Rating: 
Summary: A natural basis for free will, freedom and morality
Review: Each chapter in this book is a lesson, with a specific goal
of teaching us to think about something in a different way
than we probably have in the past. The result guides us to
understanding free will, freedom and morality of humans and
our society from a natural foundation - no God behind the
curtain, no Cartesian split of mind and matter, no meta-
physical magic.Dennett is a master teacher, skilled in many of the tools
of his trade. This book doesn't read like some of the great philosophical tracts of the past. It is approachable, and
more tutorial than Great Rhetoric. If you disagree with his conclusions, then the informality
of his voice will make this book an easy target to criticize. But, if your intuitions had been leading you in this direction,
as had mine, then you will find that this book completes and
realizes a vision of a natural based understanding of morality
and freedom that two weeks ago I would not have expected to
see in my lifetime.
Rating: 
Summary: You are logical, you believe in evolution, you believe in...
Review: Freewill. As you continue to seek greater truth, you may be aware that there is no real certainty in our existence only beliefs based on perception, reason and memory. As our perceptions become more congruent with reality we may have observed how evolution provides a compelling structure for purpose. What then compels some of us to accept an alternative conflicting postulate, such as intelligent design? What if that compulsion to perceive one belief over another is driven by a universal desire to effect the world outside our bodies for our perceived benefit based on an individuals perceived values based on perceived purpose. As we agree that belief is based on perception therefore relative therefore variable and governs perceived purpose and perceived value in order to effect the outside world for perceived benefit, then having an accurate belief system should be the most effective for attaining perceived goals for perceived purpose. It also seems then that the relationship between purpose, value, and belief structure simply becomes a system of reason defined by logic based on outside variables. Perhaps a dynamic way to describe, I think I am as a reason for existence, is better defined as a "state of existence" because thought requires time, not unlike our state of reason. I desire therefore I have purpose as a cause for a state of reason seems to also follow. It seems then that to define the culminations of ones collective desires is to further if not completely define ones collective purpose. Replication and the manifestations of such a process in a limited resources environment such as survival of the fittest seem to be a pretty good idea to stick in the purpose slot to describe accurately aspects of our perceived environment seem to follow. From this frame of mind arguments accepting a priori, intelligent design, which seems to require a little more faith, begs this question among others what is that feeling that drives our desire to seek something less logical? As you take a moment to contemplate this idea you might ask yourself if there are other such ideas we might foster for the same reason. Are these logic anti-fields beneficial? What would it be like if there were others who's beliefs were also more congruent in their logic to see us. Some of us have never had a core belief change for one of two reasons, we value other things more than truth when reasoning or we have come to believe the most reasonable beliefs we have encountered. For some people, it seems possible that an illogical belief may make them more effective in achieving their actual purpose, making an illogical belief more congruent with purpose than logical ones. What would you write to those people if you had a perceived logical truth which seemed greater than theirs? I believe that some people will and some will not be able to perceive the illusion of choice. If you cannot, or it is not beneficial, this is the book for you. I obviously have an opinion implying that people who beleive in freewill because it seems logical will reason their way out of this belief in time.
Rating:
Summary: You are logical, you believe in evolution, you believe in...
