Rating: 
Summary: One Core Idea: Don't Kill Civilians, End Collateral Damage
Review:
I would not normally have bought this book, which started out as an article and should have stayed there. However, it is being touted in Special Operations circles, and in the interest of ensuring that I respect and understand what my uniformed colleagues are reading, I made the effort.First off, the book is *mostly* about how terrorism or scorched earth tactics are not a good idea for states. I agree. However, the book completely misses the point on how effective terrorist attacks are as a means of causing great economic and social pain to industrial era states that persist in pursuing unilateralist Christian crusades as well as immoral capitalism that enriches micro-elites while disenfranchising the bulk of foreign populations. Do the math: for $500 *thousand*, Bin Laden got roughly $500 *billion* in costs to the U.S. taxpayer. He (and his thousands of successors) can keep this up forever, we cannot. There is major aspect of this book that I applaud, and it takes it from 3 to 4 stars: it is the single most effective statement I have seen that denounces U.S. "precision" warfare as not so precision afterall, because of the pre-planned (i.e. pre-meditated and culpable) deaths of tens of thousands of civilians as acceptable "collateral damage." Although "total war" certainly applies to state on state warfare, the author correctly notes that killing civilians is neither beneficial nor acceptable when making war on dictators or terrorists. That has to be "man on man" and America is simply not capable of doing that--the military-industrial complex would cease to exist as we know it if we actually focused on funding ground truth intelligence at the neighborhood level, and the ability to send invisible snake-eater in and out to do justice on the basis of "one man, one bullet," something I have long advocated. The author is conventionally leftist and in harmony with Chalmer Johnson's and other critiques of the misadventures of the Central Intelligence Agency, but I find his critiques uninformed and sophomoric. Although I certainly agree with the author's short listing of CIA's analytical and operational failures over time, as someone who actually understands CIA and the US military better than the author, I have to wave the "CRAP" flag on several of this author's pages as they pertain to intelligence, pages 204 and 260 in particular. The book ends with the observation that terrorism is like slavery, piracy, and genocide in that sufficient action must be taken to stop individual behavior along those lines, and the sensible suggestion that "evangelical Western capitalism must learn greater restraint and respect for other cultures" and that Western governments must eschew "gunboat diplomacy as self-defeating. Golly. The author may understand but does not demonstrate substantive understanding of the degree to which slavery, piracy, and genocide (18 active campaigns right now, a great deal more than the author's "still attempted in some corners of the world") continue to be tolerated by Western governments. There is nothing in this book helpful to crafting a new grand strategy balancing military, diplomatic, intelligence, cultural, and economic initiatives to "close the gap" (see my review of Thomas Barnett on "The Pentagon's New Map." Overall this double-spaced essay with no footnotes strikes me as gross misrepresentation. The bibliography is marginal, especially with respect to both modern terrorism and U.S. intelligence. The author took something he knows about--the history of conventional state military warfare--and dressed it up as being relevant to the Global War on Terror. Yes, but it could have been done in one page. This is a very labor intensive way to get to the obvious point, made much more intelligently by Jonathan Schell in "Unconquerable World": there are not enough guns in the world to quell instability stemming from abusive government rule and immoral capitalism. Tony Zinni sums it up in one line: the faster you introduce food into an area, the more quickly the violence ends.
Rating: 
Summary: Turgid Prose and Poor Research
Review: As the author admits, this book started out as an essay. What he neglects to mention is that he converted it into a book, not by adding new material, but by repeating various combinations and permutations of the original material over and over again. In and off itself this would merely make the book boring. What makes it actively distasteful to me are the glaring historical inaccuracies. To name just three, he displays a minimal understanding of General Grant's tactical and strategic ability, he implies that Winston Churchill was responsible for the sinking of the Lusitania and he quotes a casualty figure of 100,000 for the bombing of Dresden. Any serious historian, or even anyone who followed the David Irving libel suit would know that the true figure was approximately 20,000. The author may well have a valid point in this book, but if so it is obscured by turgid prose and discredited by poor research.
Rating: 
Summary: Focusing on the solution to terrorism
Review: Caleb Carr clearly wrote this book in a hurry after 9/11, while the public was preoccupied on the subject. In his prologue, he ackowledges that most of the ideas espoused come from a 1996 article he wrote for the World Policy Journal.
That being said, the importance of an army avoiding civilian casualties with precision strikes was interestingly prescient, having been written before the Iraq War. The author adds excellent background from ancient military history as well as current political decisions made by Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton.
