Rating: 
Summary: Escorts free will almost all the way out of the fly bottle
Review: (4 1/2 *)
Though I heartily despise materialistic monism, the central pillar of Daniel Dennett's philosophy, I am forced to acknowledge him as more than just our ablest defender of that folly. He is the most silver-tongued American philosopher since William James, bursting with fresh insights, sizzling with curiosity, ready to pull the perfect vivifying metaphor out of his pocket on any occasion. He never oversimplifies, yet like James writes with colloquial clarity. And few philosophers work as hard to avoid straw men, doing justice to both the meat and the spirit of opposing thinkers. He is never less than a pleasure to read."Freedom Evolves" isn't as seminal or as tightly argued as Dennett's 5-star classic "Consciousness Explained". But it is still brilliant, and essential reading for anyone who thinks about free will. The book's burden in a nutshell: The traditional metaphysical wrangle over freedom of the will is simply beside the point. All of the practical and ethical benefits we want "free will" to accomplish for us - a sense of control over our own destiny; an anchor for personal responsibility, punishment and reward; and the ability to say "I could have done otherwise" and mean it - are entirely compatible with the most thoroughgoing determinism. And anyway there's no practical way ever to distinguish between a determined decision and one which (whether by the grace of quantum mechanics or some ghost in the machine) is indeterminate. So we should take heart, take pleasure in the freedom our common sense tells us we enjoy, then concentrate on expanding the political freedom of all humans, and on taking responsibility for the expanded choices our technology affords us. His central new trick is to spell out a new concept that walks like free will, and quacks like free will. Using an example from the libertarian John Austin, who wrote about how he "could have made" a golf putt he actually missed, Dennett observes that Austin is not really saying he could have made the putt under *exactly* the same circumstances. Rather, Austin was claiming that he could have made it under circumstances *indistinguishable* from those which really obtained. Even under determinism, any world state we perceive at a given moment will be fuzzy; we would have perceived not only the actual world at that moment, but any of a host of similar worlds, as being "the same." And even under determinism, it makes perfect sense to say that among the (determinate) futures of that collection of similar worlds are some futures in which Austin made his putt. That, Dennett argues (convincingly) is what Austin *really* meant by "I could have sunk precisely that putt"; and (less convincingly) what everybody means when they say such things in real life. And (convincingly again) that this determinate-world, fuzzy-proposition interpretation of "I could have done otherwise" provides all the elbow room needed to satisfy the free-will druthers of the man on the street. In this discussion, Dennett pulls a bit of a fast one: he drops into the modal logic jargon common to philosophers these days, and calls these similar worlds "possible worlds". Actually, if determinism is true, no world other than the one that happened was really possible, and only a professional philosopher or an artificial intelligence maven would be prone to fall for the equivocation. But his point carries despite the legerdemain. His gloss on "possible" is a *possible* meaning for possible, and it does afford the benefits he claims for it. Sure, the old metaphysical quarrel is left unresolved. But Dennett's point is that what really matters to most participants in free will debates is not the metaphysics of it, but the social and ethical fallout. Along the way there are stimulating and illuminating discussions of the phenomenon of temptation (it arises because mammals like ourselves discount future gains on a hyperbolic rather than an exponential curve), and of the ways in which freedom expanded over the course of evolution, right up to the emergence of "free will" - i.e., of self conscious deliberation over reasons for actions, in a way that allows for the sense of "could have done otherwise." Even opponents (like myself) of materialistic monism will find a lot to take away from Dennett's analysis, because only parts of chapter 8 actually rely on that odious doctrine. The kind of "free will" he describes winds up being the same, and equally useful to have, regardless of whether the underlying cosmology is monist or dualist, determinist or libertarian. And the same goes for his dissection of temptation and of character development. In the best Jamesian (and likewise the best Wittgensteinian) tradition, he manages to be philosophically pertinent while bypassing metaphysics altogether. He makes a good case that his limited modified hang-out version of free will is practically indistinguishable from the traditional kind. He concludes that the traditional kind is therefore not worth fretting over. For a secular thinker like himself, that's probably so. But some of his readers will not be secular thinkers. It's worth noting that those readers will have a valid reason to care about the difference. After all, the free will debate in Western philosophy really began with Augustine, who had a non-secular motive: human beings have to have free will in order to absolve God from the moral evils humans commit. And though Austin couldn't distinguish between the world in which he failed to make his putt, and the nearby worlds in which he would have, they would be distinguishable to God - whereupon all of the "could have done otherwises" would shrink back to a deterministic dot.
