. Now, and this is especially true after Sept. 11, 2001, America views the world as threatened by an immoral Hobbesian chaos which must be tamed by decisive military force. Kagan says Europeans have an "emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial ties, on international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on multilateralism over unilateralism.

"Who knows better than Europeans the dangers that arise from unbridled power politics, from an excessive reliance on military force, from policies produced by nationbal egoism and ambition, even from balance of power and raison d'etat?" Kagan asks.

Kagan bases his views on practical experience, including four years in the State Department under President Ronald Reagan. He is now director of the 'U.S. Leadership Project' at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

In contrast to the current policies, which are more blunt but otherwise quite similar to Clinton policies, he thinks America should remember some words from the Declaration of Independence and show a "decent respect for the opinion of mankind."

"But, after all, it is more than a cliché that the United States and Europe share a set of common Western beliefs. Their aspirations for humanity are much the same, even if their vast disparity of power has now put them in very different places. Perhaps it is not too naively optimistic to believe that a little common understanding could still go a long way," he concludes.

Ten years ago, Francis Fukuyama declared history was over. This book shows history is a phoenix arising from the ashes of such irrational exuberance.

This book opens up a hornets' nest of ideas. Kagan succinctly describes the growing rift between America and Europe, but leaves the reader to decide who is wrong and what might be done to correct the imbalance. Do we really want a Europe powerful enough to challenge America? Do we really want a continuing imbalance of power? Can gentle words tame an opportunistic dictator? Is the status quo acceptable? How can nations limit the powerful?

Kagan deftly outlines the problem. He's very unAmerican in not offering a unilateral solution. He leaves it to readers who like to think to consider the alternatives.

Rating:
Summary: Essential Reading
Review: This short book (an extension of a previous essay by the author) is essential for anyone seriously interested in what is going on between the US and Europe these days. The prose is clear and concise. The analytical thinking is first rate. A fine example of one man trying to make sense of the world. Highly recommended.

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Summary: Review for those who have already read Power and Weakness
Review: Jorge Borges once wrote a review of a story that was an exact copy of Don Quixote, but written much later by different author. Borge's contrasts the richness of Cervantes's' version with the triviality of it s word-for-word counterpart, written in a different time. I felt a similar disappointment with Kagan's Of Paradise and Power, comparing with his earlier, almost identical essay, Power and Weakness, published in Policy Review in Spring of 2002. In both pieces, Kagan makes a clear and compelling argument that American and Europe will inevitably split over the issue of when to exercise military power. Kagan's first essay was insightful, infuriating, frightening and prescient. This new version, published in the in the shadow of headlines on Iraq, seems almost trite.

If you have already read Power and Weakness, don't bother reading this very similar book. If you haven't then read the essay, read it, but remember when it was written. It will cause you appreciate it (and/or hate it), even it more.

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Summary: Brilliant, thought-provoking essay
Review: Why is it that in the weeks following the September 11 massacre, Europeans displayed such empathy for Americans and less than a year later appeared to be what many Americans see as superior, self-righteous and judgmental? The interest in Robert Kagan's extended essay, 'Of Paradise and Power' is not so much how he answers that question, as it is his clarity and conciseness in doing so, in a manner that any reader can grasp: 'Those who cannot act unilaterally themselves naturally want to have a mechanism for controlling those who can.'

While decidedly pro-American, Kagan is not anti-European; he does not assign blame to any one country or group of countries for the present diplomatic rift, least of all to Europe. Rather in beautifully balanced prose, as well as an admirably balanced worldview and historical insight, he explains that:

'Those with great military power are more likely to consider force a useful tool of international relations than those who have less military power'

'A man armed only with a knife may decide that a bear prowling the forest is a tolerable danger'the same man armed with a rifle, however, will likely make a different calculation...'