As the 9/11 Commission has reported recently, our nation needs to refocus its intelligence agencies and possibly restructure them - just as Carr lays out in his overview of the formation and activities of the CIA from WWII to 9/11.
Carr's writing style makes for a quick and interesting read, but much of the detail you would like him to get into gets skipped over as he moves on to the next point. Discussions of Frederick the Great's military policy versus Napoleon's are just touched on, as are the Roman Empire's trouble with the Germanic tribes and the logical consequences of Rome's razing of Carthage. Each history lesson gets short shrift in "Lessons of Terror".
Maybe its because of his focus on the topic, Carr makes his points with the confidence and urgency of a knowledgable preacher, not just as a side-line-sitting academic.
Kudo's to Caleb Carr.
Rating: 
Summary: Intriguing arguments, but poorly argued
Review: Caleb Carr defines terrorism as "warfare deliberately raised against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will to support either leaders or policies that the agents of such violence find objectionable." Such a definition includes, according to Carr, not only Osama bin Laden and Muammar Quaddafi but just about every government and national leader in the history of the world, from the Roman Empire to Franklin Roosevelt and Ariel Sharon. Even if one accepts Carr's all-encompassing definition of terrorism, his book remains remarkably vague in other areas. He never even defines the difference between civilians and the military. (What about police forces? Defense industry personnel? Non-combat support crews? Elected leaders? Cabinet members?) He fails to draw the line between terrorism and "collateral damage," which he mentions only a few times in passing. (Would the difference be in the perpetrator's motives? in the ability to prevent harm to civilians? in perceptions of the victims? in the severity of casualties?) Likewise, he excludes "domestic terrorism" from his discussion, without saying how it is distinguishable from international terrorism. (In which category would one put Aryan Nation, the IRA, the KKK, the contras in Nicaragua, FARC in Colombia? Are Islamic terrorists from Uzbekistan "domestic" before the dissolution of the USSR and "international" afterwards? If so, why does this difference matter?) Carr argues further that warfare against civilians always backfires, that it "has never succeeded"--and this is probably the most controversial and ridiculed argument in the book. In support of this assertion, he must posit some dubious causalities, often taking this form: nations commit terrorism, then they experience violence or war or collapse, therefore terrorism always leads to decline and fall. For example, Carr argues that the Roman sack of Carthage led, hundreds of years later, to "their own eventual downfall," or Sherman's March to the Sea inevitably created the resentment that resulted in home-grown terrorist groups like the KKK. Perhaps a full study could support such dubious theories, but Carr's brief analysis fails to connect the dots. He ignores or dismisses historical episodes that easily undermine his thesis: one might argue that the contras successfully ousted the Sandinista government and suffered little in the way of "backlash." Likewise, he defines the bombing of Hiroshima as a terrorist act yet doesn't in any way show how this atrocity hurt the United States--in either the short term or the long term. More incredibly, Carr canonizes Oliver Cromwell as an early practitioner of "progressive warfare" (limited military action that avoids civilian casualties), but to do so he must avoid mentioning the New Model Army's several sieges that ended in massacres of civilian populations--a practice culminating at Basing House. One could certainly argue that, relatively speaking, Cromwell was quite humane for his time, but by altogether ignoring commonly known evidence, Carr needlessly supplies his opponents with plenty of ammunition. Another basic problem is that "The Lessons of Terror" covers more than two millennia in an essay hardly longer than a novella. Carr abandons detailed substantiation, careful qualification, and causal reasoning in favor of glib overstatement, facile generalization, selective evidence, and--above all--an aura of incontestable authority. Rarely has a historical essay been so peppered with the words "always" and "never," often in italics. Carr seldom bothers to supply supporting evidence or citations for his arguments; instead he tends to rely on his own authority as a "military historian," equally conversant in all periods of human history. On the whole, then, the problem with "The Lessons of Terror" is not its thesis or its suppositions or conclusions, a few of which I agree with (his comments on the CIA are especially on the mark), but that this short book is so sloppily and condescendingly argued.
Rating:
Summary: Is international terrorism war?
Review: Caleb Carr's book is informative and interesting. Of course, he tried to persuade the readers that international terrorism is indeed war and therefore should be answered by war. While he had successfully proven the case that war frequently included terrorism against civilians throughout history, he failed to prove the opposite: terrorism always means war. One example from the book. Carr did not agree with Clausewitz and he cited J.F.C. Fuller's criticism below against Clausewitz to support his view. According to Fuller, Clausewitz "never grasped the true aim of war is peace and not victory." If Fuller who Carr appeared to agree, was right, it is difficult to believe that bin Laden and other like minded terroists have peace and not victory as their true aim.
