Rating: 
Summary: great book
Review: This is a wonderful book for anyone interested in America's foreign policy who is willing to accept that there is not one right answer for a very difficult problem. I learned alot.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent framework for thought
Review: This is an excellent read for someone who is new to foreign policy issues. The author doesn't tell the reader WHAT to think--rather, he provides a framework for HOW to think about U.S. direction in foreign policy. The book provides a structure for thinking about and discussing U.S. reaction to world issues that I've not seen elsewhere. While the author provides well-researched historical support for his ideas, he doesn't try to give in-depth history lessons.In the end I only wished to have been able to read what his views were regarding events on September 11 and its affect on subsequent U.S. policies.
Rating:
Summary: The Best New Book on U.S. Foreign Policy
Review: This startlingly good book attempts to explain modern U.S. foreign policy by way of the country's early and neglected foreign policy traditions. Contrary to many informed views of early U.S. foreign policy as either inept or missing in action until the middle of the twentieth century -- Mead argues that the U.S. was actually a masterful practitioner of diplomacy and geopolitics from its earliest days. While several major European states engaged in destructive wars during the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, the U.S. seemed to make the right moves at various key moments in its history. Mead contends that these outcomes were not fortuitous accidents, but the result of a flexible diplomacy based on four schools of foreign policy that he names after U.S. historical figures: Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Woodrow Wilson, and Andrew Jackson. The names do not mean that the foreign policy is derived from the historical figure so much as the main idea in each of the schools can be associated with him. In the case of Hamiltonians, the priority is to the country's economic health and federal support for big business. For Jeffersonians, it is a low-profile foreign policy and support for democracy at home. For Wilsonians, there is a commitment to international justice and institutions. Jacksonianism is a widespread populism that expresses itself mainly through protectionism, patriotism and a fierce belligerence at times of war. Mead argues that each of these traditions has their place and that the reason for the geopolitical success of the U.S. is due to the flexibility from combining the different schools to various degrees. In some periods, Jeffersonianism might be appropriate as the main approach. In others, a Jacksonian approach might be what's needed. In still others, Wilsonians and Hamiltonians might both share the top billing. In any case, Mead stresses that what American policymakers have lost sight of since the beginning of the Cold War is the need for this kind of flexibility that only a deep appreciation of America's foreign policy traditions can provide. At first, I found Mead's descriptions and examples of the four schools suspiciously vague and sometimes even contradictory and ahistorical. But his approach grew on me as I continued through the book. I found it helpful to think of Mead's four divisions as more like archetypes than schools and of his book as more of an introduction to the subject than the final word. While he didn't quite nail his conceptual framework down, I think any reader will see that he's on to something special and that his ideas about U.S. foreign policy need further discussion. (Note: Mead published "Special Providence" before 9-11, but I don't see how anything is changed by the tragedy, other than perhaps Mead's own final prescription for the foreign policy school to which the U.S. should now give priority.) The most impressive part of the book, however, has nothing to do with the four schools. In the first two chapters, Mead deals with the foreign policy tradition of the United States. They are nothing short of revelatory as Mead rescues this tradition from the mistaken notion that the U.S. lived a blessed existence in the nineteenth century, largely free from foreign policy concerns. Instead, the truth was quite different as Americans - both the public and policymakers - were obsessed with foreign policy, particularly their economic dependence on Britain and securing the New World as their exclusive geopolitical sphere. As Mead describes it, foreign policy was not a periodic concern for Americans, but a constant concern, and the various successful ways in which policymakers of that era handled U.S. foreign policy should continue to be a guide for America in the post-Cold War era.
Rating:
Summary: The Best New Book on U.S. Foreign Policy
Review: This startlingly good book attempts to explain modern U.S. foreign policy by way of the country's early and neglected foreign policy traditions. Contrary to many informed views of early U.S. foreign policy as either inept or missing in action until the middle of the twentieth century -- Mead argues that the U.S. was actually a masterful practitioner of diplomacy and geopolitics from its earliest days. While several major European states engaged in destructive wars during the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, the U.S. seemed to make the right moves at various key moments in its history. Mead contends that these outcomes were not fortuitous accidents, but the result of a flexible diplomacy based on four schools of foreign policy that he names after U.S. historical figures: Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Woodrow Wilson, and Andrew Jackson. The names do not mean that the foreign policy is derived from the historical figure so much as the main idea in each of the schools can be associated with him. In the case of Hamiltonians, the priority is to the country's economic health and federal support for big business. For Jeffersonians, it is a low-profile foreign policy and support for democracy at home. For Wilsonians, there is a commitment to international justice and institutions. Jacksonianism is a widespread populism that expresses itself mainly through protectionism, patriotism and a fierce belligerence at times of war. Mead argues that each of these traditions has their place and that the reason for the geopolitical success of the U.S. is due to the flexibility from combining the different schools to various degrees. In some periods, Jeffersonianism might be appropriate as the main approach. In others, a Jacksonian approach might be what's needed. In still others, Wilsonians and Hamiltonians might both share the top billing. In any case, Mead stresses that what American policymakers have lost sight of since the beginning of the Cold War is the need for this kind of flexibility that only a deep appreciation of America's foreign policy traditions can provide. At first, I found Mead's descriptions and examples of the four schools suspiciously vague and sometimes even contradictory and ahistorical. But his approach grew on me as I continued through the book. I found it helpful to think of Mead's four divisions as more like archetypes than schools and of his book as more of an introduction to the subject than the final word. While he didn't quite nail his conceptual framework down, I think any reader will see that he's on to something special and that his ideas about U.S. foreign policy need further discussion. (Note: Mead published "Special Providence" before 9-11, but I don't see how anything is changed by the tragedy, other than perhaps Mead's own final prescription for the foreign policy school to which the U.S. should now give priority.) The most impressive part of the book, however, has nothing to do with the four schools. In the first two chapters, Mead deals with the foreign policy tradition of the United States. They are nothing short of revelatory as Mead rescues this tradition from the mistaken notion that the U.S. lived a blessed existence in the nineteenth century, largely free from foreign policy concerns. Instead, the truth was quite different as Americans - both the public and policymakers - were obsessed with foreign policy, particularly their economic dependence on Britain and securing the New World as their exclusive geopolitical sphere. As Mead describes it, foreign policy was not a periodic concern for Americans, but a constant concern, and the various successful ways in which policymakers of that era handled U.S. foreign policy should continue to be a guide for America in the post-Cold War era.