'If Americans are unhappy about this state of affairs, they should recall that today's Europe'is very much the product of American foreign policy''

Although Kagan attempts to play down its significance, one simple reality underpins this essay: as long as America defends European interests, Europe has the luxury of taking the moral high ground. As long as America worries about global security, Europe can worry about global warming. Germany may deride America's use of force, but it is not expelling America's troops (if for no other reason than the effect such a move would have on the already ailing German economy). On the specific problem of Iraq, Kagan convincingly argues that Europe is worried more about America's handling of the problem than about the Iraqi threat itself. His deft comparison of Europe's appeasement to Hitler in the 1930s and Germany's and France's present-day conciliatory attitude to Saddam Hussein is a chilling historical reminder, to say the least.

One problem inherent in Kagan's laser-like focus on the power/paradise argument is that he diminishes the roles of economic interests and historical relationships, both of which seem to have more present importance than he assigns them. On the other hand, he does acknowledge the lingering doubts the two main continental players, Germany and France, have about each other. While Schroder's talk of 'the German way' may be unsettling to Americans, it strike fear in the collective heart of France, which has seen 'the German way' first hand ' and too often. Despite that, Kagan's view is that Europe (with French and German leadership) must pursue its own military defense. Even if it does not have the resources to balance America's military capability, such a move would send a clear signal that Europe is not content to remain dependent on America's might -- and thus subordinated to America's plans of action.

So, what is at the heart of the change in Europe's attitude to America between September 11, 2001 and September 11, 2002? Kagan attributes it to genuine European grief for America, a grief that dissipated once America's plans for using force to obtain justice and security became clear. Perhaps. But Kagan's underlying message is even stronger: in the days following September 11, when America was brought to its knees, Europeans could once again, if only fleetingly, feel superior. Historical rivalries die hard, if at all.

At 103 pages, this is a book to read, and then read again. No, it is not the only explanation of the present rift between the US and Europe, but it a concise, clear telling of one account of that rift.

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Summary: The old Europeans are no longer our true allies
Review: Robert Kagan brilliantly pulls no punches and bluntly informs us that the older European nations do not wish us well. Are they our per se enemies? Not exactly, but they are definitely not our real friends. The old Europeans are intimidated by our overwhelming wealth and power resulting in feelings of cultural inferiority. The deadly sin of jealously motivates their actions when they interact with us. Sadly, it appears that they are even willing to put themselves into harm's way merely to spite the United States. We have provided them with much of their military protection and regretfully no good deed goes unpunished. America is more than willing to clearly assess dangerous situations and boldly take action to remove the threat. Our major political philosophers reject the namby-pamby make believe vision of Immanuel Kant and instead opt for the more realistic insights of Thomas Hobbes. These Europeans, especially the French, prefer to appease aggressors. Never ending dialogue with a tyrant is deemed of value even when common sense dictates that the fiend will violate any agreement at the first available opportunity. This is how the old Europeans responded to Adolph Hitler in the 1930s, and nothing has significantly changed concerning the current threat of the totalitarian Muslims. Only a few years ago, their own elected politicians failed miserably to resolve the Balkans horror. It was primarily America's military might that halted the slaughter. The author might be reluctant to describe these folks as wimps, but alas I have no such hesitation. To be blunt, the old Europeans have also unsurprisingly become adherents to the belief system of utopian Socialism. This debilitating mindset has eviscerated their ability to work hard and behave like grown ups.

We are almost certainly going to war against Iraq. The old Europeans have basically told President George W. Bush to take a hike. It is best that Americans clearly understand the full extent of the moral and intellectual rot infecting these nations that are now mere shadows of their former greatness. Robert Kagan is to be congratulated for a job well done. This essay is a masterpiece deserving your immediate attention. You probably cannot justify reading any other book until thoroughly digesting "Of Paradise and Power."

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Summary: Kagan's insight and analysis is right on the mark!
Review: The book "Of Paradise and Power" by Robert Kagan is a short, concise, well-written book that offers a scholarly analysis of the current relationship between the United States and Europe. . .

Written this past summer as an essay and later published in book form, it it right-on-target with today's lack of US/European consensus in the United Nations. . . In little over 100 pages, Robert Kagan offers us an explanation of the post-Cold War policies and examines the relationships, political/military actions, and national interests that have brought us to where we are today. . . This is a "must read" for anyone trying to make sense of what's happening in the UN Security Council today. . .