Rating:
Summary: Insightful
Review: Carr has written an insighful account of the political, economic, and human waste that is terrorism. Carr leads the reader through many historical examples, where occupying powers laid waste to the people they conquered only to receive in kind, many times over. Its a useful preliminary account of what terrorism is, and his advice to stop it is worth great consideration.
Rating:
Summary: Objective and Worthwhile Overview
Review: First: Good quality trade paperback; well-spaced and readable
typeface; useful index and bibliography; sturdy binding. Make
sure you order the Revised And Updated version from 2003. Carr provides much useful information and perspective on the
murderous effect that war has always had on "noncombatants".
Writing clearly (if rather dryly) he describes how such massacres - intentional or otherwise -
have effected the evolution not only of warfare's goals but of mankind's concept
of how to define and therefore somehow limit what war actually is. I found Caleb Carr's effort here extremely valuable. He provides
much perspective. It would be petty to gnaw and nit-pick over some of the specific examples
Carr utilizes in advancing his basic idea. Carr has enough dash to make sure he instigates
both left and right on his way to the finale--good for him.
You will find some of those ideologues fuming in earlier reviews.
Carr displays clear-eyed common sense in his analysis of war's
lack of distinction between soldier and civilian in its consequences and even its strategies.
His comparison of terrorism with slavery and piracy were alone worth the time spent reading. This is a short read but a most worthwhile one. Make up your own mind - just look over the introduction. Carr's objectivity and knowledge of military history will provide you with a valuable and useful primer on the nature of terrorism and how
it relates to war's human nature. He does not offer any convenient explanations or easy solution. I look forward to hearing more from him on this topic.
Rating:
Summary: don't waste your money
Review: If you think the U.S. deserved the 911 attacks, this is the book for you. If you know anything about military history spend your money on something else. This book is PC anti western, anti Christian, and anti America rant.
Rating:
Summary: Fairness of War: Subjective Assessment
Review: In The Lessons of Terror, Caleb Carr artificially separates international terrorism from domestic terrorism. Terrorism does not know borders and has disciples almost everywhere. Carr, however, is right to depict terrorists not as ordinary criminals but as warriors who deliberately target civilians with the purpose of undermining their determination to support either leaders or policies that these warriors oppose. Carr uses historical precedents that aim at showing that terrorism is a spectacularly failed tactic, what is not always true or proves to be correct only a few centuries after the facts. Some victimized civilian populations such as the survivors of Carthage after the Third Punic War, the Amerindians at the end of the 19th century or the civilians of the Axis Powers after WWII had no longer the capacity and/or willingness to retaliate. Other victimized civilian populations such as the direct witnesses of the atrocities of the Roman Empire or Crusaders were long dead before their nemeses were finally defeated. Furthermore, the victors could have shielded their own terrorists from justice because they were perceived as patriots and heroes, not as criminals. In these circumstances, perpetrators of these atrocities against civilians have been answerable for their crimes only after their own death. Unlike Carr, Victor Hanson in Carnage and Culture clearly shows that the real atrocity for the Westerner is not the number of corps, but the manner in which soldiers and civilians died and the protocols under which they were killed. The West believes that only war waged through open and direct assault is fair, regardless of the frightful losses inflicted on the adversary. The West has never accepted the logic of far fewer killed through ambush, terrorism, or the execution of prisoners and noncombatants as the current situation in Iraq convincingly demonstrates. However, Carr has a point that the West has not always practiced what it has been preaching on this subject. The Nazis and their allies come prominently to mind in their systematic disregard of the rules of Western civilization that did not save them from ultimate defeat. Although Carr praises the military campaign that the U.S. launched against Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11, he is very negative in his appraisal of domestic efforts to prevent a repetition of this tragedy. Carr also harshly criticizes the Bush Junior administration for asking Americans to go about their lives and business as usual. Carr apparently does not want to acknowledge that a capitalist, democratic society is by definition an open society that thrives on exchanges within its borders and with the rest of the world. Vigilance and awareness rather than paranoia are required. Otherwise, one plays the game of terrorists and turn one's life into a prison. Interestingly, Carr wrote his book before the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Carr states that fighting terrorism requires at times force against terrorists and the states protecting them, at other times diplomacy conducted with the states that are willing to mend their ways. Ultimately, Carr correctly pushes for the adoption of an international convention that should outlaw terrorism after the model of previous conventions banning for example piracy, slavery and genocide. Carr, however, wrongly downplays the importance of the political dimension of terrorism. No one can vanquish terrorism as long as its breeding ground is not drained. Bombarding a swamp can kill a few mosquitoes, but not their capacity to be born again and haunt their future victims.