Review: Freewill. As you continue to seek greater truth, you may be aware that there is no real certainty in our existence only beliefs based on perception, reason and memory. As our perceptions become more congruent with reality we may have observed how evolution provides a compelling structure for purpose. What then compels some of us to accept an alternative conflicting postulate, such as intelligent design? What if that compulsion to perceive one belief over another is driven by a universal desire to effect the world outside our bodies for our perceived benefit based on an individuals perceived values based on perceived purpose. As we agree that belief is based on perception therefore relative therefore variable and governs perceived purpose and perceived value in order to effect the outside world for perceived benefit, then having an accurate belief system should be the most effective for attaining perceived goals for perceived purpose. It also seems then that the relationship between purpose, value, and belief structure simply becomes a system of reason defined by logic based on outside variables. Perhaps a dynamic way to describe, I think I am as a reason for existence, is better defined as a "state of existence" because thought requires time, not unlike our state of reason. I desire therefore I have purpose as a cause for a state of reason seems to also follow. It seems then that to define the culminations of ones collective desires is to further if not completely define ones collective purpose. Replication and the manifestations of such a process in a limited resources environment such as survival of the fittest seem to be a pretty good idea to stick in the purpose slot to describe accurately aspects of our perceived environment seem to follow. From this frame of mind arguments accepting a priori, intelligent design, which seems to require a little more faith, begs this question among others what is that feeling that drives our desire to seek something less logical? As you take a moment to contemplate this idea you might ask yourself if there are other such ideas we might foster for the same reason. Are these logic anti-fields beneficial? What would it be like if there were others who's beliefs were also more congruent in their logic to see us. Some of us have never had a core belief change for one of two reasons, we value other things more than truth when reasoning or we have come to believe the most reasonable beliefs we have encountered. For some people, it seems possible that an illogical belief may make them more effective in achieving their actual purpose, making an illogical belief more congruent with purpose than logical ones. What would you write to those people if you had a perceived logical truth which seemed greater than theirs? I believe that some people will and some will not be able to perceive the illusion of choice. If you cannot, or it is not beneficial, this is the book for you. I obviously have an opinion implying that people who beleive in freewill because it seems logical will reason their way out of this belief in time. I really have no idea, and my reasoning is incomplete at best as stated though most of this review, however, my grammer and spelling are sure to be flawed so if this is less than enlighening for you, feel free.
Rating:
Summary: The best self-help book you'll ever read.
Review: I am honored to be the first to review this book. I have read most of Dennett's previous books (Elbow Room, CE, and DDI) and many of his essays but I have always felt a little anxious about his conclusions; like he is the crow in the Dumbo cartoon (read the book). Why is this man smiling? Freedom Evolves ties together all of his previous books. He convincingly shows how a naturalistic account of ourselves gives us REAL free will. He also clarifies many previous arguments. Dennett defines freedom as the "capacity to achieve what is of value in a range of circumstances." Despite the prevailing view, science does not decrease our freedom through exculpation, but increases it by giving us more options and self-control. He also points out that memes give us freedom by giving us new standpoints. Also, memes are tools and need to be used to work; that is, we still have to think. This is a very important point because almost everyone I try to explain memetics to hates it because they feel it robs them of their self. It does the exact opposite! Dennett says that a human self results from an interpersonal design process and to become autonomous, we need a little help from our friends. I would add to this point by saying that some of the best "friends" we can ask for help in the arduous process of creating an autonomous self are the great artists of the ages. This is a point Richard Rorty has recently been making. This is a fantastic and extremely important book. I am a philosophical dilettante (but I am a scientist) and I appreciate Dennett's extremely useful and lucid writing. If only more philosophers were like him. More importantly, this book is wonderfully hopeful and can be thought of as a philosophical self-help manual. Now I know why he is smiling.
Rating: 
Summary: Thoroughly unimpressed
Review: I didn't learn anything new in this book. The writing is cloudy and arrogant and redundant and inefficient. While I agree with Dennett's basic premise, that questions of ethics and free will should be asked from an evolutionary standpoint (how does this help the species survive?) I closed the book feeling altogether unsatisfied. Dennett always meanders around points and then claims them later. His arguments are not clear and convincing. Some of the main points in the book are: that free will is an evolutionary adaptation
that indeterminism is not made possible by quantum mechanics
that decisions are processes taking place in the brain over space and time and therefore cannot be pin-pointed but to me none of these theses are new or surprising, and I just don't see what took him so many pages to say what he said.