Rating: 
Summary: Special Providence
Review: Very good book for understanding American foreign policy and political culture. The four categories (Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian) are very useful and effective at describing the tensions in American thought. Some parts are slow going (I got tired of reading about missionaries in the Wilsonian chapter) but for the most part enjoyable reading.
Rating:
Summary: Re-evaluating America's Foreign Policy History
Review: Walter Mead's Special Providence belies the historical myth of American foreign policy. Mead challenges the idea that American foreign policy was non-existent or amateurish before World War II. Mead argues and capably supports that the United States has a unique and rich tradition in its dealings in International Relations. Mead asserts that this policy is a product of our American democracy; a form of government that many argue is inferior when dealing in foreign affairs. However as a product of American society, a number of voices and ideals have tempered a policy that has done exceptionally well, judging by our rise to power and status today.
"American foreign policy rests on a balance of contrasting, competing voices and values - it is a symphony - or tries to be, rather than a solo," asserts Mead. Escaping the typical and lacking descriptions of realist versus idealist, Mead illuminates four active voices within America. Each voice is complicated enough that any elaboration I give here will be lacking. However, the names of the schools should give you the idea. The Hamiltonians, Jacksonians, Jeffersonians, and Wilsonians make up the America's collection of competing schools of thought. Mead concedes that the names are not historically accurate. But he makes a strong case, leading the reader to re-evaluate American foreign policy history - providing historical antidotes of each school in action. Mead treats each school with respect and supplies a convincing intellectual argument for each. Special Providence is a delight to read. This paradigm of the four schools provides deeper insight and understanding of American politics in the international arena, and even to a lesser extent on the domestic side. Meads insights are lightly glazed with wit. I found myself laughing out loud numerous times. I recommend this book to anyone with the slighted predilection for international relations or American history.
Rating: 
Summary: Misses the Obvious Leap
Review: Walter Russell Mead in "Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World" attempts to disprove the conventional wisdom on America's foreign policy. The conventional wisdom on this issue is that, prior to World War II, the United States was a neutral, isolationist non-power secure behind the protection of two large oceans. It is generally believed that we did not engage in something that could be described as foreign policy until the advent of the Cold War. Mead, however, contends that the United States has had a vigorous foreign policy ever since the nation's inception. He believes that the myth of what he calls "virtuous isolation" was created by Cold War diplomats to sell regular Americans on the necessity of our struggle against communism. With "Special Providence", Mead hopes to debunk that myth and to spin a new one for a new age. Mead's dissection of American foreign policy history is broken up into four schools, which he names after a person who can be easily identified with each. They are Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian. The Hamiltonian school is concerned primarily with the economic order and with America's economic well being. The Wilsonian school is primarily concerned with exporting America's democratic system and with improving the lives of all the world's peoples. The Jeffersonian school is primarily concerned with the health and stability of America's democracy. Jeffersonians believe that democracy is a fragile creature that must be protected from the dangers of the outside world. The Jacksonian school is primarily concerned with protecting the living standards of the middle class and with issues of honor and defense. Mead admits that this is a simplification of the forces shaping American policy and that few people belong completely to only one school. Mead gives examples beyond the schools' namesakes that immediately have you recognizing the overlap of some of the schools. Mead also analyzes America's foreign policy efforts of the 1990s and uses the decade as an example of what can happen when the four schools are unable to come up with a consensus opinion. The Cold War was one such consensus era with even the isolationist-leaning Jeffersonians accepting the need for a highly engaged America. The 1990s began with the Wilsonians and Hamiltonians ascendant and ended with both schools in retreat. I was generally satisified with Mead's portrayal of each school and his description of how each has affected American foreign policy in its own right over the years. It is an interesting way to look at policy formation and one that is typical of a diversified democracy like America. Mead faltered however in presenting what all this means to America going forward. It may not have been his intention, but some foreign policy design seemed appropriate to go along with the book's discussion. Instead, Mead simply states at the book's conclusion that a reassessment of American foreign policy requires the Jeffersonians to become more active in policy formation. A retrenched and less militarily active America would help ease world fears of a hegemonic America bent on exporting our entire way of life to every corner of the globe. This may be true but what then. Is there some crisis, looming on the horizon, that would necessitate the reassertion of either the Hamiltonian or Wilsonian viewpoint? Is China that crisis, is it international terrorism, or maybe it's the AIDS epidemic running out of control in undeveloped countries. Mead is disappointingly silent on this issue and it damages what is otherwise a well-presented thesis. One other thing that frustrated me while reading this book is Mead's seeming connection of policy success with historical outcomes. He labels the Vietnam War a failure of American foreign policy because we ultimately lost the war. This should not be seen as a foreign policy failure, but rather as a failure of execution. This belief of Mead's, to me, smacks of an "ends justify the means" approach. Just because the outcome is not positive doesn't mean the policy was not justified. And just because the outcome *is* positive doesn't mean the policy is right. Had Hitler managed to conquer Europe, it wouldn't have made his foreign policy any more justifiable.
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