Although Carr scores some points in describing some shortcomings of the DOD, the CIA and the NSC, he does not seem to acknowledge the difficulty of their task. Whoever has ever been involved in intelligence gathering and assessment knows that sometimes it can be extremely difficult to get a complete picture of an existing or potential threat. Intelligence is both an art and a science that is just as good as its imperfect human practitioners. Furthermore, the choice of allies sometimes requires association with dirty friends in order to fight dirty enemies. A carrot and stick certification policy is in place to minimize the risk that these dirty friends metamorphose into dirty enemies. In addition, waging war has never been a clean business because of inevitable civilian casualties that are sometimes euphemistically referred as collateral damage. Finally, as Max Boot reminds his readers in Savage Wars of Peace Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, the U.S. military should continue to nurture its different branches with the same care so that it can fight any type of war, including terror against civilians, with equal efficiency.
Rating:
Summary: Fairness of War: Subjective Assessment
Review: In The Lessons of Terror, Caleb Carr artificially separates international terrorism from domestic terrorism. Terrorism does not know borders and has disciples almost everywhere. Carr, however, is right to depict terrorists not as ordinary criminals but as warriors who deliberately target civilians with the purpose of undermining their determination to support either leaders or policies that these warriors oppose. Carr uses historical precedents that aim at showing that terrorism is a spectacularly failed tactic, what is not always true or proves to be correct only a few centuries after the facts. Some victimized civilian populations such as the survivors of Carthage after the Third Punic War, the Amerindians at the end of the 19th century or the civilians of the Axis Powers after WWII had no longer the capacity and/or willingness to retaliate. Other victimized civilian populations such as the direct witnesses of the atrocities of the Roman Empire or Crusaders were long dead before their nemeses were finally defeated. Furthermore, the victors could have shielded their own terrorists from justice because they were perceived as patriots and heroes, not as criminals. In these circumstances, perpetrators of these atrocities against civilians have been answerable for their crimes only after their own death. Unlike Carr, Victor Hanson in Carnage and Culture clearly shows that the real atrocity for the Westerner is not the number of corps, but the manner in which soldiers and civilians died and the protocols under which they were killed. The West believes that only war waged through open and direct assault is fair, regardless of the frightful losses inflicted on the adversary. The West has never accepted the logic of far fewer killed through ambush, terrorism, or the execution of prisoners and noncombatants as the current situation in Iraq convincingly demonstrates. However, Carr has a point that the West has not always practiced what it has been preaching on this subject. The Nazis and their allies come prominently to mind in their systematic disregard of the rules of Western civilization that did not save them from ultimate defeat. Although Carr praises the military campaign that the U.S. launched against Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11, he is very negative in his appraisal of domestic efforts to prevent a repetition of this tragedy. Carr also harshly criticizes the Bush Junior administration for asking Americans to go about their lives and business as usual. Carr apparently does not want to acknowledge that a capitalist, democratic society is by definition an open society that thrives on exchanges within its borders and with the rest of the world. Vigilance and awareness rather than paranoia are required. Otherwise, one plays the game of terrorists and turn one's life into a prison. Interestingly, Carr wrote his book before the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Carr states that fighting terrorism requires at times force against terrorists and the states protecting them, at other times diplomacy conducted with the states that are willing to mend their ways. Ultimately, Carr correctly pushes for the adoption of an international convention that should outlaw terrorism after the model of previous conventions banning for example piracy, slavery and genocide. Carr, however, wrongly downplays the importance of the political dimension of terrorism. No one can vanquish terrorism as long as its breeding ground is not drained. Bombarding a swamp can kill a few mosquitoes, but not their capacity to be born again and haunt their future victims.
Although Carr scores some points in describing some shortcomings of the DOD, the CIA and the NSC, he does not seem to acknowledge the difficulty of their task. Whoever has ever been involved in intelligence gathering and assessment knows that sometimes it can be extremely difficult to get a complete picture of an existing or potential threat. Intelligence is both an art and a science that is just as good as its imperfect human practitioners. Furthermore, the choice of allies sometimes requires association with dirty friends in order to fight dirty enemies. A carrot and stick certification policy is in place to minimize the risk that these dirty friends metamorphose into dirty enemies. In addition, waging war has never been a clean business because of inevitable civilian casualties that are sometimes euphemistically referred as collateral damage. Finally, as Max Boot reminds his readers in Savage Wars of Peace Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, the U.S. military should continue to nurture its different branches with the same care so that it can fight any type of war, including terror against civilians, with equal efficiency.
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