Rating:
Summary: Thoroughly unimpressed
Review: I didn't learn anything new in this book. The writing is cloudy and arrogant and redundant and inefficient. While I agree with Dennett's basic premise, that questions of ethics and free will should be asked from an evolutionary standpoint (how does this help the species survive?) I closed the book feeling altogether unsatisfied. Dennett always meanders around points and then claims them later. His arguments are not clear and convincing. Some of the main points in the book are: that free will is an evolutionary adaptation
that indeterminism is not made possible by quantum mechanics
that decisions are processes taking place in the brain over space and time and therefore cannot be pin-pointed but to me none of these theses are new or surprising, and I just don't see what took him so many pages to say what he said.
Rating: 
Summary: disjointed; recycled
Review: I'll just repeat nearly verbatim what an earlier reviewer said: I'm a huge fan of Dennet, but (1) the material in this book feels confused and disjointed, written in a rush (2), and an irritating quantity of the material is recycled from previous Dennet texts. This is potentially a more useful way of thinking about freewill, but I was left feeling a little cheated that one of the best non-fiction writers I know (and certainly the most lucid and comprehensible philosopher) would give us such a weak volume on such an important topic. This deserved the thoroughgoing organic presentation that we saw in *Consciousness Explained* and *Darwin's Dangerous Idea*. And get rid of "Conrad," the not-very-smart-or-persistent objector who shows up intermittently (and not always when he should).
Rating:
Summary: Derivative, uninformative, self-satisfied
Review: If you are heavily invested in the professional debate on the question, you need to read this book, of course. Professional debate is kind of like a sport, and Dennett is the batter at the plate. In this book, he's hit the ball pretty hard, even though he's no Babe Ruth. If you're a participant (or even avid fan), you gotta get in there and pull for your team, whatever it may be! "Go, Dan, go!" Or, conversely, "Catch it, catch it, catch it-go foul, go foul, go foul!" If you don't know anything about the current state of intellectual debate on freedom and determinism, and if you care, this might be a good book to read to get a first-rate state-of-the-art accounting. Dennett's examples and explanations are clear and compelling. Beyond that, there doesn't seem much point to this book Except for new teaching tools-e.g., from the world of computer experimentation--the book is highly derivative, not a great leap forward. In the sections directly on freedom and determinism, I didn't see much whose source or precursor in, say, pre-1965 philosophical literature I could not identify. In the sections on the evolution of morality, most of what he says is overtly borrowed from other people. I remember years ago when my father lost interest in a writer he'd always admired. I asked him why, and he said, "He's run out of things to say. Now he's just writing books to be writing books." This book suggests the same might be true of Dennett. I find Dennett's writing lethargically paced, overly drawn out, and lacking consistent rhetorical snap. He simply will not use a sentence where a paragraph will do, or a paragraph where he can spin out several pages. The people who marvel at his writing style must mostly read academic or technical documents. To me, he seems like an otherwise-entertaining guy who's altogether too fond of hearing himself talk, so that his entertainment value quickly passes the point of diminishing returns. And I find it offensive that in this book Dennett argues ad hominem so much. If you disagree with him, it isn't that you think he's wrong. It's that you're scared, you have a hidden agenda, and you are intellectually dishonest-his words, not mine. I had a hard time getting past the intro, so unbounded is this unseemly behavior. Generally, I think work at this level of abstraction is waste of time and creates but an illusion of knowledge. I only read this stuff because I inevitably have students ask me about it. (I teach, among other things, both evolutionary psychology and ethics.) The free will/determinism thing seems to me a useless set of questions, based on conceptual artifacts rather than anything we know about the world. Free will is a folk notion, and it serves quite well in that capacity. But no one has ever been able to give an intellectually credible, coherent conceptual account of what it might be or how it might work. Does that mean it is useless or suspect as a folk notion? Of course not. An analogy: Most notions of romance are folk notions, and they serve us quite well within their sphere. Meanwhile, determinism is not a scientific discovery, a necessary presupposition of science, or an implication of science. Once upon a time it was thought to be all of these, but that is just not so. We can, and in some areas most assuredly must, do science just fine without any such idea. As a matter of cold, hard fact, science has yet to discover even ONE deterministic law, principle, or process in human behavior. We