Rating: 
Summary: Tabloid Philosophy
Review: A former colleague brought Dennett's name to my attention several weeks ago. Hearing claims of "original philosophical thinking" attributed to Dennett's "Freedom Evolves", I decided that this would be a promising place to start. Alas ... Already by p. 14, we find that the author's "fundamental perspective is naturalism, the idea that philosophical investigations are not superior to, or prior to, investigations in the natural sciences ... and that the proper job for philosophers here is to clarify and unify the often warring perspectives into a single vision of the universe." One begins to suspect that the real agenda here is to use philosophy in an attempt to legitimize half-baked scientific thinking. How much better it would be if he had simply employed the Scientific Method, and properly labeled any ideas that don't possess true predictive power as mere speculation. Not to be discouraged, though, Mr. Dennett rings the bell of fear to hopefully seduce us into accepting lines of thought that we would clearly avoid under normal, less-paranoid circumstances. His use of tragic, hot-button images (e.g. a neglected infant baking to death in a hot car, sex offenders undergoing castration) gives the book an almost tabloid-like character, and merely serves to increase the suspicion that there is little of true scientific or philosophical value within its rambling pages. In summary, this book is largely an experiment in mood-making: it neither suggests new avenues for scientific experimentation, nor does it reframe fundamental philosophical issues in innovative or inspiring ways. Mr. Dennett urges that by accepting Darwin's "strange inversion of reasoning" we can thereby eliminate the Deus ex Machina and bootstrap our way up to the "best and deepest thought on questions of morality and meaning, ethics and freedom." Such cheerleading is no doubt sufficient to enkindle the hopes of the naive, but I doubt that serious philosophers or scientists will be joining him to construct this Tower of Babel.
Rating:
Summary: Warning! Not for closed minds!
Review: Actually, that title's false. This book is a tool kit aimed precisely at closed minds. Assuming that even closed minds have niches and clefts, Dennett's kit is for opening those nooks and crannies. Every tool is a tiny wedge, each labelled "natural selection." The closed ramparts he wants to breach are concepts most of us hold dear - "determinism," "free will" and "consciousness." He doesn't want to destroy those concepts. He wants to part the seams to insert new material. He wants his readers to "adjust their imaginations" to allow some redefinitions of these and other firmly held traditions. For that, he insists, is what evolution is all about for humans - that ideas are constantly in flux. Holding steadfastly to beliefs that new ideas challenge is our most grievous flaw. Dennett's wedges, so earnestly and skillfully inserted in our minds through this book, offer the promise of a more rational future. Dennett argues that "determinism" has suffered bad press. We need to recognize that many things are "determined" - gravity, sunlight, the way our body's cells unite to keep you operating. Determinism is simply the rules of the game of life. That doesn't mean that the rules fix every aspect of life. Various choices appear at different times at many levels. Does the gazelle flee right or left? Does a bird seek food at this tree or that one? How many of these choices are "conscious" and how many innate? Humans, as part of their cultural heritage, have tended to see only themselves as possessors of "free will." Dennett argues that there are too many levels and too many variations to take such an absolutist stance. A long evolutionary trail operating within the "determined" world environment has led to us. Humans, to a large extent, have overcome the barriers of what is "determined," but we must be cautious in celebrating that triumph. We are neither wholly free nor biologically driven. It's too easy to slip from "fixed" circumstances into "fixed" behaviour, which Dennett brands a false assumption. He scorns the frequently levied charge that evolutionary roots for our behaviour must deny our ability to think. He's equally disdainful of those who argue that memes obscure our will. His section on memes and memetics as a science is among the best in print. No discussion on will can skirt the issues of ethics and morals. There will be readers who will skip to Chapter 7, yet those are the people who will pause at its title: "The Evolution of Moral Agency." Dennett's wedges are aimed at such, and it's to be hoped they will read carefully, as we all should. Many preconceived notions are held up for close scrutiny and assessment. Those notions are held by Dennett's readers and his critics and he addresses them ably. If we possess free will, then we must use it - but we must exercise it from a knowledgeable base. We must consider the impact of our choices before we apply them. Dennett offers some practical examples, some of them jarring in their import, for you to consider. The examples are those dealt with daily by law and government. They confront you directly and, in a "free" society, you must make choices you can live with. Dennett, far more than the rest of the philosopher's guild, confronts you with these choices in a clear and open manner. There are no mysteries or metaphysics to unravel. Read this and see if you are making choices in a rational manner. How rational your choices are will be up to you to assess. [stephen a. haines...