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Summary: The Awful Truth
Review: I've lived in Europe fifteen years; all my children were born there. I love Europe, despite the overwhelming anti-Americanism I've encountered. I've felt guilty for being an American; I've felt angry at Europeans for their anti-Americanism. But I have never understood exactly why I felt guilt, or why Europeans felt angry. This book explains it. It is, without doubt, one of the most persceptive and depressing books I have ever read. No wonder Europeans hate this book. It is terrifyingly accurate and damning. Worse, it bodes no good future. If you have any questions about American foreign policy (and believe me, this is NOT a Republican, pro-Bush tract) and any wonder why Europeans oppose us (and this is NOT an anti-European treatise), then read this book. It is unforgiveably insightful. Our relations with Europe are doomed; the future is not at all like the past. After reading this book (it took only a few hours) I was profoundly depressed. This is a good and helpful sign. It's long past time we stopped deceiving ourselves. We need to face reality. This book is the ultimate reality. But beware, you're not going to like what the future foretells. For heaven's sake, spend a few dollars, invest a few hours, and get a good grasp of reality. It sure as hell beats the Fox Network.

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Summary: alluring concept - though it misses the mark
Review: Alluring little book which I read in one sitting. Though the author's overemphasis on wielding force misses the point - our greatest current challenge is terrorism, and the war against terrorism cannot be won by military means alone. Police work, cooperation with other nations (ironically Europeans have had much more experience than the US in fighting terrorism and ensuring security at home), and the encouragement of economic and political development are essential.

In this, as in most matters, the reality is that the US can lead, but it cannot dominate. Leadership implies strength but also some humility. "Speak softly and carry a big stick", as Theodore Roosevelt used to say.

Rating:
Summary: Pretty good, but not good enough
Review: The growing divide between Europe and the United States is troubling only to those who continue to look to Europe as leading the West culturally and thereby politically, i.e., the very people who will reject Kagan's argument precisely because they share the left wing of the political spectrum with the Europeans that rejects the use of power herein described. Obviously, as Kagan states, the strong view power much more favorably than the weak. There are other aspects, however, of Kagan's argument that are not quite so necessarily true when viewed from a more realistic perspective. First, just because Europeans believe they have moved beyond power and entered a "postmodern paradise" of bureaucratic bliss does not mean they actually have. As Kagan points out, this so-called movement "out of history" was made possible by American military protection. Would it not be more accurate therefore to describe this belief as an illusion of moving beyond history, into the world of Kant's perpetual peace? Historically it is quite naive to believe the situation of peaceful bliss enjoyed now by Europe will continue perpetually, especially if Europe is "decoupled" from the United States. Apparently Kagan shares this view of "paradise" because he, following other fantasy driven analysts such as Fukuyama, actually believes that liberal democracy is the last rung on the ladder of political history. Memo to Kagan: the Enlightenment ended with the French Revolution and the murderous utopian crusades of the Napoleonic Wars. It is a much safer bet that history has not and will not stop as long as humans continue to exist. There may be periods of relative local and even global stability but change is sure to come.

As for the European situation itself: the German "question" as described by Kagan is only half true at best. Setting aside qustions of militarism and whatnot (after all, I suspect the Europeans would charge the United States with militarism now), would it not be in the interest of the United States to encourage Germany to assume more of a leading role in Europe, especially militarily? Given the strategic situation of an integrated Europe there is no reason to fear a German revival (i.e., the integration of Europe removes the geopolitcal forces that resulted in previous conflicts). In fact, if the United States could help Germany exorcise it past demons and assume the leading military role in an integrated Europe commensurate with its economic and technological position it would alleviate some of the global burden on the US, help to dampen anti-Americanism in Europe by naturally deflecting criticism that results from such dependence, and allow the US to concentrate more on threats outside Europe and the NATO structure, where the greatest challenges to American security exist. Germans do not have the natural resentment of the American power that the French seem to have. A more powerful Germany is the answer to the problem, and not something to be feared by Americans. Of course the French will see it differently. But it is only a matter of time before the Germans realize that a policy that puts them under the thumb of France and Russia and in the service of French and Russian interests is less desirable than either following the US or taking the lead themselves in Europe. This will occur soon after the downfall of the current SPD government.