Rating: 
Summary: Enlightening info. pack around weak hypos.
Review: Mr. Carr wades deep in historical accounts, but they fail to provide any support for his insistence that terrorism (war on civilians) never works. If terrorism didn't work, Mr. Carr wouldn't be writing a book about it. If accounts of failures sold well, there'd be lots more books about the Edsel & the Gremlin.
What interested me more was Carr's secondary thesis, that the disastrous Crusades (European Christian zealots trying to recapture the Holy Sepulchre from Moslem zealots) led eventually to the creation of nations & national armies. Whereas "terrorists" were once hired guns of the aristocracy, they were after the 13th century its primary opposition.
However, even the most brilliant propagandist will fail to explain how the US of A became the object of Islamic ire. What's more, Carr & his fellow think tankards obfuscate all reason when they view several Mid-Eastern nations as "Muslims," yet view the Amero-Euro response in terms of nations. Of course, such an absurdist battle has fueled diversionary debates on tolerance for Islam & Muslim-Christian "dialogue." & Although it may be nice to know just when the Wahabibi sect came into existence, it seems lots more relevant to know that when the Wahabibi forbears turned on the West, they had been adequately trained by Americans & conservative, Christian-valued ones @that.
See?, we can all get along ...
Rating: 
Summary: A thoughtful presentation, should be read by everyone
Review: This book, by a trained miliatry historian, lays out a case for the avoidance of terror against civilian populations. It then goes on to define terror in ways I had never considered. Particularly disturbing are several discussions about the consistency with which indiginous military trained by an outside invader turn on that selfsame invader after the invasion is over. ( Sound familiar? Mujahadeen anyone?) The early sections on the tactics of the Roman Empire were quite revealing, particularly given the parallels with modern practice. Well worth the time.
Rating:
Summary: Timely Book Uses History to Dissect the Future of Security
Review: This is a timely book that is well written in the main. It is somewhat marred by the author's absolutism in arguing his main thesis that warfare against civilians (terrorism) is always a losing strategy for the perpetrators. His secondary thesis is that surgical, preemptive strikes have been consistently the most effective way of eliminating terrorist threats (all the more interesting since Carr wrote this book before the Iraq War). Caleb Carr looks at history from Roman times to the current Arab-Israeli conflict to argue that terrorism always loses. Terrorism, or attacks on civilians, differs from guerilla warfare in that guerillas use their irregular forces and tactics to target opposing/occupying military personnel and targets. Terrorists just kill and maim wantonly, under the mistaken belief that carnage and death will force change or lead the terrorists to their goals. The historic evidence is otherwise. Terrorism almost always hardens the hearts and steels the minds of both targets and local populations against the perpetrators and frequently begets terrorism as a response. Carr's examples are many. The Romans struck not the military might of the German tribes across the Rhine, but the villages and peoples thereof. German tribes became ferocious opponents and were the ones who ended up sacking Rome. Michael Collins was on his way to winning independence for all of Ireland. His turn to terrorism stiffened British resolve (leading one British prime minister to state he would not conclude a deal with the IRA because he "would not shake hands with murder.") and undercut his local support. Palestinian terrorism has not shaken the resolve of Israel; it has produced hard line Israeli governments less likely to negotiate Palestinian autonomy or statehood. These are a few of the historic examples Carr cites in support of his argument. While I think he is generally right, he mars his well argued position by stating that warring against civilians and non-military targets always loses. Certainly the American Indian experience shows that wars of annihilation can sometimes (obviously) reduce an opponent to absolute subjugation for the long-term. And while Rome was sacked by the descendants of tribesman who sufferings were legion along the Rhine, several hundred years elapsed from then until Rome's fall. Also, General Sherman's romp through Georgia is referred to several times, but America healed fairly well and fairly quickly after the Civil War. Nevertheless, the author's failed attempt to prove his observation correct in every case does not mar this book's demonstration that his thesis stands up well in most cases. On the contrary, the evidence marshaled by Carr is persuasive and the conclusion convincing. Carr also shows what has worked historically in dealing with perpetrators of terrorism. Preemptive war, surgical strikes, leadership strikes have all proven the most consistently successful means to deal with history's bad actors. The reason is simple. Responding to terrorism with terrorism creates nations of opponents among people who generally want to live in peace and are probably suffering under their terrorist leader, warlord, or ruthless tyrant and would like nothing more than to see that person removed. As Jefferson showed in dismantling the Barbary pirates (at least as a threat against American interests) and President Bush has just shown against Saddam, the surgical strike first articulated by Frederick the Great removes the problem by attacking leadership and military interests without killing so many civilians that a nation of revenge seekers is created. Failing to act preemptively begets larger threats over time. The suffering nation is perceived as weak (terrorists and tyrants look to prey on the weak) and the threat grows. The recent evidence of this progression can be seen in the mid to late 1990's as American embassies, interests, and the USS Cole were progressively attacked by Islamic terrorists who came to believe that America's only response to such outrages would be a few cruise missiles thrown against desert encampments. As unseemly as preemptive war seems to Americans, it is certainly better than the alternative of massive casualties inflicted upon us by those who come to believe they can act with impunity because we are not willing to persecute these threats until they are eliminated. This is an interesting and persuasive book that should be read by every member of Congress as well as all that want to know how to best protect America in this age of terrorism.
| 