Rating:
Summary: Indeterminism isn't ? ? ?
Review: All I can say is "Wow." I admit to struggling with this excellent book for much of the first half, then, after digesting as much as I could, the last half was a bit easier. Dennett does his usual outstanding job of defining and carefully leading us through the many different arguments around his controversial topic of Free Will. Having read both Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Ideas, I was really looking forward to this book as well. Little did I know that it would so challenge my focus and ingrained ideas about determinism and free will. Dennett shows that determinism does not imply inevitability. As if that isn't enough to struggle with, he then goes on to show that indeterminism doesn't give us free will as most people argue it does. And then, to add insult to injury, Dennett shows clearly how there are real options in a deterministic world. Free will becomes "real, but it is not a preexisting feature of our existence, like the law of gravity. It is also not what tradition declares it to be: a God-like power to exempt oneself from the causal fabric of the physical world. It is an evolved creation of human activity and beliefs, and it is just as real as such other human creations as music and money. And even more valuable." Since I speak and lecture on Ethics as a Process, I was most interested in Dennett's view on ethics. He gave me much to think about as he states that: "I have not sought to replace the voluminous work in ethics with some Darwinian alternative, but rather to place that work on the foundation it deserves: a realistic, naturalistic, potentially unified vision of our place in nature." No doubt I will have to return to this book again soon. And there is also no doubt that I will enjoy it even more the next time around and learn perhaps as much as my first time through. This is definitely a five out of five on my review scale!
Rating:
Summary: Indeterminism isn't ? ? ?
Review: All I can say is "Wow." I admit to struggling with this excellent book for much of the first half, then, after digesting as much as I could, the last half was a bit easier. Dennett does his usual outstanding job of defining and carefully leading us through the many different arguments around his controversial topic of Free Will. Having read both Consciousness Explained and Darwin's Dangerous Ideas, I was really looking forward to this book as well. Little did I know that it would so challenge my focus and ingrained ideas about determinism and free will. Dennett shows that determinism does not imply inevitability. As if that isn't enough to struggle with, he then goes on to show that indeterminism doesn't give us free will as most people argue it does. And then, to add insult to injury, Dennett shows clearly how there are real options in a deterministic world. Free will becomes "real, but it is not a preexisting feature of our existence, like the law of gravity. It is also not what tradition declares it to be: a God-like power to exempt oneself from the causal fabric of the physical world. It is an evolved creation of human activity and beliefs, and it is just as real as such other human creations as music and money. And even more valuable." Since I speak and lecture on Ethics as a Process, I was most interested in Dennett's view on ethics. He gave me much to think about as he states that: "I have not sought to replace the voluminous work in ethics with some Darwinian alternative, but rather to place that work on the foundation it deserves: a realistic, naturalistic, potentially unified vision of our place in nature." No doubt I will have to return to this book again soon. And there is also no doubt that I will enjoy it even more the next time around and learn perhaps as much as my first time through. This is definitely a five out of five on my review scale!
Rating:
Summary: Important clarifying work on a central philosophical issue
Review: Although this book doesn't introduce anything radically new for those who follow Dennett, it does clarify his previous ideas on consciousness, free will, and human nature, and this
is far from a trivial matter. For anyone seriously interested in the question of how human free will can possibly be compatible with physical laws of cause and effect, and thought that nothing else could be reasonably said on the matter, this book is an essential. It will indeed help you clarify your thoughts, which is afterall one of the best things a work of philosophy can do for you, and one all too rarely accomplished by most philosophers. For those who wonder about the conditions that foster human freedom and those that suppress it, this book doesn't quite delve into political or social philosophy per se, but it is at least a start at a real answer by providing clear thoughts and useful science and meta-science. One very good reason for this book is that while Dan Dennett is a clear and vivid writer, particularly for a philosopher, he is also frequently rather badly misunderstood for some reason.