simply, unequivocally do not possess ANY science that supports the notion of determinism in human behavior. I cannot understand wasting all this intellectual energy debating whether human action is "really" determined when we've yet to discover any even *apparent* determination within the human sciences. I suspect that such wasted effort really serves a religious function for people like Dennett-it gives them a way to feel confident in the universe. Support for this contention would be Dennett's boundless, and scientifically unjustified, confidence in his account of the current neo-Darwinian theory of evolution. I have no doubt that evolution is true. I also know that within science, we have a long, long way to go in understanding how it happens. I also know that even if, in broad outlines, Darwin got it right, that tells us nothing about particulars-including humans. Get down to the ground level of science, and you'll find things considerably messier and more uncertain than at Dennett's rose-colored level of abstraction. The religious function of high abstraction is to say, "Oh, never mind that scientists can't yet figure how to account for all sorts of things-we can be sure that eventually they will discover what I *already* know, that the current neo-Darwinian model is correct. No big mysteries! Hooray!" This resting assured within one's beliefs about the universe is what I mean in saying this is a religious notion-a belief that surpasses all evidence, that makes those who hold it feel secure. Along these lines, note that Dennett uses "mysterian" as an insult-he thoroughly loathes, and often argues ad hominem against, anyone who allows that there may really be mysteries to life, even when they are reputable scientists (e.g., Pinker) who generally agree with him. You want to know how the world works? Study science and history. Not these high abstractions. One other thing: Dennett completely fails to understand the idea of "the soul." Personally, I am not religious, but I know enough history to know that the main concern of people who insist on a soul is not free will. The idea of soul does not even *imply* the idea of free will-vast stretches of the history of religious thought insist on both determinism and the sanctity of the soul. The idea of the soul has to do with a longing for what is sacred, a notion that "significance" lies beyond the "vail of tears," that meaning-even life-transcends time and finitude. Nothing that Dennett says even touches these concerns. He so thoroughly misses the point that he doesn't even try.
Rating:
Summary: Now, Dennett should evolve
Review: In 1991, Dennett published his great work "Consciousness Explained," a brilliant benchmark on "consciousness." Then in the later 90's, he published his next major piece "Darwin's Dangerous Idea," and came up with a stunning and thought-provoking analysis of Darwinism that explained the subject far more effectively than almost any had done before. An argument could be made it was just a normal extension of his own work, I saw it as almost someone who did not know how to write the next chapter of their own book. This new book seems to nourish that conclusion rather than contradict it. For someone of Dennett's prestige and genius- he's certainly one of the 20th century's great philosophers- he must feel pressured to come up with something new, to be more brilliant, to soar even higher than the last time, he is expected to deliver, and this is what I feel this book is, a book to satisfy those who demand from him new genius, but instead of delivering that, he has fallen into the trap of writing something simply because he feels he has to, instead of writing because he has found the next piece of the puzzle. He talks much, but says little. Yet once again, as he has done in previous books, he writes much about Conrad's Life Worlds. I feel this is dangerous thing to do, to rest so much on this program, because in the future, if the logic and flaw of it are exposed, his writing so much about it will lessen the value of his own teachings. He needs new "examples" to get his points across and should not place so much emphasis continuously on this. I'm not saying it has flaws, but he is walking too much on this "plank." He also seems to apologize too much for what he is about to say. Great philosophers don't make apologies. They accept them from others. He says many times people reading might be tempted to "stop that crow!" yet there is little here that merits that reaction. In fact, if there are two opposite ways to go from Dennett's work, he firmly stays outside the camp of the radical. "I'm not saying we're Zombies, I'm not saying to castrate" The question is can someone who is so worried about misinterpretation really be laying everything they think and feel completely on the line, or do they hold back from fear?" Has his position become so lofty, he enjoys the status quo and seeks to maintain it at the expense of his own development? Dennett goes to great lengths to try to despel Libet's experiments, which is almost always a sure sign there might be something to them. An example of "The philosopher doth protest too much." Instead of turning me away from them, he has done the opposite and made me interested.