He has been described by reviewers as denying that human beings have free will or conscious awareness, and he has been accused of being an "ultraDarwinist," although he himself disputes these claims. In Freedom Evolves, he ties his previous ideas together and presents them in a way that will resist these misinterpretations of his ideas.
First, Dennett defends the compatibilist tradition (where free will and determinism are considered compatible in principle). He believes that the universe is probably deterministic in its physical nature, but that this doesn't mean our lives are pre-determined, nor does it prevent us from having forms of freedom worth working and fighting for. This is done by distinguishing determinism clearly from inevitability with the help of his perspective tool of
different 'stances.' The 'stances' help see causation in different terms: mechanical causes from a physical stance vs.
functional causes from a design stance vs. the action of intentional agents from an intentional stance. We perceive inevitability in causal models from the design stance. Then we get confused between free will and determinism because we apply inevitability back to the physical, where it simply doesn't happen. Then he builds a non-Cartesian account of choice and agency. Rather than distinguishing mind from mechanicals,
he describes different kinds of agency arising as the result of different raw materials available at different times and places. He uses the "toy model" of Conrad's Game of Life as an intuition pump to show how the appearance of agency arises from Darwinian algorithms through patterns like anticipating and avoiding harm. The fact that the game is implemented on a device that follows instructions to the letter makes it a tough sell I think, and not entirely convincing (something he is acutely aware of, but can't seem to do anything about). The human kind of agency is introduced by a much clearer discussion of Libet's "half second delay" experiments than he provided in "Consciousness Explained." He makes the point much more directly here how the half second delay can reflect a distributed decision making process rather than demonstrating that "we" are not in charge of our own actions, as the interpretation sometimes goes. He still follows the basic interpretation used by Tor Norretranders in "User Illusion" and Dan Wegner in
"Illusion of Free Will," (which he has a lot to say about, mostly very good). The fact that there is a reliable
readiness potential prior to reporting our decision to act does mean that in some sense "I" don't directly initiate my actions. But Dennett further shows how we are shrinking this "I" too far when we use this argument to claim that "we" aren't in control or that a mysterious unconscious mind is in control. "We" are able to disavow responsibility for our own actions under these contrived conditions because we break in
to the middle of the distributed process of decision making. Libet's results demonstrate the separate operation of the parts comprising the whole process, and the flexibility of our sense of self, not the ultimate powerlessness of the "I". This discussion is a high point of the book. In building a case for the power of the "I" to take responsibility and form committments, Dennett does a brief
review of the literature on evolutionary game theory and the role of committment problems in human social life. He then makes his most important and final argument, that the capacities evolved to solve these problems have become the basis, through cultural evolution, of a fragile and socially and culturally nurtured and exercised ability to internallize reasons for behavior through reflecting on them and communicating them. The idea that freedom, in the sense used in Dennett's final argument, is so real and yet so fragile is seen in the
way it can be heavily influenced simply by what we believe about it. The metaphor of "bootstrapping" runs throughout
the book, having been introduced in terms of the children's story of Dumbo the elephant. In some sense, we actually rely on useful illusions, such as the 'magic feather' that boosts Dumbo's confidence enough for him to try to fly. A crow flies up to shatter the useful illusion by grabbing the feather away. Dennett refers back to our frequent attempts to "stop that crow !" at various points in the book, pointing out where we may possibly be building real qbilities on the scaffolding of useful illusions, and trying to determine where the scaffolding can potentially be taken down once the real ability is in place.
Rating:
Summary: A Deterministic Basis For Free Will?
Review: Daniel Dennett has written (as he calls it) an apologia for determinism in "Freedom Evolves" in which he endeavors to reinstate free will in human affairs. In fact he states that the common belief that free will is banished by determinism is dead wrong! And I think he has succeeded in at least convincing himself that his definition of determinism allows for this seeming slight of hand. I have to note I am in no way a philosopher of science, so I will give here only my opinion of this as a biologist who has specialized in arthropods, and as a rank layman in theoretical evolutionary thought. I will also note that I tend to agree most with the views of Ernst Mayr on the subject. Mayr quotes Sewall Wright in "Toward a New Philosophy of Biology", p. 288, as saying "The Darwinian process of continued interplay of a random and a selective process is not intermediate between pure chance and pure determinism, but in its consequences utterly different from either." Thus, like the argument between nature and nurture, the issue of determinism vs. indeterminism is at least in part spurious. Given, however, that there is some reason to discuss this issue at all (it is certainly fascinating) it seems very reasonable that a man as eminently qualified as Daniel Dennett should write this book. Indeed, Dennett wrote an excellent exposition of the determinist view of evolution in "Darwin's Dangerous Idea." I have a few bones to pick, however. On p. 25, Dennett uses Van Inwagen's definition for determinism as the thesis that "there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future." He goes on to state that determinism thus defined does not imply inevitability. However, most dictionaries state in their definitions that determinism precludes free will. Is Dennett here redefining the meaning of the word to allow himself the luxury of free will? To some extent he is- at least the commonly understood meaning. However, he does so at his peril because words can and do get people into trouble and his detractors have the same privilege! The second bone is the statement by Dennett that he felt the need to write this book because he and his associates (among whom he lists Crick, Watson, Wilson, Dawkins, and Pinker) are often misunderstood and misquoted by colleagues who disagree with "genetic determinism." He may have a point about his colleagues (although they have said the same thing about him). He also notes that there have been "some unfortunate overstatements and over simplifications," which have made him and his associates targets (undoubtedly in part because of sensational headlines often associated with them.) Unfortunately, the press, most politicians, and much of the general public will never understand the nuances of the argument and some don't want to do so for their own reasons! Beside, some of the people he names as associates, or "responsible, cautious naturalists," as he calls them (such as Pinker, Dawkins and even Wilson) and other "genetic determinists" that he does not mention (perhaps these, such as Thornhill and Ruse, are irresponsible naturalists?) have made statements in interviews and in their publications that lend themselves directly to sensationalism and criticism by their peers. He also should not be too surprised that Derk Pereboom (2001) runs with the idea that we have no free will, given the "unfortunate overstatements" of his associates. A third bone is that although Dennett does admit that some of the deterministic ideas can be misused he states that they should not be. However, deterministic ideas based on little solid experimental or historical evidence (such as Pinker's genetic basis for infanticide or Thornhill's male hardwiring for rape) should not be stated as fact, especially when scientists urge their use to set social policy. While Eldredge in his recent book (2004) does not believe that a researcher should hide the truth to avoid unpleasant realities, he does think that they have to be reasonably sure that the view is not a biased untruth. To paraphrase Mark Twain, it is not what you don't know that causes trouble; it is what you "know" that ain't true! How does Dennett handle his main arguments (including one that quantum theory cannot save us from a deterministic universe)? Very well, but to me unconvincingly! To be fair he (among his associates I think a first) points out that hard determinists are faced with a serious dilemma, namely how to give themselves free will while denying it to others! Dennett also (correctly I think) points out the rather flawed idea of using labels, such as "genetic determinist." I wish Steven Pinker had been as careful about the "blank slate" idealists (environmental determinists)! However, Dennett reinstates free will by (I think) a mechanistic slight of hand (I might add that this slight of hand could be how the universe works!) He dismisses quantum effects (I think the jury is still out on that one - perhaps Roger Penrose is wrong, but we shall see!) as weakening the ability to reach a free will decision and thus defeating the very process it seeks to validify. In essence, as near as I can tell, he reinstates free will as being a necessary byproduct of deterministic processes. In closing, I think Dennett's book is well worth reading, despite my disagreements with him. Some of his arguments I feel unqualified to judge and in any case I may be wrong in my criticisms. He certainly brings up numerous interesting points and articulately defends his position. I remain, however, somewhat skeptical. After wading over the years through books by Dawkins, Ruse, Wilson, Gould, Eldredge, Lewontin, Pinker, Mayr, Williams, Barash, Diamond, Lorenz and Dennett (not to mention the more popular, but also more sensationalistic writers Ardrey and Morris) I am getting a bit tired of the debate. It has to some extent taken on the appearance of a group of clerics arguing over esoteric and obscure points of the Old Testament, with no end in sight!