At the end of the book, he seems to have forgotten what the book is supposed to be about, and it lacks an ending chapter that summarizes everything before it and gives us something tangible in terms of clear-cut explanations about what he is saying on the subject matter. Instead, you are left on your own to sort out whether anything concrete has been said about it at all. The extensive reading lists he gives at the end of each chapter is also a clue that Dennett is not willing, or perhaps can't, fully discuss things to the satisfaction of the reader. He seems willing to insert meanderings of many topics in order to avoid having to discuss the real issues. The stories here are not as clever as before, the quotations less stimulating, and his take on things too brief and "thrown in" to have any impact. He expouses "free will" in terms of morality and ethics, topics of great interest and makes for great padding, but are not necessarily the most important in terms of conclusions. The problem is that there is nothing "new" here. It's another revisit to the well of the past. Dennett would be best served to follow the streams of thought his "Consciousness Explained" produced and at the end of that stream, move to deeper waters.
Rating:
Summary: Now, Dennett should evolve
Review: In 1991, Dennett published his great work "Consciousness Explained," a brilliant benchmark on "consciousness." Then in the later 90's, he published his next major piece "Darwin's Dangerous Idea," and came up with a stunning and thought-provoking analysis of Darwinism that explained the subject far more effectively than almost any had done before. An argument could be made it was just a normal extension of his own work, I saw it as almost someone who did not know how to write the next chapter of their own book. This new book seems to nourish that conclusion rather than contradict it. For someone of Dennett's prestige and genius- he's certainly one of the 20th century's great philosophers- he must feel pressured to come up with something new, to be more brilliant, to soar even higher than the last time, he is expected to deliver, and this is what I feel this book is, a book to satisfy those who demand from him new genius, but instead of delivering that, he has fallen into the trap of writing something simply because he feels he has to, instead of writing because he has found the next piece of the puzzle. He talks much, but says little. Yet once again, as he has done in previous books, he writes much about Conrad's Life Worlds. I feel this is dangerous thing to do, to rest so much on this program, because in the future, if the logic and flaw of it are exposed, his writing so much about it will lessen the value of his own teachings. He needs new "examples" to get his points across and should not place so much emphasis continuously on this. I'm not saying it has flaws, but he is walking too much on this "plank." He also seems to apologize too much for what he is about to say. Great philosophers don't make apologies. They accept them from others. He says many times people reading might be tempted to "stop that crow!" yet there is little here that merits that reaction. In fact, if there are two opposite ways to go from Dennett's work, he firmly stays outside the camp of the radical. "I'm not saying we're Zombies, I'm not saying to castrate" The question is can someone who is so worried about misinterpretation really be laying everything they think and feel completely on the line, or do they hold back from fear?" Has his position become so lofty, he enjoys the status quo and seeks to maintain it at the expense of his own development? Dennett goes to great lengths to try to despel Libet's experiments, which is almost always a sure sign there might be something to them. An example of "The philosopher doth protest too much." Instead of turning me away from them, he has done the opposite and made me interested.
At the end of the book, he seems to have forgotten what the book is supposed to be about, and it lacks an ending chapter that summarizes everything before it and gives us something tangible in terms of clear-cut explanations about what he is saying on the subject matter. Instead, you are left on your own to sort out whether anything concrete has been said about it at all. The extensive reading lists he gives at the end of each chapter is also a clue that Dennett is not willing, or perhaps can't, fully discuss things to the satisfaction of the reader. He seems willing to insert meanderings of many topics in order to avoid having to discuss the real issues. The stories here are not as clever as before, the quotations less stimulating, and his take on things too brief and "thrown in" to have any impact. He expouses "free will" in terms of morality and ethics, topics of great interest and makes for great padding, but are not necessarily the most important in terms of conclusions. The problem is that there is nothing "new" here. It's another revisit to the well of the past. Dennett would be best served to follow the streams of thought his "Consciousness Explained" produced and at the end of that stream, move to deeper waters.
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