Rating: 
Summary: Is that all?
Review: Daniel Dennett is attempting a thankless task, but one that is long overdue. Back in 1984, with the publication of Elbow Room, he sought to liberate free will - that perennial hobgoblin of philosophy - from a surplus of metaphysical baggage that is increasingly difficult to justify based on what we know about how brains work and how minds evolved. On these two topics, however, Elbow Room required the reader to reserve judgment. Since then, Dennett has given the world Consciousness Explained (1991), which, as the title implies, tries to tell us how brains work, and Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995), which tries to explain how minds evolved, and in the process provides one of the most lucid accounts yet of the philosophical implications of Darwinism. Now, with Freedom Evolves, Dennett attempts to tie it all together. The problem with this book, as far as I am concerned, is that it feels rushed and disjointed. I was more than happy to read all 500+ pages of DDI because the topic deserved that much space and, honestly, that book is a pleasure to read. The topic of free will, if anything, requires even more space to develop, and I would have gladly sat through six or seven hundred pages if necessary. As it is, my understanding of Dennett's arguments is sketchy - even after letting them sink in a few days and re-reading a few sections - so sketchy, in fact, that I won't attempt anything like a synopsis here, for fear of bungling the job. Beyond that, I was a little annoyed with the amount of recycled material from CE and DDI. So why is Daniel Dennett's task a thankless one? Because he insists that free will is not an "illusion" as some hardcore materialists claim - nor is it some "extra something" in the sense implied by traditional dualist philosophers. There are a lot of feathers to ruffle in this area. Affirming free will on a strict materialist basis would be quite a feat, if done clearly and convincingly. I believe that case can be made, and that it should be made, and that Dennett is qualified to make it. Unfortunately, in Freedom Evolves he didn't do so as clearly and convincingly as I wish he had. Until Dennett or somebody else does so, the task will remain long overdue.
Rating:
Summary: On Freedom
Review: Dennett affirms both that 1) the universe is deterministic, and that 2) we are free. "The universe is deterministic" means that if somehow the state of the universe is reset to the state it was, lets say, a million years ago, then everything will repeat exactly the same, even quantum events. So you will be reading again this very same lines in a milion years. It means also that a god, or deamon, knowing the laws of nature, and knowing the complete state of the universe at time t, can calculate completely the state of the universe at any other instant after t. For this god you are more predictable than a ballistic trajectory. But we are not gods. We, beings that are within the universe, can not know, in any circumstance, the complete state of the universe. It is impossible for us to know the complete state of the universe. I will summarize this by saying that we are ignorant subjects. In Dennett words (page 91): "... this unavoidable ignorance guarantees that it [the ignorant subject] has a _subjectively_ open future". The best we, ignorant subjects, can do is to use concepts such as
necessity, possibility, causation, learning, self, and freedom. So freedom is a second order, or subjective, concept. This is how we see ourselves free, although we live in a deterministic universe. Of course, Dennett argument is reversible. You can take self and freedom as first order concepts, as Descartes did, and then go on to show that both the laws of nature and the state of the universe are just second order, or subjective, concepts. And I prefer this approach, because I still see the point Descartes did. I will say more: If someone does not see Descartes point, it is because he is holding hidden and unsupported
hypotheses. In the case of Dennett's argument it is very clear that we, ignorant subjects, can not know whether the universe is deterministic or otherwise. By the way, you should read Dennett's book.
Rating:
Summary: Depends on what you're looking for
Review: Each chapter in this book is a lesson, with a specific goal
of teaching us to think about something in a different way
than we probably have in the past. The result guides us to
understanding free will, freedom and morality of humans and
our society from a natural foundation - no God behind the
curtain, no Cartesian split of mind and matter, no meta-
physical magic. Dennett is a master teacher, skilled in many of the tools
of his trade. This book doesn't read like some of the great philosophical tracts of the past. It is approachable, and
more tutorial than Great Rhetoric. If you disagree with his conclusions, then the informality
of his voice will make this book an easy target to criticize. But, if your intuitions had been leading you in this direction,
as had mine, then you will find that this book completes and
realizes a vision of a natural based understanding of morality
and freedom that two weeks ago I would not have expected to
see in my lifetime.
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